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This thesis analyses the logistics behind the expansion and operations of the Royal Naval
Air Service and the Fleet Air Ann during the two World Wars. The logistics of British
naval aviation has largely been a peripheral topic compared with operational issues. Studies
of aviation during both World Wars are also unusual. The aim is to study this topic largely
through the available original material, both official and unofficial, and thereby to provide a
new focus for the analysis ofnaval aviation.
Both organisations had to expand from a small base under the exigencies of wartime
conditions, in 1914 when aviation was in its infancy and in 1939 just after the Navy had
regained full control over naval aviation.
This thesis will investigate the relationship between naval air logistics and strategy,
national economics, operations and tactics and therefore is organised under five main
themes. Firstly, to examine the naval air expansion programmes, especially in the Second
World War, from which other requirements stemmed. Secondly, to relate naval strategy to
the needs for naval air stations, a topic frequently ignored by many authors who give more
consideration to aircraft carriers. Thirdly, to address how successful was aircraft production
in meeting the requirements laid down in the expansion programmes. Fourthly, the co-
ordination of resources, be they ships or squadrons, for operations and fifthly, from the
tactical perspective the difficulties of maintaining aircraft in the front line. The conclusion
includes an appreciation ofcomparisons between naval aviation during the two World Wars
and a summary of the air logistics of the British Pacific Fleet in 1945 when many earlier
developments came to fruition.
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Chapter 1 -Introduction: Logistics of Naval Air Power
Naval air power - an overview
The history of air power in the Royal Navy (RN) is one of great contrast. Few military
organisations have been on such a rollercoaster ride. A world leader during the First
World War in the use of seaplane carriers, the development of the modem aircraft carrier,
a pioneer of strategic bombing and responsible for large numbers of aircraft in ground
attack and air superiority roles on the Western Front, the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS)
was the senior air service, as the Royal Navy had been the Britain's Senior Service for
centuries. Twenty years later the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) went on to achieve global power
projection capability during the Second World War escorting convoys, striking against
enemy fleet units and land targets, providing fighter cover for fleet operations and an air
umbrella for amphibious landings. The wartime carrier building programme set in motion
in 19421 came to fruition in a powerful carrier force with world class aircraft during the
late 1950s and early 1960s, whilst the cornerstone of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review
was the construction of a new generation of aircraft carriers, the largest vessels in the
history of the Royal Navy, the first to enter service in 2015.
There is a marked disparity with the disjointed organisation of dual control in the
inter-war period and the decade of uncertainty following the cancellation of new carrier
CVA-O 1 in 1966, when the future of naval air power, although not in doubt per se, was
afforded a lower priority and morale in the service was affected accordingly. Even today
the government is giving out mixed signals by deciding to withdraw the Sea Harrier FA2
fighter from service; between 2006-2015 the Royal Navy will be without indigenous
fighter cover for only the second time since the installation of launching platforms aboard
capital ships in the First World War.2 National priorities, to rationalise the air forces in
1918 and withdraw from East of Suez in the 1960s, naturally overrode the purely military
arguments. It took the Fleet Air Arm a considerable time to recover from both episodes
and once again place itself at the forefront of naval operations; largely inevitable from the
purely naval standpoint given that aircraft became a dominating feature of naval power
during the twentieth century. A century on from HMS Dreadnought it is the American
I Aircraft Carriers: Fleet requirements and Board Specifications. Admiralty conference, proposed expansion
ofwartime building programme, comparison ofnaval strengths ofUSA and Japan, 1936-1942, ADM
1/11971, National Archives, Kew. [Further references to National Archives sources will include only
departrnentalletter codes and series numbers]
2 The other occasion being December 1978 - February 1981 between the withdrawal of the Phantoms of892
Squadron aboard HMS Ark Royal and the Harriers of800 Squadron becoming operational on HMS




Nimitz Class aircraft carrier which is now the capital ship with the same requirement for a
huge industrial base to support it.
The overwhelming amount of coverage on naval air power, in common with naval
and military affairs more generally, is afforded to operations. Comparatively little research
has taken place on the creation and maintenance of naval air power during the World
Wars. In both conflicts the air services expanded enormously from a small base and made
great strides in training, equipment, tactics and doctrine under the pressure of wartime
exigencies, especially between 1939-1945 when air power played a far more pivotal role.
At the outbreak of war in 1914 the RNAS possessed between 93-95 land and seaplanes,
six airships, two balloons and 727 personnel? Upon the formation of the Royal Air Force
(RAF) on 1 April 1918 there was a veritable armada 0 f 2,949 aircraft, 111 airships, 200
balloons and 55,066 officers and other ranks." A numerical comparison with the FAA in
World War Two is somewhat superficial, not least because of its significantly different
duties, but it is worth bringing to the reader's attention at an early stage; the seven aircraft
carriers, four naval air stations, 609 aircraft and 5,300 officers and men on the books in
1939 had expanded to 81 carriers, 71 bases, 4024 'planes and 84,000 personnel by August
1945.5 The massive effort in planning, procurement and deployment which changed the
two organisations beyond recognition has tended to take a back seat in lieu of coverage of
operations.
The most widely neglected statistic in the latter set of figures is the dramatic
increase in the number of naval air stations. In the First World War, before the advent of
the true aircraft carrier, almost the entire RNAS was land-based. Even since then, when
aircraft carrying ships and their aircraft have been the cutting edge of the service, and in
Britain the responsibility for land-based maritime air power has rested with Coastal
Command of the RAF since 1918, the whole basis of the air service has rested upon its
facilities ashore required for basic training, the formation and working up of squadrons,
disembarked formations and aircraft maintenance. On returning to port, operational
squadrons fly off to a shore base to rest, reorganise and repair. If operations in a new
theatre were to be entertained, the provision of air stations was essential prior to the
carriers' arrival, although not often possible in wartime to an ideal standard. Fortunately in
the Second World War the assistance afforded by the RAP and other Allied air forces
3 The naval arm of the Royal Flying Corps became the Royal Naval Air Service in July 1914.
4 R.D. Layman, Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influence (London: Chatham
Publishing, 1996), 205.




negated the necessity of a large airfield building programme which would have probably
proved impossible given the shortages of manpower, resources and time. The enormous
effort expended on expanding the FAA into a worldwide organisation was rewarded
before the end of hostilities when it was presented with an opportunity in the Pacific to
demonstrate its full logistic potential which is explored in Chapter 7.
Logistics and the Royal Navy
The Pacific campaign during 19456 was the Royal Navy's only campaign in the
Second World War where the logistics have attracted significant attention, essentially
because the extensive requirement for support afloat - the Fleet Train - made it such an
obvious break with previous British practice," Former Head of the Naval Historical
Branch, David Brown summarised the strategic situation which dictated the Navy's
operating conditions until the last year ofthe war:
'The availability of suitable ports under British, Dominion or Allied control in
the RN's principal theatres of operations and the nature of the war - defensive
up to the end of 1943 and an offensive against accessible areas thereafter -
meant that the relatively short range of British Fleet units was not a major
handicap and there was no immediate requirement to acquire either the expertise
or the specialised equipment needed for at sea replenishment of a modern
Fleet.,8
It is understandable that authors regard the logistic provision in the early war years
as simply a continuation of the system which had largely been in place in the inter-war
era. The lack of interest in logistics is demonstrated by the fact that in the official history
of the naval war against Japan there is no mention of logistic shipping for the Eastern
Fleet's operations in the spring of 1942, although the support ships with the Japanese
Fleet are listed." The only official history solely on British naval logistics, albeit
unpublished, covered the Fleet Train, the navy's support afloat which played a relatively
6 For the Royal Navy: Operation Iceberg, 25 March - 20 April and 1-25 May 1945; July and August
Operations, 17 July- 13 August 1945. For coverage of the operations see ADM 199/590, 199/591 and
199/1478.
7 The discussion here does not encompass amphibious operations which are combined in nature and not
purely naval; the logistics of Operation Overlord and the American island hopping campaign in the Pacific
have both received significant attention.
8 David Brown, ed, The British Pacific and East Indies Fleets: 'The Forgotten Fleets' so" Anniversary
(Liverpool: Brodie Publishing, 1995), 88.




minor role until 1945.10 As David Brown suggests, regarding port facilities, the
continuation of the pre-war logistic support structure was largely true. The one great
exception for the Royal Navy was the FAA, since it was the RAF that remained in control
of all air bases and provided all the maintenance personnel until May 1939.
The major logistic requirements in the Pacific were refuelling and the supply of
aircraft. These receive far greater attention because the failure to deliver sufficient
quantities of both at times threatened to seriously impair the fleet's viability and the
Admiralty was made fully aware of the difficulties encountered in the case of the latter in
the report on the British Pacific Fleet's (BPF's) experience in March 1946: 'Reports
previously forwarded will have made it clear that the lack of air stores came nearer to
causing a complete breakdown in operations than any other single factor.' 11 Operations
were on such a scale that separate commands were established with Rear Admiral Portal,
the Flag Officer Naval Air Pacific (FONAP), based in Melbourne assuming responsibility
for the Navy's air organisation within the theatre; Vice Admiral Charles Daniel, Vice
Admiral Administration (Q), being in overall charge of the Pacific logistics effort. In
effect the organisation in the Pacific was an FAA in miniature and this organisation was
dependent upon support from the Navy's network of air bases worldwide in Britain, the
United States, South Africa and Ceylon which had built up throughout the war. This
example demonstrates the ultimate development of British naval air power during the
World Wars in terms of the size of forces deployed, power projection capability and
ability to sustain operations through a complex system of land bases and support afloat.
Indeed it was through the study of the BPF's air operations that the author first
became aware of the key elements and importance of air logistics.f Because, as
mentioned above, the logistic problems threatened the continuation of the campaign, it is
perhaps the most obvious place to start in an analysis of naval air logistics of the period.
Following the completion of this study it became apparent that little research had been
undertaken on this subject earlier in the Second World War. The air logistics of the BPF
had largely been regarded in isolation, which they clearly were not, rather than as the
result of a series ofdevelopments since 1939.
As indicated by the numerical summary, the events in the Pacific marked the
culmination of a period of rapid wartime expansion for the FAA just as the RNAS had
10 Captain R.F. Leonard, History ofthe Fleet Train, 1936-1945, Naval Historical Branch, Portsmouth
[Further references to the Naval Historical Branch will be referred to as NHB] T1884.
11 Report of the Experience of the British Pacific Fleet, Jan - Aug 1945, Part Il, ADM 199/1457.




experienced between 1914-1918. On both occasions the air organisations started the
conflict at low ebb. At the beginning of the First World War the delivery vehicle, the
aircraft, had been in existence for a little over ten years and integration with the rest of the
navy was in its infancy. The return of the FAA to naval control in May 1939 ended a
period of unprecedented neglect and confusion resulting in the loss of its status as the
world leader in the 1930s, and most crucially the chaotic nature of aircraft construction
and procurement which bedevilled the service until the final year of the war. Without
enormous material assistance from the United States the large-scale expansion ofthe FAA
would have not taken place in wartime at all.
In addition to an analysis of the development of the two naval air organisations, it
is crucial to place the logistics of air power within the context ofthose for the Royal Navy
as a whole. Amidst the literature on the Royal Navy there is a relative dearth of interest in
the logistics, though more material on traditional requirements such as dockyards and
victualling. The operational freedom afforded in the era of the wooden walls, when ships
did not have to refuel enabling them to undertake long blockades, ended with the
introduction of the steam engine. However, the establishment of a worldwide network of
coaling stations, also utilised as communication bases for the undersea telegraph system,
allowed the Royal Navy to achieve a global reach, despite the short ranges of its vessels,
unmatched by any nation: ' ...with the conversion to coal and steam power, a ship's
endurance was once again limited. But they could still carry their ammunition and
supplies farther and faster, and were thus more logistically independent than horse-
powered armies, despite the need for coaling stations.' 13 Before the First World War the
Royal Navy adopted oil as a more convenient and superior method ofpowering its vessels,
although supplies were initially limited. The Royal Navy's logistical prowess was not
matched until the United States Navy's Service Squadrons pioneered extensive support
afloat in the Pacific during the latter years ofthe Second World War.
Logistics literature review
A revival in the historiography of logistics in warfare was heralded by Martin van
Creveld's pioneering work Supplying War in 1977 when he highlighted the unpopularity
of logistic subjects:
"Hundreds of books on strategy and tactics have been written for every one on
logistics, and even the relatively few authors who have bothered to investigate
13 David M. Moore, Jeffrey P. Bradford and Peter D. Antill, Learning from past defence logistics
experience: Is what ispast prologue, (London: RUSI, 2000),4.
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this admittedly unexciting aspect of war have usually done so on the basis of a
few preconceived ideas rather than on a careful examination of the evidence. ,14
While the arguments have moved on somewhat since, many writers still take logistics for
granted and view the 'unexciting aspect' pointed out by van Creveld as a sign that there
will be no market for work in this field. In the history of British naval air power, the
concentration on logistics, mainly in the sense of national economics, shipbuilding and
aircraft production, has been in the inter-war period. There are significant works by Hone,
Friedman and Mandeles, and Geoffrey Till on British naval air logistics examining the
effect dual-control had at all levels of the Fleet Air Arm in the inter-war period." Andrew
Gordon also gave coverage to the problems encountered by the F.A.A. in the field of
aircraft procurement during the period of rearmament. 16 In Airpower and the Royal Navy
1914-1945, Till did cover developments in the Second World War, but on a general level
rather than the detailed decision making process to be examined in Chapter Two.
The most significant American works on naval logistics in the Second World War;
Ballatine's us. Naval Logistics in the Second World War and Carter's Beans, Bullets,
And Black Oil were written by practitioners after the end of the conflict.l They were
reprinted in the late 1990s by the Naval War College at Newport for teaching purposes as
part of their Logistic Leadership Series. The fact that such works were not produced on
the Royal Navy is probably a recognition of the scale of the logistic hurdles faced and
overcome by the United States Navy (USN). Whereas naval logistics had undergone a
revolution for the Americans, that was not the case with the Royal Navy, except for its
Pacific operations in 1945.
Rear Admiral 'Nick' Carter, author of Bullets, Beans and Black Oil, a history of
American naval logistics during the Pacific campaign put the case for logistics in
characteristically blunt fashion: ' ... those interested in naval history may realize that naval
warfare is not all blazing combat.' 18 Indeed since so many authors have ignored the
logistic sphere, for many it may well have come to be regarded as an acceptable norm.
14 Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977),231.
15 Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman and Mark D. Mandeles, American & British Carrier Development
1919-1941 (Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press, 1999); G. Till,Airpower And The Royal Navy 1914-
1945: A Historical Survey (London: Jane's, 1979)
16 Andrew Gordon British Seapower and Procurement between the Wars: A Reappraisal ofRearmament
(London: Macmillan, 1988)
11 Duncan S. Ballantine, u.s. Naval Logistics In The Second World War (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1947; reprint, Newport: Naval War College Press, 1998); Worrall Reed Carter, Beans, Bullets, And
Black Oil: The Story OfFleet Logistics Afloat In The Pacific During World War II. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Print Office, 1953; reprint, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1998)
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Prominent strategist Colin Gray reinforces van Creveld's theory that there is a problem
with 'pre-conceived ideas':
'Military history is full of examples of great adventures which appeared to
triumph over logistical frailty, and other great adventures which were brought to
nought apparently because of those frailties. In short, history yields ever-
arguable 'evidence' in abundance to illustrateany position in argument a scholar
prefers to take.' 19
This trend might be a product of historians knowing the results of campaigns before
selecting their arguments and not researching the logistic aspects as much as they might
and, as already suggested, taking them for granted. John Lynn has argued that van Creveld
was guilty of choosing his evidence to support his theory on the weakness of logistical
planning:
'It would not have been so easy for van Creveld to criticize the foibles of planners
and praise the logistic improvisations of field commanders if he had considered
the successful U.S. central Pacific campaign of 1942-1945, especially when
contrasted with the failure of the German onslaught to defeat the Soviet Union in
1941.,20
Land, sea and air logistics
Further to a general neglect of logistics, most authors on the subject have focussed
upon military rather than naval or air force matters. Since wars are ultimately decided by
land forces this is perhaps not surprising, but Lawrence Freedman espoused a more
fundamental reason: ' ... [although] it is a practical art that must be mastered by navies and
air forces as well, there is something distinctive about logistics in land warfare in that it
requires territory to be held once taken, over an extended period.Y' Moreover, for
centuries military commanders depended for much oftheir supplies upon local resources-
living off the land - as it was more problematic to transport significant quantities of stores
on land than by sea which is still the case today; as Julian Thompson commented: 'What
is also distinctive, and therefore interesting, about logistics in land warfare is that they are.
18 Carter, Beans. Bullets and Black Oil, xxxv.
19 Thomas M. Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance (London: Frank Cass, 2001), ix.
20 John A. Lynn, 'The History of Logistics and Supplying War' in John A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars (San
Francisco: Westview Press, 1993), 14.
21 Julian Thompson, Lifeblood of War: Logistics In Armed Conflict (London: Brasseys, 1991). xvi.
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to put it crudely, more difficult. ,22 Since ships carry the supplies for their crews, the
individual units and the naval organisation as a whole have to possess a greater awareness
of logistic needs; in a similar fashion to desert warfare all of the provisions must be
delivered by the logisticians; there was no prospect of living off the land: 'The need to
carry all requirements from the outset of a voyage meant that logistics at sea reached a
high level of administrative complexity and efficiency long before this was achieved in
land warfare. ,23
The British Maritime Doctrine of the mid 1990s observed the relative ease with
which naval logistics is carried out on a day-to-day basis means the recipients are not as
aware of supply problems as their military counterparts: 'Indeed the sailor is so used to the
level oforganic logistic support that is provided routinely in ship and its tactical formation
that logistic considerations are intrinsic to maritime doctrine. ,24 Since warships have
traditionally been the most complex and costly weapon systems and the dockyards built to
support them were the biggest and technologically advanced industrial complexes, navies
achieved a sophistication long before their land based counterparts; for example the skill
required to command a warship saw the buying of commissions stopped in the navy
centuries before the army and while patronage was still important it was the quality of the
officer which counted above all else. But what has recently applied to authors of military
history, a focus on strategy and tactics, also applied in the case of United States Naval
officers before 1941 according to Vice Admiral George Dyer: ' ...the officers of the Line
of the Navy had taken only a cursory interest in logistics in the years before World War II.
This occurred because... there were few really large difficult logistical problems
demanding command decisions.I'" By the time Duncan Ballantine wrote his volume on
US. Naval Logistics in the Second World War in 1947 and with the experience of that
conflict still fresh, the necessity for training in strategy, tactics and logistics was more
widely understood:
'The persistence of this neglect of logistics bears witness to the long dominance
exercised over naval minds by a too narrow defmition of strategy and tactics ... In
modem times it is a poorly qualified strategist or naval commander who is not
'2 Ibid .
- 1, XVI.
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24 Ministry OfDefence, The Fundamentals ofMaritime Doctrine BR1806 (London: HMSO, 1995),93.




equipped by training and experience to evaluate logistic factors or to superintend
logistic operations. ,26
Levels of logistic provision
An analysis of the different levels of logistic prOVISIon IS crucial for an
understanding of the manner in which the problems of supply were influenced by and
impact upon national strategy, economic planning, operational effectiveness and tactical
manoeuvres. Henry Eccles summarised the wide application of the term: '''Logistics'' is
merely a convenient term used to encompass the problem of controlling all the "means of
war" as appropriate at various levels ofcommand. ,27
Thomas Kane has argued that since many authors have concentrated upon one of
these areas, the logistic debate as a whole has tended to lack a core focus: 'Although most
commentators lament what they see as an absence of interest in logistics, a review of the
relevant literature reveals not so much a dearth of material as a lack of direction. ,28 Kane
regards the impact of logistics on strategy as of key importance and believes it is in the
strategic freedom that is conferred on the commander by logistic superiority, which is
where the real significance of the supply conundrum lies, rather than on the battlefield
itself as authors such as van Creveld have espoused. In his only chapter concerned with
naval warfare, the American campaign in the Pacific during the Second World War, Kane
noted that American logistics enabled an early counterattack to nullify Japanese tactical
advantages and Allied industrial strength could be brought to bear upon the Japanese at
any point in their defensive system through the flexibility afforded by amphibious and
carrier task forces supported by an enormous organisation of shore bases and supply
vessels.f Kenneth Macksey was in full agreement with this view: ' ...the Japanese were
confronted by an enemy with an immensely superior logistic strategy and capability, such
as they had never contemplated when setting up their perimeter defences ... ,30 The
problem with Kane's argument is that to concentrate just on the relationship between
strategy and logistics is to miss the linkage to the other facets of logistics; national
economics, operations and tactics. For example Britain's Far Eastern strategy during the
Second World War demanded that large naval air forces should be established in the
Indian Ocean, but was hindered by the lack of resources to build the necessary bases and
26 Ballantine, u.s. Naval Logistics in the Second World War, 5.
27 Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense, Logistics In The National Defense (Harrisburg:
Stackpole, 1959; reprint, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1997). 10.
28 Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, 2.
29 Ibid, 69.
30 Macksey, For Want ofa Nail, 139.
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supply the carriers and aircraft. Anyway a large proportion of the available resources were
diverted operationally to the Mediterranean and as Admiral Somerville recognised in early
1942, tactically the numbers and types of aircraft in the fleet were wholly inadequate for
fighting the Japanese.
Bearing in mind that both world wars are under consideration, it is a key question
how the chronology and the levels of logistics can be successfully entwined. It is intended
that the experiences ofthe air services during the two world wars will be compared within
five major themes. Firstly, to examine the naval air expansion programmes, especially in
the Second World War, from which other requirements stemmed. Secondly, to relate naval
strategy to the needs for naval air stations. Thirdly, to address how successful aircraft
production was in meeting the requirements laid down in the expansion programmes.
Fourthly, the co-ordination of resources, be they ships or squadrons for operations and
fifthly, from the tactical perspective the difficulties of maintaining aircraft in the front line.
The final chapter includes a summary of the air logistics of the BPF in 1945 when many
earlier developments came to fruition and an appreciation of the comparisons between
naval aviation during the two World Wars.
Air logistics and strategy
Strategy was important at two levels, naval strategy which dictated the naval air
expansion programmes and national strategy which dictated where the navy would have to
fight. The expansion programmes were subject to economic limitations as Henry Eccles
explained: 'In tenus of general principles ...economic capabilities limit the combat forces
which can be created. At the same time, logistic capabilities limit the forces which can be
employed in combat operations. Thus, it is obvious that economic-logistic factors limit
strategy.v" Planning at national level was especially fraught due to its inter-Allied nature.
Each country would draw up a list of possible operations many of which were then
cancelled at Allied conferences; in Grave of a Dozen Schemes, Ned Willmott recounted
the 'Alice-in-Wonderland' characteristics which applied to much British planning in the
Far East between 1943-1945. 32 John Ehrman's volume on Grand Strategy from the same
period identified the lack of shipping as the key strategic arbiter:
'As recently as May 1943, the highest British authorities had concentrated
specifically on shipping as the most pressing limit on strategy. It was at that time,
3\ Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense, 41.
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to the Prime Minister, "the measure of all our operations"; to the C.I.G.S., "the
stranglehold on all our operations"; while to the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty,
it "will, and does indeed already restrict our whole offensive strategy.">"
In the spnng of 1938 an Admiralty Committee considering the possible logistic
requirements of the Eastern Fleet, excluding oilers and not mentioning the FAA.
recommended that a total of seventy-two repair and supply ships would be needed.i" It
was unsurprising, therefore, that: 'By 1941. ..when the Eastern War began, the shipping
situation did not permit ofmore than a fractional implementation of the recommendations
for such a war and all requirements had to be restated of their merits as they arose. ,35 The
need to prioritise British shipbuilding capacity most directly affected the FAA in the need
to delay the completion the Fleet Carriers Indefatigable and Implacable until 1944, despite
a shortage of carriers caused by early losses. The FAA required a relatively small number
of specialist ships for logistic support, the repair and maintenance ofaircraft, but only one-
third were in service by the end ofthe war.
Norman Friedman's British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and their
Aircraft provides unsurpassed coverage of the carrier programmes throughout both world
wars and the inter-war years." The only criticism, perhaps churlish given the level of
detail that Friedman affords, is that he does not use many footnotes to indicate which of
the sources, from the extensive list in the bibliography, are related to the text. It is
necessary to cover the carrier programme in some detail in the following chapter as this
formed the basis for the air expansion programme and therefore aircraft production
requirements. For carrier development during World War I, there is also useful coverage
in David K. Brown's Grand Fleet, R.D. Layman's Before the Aircraft Carrier and P.M.
Rippon's Evolution of Engineering in the Royal Navy, Volume 1.37 For details of the
carriers and the specifications of individual vessels there can be no better reference work
than David Hobbs' Aircraft Carriers ofthe Royal and Commonwealth Navies. 38
32 H.P. Willmott, Grave ofa Dozen Schemes: British Naval Planning and the War against Japan, 1943-1945
(London: Airlife Publishing, 1996)
33 John Ehrman, Grand Strategy Volume V August 1943 -September1944 London: HMSO, 1956) 26-27.
34 Captain R.F. Leonard, History ofthe Fleet Train, NHB T1884, 2.
35 Ibid, 3
36 Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution ofthe Ships and their Aircraft (London:
Conway Maritime Press, 1988).
37 David K. Brown, The Grand Fleet: Warship Design and Development 1906-1922 (London: Chatham
Publishing, 1999); R.D. Layman, Before the Aircraft Carrier, The Development ofAviation Vessels 1849-
1922 (London: Conway Maritime Press. 1989),33-81; Commander P.M. Rippon. Evolution ofEngineering
in the Royal Navy, Volume 1: 1827-1939 (Tunbridge Wells: Spellmount Ltd. 1988), 185-194.
38 David Hobbs, Aircraft Carriers ofthe Royal and Commonwealth Navies: The Complete Illustrated
Emyclopediafrom World War I to the Present. London: Greenhill Books, 1996.
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What remains outside Friedman's extensive remit IS the need for naval arr
stations, an essential requirement not only for training, but supporting operations
worldwide. The manner in which the vital contribution played by airfields as the key
basing requirement for naval air power has been largely ignored has already been raised
in this paper. Aircraft are the only naval weapon system with a separate basing
requirement; the Royal Navy's great industrial complexes of Chatham, Portsmouth and
Plymouth which for centuries maintained ships from wooden walled Ships-ofthe-Line to
nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines are largely irrelevant when it comes to
maintaining aircraft. This limitation was similarly applicable to the facilities around the
world including Bermuda, Gibraltar, Malta and Singapore. Jon Sumida highlighted the
British complexes as the basis of naval logistics in 1914: 'The navy, which was the
world's largest, depended upon an extensive complex of steel works, engmeenng
workshops, ordnance foundries, and dockyards for the manufacture, repair, and
maintenance of its ships and associated equipment.t " The carriers themselves, of course,
required the same repair and maintenance facilities, plus victualling, ammunition, stores
and personnel requirements but also needed the facilities for the aircraft. Kenneth
Macksey noted the shifting priorities during World War One:
, ...by mid-l9l5 air warfare was beginning to absorb a significant slice of the
logistic cake as its capabilities were extended from simple reconnaissance to a
wide variety of roles at sea and over land... Behind every front a complex of
airfields, headquarters, anti-aircraft artillery, communication networks,
maintenance and repair depots sprang up and was imposed upon the traditional
logistic services - to raise further the demand for skilled, high grade personnel in
competition with the other combat arms and services.t"
National policy, in the form of the dual control arrangement since 1918, resulted in
serious logistical consequences for the Fleet Air Arm in 1939 as it possessed few shore
facilities in the United Kingdom and none abroad at all. There was little that could be done
immediately to improve the situation overseas because of the lack of resources and the
need to build up a firm base in Britain. Vice Admiral Tom Phillips, the Vice Chief of the
Naval Staff, recognised the crucial importance of an air station network during discussions
on the defence of Singapore in November 1940:
39 Jon Sumida, 'Forging the Trident, British Naval Industrial Logistics 1914-1918', in John A. Lynn. ed.,
Feeding Mars (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1993),217.
39 Kane, Military Logistics and Strategic Performance, 2.
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'Sea power depends on adequate bases and facilities all the world over. For
surface ships that has been the policy for generations, and the development of air
power in the present generation likewise depends upon the facilities to give the
Air Forces the necessarymobility.r"
More than five years later, in his letter accompanying a report on the hitherto unique
experience ofthe BPF, Admiral Bruce Fraser came to very much the same conclusion:
'In ocean warfare, where ships do long spells away from their main bases, it is
essential that adequate shore air facilities are available to accommodate
disembarked Carrier Air Groups... We are accustomed in the Navy to fmd
docking and repair facilities for ships at mainbases; shore air accommodation for
Carrier Air Groups from the carriers is just as much as part of the base as are the
other facilities. ,42
It is fascinating that Fraser, Britain's most senior sea-going admiral at the end of the war,
felt the need to restate the basic requirements of a cornerstone of the Service, although as
highlighted earlier in this chapter the navy's Pacific operations brought air requirements to
a new level. The ability to construct air facilities abroad at short notice was not achieved at
any time in the war primarily due to the lack of construction personnel. It was planned to
allocate 3000 Royal Marines Engineers to the Pacific in the summer of 1945,43 but the
Mobile Naval Air Bases upon which Fraser's forces depended were based at airfields
loaned by the Royal Australian Air Force and the USN. It was a constant struggle to
obtain airfields from the Air Ministry, United States Navy, Australian and South African
Air Forces and other Allied nations because ofthe FAA's meagre indigenous resources.
It was vital that the various logistic aspects were co-ordinated to position naval air
squadrons with the right types of aircraft, either land-based or ship-borne, to carry out the
requirements demanded of them as part of the wider strategic plan. However, as Hone,
Friedman & Mandeles concluded in the case of the United States Navy: ' ... improvements
in carrier defenses, added to an increase in the number of large, fast carriers, did not
produce a weapon with strategic impact.T" For the long and sustained operations in the
Pacific, the network of air bases and support ships was essential to maintain the American
40 Macksey, For Want ofa Nail, 73.
41 Memorandum by Air Branch on meeting to be held on 'Naval Air Requirements in Singapore area', 10
November 1940, ADM 1/11850.
42 Report ofExperience ofBPF, Jan to Aug 1945, Part II, ADM 199/1457.
43 Monthly report 'State ofFleet Air Arm' by Air Branch, Jun 1945, ADM 116/5534.
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Carrier Task Forces in action. On the grand strategy scale, Duncan Ballantine observed
that Operation 'Overlord' and the assault on the Marianas Islands only nine days apart:
'The launching of a full scale offensive in all theatres of war in 1944 brought the
accompanying logistic effort into its mature phase, a phase in which three dominant
factors - distance, magnitude and uncertainty - conditioned the character of logistic
effort. ,45 Such co-ordination could only be achieved by settled plans and huge logistic
support to maintain them, especially in this case where two amphibious operations were
being launched. Keeping the initiative was necessary for achieving the former and in the
early years ofthe war this had proved impossible when Axis forces had the upper hand."
Air logistics and national economics
Given the small size of the air organisations at the beginning of the World Wars,
the allocation of adequate resources within the national economy strategy was vital,
probably more so between 1939-1945 when air power was considerably more important
as the Norwegian campaign in the spring of 1940 amply demonstrated.l Duncan
Ballantine clearly saw the significance of national economy in military potential: 'As the
link between the war front and the home front the logistic process is at once the military
element in the nation's economy and the economic element in its military operations. ,48
Henry Eccles succinctly captured this view: 'Logistics is the bridge between our national
economy and the actual operations ofour combat forces in the field.,49 The supply system
at national economic level in wartime was a fundamentally different environment as
Ballantine pointed out: 'The logistic process in total war must operate in an economy
saturated by demand, in which the ordinary laws of the marketplace are in suspension, in
which the factor of time supercedes price and the greatest evil is to have "too little, too
I t ,,, 50a e .
The allocations for the RNAS or the FAA cannot be viewed in isolation, but as an
element of the Senior Service as a whole. Within the context of national strategy and
economy there will always be fierce competition for finance, resources and manpower
between the three Services. A study of naval air logistics offers a unique opportunity for
the analysis of both navy and air force logistics, especially since the RAP became the
44 Hone, Friedman and Mandeles, American & British Carrier Development, 69-70.
45 Ballantine, US Naval Logistics in the Second World War, 169.
46 Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943 (Washington:
Department of the Army, 1955),212.
47 For coverage of the Norwegian Campaign see Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 11-29.
48 Ballantine, u.s. Naval Logistics in the Second World War, 3.
49 Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense, 10.
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senior air service at the end of the First World War and has remained so ever since. This
link was more important for the Royal Navy than, for example, the USN, given the dual
control of the FAA in the inter-war years. Even between 1939-1945 in the realms of
aircraft production, maintenance, storage and distribution the Ministry of Aircraft
Production and the RAF were key players in the navy's ability to field an effective force.
The major economic air requirements were ship building and aircraft production.
Geographically these activities were widely dispersed, especially during the Second World
War when the enormous resources of the United States, uninterrupted by dislocation of
war, were brought to bear with great benefit for the entire Allied war effort: 'In 1943 the
British Navy received ...26 auxiliary aircraft carriers and 72 destroyer escorts and
frigates ... In addition there were numerous minesweepers, smaller anti-submarine vessels,
tugs and landing craft... ,51 As Julian Thompson observed, it was an era when the only
restriction on production was economic capacity:
'Technology had not yet progressedto the stage where equipment was so complex
and expensive that cost was a limitation on the numbers that could be produced.
The quantity of tanks, guns and aircraft that a nation could produce were a factor
of the state of its industry, coupledwith its access to raw materials. ,52
The FAA benefited from the USA materially to the tune of thirty-eight Cvfis, one Air
Stores Issuing Ship, 6600 aircraft with spares and the training facilities for a large number
of squadrons. The official history on the use ofmerchant shipping in the war noted that the
need to undertake training overseas placed an additional burden on transportation
resources:
'In this country, where space and safety were hard to find, it was impossible to
train air-crews in sufficient numbers. They had to be sent to Canada and other
Commonwealth countries, and later to the United States, and brought home when
their training was finished. These instances... illustrate the demand for passenger
accommodation that must arise when an empire scattered over four continents
attempts to mobilise and co-ordinate its resources... ,53
50 Ballantine, Us. Naval Logistics in the Second World War, 8.
51 Duncan H. Hall and c.c. Wrigley, Studies ofOverseas Supply (London: HMSO, 1956),36.
52 Thompson, Lifeblood of War, 101.
53 C.B.A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping And Demands OfWar (London: HMSO, 1955), 219.
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However, the cost of aircraft spares alone supplied from the USA amounted to $200
million. It is impossible to emphasise how different the FAA's wartime experience would
have been without the support ofthe United States Navy.
This profligate production capability compared extremely favourably with the
most controversial failure of Britain's economy for the FAA in the field of naval aircraft
production. A combination of complex specifications, outdated designs, long
development periods and small production capacity caused serious tensions between the
navy and the Ministry of Aircraft Production, which co-ordinated the air requirements of
the RAF and the FAA. At times there were no naval fighters in production in Britain and
the reaction of aircrews upon receiving Royal Air Force cast-offs which had already been
shot down in the Battle of Britain can only be imagined. In the First World War the
RNAS was very much an integral part of the Senior Service and was able to take
advantage of the navy's technological superiority and procurement organisation.
Comparisons have been made with the neglect of merchant ship construction in the First
World War in favour of warships and the neglect of naval aircraft in the Second; the
official history on the Administration of War Production between 1939-1945 noted the
simmering atmosphere within which naval aircraft production took place:
' ... emotions engendered by the rough-handling of merchant ship-building in the
first war had had twenty years to die down... whereas the controversy over
naval aircraft had continued at fever heat. At least from that point of view,
indeed, the closer parallel would seem to be the one... between the twentieth-
century problem of naval aircraft and the nineteenth century one of naval
ordnance. ,54
Air logistics and operations
The impossibility of producing a coherent strategy under enemy pressure in the
early years of the Second World War meant that many operations were somewhat ad hoc
rather than planned. Like the navy as a whole and many other elements of the British
armed forces, units of the FAA were ordered into action at short notice. The small size of
the FAA at the beginning of hostilities was exacerbated by the loss of Courageous and
Glorious, two of the four major fleet units, and personnel were stretched to the limit on
operations and squadrons stripped of experienced crew to man new training units as
responsibilities were taken over from the RAF. Even in the case of the BPF in 1945 Ned
54 J.D. Scott and Richard Hughes, The Administration OfWar Production (London: HMSO, 1955), 157-158.
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Willmott observed that aircraft losses had a greater impact than those of the Americans
since the BPF's carrier groups constituted a higher proportion of the overall air
establishment in the theatre than those of the USN.55 In the early war years a high
proportion of the overall strength was operating in the First Line squadrons. During the
First World War the RNAS was not stretched operationally until 1917 when it was forced
to expand a number ofits key roles simultaneously.
Admiral Raymond Spruance who commanded the U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Pacific
noted: 'If the necessary minimum of logistic support cannot be given to the combatant
forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.' 56 The
British Admiralty Supply Representative in Washington defined what the operational
commander required in logistic terms in July 1943:
' ...all material preparations which are necessary to ensure the Commander can
carry out his plan ... includes repair, maintenance, docking, supply of weapons,
protective devices, ammunition, materials, fuel, victualling, stores used by the
Navy whether ashore or afloat & craft for service in the Fleet.,57
The movement of logistic resources into theatre to carry out the strategic plan was
naturally a prerequisite to successful sustained operations. The Americans became mobile
in the Pacific through a combination of Service Squadrons afloat and shore bases swiftly
brought into action by Construction Battalions: 'The coming of the fleet train and
underway replenishment techniques from oilers and stores ships in the Second World War
endowed navies with as great endurance as in Nelson's time; except that his ships could
stay at sea for years, with longer intervals between dockyard maintenance periods than
d hi ,58mo em wars IpS.
The FAA depended upon merchant ships, flight delivery and later Escort Carriers
(CYEs) operating in the ferry role to supply its aircraft around the world. Merchant ships
carried crated aircraft but usually only in small numbers per ship and these required
complex reassembly facilities at their destination. As the quantity of aircraft rose,
especially from the United States, more CYEs were employed in this role provoking
argument over the navy's priorities. It was not until the advent of the YSTOL jet and the
55 Willmott, Grave ofa Dozen Schemes, 141.
56 Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 4: Naval Logistics (Washington: Department of the
Navy, 2001),33.
57 Memorandum by British Admiralty Supply Representative, USA, to Deputy First Sea Lord, 7 Jul 1943,
ADM 1/13169.
58 Thompson, Lifeblood ofWar, 17.
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helicopter that the problem of transporting aircraft reinforcements and the use of
specialist shipping, usually carriers, proved unnecessary.
In the post-war era, an excellent example ofthe mobility of naval power compared
with the static nature of land-based air power was provided by HMS Eagle's sixty day
patrol offBeira at short notice in 1966. Ironically it occurred shortly after the cancellation
of new carrier CVA-01 and the government's acceptance of the RAF's island base
strategy in the Indian Ocean. The navy's superior agility was reported with obvious
satisfaction by the Flag Officer Middle East:
'The cover of the approaches to Beira provided by aircraft from HMS Eagle was
excellent throughout her longpatrol. This, and the speed with which the operation
was mounted, provided an excellent demonstration of the flexibility and
effectiveness of naval air power. The delays and frustrations still being suffered
by the Royal Air Force in obtaining clearance to fly from Majunga provided an
alarming contrast, and give rise to sober reflection on the situation which will
arise in the mid-1970s.,59
It was in the operational theatre where the efforts of the production facilities, training
bases and transportation system were brought together by operational units into coherent
system: 'Strategy and tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of military operations;
logistics provides the means therefore. ,60 The final hurdle to be surmounted was the
maintenance ofaircraft in serviceable condition on a day-to-day basis.
Air logistics and tactics
Tactically, the means of maintaining aircraft at their operational base, be afloat or
ashore was the major requirement. As David Hobbs noted: 'Aircraft carriers are unusual
warships in that they support weapons systems more technically complex than the ships
themselves.l'" This is clear from the crew composition of the crew of one of today's
Invincible class carriers, 366 personnel in the Carrier Air Group as opposed to a ship's
company of 686. Aboard the American Nimitz Class carriers, 43% of the crew were
devoted to air operations - a 2480 strong Air Group compared with a ship's crew of 3200
- demonstrating the economies of scale compared with the 340/0 of an Invincible. The
majority of the air personnel are for maintenance rather than flying duties. The high level
59 Report No.314/176/LEMl12 by Flag Officer Middle East, 6 Jun 1966, ADM 355/35.
60 Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense, 19.
61 Hobbs, Aircraft Carriers ofthe British and Commonwealth Navies, 16.
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of training required by maintenance personnel dates back to the First World War when in
many cases they were much better qualified than pilots.
While the percentages of FAA aircrew in the inter-war period from the RN or RAF
tend to be widely quoted, the fact that all of the maintenance personnel were from the
RAF is largely forgotten and does not appear to have been a controversial issue. Thus
while there was a lack of senior naval officers with air experience, there were very few at
any level with air maintenance experience.
The differing environments presented various logistical challenges. Aboard ships
in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Arctic and Far East aircraft engaged in a multitude of
operations including convoy escort, combat air patrols, anti-submarine, ship strike and
reconnaissance. Bases in the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, the Middle
East and Far East afforded facilities for aircrew training, working up, disembarked
squadrons and operational sorties. FAA squadrons assumed Coastal Command duties in
the waters around Britain and flew from numerous airfields in the Mediterranean. It is
interesting to analyse how the maintenance crews coped in a multitude of largely
inhospitable conditions.
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the significance of logistics in military affairs, how
the different levels of logistic provision are inter-related and the unique requirements of
air logistics compared with those for the rest of the Senior Service. The rest of this study
aims to study the growth of two organisations - the RNAS and FAA - under wartime
conditions in the fields of planning, procurement, co-ordination of resources and
maintenance. Through the focus upon logistics a new interpretation should emerge of the
history of British naval air power, complementary to those authors who have analysed
operations, but failed to explore the logistic background.
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Chapter 2 - Strategy and Naval Air Requirements
Overview
The aim of this chapter is to outline the major strategic decisions which influenced the
expansion of British naval aviation during both World Wars and the naval air expansion
programmes that resulted. Future chapters will examine how successfully these expansion
plans were met in the spheres of air bases and aircraft production. Both air forces had to
expand from a small base at outbreak of war that was more significant for the FAA, given
the greater importance 0 f naval aviation in 1939.
The expansion programmes differed in a number ofways. In 1939 the growth ofthe
FAA was largely pre-determined. Planning for naval air expansion had proceeded
throughout the 1930's with orders for the illustrious Class carriers, which defined pre-war
naval air policy, beginning in 1936. The requirement for trade protection, the major
addition to FAA strength during the Second World War was appreciated, but resources
were not sufficient to build ships for work in fleet and trade roles. A four year aircraft
expansion programme was drawn up in 1938 and one of a similar time span in 1942, with
their major facets, the carriers and aircraft being familiar entities.
This was hardly possible for the RNAS and no overall establishment for the
organisation was laid down until 1916; given the changing operational tasks and rapid
technological changes in engines, airframes and weaporuy any pre-war plans would have
been rendered swiftly obsolete. Technological developments resulted in large numbers of
aircraft types. In fact the long-term plans in the Second World War, perhaps unsurprisingly,
proved highly susceptible to fluctuating wartime conditions and the vagaries of production
capacity. The largest increase in FAA strength came from America, a source of production
that could not have been foreseen. Indeed the American contribution enabled the FAA to
attain a size that could not otherwise have been achieved and was unsustainable without
continued US support.
However since the demarcation line between the duties of the RNAS and RFC had
not been clearly defined and with aviation in its infancy, the RNAS was able to proceed
with an almost uncontrolled expansion making use of the Navy's long standing links with
industry to produce the most effective aircraft. This contrasted with the FAA's strictly
defined role and limited manufacturing capacity controlled by the Ministry of Aircraft
Production from 1940 and dominated by the RAF. During the First World War the majority
of naval air power was land-based as opposed to carrier-based forces between 1939-1945
when the number of carriers largely dictated air requirements. Secondly, there was a
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marked contrast between the use of aeroplanes, seaplanes, airships and kite balloons in the
Great War and the concentration on wheeled aeroplanes from the 1920s. Expansion
programmes for aircraft in the First World War largely encompassed aeroplanes, seaplanes
and their engines, the production facilities for airships and kite balloons being separate.
The complexity of aircraft in the 1940s meant the FAA had to operate with types
under consideration at the beginning ofhostilities or those adapted from RAP designs. The
RNAS operated a rapidly developing array ofaircraft and airships with much shorter design
periods. In the First World War the design and performance of naval aircraft was similar to
that for RFC aircraft, in many cases because they used the same types, the RNAS being as
much engaged in shore-based tasks as purely naval ones. With aviation in its infancy
between 1914-1918 the RNAS also engaged in the whole spectrum of air operations and
much more besides with an anti-aircraft corps,' armoured cars,2 and even armoured trains.'
Strategic decisions, either governmental or naval, contributed to expansion plans, either in
size or types of forces required. Several factors influenced the changes of expansion plans
including requirements of national strategy, operational naval experience, and
improvements in technology and production capacity.
RNAS strategy and naval air requirements
Naval air expansion programmes
The sources for the RNAS do not allow such a systematic examination of the naval aircraft
expansion programmes as that for the FAA in the Second World War. It is especially
difficult to determine the target date for many programmes in the early years of the war to
judge their success. This can partially be explained by the difficulty of laying down large-
scale programmes given the new nature of the material, relatively unknown manufacturing
capacities and rapidly changing technological background. The First Lord's fortnightly
returns for the RNAS detailing the aircraft in commission, anticipated deliveries for the
next two weeks and the remaining orders for each type began on 15 February 1916.4 The
Admiralty Intelligence Division's Quarterly Returns for War Vessels and Aircraft listing
the aircraft in commission and on order did not start until July 1916.5 It is also problematic
because many aircraft and airships were allocated to air stations with no specified
establishment and there was no official size for squadrons until 1916. Unlike in the Second
1 Report on Anti-aircraft Section ofAir Department, 1915, ADM 1/8418/100.
2 Armoured car force ofRNAS, 1915, ADM 1/8418/99.
3 Reports on operations of armed trains, 1914-1915, AIR 1/2099/207/20n.
4 First Lord's RNAS fortnightly returns, 15 Feb 1916 - 31 Dec 1917, AIR 1/150/15/113/1-3.
5 Naval Intelligence Division, Admiralty, War Vessels and Aircraft (British and Foreign) Quarterly Returns.
Jul1916 - Apr 1918, NHB.
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World War there was no defining gauge for expansion. The number of carriers dictated
much ofthe rest ofthe programme between 1937-1945.
The aircraft programme in December 1914 highlighted the orders smce the
outbreak of war; 300 aeroplanes, 96 seaplanes, 8 special seaplanes and 14 Atlantic
seaplanes plus the seaplane carrier Campania." As early as April 1915 Churchill, the First
Lord, made the first pronouncement on large scale aircraft requirements: 'Every effort
should be made to reach 1,000 aeroplanes and 300 seaplanes as early as possible before the
end of the present year. 400 pilots will be required, and all arrangements should be made to
procure and train them.'7 However this was never a realistic proposition as Rear-Admiral
Vaughan-Lee, Director ofAir Services (DAS), noted a year later:
'No defmite scheme of allocation for Aeroplanes and Seaplanes at home and
abroad has existed up to now. The only scheme worked to has been that of the
late First Lord, who decided that the Establishment of the Royal Naval Air
Service should be 1,000 Aeroplanes and 300 Seaplanes. This Establishment has
longbeen recognised as being unworkable."
Between July 1916 - April 1917, when detailed figures are available from the Intelligence
Division's Quarterly Returns, the number of aeroplanes in commission and on order
comfortably exceeded the corresponding figures for seaplanes. In April 1917 there were
1403 aeroplanes in all roles and 1256 on order with only 393 and 759 seaplanes
respectively. The quantity of 'seaplanes' on order rose dramatically to 1221 in July 1917
and 1440 in April 1918 when the number of seaplanes in service had also more than
doubled to 823. However much of the latter increase, 215, was due to the introduction of
wheeled fighters and reconnaissance aircraft on capital ships, which were counted as
seaplanes, that term being given to aircraft operating in close proximity to the fleet, rather
than simply aircraft with floats."
One of the few documents to give a comprehensive long-term summary is a minute
simply signed 'Wing Commander RN' dated 27 February 1917. It details the anticipated
and actual deliveries between June 1916 and January 1917:
6 Extracts from Admiralty Memorandum for Cabinet, 9 Dec 1914,Doc. No.57, in S.W.Roskill, ed,
Documents Relating to the Naval Service, Volume I 1908-1918 (London: Navy Records Society, 1969), 185-
186.
7 Minute to War Council by Mr Churchill, First Lord, 3 Apr 1915, Doc. No.65, in Roskill, Documents
Relating, 200-201.
8 Minute by DAS, 15 Mar 1916, ADM 1/8449/39A.
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Table 1. Anticipated and actual deliveries of aircraft and engines, June 1916 - January 191710
Engines Aeroplanes Seaplanes
Period Anticipated Deliveries Deliveries Anticipated Deliveries Anticipated Deliveries
deliveries Ex Army Ex- deliveries Ex deliveries Ex
Admiralty Admiralty Admiralty
contracts contracts contracts
1916 197 13 141 113 121 65 41
Jun
Jul 356 14 272 109 129 44 41
Aug 319 15 232 119 149 42 48
Sep 349 21 188 135 111 48 14
Oct 294 2 182 135 107 47 14
Nov 381 10 244 148 115 56 17
Dec 544 5 301 152 113 41 18
1917 395 415 136 149 33 11
Jan
Total 2835 80 1975 1047 994 376 204
(-780) (-53) (-172)
This shows that while aeroplane production was only 5% short of orders, seaplane
production was 46% short and engine production 31% less than specified. Between
February - July 1917 aircraft deliveries for the RNAS' s training requirements alone totalled
90 aeroplanes per month comprising five Maurice Farman Shorthorns, twenty Maurice
Farman Longhorns, thirty Avro Type 179s, twenty BE2Cs or 2Es and fifteen Sopwith Pups.
A possible increase of twenty-five per cent was earmarked for July 1917.11
There was pressure for more accurate aircraft estimates in 1917 as production for
both the RFC and RNAS was co-ordinated by the Ministry of Munitions and therefore had
to be thoroughly justified for the allocation of resources. For example it was calculated that
for seaplane bases in Channel12 to maintain three patrols a day with two aircraft each would
need eighteen aircraft to guarantee availability: 'This represents 396 seaplanes in
commission in the Channel; assuming the life of a seaplane as averaging four months in the
Channel, this would require 1,188 seaplanes by the end of the year.' 13 The Director of Air
Equipment estimated on 5 February 1917 between 1500 and 2000 machines were required
9 Naval Intelligence Division, Quarterly Returns, Jul1916 - Apr 1918, NHB.
10 Minute by Wing Commander RN, 27 Feb 1917, AIR 1/149/15/93.
II Letter from DAS to Secretary of the Air Board, 15 Feb 1917. AIR 1/149/15/93.
12 Newlyn, Scillies, Mullion, Cattewater, Queenstown, Portland, Bembridge, Calshot. Cherbourg and Brest.
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and recommended the immediate orders for 1000 anti-submarine aircraft including 200
Large Americas, 400 seaplanes of either 310hp Sunbeam Shorts or 250hp Fairey
C . d . 14amparnas an 400 aeroplanes oftwo-seater Sopwith two-seaters. Quarterly requirements
for new seaplanes for the Channel Patrol would rise from fifty-two in April 1917 to 120 in
June, 174 in September and 240 in December. Is To give an idea of the size of requisitions
for aircraft and engines, prior to formal ordering, for the week ending 23 June 1917,
fourteen requisitions were placed totalling 2506 aeroplanes, 125 engines, twenty-six flying
boats and six seaplanes. 16
Pre-war planning
Pre-war planning centred on a chain of air stations along the East Coast of England
for coastal patrolling and support of the Fleet. I7 As the main requirement to equip these
stations was for seaplanes Churchill stated at the 121 st meeting of the Committee of
Imperial Defence in January 1913 that the navy's priority would be the development such
aircraft. 18 Accordingly he informed the Second Sea Lord in September 1913 of the number
of machines required: 'If we aim at a war establishment of 100 machines, we should
apparently require at least 150 or 160 to realise this. It is not necessary, however, to reach it
in the first or second year.,19 The second annual report of the Air Committee in May 1914
noted the change in emphasis in the types of aircraft in the last twelve months; in May 1913
there were twenty-eight aeroplanes with sixteen on order compared with only six seaplanes
commissioned and thirty-three ordered. By 1914 seaplanes were in the majority with fifty-
five in service and forty-five on order compared with only forty and four respectively for
aeroplanes.i"
Aviation and the Grand Fleet
Support for the fleet was an obvious role for naval aviation but was limited as
seaplanes could not take off or land on anything but the calm seas. Admiral Jellicoe,
Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet wrote to Beatty on 7 August 1915 that for
seaplanes: ' ... the chances are about a hundred to one against it being suitable for them to
13 Draft paper 'Aircraft requirements 1917' byDAS, 12 Feb 1917, AIR 1/149/15/93.
14Minute by DAE, 5 Feb 1917, AIR 1/149/15/93.
15 Minute by DAS, 12 Feb 1917, AIR 1/149/15/93.
16 Sixteenth report by Department ofAeronautical Supplies, 23 Jun 1917, AIR 1/151/15/118.
17 Extracts from Memorandum by DAD., Aug 1913, Doc. No.33, in Roskill, Documents Relating. 109.
18 Extracts from Minutes of121 st Cll meeting, 7 Jan 1913, Doc. No.25, in Roskill, Documents Relating, 72.
19 Minute by First Lord to Second Sea Lord, 27 Sep 1913, Doc. No.36, in Roskill, Documents Relating, 115.




nse from the water. ,21 The Grand Fleet's first seaplane earner, HMS Campania, a
converted Cunard liner, did not arrive until April 1915 and HMS Manxman, added in 1916,
proved to be wholly inadequate: 'The recently joined seaplane carrier "Manxman" has
proved to be totally unfit for service with the Battle-Cruiser Fleet owing to her lack of
speed.,22 The turning point proved to be the failure at the Battle of Jutland on 31 May 1916,
when Campania was ordered back to Scapa Flow and Engadine, operating with Beatty's
battlecruiser force managed only one reconnaissance flight,23 HMS Argus, the RN's first
flush deck carrier was ordered in September 1916 and a month later Jellicoe's requests for
kite balloons was finally accepted by the Admiralty." At a meeting between Jellicoe and
Rear Admiral Tudor, the Third Sea Lord, in October 1916 the former rejected a suggestion
that flying boats could replace seaplanes
,... the radius of action of flying boats is insufficient to enable them to work with
the Fleet and that the difficulties of re-fuelling them at sea, even if they safely
make the rendezvous ordered, are great. H.M. Ships "Campania" and "Engadine"
therefore remain the only means of aerial scouting that the Fleet can expect,
exceptkite balloon inflated on shore and towed by battleships.r"
In October 1916 there were only fifty 'Class l' seaplanes allocated to carriers of the Grand
Fleet out of a total of 408 in service.f Fleet aviation took a relatively low priority in 1916
in comparison to that for strategic bombing.
Admiral Jellicoe was convinced of the advantage afforded to the High Sea Fleet
through its possession of Zeppelins for reconnaissance. However, the expansion
programme for British rigids followed a distinctly slow and uncertain path. No.9, the first
rigid after the ill-fated Mayfly, was ordered from Vickers in March 1914, but work was
stopped in February 1915 only to be restarted five months later. In October 1915 three of
the 23 Class were ordered from Armstrong, Beardmore and Vickers with five more
following in January 1916. One month later two wooden rigids were approved from Shorts
and a rigid programme totalling eleven airships was approved in June 1916.27
21 Arthur Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol IV: 1917 Year ofCrisis (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1969), II.
22 Letter from C-in-C Grand Fleet to Secretary of the Admiralty, 11 Jan 1917. AIR 1/651/17 i 122/447.
23 Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, 47.
24 Minute byDAS, 25 Nov 1916, AIR 1/651/17/122/447.
25 Extract of minutes from meeting between C-in-C Grand Fleet and Third Sea Lord, 12 Oct 1916. AIR
1/651/17/122/447.
26 First Lord's RNAS fortnightly return, 1-15 Oct 1916, AIR 1/150/15/113/3.
27 Paper 'Present situation in airship operations and construction', Jun 1916, ADM 1/148/15/80.
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In lieu of rigid airships, which were delayed by slow construction, six twin-engined
North Sea type non-rigids were ordered for fleet use in March 1916.18 A further six were
ordered in November 1917 to keep six in commission and replacements procured for the six
lost in 1918.
At the beginning of 1917, Admiral David Beatty, new C-in-C of the Grand Fleet,
observed the inadequate air support for the Fleet and requested improvements in the use of
seaplane carriers, kite balloons, rigid airships and large seaplanes. Godfrey Paine, the Fifth
Sea Lord, ordered that twenty-five per cent of pilots should be utilised for fleet work. To
reinforce his air capabilities before the completion of Argus Beatty forced through the
conversion of HMS Furious to carry aeroplanes in March, together with merchant ships
Pegasus and Nairana as seaplane carriers. The world's first purpose-built carrier, HMS
Hermes, was laid down in July 1917. Jellicoe's intervention had led to the a large order of
sixty of kite balloons and twenty-four meteorological balloons for Fleet and patrol work.i"
To increase the number of fighters available the anti-Zeppelin role experiments were
undertaken to them fighters from the platforms on cruisers, the first successful flight by
Flight Commander F.J. Rutland from HMS Yarmouth in June 1917. Turret platforms were
developed shortly afterwards enabling the use of aeroplanes from capital ships.i"
In addition to providing the fleet with fighter cover and a reconnaissance capability,
planning was well advanced by the end of the war for an offensive torpedo-bomber
capability. A plan submitted by Squadron Commander de G. Ireland, CO at Great
Yarmouth in 1916 for between 100-150 torpedo-carrying seaplanes was afforded a low
priority by the Admiralty. There were problems developing a seaplane, which could carry
an eighteen-inch torpedo, yet this failure can only be seen as a product of the tactical
thinking within the Admiralty. The torpedo-carrying seaplane had been technically proven
in the Dardanelles in 1915 and the Admiralty had developed the large Handley Page
bomber from scratch without a precedent. Indeed it was the formation of an offensive
capability at Luxeuil in northern France in 1916, which pre-occupied Vaughan-Lee, the
Director of Air Services, and other senior figures within the Admiralty. It was not until
February 1917 that twenty-five Short 320 seaplanes capable of dropping an eighteen-inch
torpedo were ordered for use in the Adriatic. To equip HMS Argus and other ships in the
Grand Fleet 200 Sopwith Cuckoo torpedo-carrying aeroplanes were ordered 1917.31
28 Minutes of conference held by SAC, 4 Mar 1916, AIR 1/148/15/80.
29 Minute by DASD, 18 Ju11917, AIR 1/669/17/122/782.
30 Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, 54.
31 Letter from Secretary of Admiralty to Secretary to Air Ministry, 8 Aug 1918. ADM 1/643/17/1 '22/257.
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Air defence of Great Britain
With the despatch of the whole RFC to France, responsibility for the air defence of
the UK was transferred to the RNAS on 3 September 1914. This decision had two long-
term ramifications for the RNAS; firstly, to have any hope of engaging the Zeppelins high
performance single-seater fighters were required and secondly, the inability of existing
aircraft to engage the Zeppelins at high altitude saw the Navy adopt an offensive strategy
against Zeppelin bases, one of the stimuli for its strategic bombing policy. Any bases or
manufacturing facilities in Germany, which supported their naval forces, were regarded as
legitimate targets and the first attack on Zeppelin sheds in Germany took place on 22
September with aircraft based in Belgium. On 28 December 1914 Murray Sueter, Director
of the Naval Air Division, drew up the specification for a 'bloody paralyser' of an aircraft
to pursue the offensive policy, which manifested itself as the twin-engined Handley Page.
Indeed in April 1915 Churchill stressed: ' ...the necessity of developing a very large fleet of
aircraft, capable of delivering a sustained series of "smashing blows" on the enemy; more
in the nature of "bombardment" by ships than the present isolated "dashing exploits" of
individual or two or three aeroplanes ....,32 This offensive posture was also apparent with the
requisitioning of three seaplane carriers Empress, Engadine and Riveria in August 1914 to
launch torpedo attack on High Seas Fleet; however the problems of designing a seaplane
with sufficient engine capacity to carry an adequate sized torpedo saw them being used to
bomb the Zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven on 25 December 1914.
Aeroplanes were based at coastal stations in the hope that they could intercept
Zeppelins before or after their attacks. Air defence requirements also led to the formation of
Anti-Aircraft Section of the Air Department which by April 1915 comprised 42 officers
and 1052 men.33 The RFC took over defence of Great Britain in early 1916, but home
defence remained a secondary role for the RNAS; its aeroplanes in Britain in 1916 became
mainly second-class types and were utilised on night flying training.
The embarrassment suffered by the RNAS when it was unable to intercept
Zeppelins in 1915 was nothing compared with the furore, which occurred when twin-
engined Gotha bombers raided London in the summer of 1917. Such was the impact of
these attacks that the government afforded aircraft production priority over all other
munitions. The policy of strategic bombing was now given official government backing
with forty new squadrons allocated for bombing of German cities. The headline figures
were certainly impressive with a planned increase ofRFC squadrons from 108 to 200 and a
32 Minutes of conference held by First Lord, 3 Apr 1915, ADM 1/8433/270B.
33 Report on Air-Aircraft Section of Air Department, 20 Apr 1915, ADM 1/8418/100.
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trebling of the monthly engine output from 1200 to 4500 with a comparative, but
unspecified expansion for the RNAS.34 At the end of July 1917 several hundred DH4s and
100 Handley Pages were ordered, increased on 6 September to 2700 DH4s and DH9s and
300 Handley Pages. The big problem was meeting such production targets and this will be
addressed in the next chapter.
The continental commitment and strategic bombing
Churchill's decision to deploy Royal Marines to defend Antwerp in August 1914
led indirectly to the largest RNAS commitment of the whole war; Samson's Eastchurch
Squadron accompanied the Marines to provide reconnaissance so beginning a continental
commitment which was to last until the end of the war. As early seaplanes were found to be
relatively ineffective and airships were identified in 1915 as the preferable platform for the
anti-submarine role, the base at Dunkirk provided an outlet for the Navy's substantial
aircraft production capacity which could not be employed on naval duties. In addition to
patrolling the Channel, the Admiralty justified the existence of a continental force from an
early stage as a contribution to the air defence of Britain, for which Dunkirk would be the
first line of defence. When Samson's squadron retreated to Dunkirk attacks were also
undertaken on Zeppelin bases which the Germans established in Belgium much to
Churchill's approval: 'We would have to concentrate our energies on the Belgian coast, and
make every effort to attack Zeppelin bases in case they opened some in Belgium. ,35 On 21
June 1915 approval was given for an increased establishment at Dunkirk 0 f six squadrons,
in addition to the two at Dover.
However, the Admiralty wanted another outlet through which it could expand its
offensive strategy. It is noticeable that in a paper by Rear-Admiral Vaughan-Lee, Director
of Air Services, on 28 February 1916 the first priority of the RNAS is not to support the
fleet or engage in anti-submarine duties, but: 'To attack the enemy's fleets, dockyards,
arsenals, factories, air sheds, &c., from the coasts, whether the coasts be the enemy's or
own (i.e. long distance bombingj.r'" The Admiralty's unilateral decision to prosecute long
distance bombing alongside the French saw the first deployment of personnel to Luxeuil
northern France in May 1916. Initially the deployment was hampered by the diversion of
resources to the RFC in preparation of the Somme offensive. The Luxeuil deployment
34 Development of aircraft production, 1917-1918, AIR 1/678/21/13/2138.
35 S.F. Wise. Canadian Airmen and the First World War: The Official History ofthe Royal Canadian Air
Force, Volume I (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1980),132.




caused outrage in the ranks of the Army and the RFC who were appealing for more
resources for the Battle of the Somme. The full extent of the deployment was laid bare by
Colonel Bares, the RNAS's French liaison officer, in a visit to London in October 1916
which caused the following reaction from Field Marshal Haig:
,... the employment of bombing machines in France is, I contend, primarily even
if not entirely, a military question... unless my requirements have first been
adequately provided, the provision of flying machines by the naval authorities for
work on the fronts of the French or Belgian armies in France amounts to very
serious interference with the British Land Forces, and may compromise the
success of my operations.t"
Under pressure the result was inevitable and the first RNAS squadron was transferred to
support the RFC on the Western Front in the autumn of 1916. The enthusiasm ofthe RNAS
to engage in land-based roles left it open to having its aircraft purloined by the RFC,
especially as there was little difference in the performance oftheir aircraft.
In January 1918 the Air Council placed seven Dunkirk squadrons under the
command Commander-in-Chief BEF, for operations on the Western Front and the naval
element at Dunkirk was reduced to a reconnaissance squadron, an anti-submarine squadron
equipped with DH4s and three Sopwith Camel fighter squadrons."
Anti-submarine warfare
The RNAS's responsibility for patrolling the North Sea and the Channel was soon
to take on a much more focussed role, that of anti-submarine patrols. A succession of high
profile losses including the elderly armoured cruisers Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy which
were sunk in rapid succession by U9 in September 1914 and the sinking of the pre-
dreadnought Formidable in early 1915 forced the Admiralty to take action as Midshipmen
Victor Goddard, one of the first airship pilots, noted: 'When the submarine menace began
to be important in the naval mind, the political field ... Lord Fisher decided as First Sea
Lord - to develop the airship and use it as a submarine searcher... ,39
The non-rigid airship possessed three key advantages; first it was not hampered by
sea states, which were crucial to seaplanes for taking off and landing, second it had a much
37 Letter from C-in-C BEF to Secretary of the War Office, 1 Nov 1916, ADM 1/8449/39A.
38 Letter from Secretary of Air Council to Secretary of War Office, 22 Feb 1918, ADM 1/8500.
39 Victor Goddard, Imperial War Museum/Sound Archive 303, 38 [Further references to Imperial War
Museum/Sound Archive will be referred to as lWM/SA].
Chapter 2
44
longer endurance and third it was much easier to produce than larger rigids of the Zeppelin
type. Admiral Fisher, the First Sea Lord, called a meeting on 28 February 1915 to discuss
the requirement for a non-rigid airship which should be of simple design, with a crew of
two, carry 160lb ofbombs and have an endurance of eight hours.4o Such swift progress was
made on the design and development that the first prototype of the Submarine Scout (SS)
airship flew at the end ofMarch and twenty-seven were soon ordered." Rapid progress was
made on expanding the airship programme and at a conference held by the First Sea Lord
on 19 June recognised the need for a larger non-rigid with greater range, reliability and
speed capable of scouting up to 150 miles from the coast and Churchill sanctioned the order
for thirty ofthe Coastal Class.42
At a conference held by the Superintendent of Aircraft Construction (SAC) on 4
March 1916 forty improved SS airships, the SS Pusher (SSP) type were ordered together
with one C Star, a development of the somewhat disappointing Coastals.f The C Star with
a new envelope was superior to the Coastal in all aspects except rate of climb, but
mechanical problems delayed its entry into service; at the height of the programme twenty
were envisaged, but this was later reduced to ten. The first was not completed until January
1918 with the remainder in service by September.
Due to production difficulties the SSP did not appear until January 1917 and only
six were completed by May 1917 when the programme was terminated in favour of the SS
Zero, which had a much superior boat shaped car. Sixteen Zeros were ordered on 6 April
1917 and at one time ninety-three were specified in the expansion programme, but by
November 1918 it was planned to keep fifty-nine in commission. The main reason for this
reduction was the design of the superior twin-engined SS ship proposed in 1917; trials of
S.S.E.1 in early 1918 were unsatisfactory but S.S.E.2 known as the 'Mullion Twin' since it
was designed at Mullion air station in Cornwall met all requirements and the production 0 f
twelve SS Twins was approved. In November 1918 the envisaged operational airship
strength was eleven rigids, fifty-nine SS Zeros, 115 SS Twins, ten Coastals and ten North
Sea airships.
Flying boats and aeroplanes increasingly supplemented the airships and seaplanes
available for anti-submarine patrols in 1917-1918. The impetus for improvements in anti-
submarine forces came first with the creation of Anti-Submarine Division in December
1916 and then Germany's unrestricted submarine offensive, which began on 1 February
40 Patrick Abbott, The British Airship at War, 1914-1918 (Lavenham: Terence Dalton, 1989),22.
41 Minute by DAD, 9 Jun 1915,AIR 1/148/15/80.
42 Minutes of conference held by First Sea Lord, 19 Jun 1915, AIR 1/2634.
43 Minutes of conference held by SAC, 4 Mar 1916, AIR 1/148/15/80.
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1917. In the early spring of 1917, 176 'Class I' seaplanes and forty-six airships were
allocated for anti-submarine warfare. Large flying boats, which would revolutionise anti-
submarine patrols came into service in early 1917; on 30 January 1917 the Director of Air
Services reported the two Porte flying boats were in commission with eleven on order at a
rate ofdelivery ofone per week and five Large Americas had been commissioned, a further
four were under construction and seventy-two on order with three to be delivered every
fortnight.44
Mediterranean operations, 1915-1918
Operations in the Mediterranean involved all types ofnaval air power, although on a
small scale and the theatre was generally seen as secondary for the supply of new
equipment. The Dardanelles campaign was the basis for a RNAS presence when to provide
air reconnaissance and spotting capabilities the Admiralty deployed the seaplane carrier
HMS Ark Royal, the aeroplanes of Samson's No.3 Wing which had seen action in France
and Belgium and the kite balloon ship HMS Menelaus. However, Colonel Sykes, RFC,
who reported on RNAS requirements in the Dardanelles in July 1915, found that the current
air establishment wholly inadequate:
'A moderate measure of success has been obtained and valuable experience has
been gained. But the scale of the land operations is now being largely increased
and the necessity for extensive aeroplane reconnaissance and systematic co-
operation is becoming more and more evident. .. To cope with this work a larger
numberof aeroplanes of a standard typewill be required. ,45
As a result Samson was reinforced by No.2 Wing later in 1915 and two SS airships were
allocated for use in the Mediterranean. The withdrawal from Gallipoli at the beginning of
1916 did not end the RNAS's commitment in the theatre where it performed
reconnaissance and spotting roles for the Allied expeditionary force that landed at Salonika
in October 1915. In March 1916 the Admiralty assumed responsibility for patrolling the
Aegean and the routes from Malta and Salonika. By the spring of 1917 the majority of the
aeroplanes ofNo.2 Wing were operating on the Salonika front and against targets in Turkey
while the seaplanes operating from Thasos, Mudros and Suda Bay in Crete together with
44 Minute by DAS, 30 Jan 1917, AIR 1/658/17/122/594.




airships at Kassandra and Mudros carried out anti-submarine patrols.l'' Murray Sueter, the
first Director of the Air Division whom the Admiralty wished to relegate to a backwater on
account of his radical views was given command of No.6 Wing in the Adriatic. Samson,
another pioneer, was placed in command of the seaplanes carriers Ben-my-Chree, Empress,
Anne and Raven II which operated in an army cooperation role off Palestine until
November 1917.
When the RAF assumed control in April 1918 the Mediterranean command were
split into five groups. The Adriatic Group patrolled the Otranto barrage and bombed U-boat
bases at Cattaro and Durazzo. The Aegean Group was responsible to support the blockade
of the Dardanelles, conduct U-boat patrols, support army at Salonika and bomb Turkish
communications, air bases even Constantinople. The more minor Malta, Gibraltar and
Egypt Groups undertook U-boat and convoy patrols in support of the introduction of
Mediterranean convoy system.V
The Carrier comes of Age
Fleet Carriers - backbone of the Fleet Air Arm
When Thomas Inskip, Minister of Coordination of Defence, proposed the return of the
FAA to naval control in July 1937, he also recommended that the number of aircraft
carriers should dictate the numbers of squadrons and therefore the aircraft, personnel and
bases required: 'So far as numbers are concerned, these will be restricted by the capacity of
the carriers and capital ships. I assume that the number of carriers will be regulated by
Cabinet decisions. ,48 The expansion programme of the late 1930s was centred on the
ordering of armoured carriers. The two factors which dominated Admiralty thinking were
the flexibility to operate in both the Fleet Carrier and trade protection roles and the
necessity of armoured protection. These ruled out the possibility of a 14,500-ton
unarmoured ship with fifteen aircraft and set the minimum standard at an armoured carrier
of 17,600 tons capable of operating twenty-four planes. The Fleet Carrier option was for a
23,000-ton ship to operate thirty-six aircraft.49 Admiral Henderson, the Controller,
concluded that the only type required was the 23,000-ton ship, the smaller carrier lacking
the capacity for enough reconnaissance and strike aircraft in the fleet role. It was decided in
June 1936 that for the foreseeable future all new vessels should be large Fleet Carriers
(CVs) with older vessels relegated to trade protection:
46 Report from VA, EMS to Secretary of Admiralty, 18 Apr 1917, AIR 1/649/17/122/408.
47 Report from C-in-C Mediterranean to Secretary of Admiralty, 8 Sep 1918, AIR 1/649/17/122/409.
48 Memorandum by Minister of Coordination ofDefence, 21 Ju11937, CAB 21/526.
49 Notes of meeting held on 28 Apr 1936, ADM 1/11971.
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,... we must return to the policy of confiding trade protection to vessels not up
to the standard of the Main Fleet, and as our strength grows in new carriers,
older carriers will be available for trade route work. We will have to be content
with that until we are up to strength in the large carriers, and then, and then only
can we affordto give consideration to building a smaller carrier. ,50
Six armoured Fleet Carriers were laid down between 1937-1939 and formed the backbone
of the FAA's wartime strength.
A plan for FAA expansion was drawn up in April 1937 in a paper entitled 'A New
Standard of Naval Strength'. This envisaged fifteen carriers by 1942; four in Home Waters,
four in the Mediterranean, which could be redeployed to the Far East to maintain a
defensive strategy against the Japanese, and five on trade routes plus a deck landing
training ship. There were to 450 aircraft which included those on capital ships and
cruisers.I' At the outbreak of war the projected expansion for 1942 totalled 490 aircraft
comprising eleven carriers and 360 aircraft, a seaplane carrier with nine aircraft, 101
aircraft embarked on battleships and cruisers and supernumerary, or reserve squadrons with
20 aircraft.
Initial wartime expenence indicated that more earners were needed for trade
defence and Captain Charles Daniel, the Director of Plans, stated in January 1940 that the
ships would be split 50:50 between fleet and convoy duties. 52 However the loss of
Courageous and Glorious and the failure to include a carrier in the 1940 construction
programme meant that by the end of the year the fleet carrier programme was already two
years behind schedule.53
The Battle of the Atlantic takes centre stage
In 1941 the FAA began to address the need for specialist ships for trade protection
and reserve aircraft formations. By 1 April, 106 additional aircraft were added to the
programme, the majority, seventy-nine for supernumerary squadrons but also six for HMS
Audacity, the first Escort Carrier (CVE). Supernumerary squadrons, later entitled
Alternative Armament squadrons, were effectively reserve formations; requirements had
been identified to allow carriers to be equipped with either single-seater or two-seater
fighters, relieve tired personnel and allow first line squadrons to be withdrawn for further
50 Minute by DCNS, 15 Jun 1936, ADM 1/11971.
51 Memorandum by First Lord to Defence Plans (policy) Sub-Committee, cm, 29 Apr 1937,11-12. CAB
16/182.
52 Minute by D ofP, 24 Jan 1940, ADM 1/11971.
53 Minute by D of P, 1 Dec 1940, ADM 1/11971.
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training. Audacity's initial success plus mounting losses in the Battle of the Atlantic saw
agreement in principle that all North Atlantic convoys would be escorted by a CVE. In the
interim fighter catapult ships were employed for stopgap defence. By 1 July 1941 150
aircraft were added for another twelve CVEs. The majority of these and their aircraft would
be supplied by the United States under lend lease; US production and training facilities
underpinned the entire CVE effort and it was accepted from the start by the Admiralty that
American aircraft were necessary to equip them. Admiral Lyster, Fifth Sea Lord, was
concerned about the aircraft situation when he wrote to Alexander, the First Lord on 10
July 1941:
'The whole question of production of aircraft for the Navy depends essentially
upon staff requirements based on the programme of ship construction. Up to the
present no departure has been made from the pre-war principle that squadrons
should be formed to arm all aircraft carriers and catapult ships to the full... if the
production requirements of the Navy are not complied with the time would come
when there would be carriers and other ships available with no aircraft to arm
them.f"
Lyster was especially anxious given the increased requirements envisaged by June 1943
involving thirteen CVEs equipped with 156 aircraft, and seven supernumerary squadrons
requiring eighty-four planes. Lyster concluded that American help would be needed to meet
the CVE requirements alone and further production was necessary for the supernumerary
squadrons.f The Naval Air Expansion Programme of 30 September 1941 issued a revised
target for mid-1943 of 925 first line aircraft up from 779. The lions share of the increase
being 141 aircraft for further supernumerary squadrons.56 By the end 1941 the programme
included aircraft for twenty-two CVEs and was underway planning for Merchant Aircraft
Carriers (MACs).57
Reinforcing the Fleet
Following the loss of the capital ships Prince of Wales and Repulse in the Far East
in December 1941 the requirement for fighters for fleet defence was greatly increased and a
review in January 1942 envisaged a need for up to 20 carriers to operate with the fleet.58
54 Letter from Fifth Sea Lord to First Lord, 10 Ju11941, ADM 1/12126.
55 Ibid.
56 Naval Air Expansion Programme (A.001.41), 30 Sep 1941, ADM 1/11938.
57 Report from Fifth Sea Lord to First Lord, 30 Aug 1943, ADM 1/14990.
58 Minute by D ofP and DNAD, 17 Jan 1942, ADM 1/11971.
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The major difficulty lay in the complicated construction required to build a Fleet Carrier
(CY). Instead design commenced on the Light Fleet Carrier (CYL) which could utilise
machinery from cruisers and thus a large saving in production time.
Captain Bridge, Director of the Naval Air Division (DNAD), reported on 15
February 1942 that requirements for June 1944 were now 1464 aircraft, 666 fighters and
798 TBR's. There would be thirty-eight CYEs, thirty American and eight British carrying
648 aircraft, and twenty-four Supernumerary squadrons with 288 machines. For the first
time in the estimates were thirteen shore-based squadrons with 156 aircraft and six night
fighter squadrons with seventy-two 'planes.i" The Head of the Air Branch noted on 2
March that with the addition of 150 Amphibious Bomber Reconnaissance aircraft and Light
Reconaissance aircraft the total would be nearer to 1600, and that while shore-based
squadrons had been the prerogative of Air Ministry since Inskip' s decision: ' ... this ruling
has been departed from on more than one occasion during the present war, often by
arrangement with the Air Ministry. ,60 Regarding the production of CYEs, the British
Admiralty Delegation (BAD) Washington signalled on 16 April that the RN could expect to
receive three British and fifteen American CVEs in 1942 with a further twelve per year in
1943 and 1944.61 Discussions were also taking place in the Admiralty on the possibility of
obtaining CVs from the Americans, but Captain Lambe, the Director of Plans, opposed any
such approach on 29 April:
'Our need for aircraft carriers may well be more urgent than that of the U.S. and
from time to time circumstances may be favourable for obtaining the temporary
loan of these ships. In view, however, of the U.S. attitude regarding the 2 ocean
navy programme, I am firmly of the opinion that an approach to the President at
the present juncture for the transfer of battleships and aircraft carriers has not the
smallest chance of success. ,62
However plans for CVLs were forging ahead and were approved by Captain D.H. Everett,
Deputy Director of Plans on 2 June: ' .. .I believe that we should made every effort to
provide Intermediate Aircraft Carriers as soon as possible and propose that the next six
cruisers due to be laid down after mid-1942 should be replaced by these carriers.l'" On 8
June the Director of Gunnery and Anti-Aircraft Warfare (DGAAW) supported the
59 Report by DNAD, 15 Feb 1942, ADM 1/11938.
60 Minute by Head of Air Branch, 2 Mar 1942, ADM 1/11938.
61 Message from BAD Washington, 16 Apr 1942, ADM 1/11938.
62 Minute by D ofP. 29 Apr 1942, ADM 1/12058.
63 Minute by DD of P. 2 Jun 1942, ADM 1/11971.
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construction of CVLs, especially if the alternative was conversions: 'An "Intermediate"
Carrier requires far less productive effort than a Cruiser, and is of far greater general value.
"Conversion" Carriers are a poor substitute and, except for their fighters, have virtually no
defensive power against aircraft, i.e. their AA armament is negligible. ,64 On the same day
Captain Terry, Director of Operations Division (Foreign), had proposed that the cruisers
Emerald and Enterprise may be converted into CVLs when next were due for refit no doubt
provoking the comments from DGAAW.65 The Director of Naval Construction reported on
7 August that a further ten CVLs had been ordered in addition to one already in the 1942
Programme and four cruisers had been cancelled to provide the requisite berths and
propulsion machinery.66
In the autumn of 1942 the requirement for further CVs, to get as many aircraft to sea
with the fleet, was approved as Admiral Pound, the First Sea Lord, wrote to Churchill on 25
October 1942:
'The Cabinet has approved Fleet Aircraft Carriers up to the maximum number of
slips available. What we still need is the labour to complete the ships quickly and
the assurance of aircraft and personnel to man them. There is no possibility of
gettingFleet Aircraft Carriers assigned to us by the U.S.A. ,67
Pound also highlighted a critical need for refrigerated merchant ships as the main reason
why the RN was so dependent on America for CVEs. He estimated that on 1 January 1944,
there would be between twenty-eight and thirty-seven CVEs in service, depending on the
supply from America in 1943 which were estimated at between twelve and twenty-two. The
loss of four or five ships had also been taken into account in his calculations.i'''
The Air Branch Acquaint of 4 June 1942 presented the latest version of the Naval
Air Expansion Programme to mid-1944 with 1789 first line aircraft. The first four CVLs
appeared in the estimates with ninety-six aircraft. In addition there were thirty-five CVEs
carrying 663 aircraft and fifteen shore-based squadrons with 180 aircraft. Training and
ancillary squadrons required 1150 aircraft, 880 in the first line and 270 miscellaneous for
Fleet Requirement Units (FRUs) and communications flights.69 On 13 July Admiral Sir
Frederic Dreyer, Chief of the Naval Staff (CNAS), laid out a tentative expansion to mid
64 Minute by DGAAW, 8 Jun 1942, ADM 1/11971.
65 Minute by DOD (F), 8 lun 1942, ADM 1/11971.
66 Minute by DNC, 7 Aug 1942. ADM 1/12156.
67 Minute from First Lord to Prime Minister, 25 Oct 1942, ADM 1/12093.
68 Ibid.
69 Air Branch Acquaint (A.OOI4.42), 4 Jun 1942, ADM 1/11941.
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1946 with two further CVs, nine more CVLs and nine British and twenty-four US CVEs
with a total of 1480 strike aircraft and 1264 fighters." By the end of 1942 the possible
number of CVEs had risen exponentially as Dreyer, wrote on 4 December: 'At one meeting
of Sea Lords which I attended the intention was that our aim should be to obtain 83
Auxiliary Carriers of which we would man and equip a maximum of 41 at anyone time.,7l
Captain Lambe, the Director of Plans explained the thinking behind this figure: 'The
number 83 has been estimated as the number required to keep 54 Escort Carriers
continuously in operation on the trade routes. The remaining 29 will be refitting, working
up or on passage to or from their stations ... 10 would require to be fully equipped for
amphibious operations...,72 Captain Bridge, DNAD, quickly quashed any likelihood of this
being achieved: 'D. of P's programme, as shown in his minute of 13th December, is now
more of academic interest than real interest, at least as far as the next 2 years or so are
concerned, in view of the recent debacle in the aircraft production situation.'73 There was
also the possibility of helicopters becoming available for convoy patrols although as
Captain Schofield, Director of Trade Division, acknowledged on 16 November 1942: 'It is
understood that helicopters or autogyros will not be available in quantity until 1944... It is
proposed that further consideration of the design of ships to carry helicopters or autogyros
should be deferred until more is known about the M.A.C. ship programme... ,74
In January 1943 the planned aircraft total for mid-1944 reduced by 339 to 1450.
Even so the proposed monthly expansion rate was the highest yet in the war: this had been
an average of2.5% up to April 1941, increasing to 3.3% in October 1941 and 4.9% in April
1942. Even with the proposed reduction in January 1943 the actual expansion rate until
mid-1944 remained at 5%, although over the long term the rate until mid-1946 it was only
3.60/0.
Aircraft production cuts
By the beginning of 1943 the aircraft production programme had become the
greatest single brake on naval air expansion. A memorandum from Air Branch to the First
Lord on 12 January recommended the adoption of a revised programme for first line
aircraft on the basis of forecast of British aircraft production received from Sir Stafford
Cripps, the Minister of Aircraft Production, on 4 January and the disappointing results of
70 Letter from Secretary ofCNAS to Secretaries of First Lord and First Sea Lord, 13 Ju11942, ADM 1/12126.
7\ Minute by CNAS, 4 Dec 1942, ADM 1/12164.
72 Minute by D ofP, 13 Dec 1942, ADM 1/12164.
73 Letter from DNAD to Captain Slattery, 8 Jan 1943, ADM 1/12164.
74 Minute by DTD, 16 November 1942, ADM 1/12189.
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the Lyttleton Mission to Washington.f Programme A, approved as recently as October
1942, was to be replaced by Programme B which envisaged deficits until 1946, the largest
being 595 on 1 January 1944:
Table 2. Comparison between Programmes A & B, October 1942 - January 1943
Programme A Programme B Difference
1 January 1943 875 570 - 305
1 January 1944 1745 1150 - 595
1 January 1945 2072 1750 - 322
1 January 1946 2464 2350 - 114
1 July 1946 2689 2689 0
These cuts would not allow the formation of any Alternative Armament Squadrons, as
supernumerary squadrons were now called, until the end of 1944 and the necessity for
CVEs to operate two-thirds of their normal complement and with largely obsolete aircraft,
mainly Fairey Swordfish, in the immediate future. A report by Dreyer, CNAS, on 13
January blamed Oliver Lyttleton, the Minister of Production for the delays: 'To him we
owe the temporary but severe cut in the reserves ... we shall not get any Alternative
Armament Squadrons until about the end of 1945.,76 The smaller scale of reserves allowed
by Programme B meant fewer first line aircraft could be maintained and hence the
scrapping of plans for Alternative Armament Squadrons in the short term. Nevertheless
Dreyer predicted the number of FAA personnel would grow from 34,000 in January 1943
to 77,000 in 1944. Adding to the general sense of gloom about aircraft availability
Alexander, the First Lord, wrote to Archibald Sinclair, the Secretary of State for Air on 2
February 1943:
'It is clear that 1943 is going to be a bad year for us. It will be impracticable to
form a single alternative armament squadron, and we estimate that even if all our
existing shore-based squadrons are disbanded and reserves of all kinds reduced to
a minimum, there will still be shortages during the year of about 700 T.B.R.s and
200 single-seater fighters.Y'
Programme B was formally accepted in March 1943 as Rear Admiral Boyd, the Fifth Sea
Lord, informed Admiral Pound, the First Sea Lord, on 30 August:
75 Memorandum from Air Branch to First Lord, 12 Jan 1943, ADM 1/14873.
76 Report by CNAS, 13 Jan 1943. 8, ADM 1/13484.
77 Letter from First Lord to Secretary of State for Air, 2 Feb 1943, ADM 1/14873.
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'Towards the end of 1942 it began to appear that in the near future the bottleneck
would be in aircraft and personnel rather than ships. It was recognised that [a]
shortage of man-power and productive capacity made it impossible to meet the
needs of the Navy, and a "realistic" expansion programme up to mid 1946 was
prepared, providing for a slower increase in the I.E. [Initial Establishment] in the
initial period.,78
The one bright spot for the long term was the resumption of the CV programme with the
recognition of the importance of getting more aircraft to sea with fleet. A memorandum by
Admiral Kennedy-Purvis, the Deputy First Sea Lord, on 16 January 1943 envisaged a
reorientation of naval building policy: ' .. .it is clear that the aircraft carrier must form an
indispensable part of every naval force taking part in all operations other than purely minor
and coastal ones...to continue to employ battleships whose main role becomes that of
AIRCRAFT CARRIER HEAVY SUPPORT SHIP.,79 Accordingly the optimum future
ratio for the fleet would be two and half CVs and two CVLs to one battleship, five and half
cruisers and twenty-one destroyers. Four CVs of an improved design were ordered in 1943
although this was later reduced to three on account of shipbuilding capacity. One was to be
completed in 1947 and two in 1948.80 No battleships or cruisers were included in the
building programme as Alexander, the First Lord noted 'As our need for aircraft carriers is
relatively much greater, I do not include any battleships in this programme as they can only
be built at the expense of Fleet carriers.l'"
The availability of CVEs was confirmed by the Americans as Captain Lambe,
Director of Plans, reported on 5 October 1943: 'Owing to our follow-on programme for
C.V.Es in U.S. being refused, the optimum number of operational carriers upon which we
can now count is 38 which is subject to diminution by casualties.,82 In fact by the end of the
war forty-four had been delivered. The allocation of Alternative Armament Squadrons was
formalised at one for every two squadrons in CVs or CVLs and one for every four in CVEs,
but the shortages of aircraft prevented any being formed. In addition catapult aircraft were
eliminated from capital ships and cruisers by mid-1943 as it was deemed more profitable to
employ the space for enhanced anti-aircraft armament.
78 Report from Fifth Sea Lord to First Lord, 30 Aug 1943, ADM 1/14990.
79 Memorandum by Deputy First Sea Lord, 16 Jan 1943, ADM 1/12836.
80 Ibid.
81 Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy, 181.
82 Minute by D ofP, 5 Oct 1943, ADM 1/12731.
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Manpower and the war against Japan
By the end of 1943 the lack of manpower was becoming an increasing factor in
restricting the expansion of the FAA. Captain Lambe, the Director of Plans, stated that the
Navy needed 17,000 men from the RAF in 1944 to meet its commitments. If none of these
were forthcoming the FAA would be short of 2,000 maintenance ratings and none would be
available for the Pacific. 83 Accordingly in December 1943 Captain Moore, the Assistant
Director of Plans (Air), approved a reduction first line strength on 1 January 1945 from
1750 to 1635.84 The CVs Indefatigable and Implacable would be commissioned and forty-
two CVEs would be in service together with one Air Store Issuing Ship (ASIS) and one
component repair ship by mid 1944 and one engine repair ship and one maintenance ship
by October 1944. But up to seven more aircraft repair Ships, two ASIS and two
maintenance ships would be put in care and maintenance on completion between October
1944 and March 1945. This did not mean that the Navy had ordered too many air repair
ships, but merely that they could not be manned until the FAA was able to concentrate on
the war against Japan. In addition only one CVL would be manned and another six placed
in care and maintenance between October 1944 and April 1945. Nevertheless the squadrons
for all the CVLs would be formed enabling them to become operational as soon as possible
after Germany's defeat when personnel would be released to man the ships." The new
policy was based on the priority afforded to the war with Germany and the need to carry
out the greatest possible preparations for a Pacific deployment in the light of manpower
limitations:
, ... the reductionto care and maintenance, until Germany is defeated, of ships and
facilities not required against Germany except for:-
(i) What is necessary to fulfil our previously agreed commitments in the Far East.
(ii) What is necessary to keep the F.A.A. expansion alive and so prevent an
inordinately long delaybetween the defeat of Germany and the time when we can
. fl . J ,86exert our proper in uence agamst apan.
The overall reduction announced by Moore may have only been 115, but it masked
a large change in types. There would be 216 more strike aircraft, 371 fewer fighters and
forty helicopters were also included for the first time in an expansion plan. The number of
83 Paper by D ofP, 27 Dec 1943, ADM 1/16439.





strike aircraft was also likely to fall as 220 Swordfish were included in the estimate, but
production of the aircraft was due to end in 1944. Air Branch acknowledged that further
alterations were highly likely: ' ...the subject of further discussion between the staff and
D.A.E. when we know for certain what the Washington Mission had achieved and precisely
what effect the cuts in production at Home will have on this year's programme of
expansion. ,87 There was little change in the training and ancillary strength from 2007 in
Programme A to 1980 in Programme B. Rear Admiral Portal, ACNS (A), recommended on
20 January 1944 that Programme B should be adhered to: 'The future strength of the Fleet
Air Arm is now in doubt, owing to the present difficulties over assignments of aircraft from
the U.S.A. Nevertheless an approved policy is necessary for administrative and planning
purposes, particularly with regard to economical distribution of manpower... we should
continue working to "Programme B", unless and until it is clear that we cannot achieve
't ,881 .
In August 1944 Admiral Cunningham, the First Sea Lord, informed Vice Admiral
Boyd, the Fifth Sea Lord, of the new parameters of national strategy and manpower within
which FAA expansion would have to operate:
'An overall reduction in Naval manpower of some 25% will be necessary within
12 months after the defeatof Germany.
2. For planning purposes it is assumed that Germany will be defeated in October
1944, and Japan two years later.
3. In order to calculate the reduced manpower requirements for Naval flying
service, you should organise the expansion of the first line strength of naval
aircraft at the maximum impact which can be brought against the enemy by 1st
October, 1945, thereafter stabilising at that strength. ,89
Planning in early 1944 called for 2689 aircraft by mid-1946, but the initial success of
Operations 'Overlord' and the progress of Allied armies in the summer of 1944 saw the
first line peak brought forward for the war with Japan to 1 October 1945 at strength of
1,800.90 Manpower shortages saw this later reduced to 1605. While aircraft production
proceeded, the availability of personnel lagged behind and the works embargo before
Operation 'Overlord' delayed the construction of airfields. Furthermore the FAA's
programme was dependent upon the transfer of further airfields in Britain from the RAF
87 Paper by Air Branch, 8 Jan 1944, ADM 1/16439.
88 Minute by ACNS (A), 20 Jan 1944, ADM 1/16439.
89 Minute from First Sea Lord to Fifth Sea Lord, 12 Aug 1944, ADM 1/16414.
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and this was not likely until Germany's defeat; these were required to support the FAA's
final expansion drive which would not be completed until the autumn of 1945. Out of the
1605 aircraft, 501 were strike, 1074 fighters and 30 amphibians. These would equip six
CVs, ten CVLs, sixteen Assault Carrier CVEs, nine trade route CVEs and eleven
Alternative Armament squadrons. The last CVL, HMS Magnificent was expected to be
completed in December 1945.91 The notes prepared by Air Branch for Ministers on 19
February 1945 summed up the increasing juggling of resources than now characterised air
expansion: '1944 has seen a deep intensification of the Navy's preparations for the air war
against Japan. The relationship between the four factors on which naval aviation chiefly
depends - aircraft, carriers, airfields and personnel - continued to become more and more
complex. ,92
To add to this complex situation on 19 January 1945 Admiral Bruce Fraser, C-in-C
British Pacific Fleet, proposed one of the most radical changes to the FAA's organisation
since 1939 with the adoption of a system of spare Carrier Air Groups similar to that of the
Americans: ' ... such a policy in the British Service would be revolutionary since we have
always stressed the importance of the close relation of the Carrier and her aircraft... It
would be unreasonable to expect our aircrews to undertake the same scale of operations as
the Americans in the same area without some comparable terms of service. ,93 Each Carrier
Air Group would now be relieved by another at six monthly intervals when Air Group tours
had previously lasted at least twelve months. If this system was adopted it meant that the
number of operational carriers would have to be reduced since there was no possibility of
forming a larger number of squadrons than hitherto proposed. Fraser's suggestion was in
recognition that his aircrews were about to undertake operations of a duration and intensity
which had no parallel for the RN in the Second World War; in an official analysis fourteen
Fleet Carrier operations between March-October 1944 were dismissed thus: 'Since this type
of tip-and-run raid is likely to be put out of date by the operations of the British Pacific
Fleet, it is not proposed to analyse those strikes any further.,94
The programme in 1944 had based on providing CVs and CVLs with
interchangeable air groups of either two fighter and one TBR squadron or one fighter and
one TBR squadron utilising eleven Alternative Armament squadrons. A memorandum on 8
90 Message from Head ofAir Branch to BAD, 30 Aug 1944, ADM 1/16484.
9\ The number of aircraft in detail were as follows: 6 CVs (423), 10 CVLs (420),16 Assault Carriers (384).9
trade route CVEs (162), 11 spare squadrons (186) and amphibians (30).
92 Notes on 'Naval Air Matters' for Ministers from Head ofAir Branch, 19 Feb 1945, ADM 1/17399.
93 Message from C-in-C, BPF to Admiralty, 19 Jan 1945, ADM 1/17385.




March 1945 by Captain Byas, DNAO, concluded that in practice no need had been found
for this arrangement. The programme was also suffering limitations from manpower
shortages and tactical requirements were rapidly changing with a greater need for CVEs for
ferrying, a new requirement for them to operate in the replenishment role and Fraser's
request for spare air groups. These modifications and the continuing war against Germany
meant the programme was again delayed: 'The date for reaching the figure [1605] was
originally cast as 1.10.45 but the prolongation of the European War and other factors have
caused that date to be deferred and it is now nearer 1.1.46. ,95 The formation of spare air
groups would be possible in the proportion of 100% for CVs, 50% for CVLs, but none for
CVEs. However, those for CVLs were not to be available until 1946. Byas estimated on 24
March that a peak of 1608 aircraft would be reached in April/May 1946.96
For the success of the spare air group plan within this limit a radical programme of
cuts were outlined by the Head of the Air Branch on 6 April 1945 including the reduction
of the aircraft establishment of Illustrious Class carriers from fifty-four to forty-five and
that ofCVLs from fifty-four to thirty-three. The number ofAssault CVEs was to be slashed
from sixteen to eight and later six and other CVEs from six to two or none as CVl.s came
into service.97 The detailed make up of the aircraft types were dependent upon the
assignments of aircraft from America in the last six months of 1945 and the first six months
of 1946. On 8 June Captain Byas confirmed a programme of 1662 aircraft to equip six
CVs, thirteen CVLs, eight Assault and two General Purpose Cv'Es, with 100% spare
groups for CVs and 50% for CVLs. Out of the 1662 aircraft, no fewer than 666 or 40%
were now allocated to spare air groups.98
The developments of 1945 marked a most remarkable change in the organisation of
naval aviation when the requirement to get the largest number of ships with the most
aircraft to sea was replaced by the need for sustained operations. For much of the war only
lip service had been given to building up reserve formations whereas spare air groups now
formed the heart of the programme. The large force of eVEs which the navy had strived to
build up was suddenly largely obsolescent as far as front line operations were concerned
and the idea of reducing carrier complements became an acceptable formula to maintain
operations in the long term.
95 Memorandum by DNAO to DAWT and DAMR, 8 Mar 1945, ADM 1/17385.
96 Notes by DNAO for meeting under ACNS (A), 24 March 1945, ADM 1/17385.
97 Minute by Head ofAir Branch, 1 Apr 1945, ADM 1/17385.
98 Message from DNAO to C-in-Cs, 8 Jun 1945, ADM 1/17385.
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Chapter 3 - Strategy and Naval Air Bases
Overview
Naval air stations are the backbone of naval aviation and yet the coverage they have
received has been relatively limited compared with the other aspects of the service. With
the personnel, carriers and aircraft, airfields were one of the four major building blocks of
the RNAS and the FAA, but possess neither the glamour of the aircraft nor the specifically
front line role of the carriers. Consequently authors have tended to neglect them in favour
of the more specifically 'naval' facets, airfields being more associated with the RAF.
The unique nature of air logistics within the Navy is that separate air bases are
required in addition to the traditional dockyards. Devonport, Portsmouth and Singapore
might have been lynchpins for maintaining the fleet in 1939, but they were of little use
when a carrier needed to fly its aircraft ashore. For basic and refresher aircrew training,
accommodation of disembarked squadrons, aircraft maintenance and repair and storage of
reserve aircraft, air bases were essential. The major factor which was relevant in 1914 and
1939 was that, in comparison with dockyards, a major build up of air bases was necessary
in wartime from almost a standing start. This was especially important for the FAA, which
had a carrier force to maintain, but was without a shore-based organisation to support it.
The decision of the dual control arrangement to place the carriers under naval
control, but all land-based support in the hands of the RAF was an extremely serious
weakness when the RN regained control in May 1939. It was not only air stations which the
FAA lacked, but aircraft repair yards and air store depots. Therefore the transfer of four
airfields by the RAF in 1939 only addressed part of the problem. There were few Air
Engineer Officers to advise on requirements. In all aspects the FAA's shore facilities were
inadequate when war broke out and it struggled to compete with its larger sister service.
The Naval Air Expansion Programmes had the most direct impact on the air station
requirements in Britain, Canada and America which were largely used for training, working
up of squadrons and disembarked units. It was extremely difficult to co-ordinate the
availability of airfields compared with other elements of the programmes since new air
stations took years of planning and construction, but were afforded less of a priority,
undoubtedly a throwback to the late 1930s where consideration of shore-based facilities
was a largely academic exercise since they were all controlled by the RAF. The expansion
programmes were laid down according to carrier construction from which the planning for
airfields and the associated repair yards and store depots seemed somewhat divorced at
least until 1942. One obvious, but major problem was that airfields took a substantial time
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to construct and whereas the time to build ships or train aircrew and work up squadrons was
taken into account, that for the construction of airfields was not.
Requirements overseas were much harder to predict being largely dependent on the
strategic direction of the war. If facilities available from the RAF in Britain were limited
then those overseas were even more so. Many of the RAF's air stations abroad were
completely inadequate even for its own needs, never mind the FAA. Some requirements
such as those on trade routes were apparent from the beginning of hostilities, while others
in the Mediterranean and Far East had to be built up according to often changing strategic
plans and operational needs.
One of the fundamental differences between the expenences of 1914-1918 and
1939-1945 was that the RNAS was largely a land-based organisation and utilised its
stations for operations as well as training, making them more significant in first line
operational terms than for the FAA. Therefore in the overall structure of organisation, the
shore bases in the First World War were in the front line, a role largely occupied by carriers
in the later conflict. In many ways its role was more that of Coastal Command than
supporting the fleet.
Some of the RNAS's larger weapons systems such as flying boats and airships
could only operate from land-bases with specialist facilities. The RNAS could depend on its
own stations for all its needs and these were located to a large extent in Britain, the main
exception being the Mediterranean. The biggest operational base was at Dunkirk, but this
could be readily supplied from home stations and reinforcements flown across the Channel.
Aircrew training and aircraft production facilities were concentrated in Britain although
some training facilities were transferred to France in 1916 and it was proposed to establish
some in Canada. In comparison the FAA's top priority was to sustain carriers worldwide;
whether at Gibraltar or in Egypt in the Mediterranean, Canada for the North Atlantic or
Ceylon in the Indian Ocean the base requirements overseas increased, especially as
operations were dramatically increased in the Indian Ocean and Far East in 1944-1945.
The construction of airfields in the First World War presented widely differing
propositions; stations for aeroplanes were often simple affairs with a grass runway and
limited facilities. Some of them, for example landing grounds with a few fighters for air
defence of Britain were not intended to be permanent so local accommodation was used to
house personnel, the construction limited to the sheds, workshops and essential facilities.
At the other end of the spectrum the rigid airships required enormous sheds to be built
before the airships themselves could be constructed. Seaplane stations also required
substantial investment, especially with the introduction of large flying boats which needed
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concrete slipways and large sheds; when it was proposed to operate flying boats in the
Mediterranean it was necessary to allocate part of the facilities at Malta Dockyard. 1
Since the RNAS performed both fleet support and coastal command roles and
aviation was in its infancy there was little difficulty in obtaining sites. With Coastal
Command under the RAF's umbrella and as such having the first choice of facilities it
retained a number of stations at key maritime locations. The location of stations were
important, usually near ports for aircraft to be flown ashore or unloaded, for units involved
in navigation exercises, torpedo training and deck landing practice with areas around the
Clyde and Liverpool becoming increasingly important. Because most RNAS units in
Britain in the First World War were not organised into squadrons, but allocated to stations
in accordance with operational need, deployments sometimes consisted of a small number
of aircraft or airships.
The grass runways, which had been acceptable in the First World War, had been
replaced by tarmac and a much larger infrastructure was required to accommodate much
larger and more technologically advanced aircraft. The wide-range of skills and equipment
required stations specialising in different roles and as the Second World War progressed
units had to spend more time re-training on new aircraft or equipment; Lieutenant George
Sadler recalls answering a question at the FAA Drafting Unit in November 1944 regarding
his training experience: 'I reeled them off - Torpedo Dropping, Deck Landing, Catapult,
Instrument Flying, Western Approaches, Rocket Projectile, Safety Equipment, Rocket
Assisted Take Off and Barracuda Conversion courses. He conceded that I had done all the
relevant courses for a TBR pilot... ,2 It required a juggling of resources between different
types of training which needed different locations and equipment.
The analysis will be split between the requirements at home and abroad. In the case
of the First World War to examine the facilities for the various weapons; aeroplanes,
seaplanes, airships and kite balloons and then a brief summary of the experiences of
establishing bases overseas. For the FAA the divide, albeit somewhat artificial, will be
made between the bases for training and disembarked squadrons in Britain, Canada and
America and the development of operational stations abroad.
1 Report by Wing Commander Longmore, 19 Jan 1918, AIR 1/649/17/122/408.





After the failure of the Navy's first airship, Mayfly, in 1911 pre-war planning was
dominated by the need for seaplane stations. As the Admiralty informed the Admiral
Commanding the Coast Guard and Reserves in November 1912: ' ... their Lordships have
approved the gradual establishment of a regular chain of stations for naval aircraft along the
Coasts of the United Kingdom within easy flight of each other.3 Sixteen stations were
planned around the south and east coasts of Britain from Pembroke to Scapa Flow. Airships
stations were to be located at the delightfully named Teapot Head near Chatham, on the
Norfolk Broads and at Rosyth.
In August 1913, Commodore Sueter, the Director of the Naval Division (DAD)
directed that the districts of Cromarty, Rosyth, Newcastle and Sheerness should have
priority and Churchill, the First Lord, agreed that it was necessary to prioritise aircraft and
personnel:
'Although the establishment of seaplane bases along the south and east coasts is
necessary on strategic grounds... I do not consider it desirable at present to
occupy and man them all... not more than four bases (including the experimental
bases) for seaplanes should be occupied in the current year.,4
A similar contraction of the programme was ordered by Churchill in June 1914: 'Only five
naval air stations instead of eight will be developed this year, the money and personnel
assigned to the whole being concentrated on the five. ,5 By the outbreak of war six seaplane
stations had been established6 and an airship station was being built at Kingsnorth.
At a meeting on 3 August 1915 Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, the new First Sea Lord,
criticised the RNAS on account of its large uncontrolled expansion and the waste of money
on air stations, but was rebuffed: 'Commodore Sueter... on being asked which of the
present or projected stations could be done away with, stated definitely that in his opinion
none should be done away with and he thought more would be required... circumstances
varied but that in round numbers about one [station] every 100 miles should be for patrol
work - Later on Commodore Lambert quoted this as an instance [where] this particular
3 Letter from Admiralty to Admiral Commanding Coast Guard and Reserves, 2 Nov 1912, Doc. No20, in
Roskill, Documents Relating, 61.
4 Minute from First Lord to Second Sea Lord and DAD, 12 Nov 1913, Doc. No.36, in Roskill, Documents
Relating, 116.




problem has been most thoroughly discussed and worked out in detail.' 7 This view would
appear to concur with Churchill's careful application of resources in this instance, rather
than his more profligate view of aircraft production.
Comparative costings and constructional labour
The table of works for RNAS installations approved in July 1915 reveals the wide
range of facilities and the comparative cost of the various types of installations." The
cheapest were for aeroplanes, Eastchurch being the sole pre-war station costing £24,110.
Up to July 1915 a further £128,700 was earmarked for Eastchurch and £120,500 allocated
for 11 new stations" plus twenty aeroplane sheds to be split equally between home and
abroad and two stand-by sheds. Five seaplane stations'" were built in the pre-war period at
a cost of £64,390 and until July 1915 another £120,435 was allocated for their expansion
and £122,760 for eight new stations. ll
By far the largest slice of the RNAS's construction budget was taken up by airships.
The four authorised pre-war stations were to cost £284,500. 12 Between August 1914 and
July 1915 further investment of £28,600 was allocated to Kingsnorth and £162,925 to
another ten air stations13 plus five portable airship sheds. Eight more stations were planned
at a cost of £920,000. 14 Of the total of £1,946,830, £725,000 had been spent by 30 June
1915 and a further £761,830 would be spent by the end of the 1915-1916 financial year.
Only £460,000, half of the allocation for the eight new airships stations, would remain for
works later in 1916. Works costing the remaining £144,500 were cancelled by the
Admiralty.
By far the most extensive and expensive installations were the airship sheds. Two
sheds for rigid airships on the Humber and at Pulham in Norfolk measuring 600 feet long,
150 feet wide and 100 feet high each cost £80,000, while the standard shed holding two
non-rigids was 320 feet long, 150 feet wide and 80 feet high cost £30,000 each. By contrast
one of the most extensive seaplane bases, Killingholme, had four 70 feet by 70 feet sheds
6 Cromarty, Rosyth, Harwich, Isle of Grain, Dover, and Calshot.
7 Report of meeting held by First Sea Lord, 3 Aug 1915, Doc. No.75, in Roskill, Documents Relating, 217.
8 Table of works authorised by the Admiralty Board to be carried out by Director of Works Department in
connection with Air Services, 31 Jul 1915, AIR 1/146/15/58.
9 Dover, Hendon, Dunkerque, Newcastle, Chingford, Chelmsford, Maidstone, Westgate, Eastboume,
Kingsnorth and Scarborough.
10 Calshot, Felixstowe, Yarmouth, Dundee and Fort George.
II Scapa Flow, Loch Strathbeg, Killingholme, Clacton, Dover, Bambridge, Dunkerque and Isle of Grain.
12 Kingsnorth, Pulham, Famborough and Wolverhampton.
13 Wormwood Scrubs, Barrow, Dover, Polegate, Anglesey, Luce Bay, Dunkerque, Marquise, Roehampton
and Gallipoli.
14 Pembroke, Mullion, Selsey, Norfolk, Humber, Tyne District, Rosyth and North of Aberdeen.
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and a temporary slipway constructed at a cost of only £5,400 while three pairs of large
sheds for aeroplanes and associated outbuildings at Eastchurch amounted to only £4,980.
Co-ordinating airfield construction was the Station Construction and Equipment
Committee. Because air power was new and relatively underdeveloped at the start of
hostilities, the Air Service Construction Corps (ACC) was formed to build RNAS stations
and was manned by forty-eight officers and 1500 men by January 1917. The biggest
contingent was at Pulham airship station comprising seventeen officers and 593 ratings.
Other significant units included ten officers and 325 ratings at Houton Bay, Scapa building
five kite balloon sheds, three officers and 156 ratings at Vendome training school in France,
four officers and 140 ratings at Howden airship station and three officers and 134 ratings at
Cranwell. Smaller contingents were to be found at Polegate, Dunkirk, Crystal Palace and
the Admiralty."
Not all construction was carried out by the ACC. Of the eight rigid sheds planned in
April 1916 those at Aberdeen, Howden, Pulham, Cranwell and East Fortune were to be
constructed using naval labour, whilst outside contractors would be brought in at Selby,
Inchinnan and Bedford. 16 In France or other areas where Expeditionary Forces were
operating, construction was undertaken by Army labour battalions, but these were
unavailable in certain areas of the Mediterranean prompting recruitment of local labour on
Malta as C-in-C Mediterranean reported in September 1918:
'Enlistment of native Maltese recruits for the RAF has been proceeding for the
last five months, and, at present just under 700 recruits have been obtained. The
total numbers aimed at are 2000. These men are all unskilled "labourers"... In the
Adriatic and the Aegean (especially the latter) a very large amount of labourwork
has to be formed [sic] - such as building, road-making, drainage, sanitation, land
and water transport... already 100 of these [Maltese] men have been drafted to
the Adriatic and 150 to the Aegean, while 50 are employed at the seaplane
station, Malta.' 17
The availability of specific labour units was a considerable fillip for the RNAS, although in
some cases temporary facilities were erected to save time and resources and get bases into
service faster.
15 Weekly report of Air Service Constructional Corps, 4 Jan 1917; Minutes of meeting of Station Construction
and Equipment Committee, Lighter-than-Air Section, 1 Dec 1916, AIR 1/149/15/100.
16 First Lord's RNAS fortnightly return, 16-30 Apr 1916, AIR 1/150/15/113/2.





Aeroplane stations in Britain formed the basis of the RNAS' s flying training. The
makeshift pre-war organisation saw pilots trained at private flying schools including the
Grahame White School at Hendon. Later in the war most recruits joined the RNAS depot at
Crystal Palace for initial naval training before undertaking initial flying training at
Eastchurch, Chingford, Redcar or Vendome. Advanced training for most pilots was carried
out at Cranwell with prospective seaplane pilots then proceeding to Calshot for specialist
inctruction. Eastchurch also housed the observer and gunnery schools. Chingford
aerodrome appeared to have a fairly notorious reputation as far as novice pilots were
concerned. Gordon Hyams recalled his experience there in 1917: ' ...a very rough
aerodrome with a lot of streams running across it and they had board bridges across where
you had to taxi ... the other side of the road was the King George V reservoirs, which had
great attraction for people with engine trouble, there were quite a lot of them. ,18
In the spring of 1916 the poor weather conditions in Britain were recognised as a
major impediment to the training programme as Rear Admiral Vaughan-Lee, the Director
of Air Services, noted: 'The continuance of the present weather conditions in this country
having brought the training of air pilots practically to a standstill, it is desired, if possible,
to establish temporarily a training Aerodrome in France.,l9 A suitable site near Vendome
was chosen in June 1916 and largely completed by 1917: 'There are 6 Aeroplane Sheds
each 180' x 80' and each to hold about 12 machines ... Two of the sheds are completed and
the remainder are practically completed... ,20 Accommodation was necessary for the station
personnel of thirty-six officers and 600 men. Pending the arrival of the huts for the first
fifty trainee officers, they would be accommodated in houses rented in Vendome. On the
commissioning of Vendome, Eastboume would be closed down, but this expectation was
short lived as D.A.S. reported on 5 April 1917: 'In order to meet the increasing demand for
Pilots, it is found necessary to provide an additional training school and it is, therefore,
proposed to re-open the R.N. Air Station, Eastbourne on the l" May 1917... ,21 Ultimately
it was planned to have 100 officers under instruction at Vendome each undertaking initial
flying training comprising 20 hours in the air and a series of lectures. Philip Bristow was
posted to Vendome in 1917: 'We had to parade twice a day on what was called the quarter
18 G.F. Hyams, IWMlSA 10409, Reel l.
19 Minute by DAS, 29 Mar 1916, ADM 1/436/15/276/2.
20 Report from CO, RNAS Vendome to DAS, 1917, AIR 1/436/15/276/l.
21 Minute by A.V. Vyvyan for DAS, 5 Apr 1917, AIR 1/635/17/122/119.
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deck... We had a flagstaff which flew the White Ensign and everything was dealt with in
naval terms. We all wore naval uniform and it was treated just like a ship ...22
Some of the training was undertaken in Canada at the Curtiss Flying School in
1915, but poor weather here like in England prompted the Vice Admiral, Director of the
Naval Service in Ottawa, to contact the Admiralty on 21 September: 'There are, at present,
approximately one hundred and thirty candidates ... The weather conditions during the past
summer have been exceptionally bad for flying purposes as there has been a great amount
of rain and high winds. ,23 In reply Bonar Law, the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
signalled the Governor General of Canada on IONovember: ' ...Admiralty ask that
candidates for Naval Air Service may be sent home to complete training. 48 can be
accepted during next two months and should be sent in batches of 12, remainder after New
Year up to total of 150.,24
Responsibility for the air defence of Britain was an unexpected and ultimately
unwanted role foisted on the RNAS in 1914 when the RFC was despatched to France. The
aerodromes established were largely temporary affairs with a few aircraft and when the
RFC took over the role in 1916 a number of the landing grounds were transferred including
Goldhanger, near Maldon and Narborough in March 1916: ' ... all fixtures will be turned
over, but that portable plant, tents, stores and transport should be returned to R.N.A.S.
Central Depot, White City, and that all ranks and ratings employed on the grounds should
be withdrawn forthwith. ,25 The inability of the aeroplanes to undertake their anti-Zeppelin
role effectively caused the Rear-Admiral Commanding, East Coast of England, to question
the whole effectiveness of the aeroplane patrols in February 1916:
, ... I do not consider any system of coast patrol by land machines can provide an
appreciable protection against the enemy's airships ... a chain of seaplane carriers
stationed... is the true line of air defence as long as we have no airships of our
own. .. the land machine stations at Whitley Bay, Homsea and Scarborough
should be abolished, and I would add Redcar to the list.,26
22 C. P Bristow, IWM/SA 13718, Reel 2.
23 Letter by Vice Admiral, Director of Naval Service Ottawa, to Secretary of Admiralty, 21 Sep 1915, AIR
1/656/17/122/552.
24 Message from Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor General of Canada, IONov 1915, AIR
1/656/17/122/552.
25 Minute by DAS, 14 Mar 1916, AIR 1/146/15/55.




The Admiralty maintained that the shore stations did have a role: ' ...they [Their Lordships]
concur in the view that aeroplanes are of little use against Zeppelins at night; at the same
time some aeroplanes must continue to be stationed on the coast in order to prevent
Zeppelins attacking in broad daylight.,27 Accordingly Redcar was retained, but Whitely
Bay closed once the RFC had assumed control of air defence of Newcastle and South
Shields seaplane station had been completed.
The importance of having airfields suitable for the higher performance aircraft
entering service was highlighted by the Divisional Commander of Air Stations, The Nore,
in March 1916: 'The Commanding Officer, Westgate ... has drawn attention to the
dangerously restricted nature of the Westgate aerodrome. This danger is very much
increased when using fast machines as they require a much larger space in which to
land... ,28 Accordingly Westgate's aircraft, pilots and forty ratings were transferred to
nearby Manston three months later.29
In addition to the training and air defence roles, a new requirement for aeroplane
stations arose in 1917 with the increase in the number of aeroplanes on Grand Fleet ships
highlighted by Captain Schwann of Campania:
' ... [a] great need that arises [is] for the provision of good facilities at Fleet Bases
for the aeroplanes to alight on land and be re-embarked in ships ... Owing to the
Fleet being generally at four hours notice for steam and to practically no ships
being able to carry more aircraft than may be required for service, it is essential
that facilities be provided for embarking aircraft, personnel and stores in a very
short time... facilities ... at Rosyth and Scapa Bases are at present totally
inadequate. ,30
Rear-Admiral Phillimore, Admiral Commanding Aircraft, Grand Fleet supported the
requirements for facilities at both at Scapa and Rosyth:
, ... Pilots will require more practice... and it is hoped to give them plenty of
work by lending them for 4 or 5 days at a time to Turnhouse Aerodrome...
Smoogroo will have accommodation for half a dozen pilots landed there for
practice. The Grand Fleet Aerodromes and bases are:- Donibristle, Rosyth,
27 Letter from Secretary of Admiralty to RAC, East Coast of England, 6 March 1916. AIR 1/635/17/122/121.
28 Letter from DCAS, The Nore to c.m-c, The Nore, 29 Mar 1916, AIR 1/646/17/122/342.
29 Minute by DAS, 9 Apr 1916, AIR 1/646/17/122/342.
30 Letter from CO, HMS Campania to C-in-C Grand Fleet, 9 Sep 1917, AIR 1/436/15/279/1.
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Tumhouse, Smoogroo, Rosyth. Of these Donibristle and Scapa are for repair
work. ..,31
By the end of the war 388 aeroplanes were allocated to the ships and shore stations of the
Grand Fleet. There were 340 officers, of whom 204 were pilots and 1552 ratings and 161
Wrens. In addition to the four carriers of the Flying Squadron, aircraft were carried on
thirty-seven other warships.Y
Seaplane stations
RNAS Calshot was the hub of the seaplane element of the service where the
training of seaplane pilots was carried out after their instruction on aeroplanes. Grahame
Donald trained at Calshot in 1915: ' ... it was a very permanent naval air station. It had been
built as a naval air station with concrete slipways and permanent sheds ... ,33 Commodore
Godfrey Paine, Director of Air Services (DAS), visited Calshot in May 1917 and noted that
the lack of progress on accommodation was affecting the expansion of the service: ' ... the
men's and officers' quarters were proceeding far too slowly. Things must be hastened, or
delay in production of pilots will occur. .. ,34 Gordon Hyams arrived at Calshot in June
1917 and was highly satisfied by his accommodation in the local area: 'Well we lived one
side of the river in a place called Warsash in a very nice country house, very comfortable
there and we crossed over to Calshot on the other side of the water in a paddle steamer.' 35
The use of civilian accommodation seems to have been a reasonably frequent occurrence;
seaplane pilot Philip Bristow was training at Lee-on-Solent in 1918: ' .. .I was quartered in
a very nice residential house on the top of the cliff. Several of these had been
commandeered by the Navy... ,36 To supplement training in Britain in 1917, thirty-five
Canadian seaplane pilots a month were receiving initial flying training in Canada before
coming to Britain and the Air Department hoped this training could be extended: ' ... ' If
time permits, endeavours might be made to complete the seaplane training of all these
pilots, and they would then only require a "polishing" course at Cranwell on their arrival in
England. ,37
31 Lecture 'The Future and Possibilities of the Air in Naval Warfare' by Rear Admiral Sir R. Phillimore,
Imperial War Museum/Department of Documents 96/33/1 [Further references to Imperial War Museum/
Department of Documents will be referred to as IWMlDoc].
32 Paper by Rear Admiral Sir R. Phillimore for Committee of the Navy League, Apr 1920, IWMlDoc 96/33/l.
33 G. Donald, IWMlSA 18, Reel 4.
34 Report of visit by DAS to Calshot, 19 May 1917, AIR 1/150/15/108.
35 G.F. Hyams, IWMlSA 10409, Reel 3.
36 c.r. Bristow, IWM/SA 13718, Reel 2.
37 Minute by Wing Commander, Air Department, 21 Feb 1917, AIR 1/151/15/115.
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In July 1917 there was argument over the need for a seaplane training school in the
Mediterranean; Captain Vyvyan, Naval Assistant to DAS, believed that: ' ... requirements of
seaplane pilots are at present being met at the home schools, and the establishment of a
training centre in the Mediterranean is not considered necessary. ,38 The Director of
Operations Division did not agree that facilities in Britain could cope: ' the number of
seaplane pilots is now approximately 300 and is increasing steadily With present
resources it is unlikely that this rate [of training] can be maintained through the winter
months ... Malta and Taranto as proposed should be kept in view.,39
A further difficulty in choosing locations for the seaplane bases were the calm
conditions required for fragile seaplanes to operate. Gerald Livock joined Great Yarmouth
as flight commander in December 1916: 'Yarmouth was a most unsatisfactory base for
seaplanes as the slipways were on the coast and our poor old aircraft - when they could be
launched at all - had to operate in the open sea, with unfortunate results to their frail
structures ... ,40 The selection of a site for a seaplane station on the Tyne and the ultimately
unsuccessful choice of South Shields illustrated the various elements needed for seaplane
operation. Squadron Commander Rathbone from RNAS Redcar, reported on possible sites
on Tyneside in September 1915: ' ...there is no suitable site ... except to the south of the
mouth of the Tyne... This is the only site on this coast which had the advantage of a
considerable stretch of enclosed water to be used for landing and getting off in rough
water. ,41 Admiral Ballard, the Admiral of Patrols, strongly disagreed with this assessment:
, .. .I do not consider it possible to construct a seaplane station at the mouth of the Tyne...
A very heavy sea breaks all along the South Jetty on to the Herd Sand in the easterly
gales ... no slipway could be built that would be strong enough to withstand it unless
constructed of stone... ,42 Despite Ballard's objections the station at South Shields was
built and was largely unsuccessful; Rear Admiral Commanding, East Coast of England
reported in June 1917 that except at high tide it was not possible to launch seaplanes from
the slipway and local weather conditions with fog and heavy swell were wholly unsuited to
seaplane requirements.43 South Shields was closed much to the relief of Christopher
Bilney, a seaplane pilot, presented a bleak tableau of life there: 'The harbour was generally
38 Minute by Naval Assistantto DAS, 16 July 1917. AIR 1/667/17/122/752.
39 Minute by DOD, 19 July 1917, AIR /1667/17/122/752.
40 G.E. Livock, To the Ends ofthe Air (London: HMSO, 1973), pp.39-41.
41 Letter by Squadron Commander, RNAS Redcar to Admiral of Patrols, Immingham, 11 Sep 1915, AIR
1/632/17/122/72.
42 Letter by Admiral of Patrols, Immingham to Secretary of the Admiralty, 15 Sep 1915, AIR
1/632/17/122/72.




too small for us to take off... The amenities ... were completely nix [nil]. .. The officers
lived in a little hotel, which we ran ourselves and there was nothing to do in the evening.
On the main we used to run a poker or shove ha'penny pool or something of that sort to
keep ourselves out of mischief. ,44
A number of seaplane stations used temporary facilities to get them operational
quickly. At Fishguard in March 1917 the hangar and slipway were complete, but the
aircrew were billeted in the Fishguard Bay Hotel and some ratings in Goodwick Village
and railway carriages. A temporary petrol store of 1000 gallons was available in the Great
Western Railway garage.45 The seaplane station at Seaton Carew with twelve aircraft was
accepted as almost wholly temporary in nature according to a Captain Vyvyan, Naval
Assistant to DAS, in November 1917:
'It is not proposed to erect permanent sheds, but to use Bessoneaux [hangars], and
the risk of their being blown down during the winter gales must be faced .... it is
not proposed at present to erect huts, but to use the Smelting Company's hut as
long as available, billeting the surplus officers and men at Seaton Carew and
placing them under canvas in the spring...,46
The introduction of the Porte and Large America flying boats in 1917 required
extensive facilities limiting the stations at which they could operate:
'These [Porte] Large Boats require large sheds and heavy slipways and, at
present, can only be accommodated at Killingholme and Felixstowe... No more
of these machines are being built, being superceded by Large America Type...
These Boats require fairly large sheds and slipways. They can be accommodated
at the following Stations: Houton Bay (building). South Shields. Killingholme.
Yarmouth. Grain. Calshot. Cattewater, Plymouth (building). ,47
The construction work did not hinder bringing the flying boats into service on account of
the slow production of such large machines.
44 N.H. Bilney, IWM/SA 002, Reel 2.
45 Extract from letter by Vice Admiral, Milford Haven to Admiralty, 4 Mar 1917, AIR 1/631/17/122/45.
46 Minute by Naval Assistant to DAS, 22 Nov 1917, AIR 1/654/17/122/506.




The requirement for a network of airship stations was not one that could have been
foreseen before Admiral Fisher, the First Sea Lord, called for a series of non-rigid airships
to counter the U-boat threat in February 1915. On the outbreak of war there were only two
airship stations at Famborough and Kingsnorth; rigger Eustace Evans was appointed to
Kingsnorth in November 1914 and recalled his first task: ' ...the transporting of wooden
sectional buildings which were to be erected for the additional officer accommodation...
The weather was simply atrocious and the continuous rain turned the ground into deep
. k d ,48stic ymu '"
Midshipman Victor Goddard was in the battleship HMS Britannia in May 1915,
when he was one of a dozen promising young officers summoned to the Admiralty by
Fisher to be airship pilots. Goddard's initial balloon training was in Roehampton and his
quarters presented a stark contrast to those on Britannia at Scapa Flow:
'Grove House... in Roehampton Lane was evidently a very rich man's house ...
complete with the staff of butler and servants ... Roehampton, which was
beautifully appointed and luxurious to a degree, to sleep in comfortable beds and
have meals of first-class cuisine, offered to you by liveried servants, was quite
something quite spoiling and of course we, as young midshipmen, enjoyed this
kind of style of life very much indeed. ,49
Fisher held a conference on 19 June when it was decided to open six bases for non-rigid
airships and two for rigids.i" Two months later facilities were well advanced at Dover,
Polegate, Luce Bay, Anglesey, Marquise in France and Lame in Ireland. Two portable
airship sheds had been sent to the Dardanelles. Work had just begun at the Lizard and
Pembroke and further bases were planned at Aberdeen, Firth of Forth and the Humber. The
most advanced station was Dover, which possessed two sheds for five SS airships. At
Polegate two sheds, each for three airships were nearing completion, although there were
few other facilities: 'This Station consists of little else than the Sheds themselves, the
necessary financial approval to complete the Station having been long delayed. ,51
48 E.E.H. Evans, IWMlDoc 74/139/1, 3-4.
49 V. Goddard, IWM/SA 303. Reel 2.
50 Minutes of conference held by First Sea Lord, 19 Jun 1915, AIR 1/2635.
Non-rigid bases at Land's End, Selsea, Tyne, Humber, Fifth of Forth and between Peterhead and Aberdeen.
Rigid bases on the Humber and in Norfolk.
51 'Statement re Progress with S.S. Airship Programme' by DAD, 20 Aug 1915, AIR 1/2634.
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By January 1916 there were seven stations in Britain and one at Imbros in the
Aegean; these included the rigid airship construction shed at Barrow-in-Furness, non-rigid
construction facilities at Kingsnorth and Wormwood Scrubs plus non-rigid stations at
Anglesey, Folkestone, Luce Bay and Polgate. Thomas Williams, an airship pilot arrived at
Kingsnorth in June 1916 after training at Wormwood Scrubs:
, .. .it was just about finished. There were huts and buildings all over the place.
Thinking back now, it was a very efficient station indeed. There were two large
sheds and... I remember distinctly thinking Kingsnorth was a rise in status and
conditions generally. At [Wormwood] Scrubs we were not resident but at
Kingsnorth we felt we were going aboard a battleship... ,52
At the beginning of 1917 there were fourteen operational bases in Britain plus three rigid
construction sheds at Barrow, Inchinnan and Barlow and non-rigid facilities at Kingsnorth
and Wormwood Scrubs. In the Mediterranean bases were at Mudros and Kassandra and St.
Pol in France. The geographical coverage of the stations in Britain was increased with
bases at East Fortune in Scotland and Mullion in Cornwall. Air Mechanic Ernest Hancock
arrived at Mullion in early 1916:
,... Mullion airship station was just a field and the erection of the main airship
sheds and roads was in the course of being dealt with and for the first month or
two we were nothing but labourers ... We had to build the first shed...,53
Frederick Verry, was an SS airship pilot based at Mullion and its associated landing
grounds in 1918: 'Mullion itself was a well-equipped station with two large sheds, a gas
plant and workshops which were quite well equipped for maintenance of the ships. The
sub-stations were rather primitive places; there were no sheds available and the ships were
moored in secluded woods. ,54
By January 1918 additional rigid airship construction facilities were available at
Barking, Bedford, Flookburgh and Kingsnorth, but there was opposition to the rigid
programme in October 1917 from Churchill, then Minister of Munitions:
52 T.B. Williams, IWM/SA 313, Reel!.
53 E.W. Hancock, IWMlSA 8950, Reel 1.
54 F.W. Verry, IWM/SA 311, Reel 6.
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,... the Airships Programme which is dependent on the new building and housing
sheds cannot mature effectivelytill 1919 ... meanwhile the erection of these sheds
will hamper and impair the execution of the far more urgent Aeroplane
Programme required for the spring and summer of 1918 by withdrawing both
skilled labour and materials." We run a great risk of spending labour and steel in
1917 and 1918 upon the erection of sheds for airship construction which when
1919 comes will be discarded in favour of far more urgent needs of aeroplane
warfare.,55
Commodore Paine, the Fifth Sea Lord, defended the airship programme, but in doing so
addressed the question of resources for the airships themselves rather than the sheds: ' ...
less than 350 tons of Aluminium is required to complete the whole of the additional Rigid
Airships proposed... the skilled labour required in building Airships is mostly supplied
from female labour. ,56 The major construction effort, which Churchill alluded to, was for
the sheds, which for rigid airships are estimated to have consumed the equivalent steel to
six destroyers. Second Lieutenant J.S Middleton based at Longside between May and
September 1916 gave an impression of the size of a rigid airship station:
'It was a steel and corrugated iron shed... that was 1000 feet long and about 200
feet high... The station itself was very, very extensive... tremendous acreage
because it was designed specifically for the rigids, which were much larger, and
you had to manoeuvre them on the ground according to the wind so it was a very
h I ,57muc arger...
The largest sheds at Howden and Pulham, were built to house the '33' Class, Howden No.2
being 750ft long, 300ft wide and 130ft high. 58 The result of suspending the construction of
sheds for rigid airships would have halted construction of the airships themselves and
hence was vigorously contested by the Admiralty.
Kite balloon stations
Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty frequently pressed the Admiralty for kite balloon trials
with the Grand Fleet from mid-1915. In July 1916 Jellicoe complained that trials had been
halted because of the need for more permanent facilities: 'The type of hangar, wood
55 Note by Minister of Munitions, 11 Oct 1917, Doc.No.185, in Roskill, Documents Relating. 532.
56 Additional note by Fifth Sea Lord, Doc. No.185, in Roskill, Documents Relating, 532.
57 J.S Middleton, IWMlSA 38, Reel 3.
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covered with canvas, as originally supplied to Scapa Air Station, is not considered suitable,
owing to the strong winds prevalent in this part of the country.' 59 Two months later Jellicoe
estimated that facilities for twelve balloons would be needed and approval was quickly
forthcoming: 'It is proposed to erect portable sheds - Silicol plant - hutting for 16 officers
and 100 men at Scapa and 8 officers and 68 men at Rosyth ...,60 According to the Director
of Works the first shed was due for delivery on the 3 November and the last in December.61
Estimates for 1917 were for seven sheds, thirty electric and eleven hydraulic winches,
fifteen gas plants, two gas holders and five air compressors. 62
By July 1917 twenty-five kite balloons were allocated to Scapa, Rosyth, Shotley,
Lowestoft, Sheerness, Plymouth and Milford for use with the fleet. A further thirty full-
sized balloons and twenty-four dummy balloons were needed to equip convoys for anti-
submarine observation and these were to be based at Portsmouth, Shotley, Devonport,
Scillies, Queenstown, Lough Swilly, Immingham and on the Tyne."
Overseas - France
The largest concentration of naval air power abroad was at Dunkirk, but being close
to RNAS bases in Britain was largely an essentially a part of the home organisation
operating in tandem with the air station at Dover for naval operations in the Channel. By
the autumn of 1915 Dunkirk was well equipped with aircraft repair workshops and
accommodation for stores and Wing Commander Lambe, CO, requested further facilities to
meet operational needs:
' ... to obtain a maximum of efficiency, not more than twenty-four Pilots can
operate from one landing-ground... in order to prepare for a vigorous Aeroplane
offensive policy in the early spring of 1916, arrangements may be made for
taking over and preparing two aerodromes between Dunkirk and Bergues ... ,64
58 C.E.S. Mowthorpe, Battlebags: British Airships ofthe First World War, An Illustrated History (Stroud:
Sutton Publishing, 1995), Appendix C, 177-181.
59 Letter from C-in-C Grand Fleetto Secretary of Admiralty, 13 July 1916, AIR 1/636/17/1221131.
60 Minute by DAS, 1011916, AIR 1/636/17/122/130.
61 Minute by Director of Works, 30 Oct 1916, AIR 1/636/17/122/130.
62 Kite balloon estimates for 1917, Dec 1916, AIR 1/636/17/122/131.
63 Minute by Fisher, DASD, 18 Ju11917, AIR 1/669/17/122/782.




Dunkirk's complement grew from fifty-one aeroplanes and six seaplanes in September
1915 to 249 aeroplanes and thirty-seven seaplanes in April 1917.65 The deployment to
Luxueil in northern France in the summer of 1916, which was also substantial peaking at
over 100 aeroplanes in January 1917, was delayed by the transfer of the aeroplanes to the
RFC rather any lack of facilities."
Overseas - Mediterranean
The concept of supporting aircraft without extensive base facilities was illustrated
by the seaplane carrier HMS Ark Royal in the Dardenelles in 1915: ' ... a large hold in
which are at present stowed six seaplanes and four land machines [aeroplanes]. There is a
well-equipped workshop for their maintenance and repair.t'" Another innovation was the
deployment of kite balloons in Hector and Menelaus. The airfield for the aeroplanes of
Commodore Samson's No.3 Wing was initially on the island of Tenedos, but later moved
nearer to the Gallipoli peninsula to Imbros where conditions were satisfactory according to
pilot Donald Bremner:
'We were really comfortable. We had a stone-built mess room, which was the
gun-room and the next door was the wardroom. We all ate in the wardroom. We
lived in aeroplane packing cases ... I suppose they were about ten feet long,
perhaps seven feet high, andpossibly seven feet wide... ,68
With the end of the Dardenelles campaign small aeroplane stations were established on
Thasos, Stavros and Mitylene to support Allied forces at Salonika and a squadron of
seaplane carriers was based in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the build up of forces in the
theatre was slow, demonstrated by the example of Malta. The Admiralty Superintendent,
Malta, requested airship and seaplane stations in January 1916 and Rear-Admiral Vaughan-
Lee, D.A.S., largely supported the request:
'This [seaplane base] will be of value in any case for training purposes in the
future... We happen however to have in stocksheds for two Coastals ... theyhave
the advantage of a steady platform and would probably be of more use in the
65 Naval Intelligence Division, Admiralty, War Vessels and Aircraft (British and Foreign), Monthly Return,
Sep 1915, NHB; First Lord's RNAS fortnightly returns, 1-15 Apr 1915, AIR 1/150/15/113/1.
66 First Lord's RNAS fortnightly returns, 15-28 Feb 1915, AIR 11150/15111311.
67 Particulars ofHMS Ark Royal, 1915, Doc. No.66, in Rosk.ill, Documents Relating, 202.
68 D. Bremner, IWM/SA 4, Reel 4.
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clear waters of the Mediterranean than elsewhere and be a deterrent to
submarines. ,69
However the Admiralty Board disagreed and only the seaplane station was approved to be
equipped initially five Large America flying boats, rising to ten machines at a later date.70
In the spring of 1917 the need to increase airship anti-submarine patrols in the
Mediterranean was apparent and Commodore Sueter, SAC, proposed the construction of
two sheds for S.S. airships and two for Coastals at Malta, but resources were restricted and
approval was only given for a single Coastal shed with local labour and materials." By
April 1917 RNAS units were widely spread throughout the Mediterranean: there were
squadrons of aeroplanes at Thasos, Mityleini, Imbros, Stavros with the repair workshops
and gunnery and flying schools at Mudros. Seaplane units at Thasos, Suda Bay, Mudros
with airship stations at Kassandra and Mudros.f
In 1918 the RNAS forces in the Mediterranean were organised into five
administrative areas; Malta, Italian, Aegean, Port Said and Gibraltar. At Malta a large
extension to the seaplane station was required for the erection and repair of Large America
flying boats and to accommodate reserve aircraft. Malta would become the central depot
for distribution throughout Mediterranean and aerodromes in Southern Italy.73 Additional
requirements were for aerodromes in the Italian area at Taranto and Otranto.i" The
seaplane base at Port Said, which had previously supported the seaplane carrier squadron,
was to be replaced by an airfield with a squadron of DH9 aeroplanes because of the narrow
and congested harbour which restricted operations.
The relatively limited nature of the RNAS's expansion in the Mediterranean is
illustrated by the number of aircraft involved, in March 1918 by far the largest
concentration was 105 aeroplanes, mainly second line machines, and thirty-four seaplanes
at Mudros and associated bases in the Aegean, compared with an overall RNAS first line
strength of 1100 aeroplanes and 550 scaplanes.f
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70 Message from First Sea Lord to Admiral Superintendent, Malta, 18 Mar 1916, AIR 1/650/17/122/427.
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73 Minute by DAD, 16 Feb 1918, AIR 1/1/649/17/122/408.
74 Report by Wing Commander Longmore, 19 Jan 1918, AIR 1/649/17/122/408.





In addition to providing the maintenance personnel and four air stations in Britain for the
FAA, agreement was reached at a meeting held on 5 August 1938 that the RAF would
supply aircraft repair facilities for the next three years:
, ... there should be no difficulty in providing that the RAF should carry out repairs
for Fleet Air Ann aircraft on an agency basis until the new Central Repair
Establishment had been constructed and was ready to function, i.e. about March,
1941, during which time the Admiralty would build up a repair organisation. ,76
This decision was as important as the loan of maintenance personnel for squadrons given
the limited repair capabilities afloat: ' ...the experience of the R.A.F ... has proved that there
are considerable difficulties in the maintenance of the Initial Equipment (or first-line)
aircraft on board ship, apart from routine servicing, minor inspections, and very minor
repairs. ,77 Carriers would undertake minor inspections and repairs, but when an aircraft was
due for a 120-hour, 240-hour or 360-hour inspection it would be exchanged for one in the
immediate reserve and handed over to the base workshop organisation for overhaul. When
either the airframe or engine became due for a major overhaul, the aircraft would be
returned to an RAF repair depot until the Central Repair Establishment was completed in
1941. The RAF also undertook to repair aircraft overseas until naval facilities were
available. The co-ordination of maintenance at overseas stations was identified as one of
crucial importance: ' ...on the more important stations from the Fleet Air Arm point of
view, the Commander-in-Chief should have on his staff a Fleet Air Arm technical
officer...,n While the FAA had no alternative but to rely on the RAF, this would be a
problem, especially on overseas stations where the facilities were extremely limited.
The navy assumed responsibility for naval air stores and equipment with the
Admiralty taking over the depot at Coventry on 1 May 1939.79
76 Memorandum on 'Proposed Repair and Maintenance Organisation for Fleet Air Ann aircraft' by Technical





The Second World War
UK planning, 1938-1942
In October 1938 Duff Cooper, the First Lord, reminded Sir Thomas Inskip, the Minister for
Co-ordination of Defence, of the need for the shore-based organisation to run in parallel
with the carrier programme:
'We are now building or completing five new Aircraft Carriers and a sixth is
about to be ordered. It is, therefore, most necessary that we should proceed at
once with our shore base organisation for the large number of squadrons which
are required. In addition, we shall, in future, have a greatly increased training
requirement and much of this can only be carried out from shore bases.,80
The Naval Air Department laid out the two primary purposes for shore stations; firstly, the
training for all observers and air gunners and for pilots torpedo-bombing, deck-landing,
seaplane, catapult, night flying and air fighting training and secondly, continued operational
training of formed squadrons. With pilots' flying training the responsibility of the RAF, the
Navy required schools for Observers and Air Gunners, a Torpedo School, a Fighter School
plus facilities for seaplane, catapult and deck-landing training.f ' Nor was it merely a task of
replicating the training facilities which had been utilised by the RAF:
,... the amount of training realised in the past [less than fifty hours a year per
aircraft] has been insufficient to bring the Fleet Air Arm to an overall efficiency
commensurate with its cost and importance... besides the embarked training, 150
to 200 hours training... must be obtained from shore bases in order to ensure
reasonable all-round efficiency in the fleet aircraft during peace-time....,82
In 1939 seven aerodromes were estimated to be required to accommodate thirty squadrons
in wartime and Ford, Lee-on-Solent, Donibristle and Worthy Down were to be transferred
from the RAF as apart of the agreement to establish the FAA. It was hoped to obtain RAF
Thomey Island for use as a Torpedo School, loan Eastleigh as an Air Gunners' and Fighter
School and construct a new aerodrome in the Orkneys. As was often the case during the
war the FAA was not happy with some of its allocated RAF stations; Donibristle was
viewed as unsatisfactory as an operational station, but in the long-term would be a repair
79 Notes of conference held by Director of Equipment at the Air Ministry, 5 Oct 1938, ADM 1/9718.
80 Minute from First Lord to Minister for Co-ordination for Defence, 17 Oct 1938, ADM 116/4038.
81 Memorandum N.A.D. 512/38 from Naval Air Department, Oct 1938, ADM 116/4038.
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depot while Worthy Down was only deemed suitable as an Air Gunners' School as long as
slow aircraft types were in service.83
For 1942 the number of units requiring shore facilities in Britain was estimated at
forty-three at ten stations. Either Crail or Kilrenny were needed to replace Donibristle in its
operational role and three new bases constructed for an Air Gunners' School, a Fighter
School and a third for deck landing training, one of these to replace Eastleigh. An
Armament Training Station was required for transfer from the RAF.84 The Head of Air
Branch estimated in January 1939 that in 1942 the FAA would have a strength of 8,700
plus some 800 trainees.f In April 1939, one month before the Navy regained control of the
FAA, the Treasury was informed of the inadequate Air Ministry assistance:
'The expansion of the Fleet Air Ann to something like three times its present first
line strength, and provision of reserves, inevitably call for a large increase in
shore accommodation. The Air Ministry are unable to transfer to the Admiralty
sufficient shore stations to meet it or to do so by using stations on a shared basis,
and it is necessary for us to makeup the deficiency. ,86
The core requirement was to develop five new six squadron stations by 1942. After
negotiations the Head of Air Branch reported the agreement for Admiralty funding: 'The
Treasury Representatives agreed that the Admiralty had established a case for three new
Stations at Home to accommodate 6 Squadrons each, and for the enlargement of Lee to
accommodate 7Y2 Squadrons, Ford to 6 Squadrons and Worthy Down to 4 Squadrons. ,87
The procedure of commissioning new air stations was something for which the RN
had not been responsible for since the First World War and with Arbroath, Yeovilton, Crail
and St Merryn due to commission in the first half of 1940, Rear Admiral Naval Air Stations
(RANAS) drew up a schedule: 'In order that the process of commissioning... shall be
carried out smoothly and efficiently it is considered that the appointment of the Executive
Officer, Paymaster Commander and the Captain's Secretary should be well in advance of
any nucleus staff and not less than 3 months before the date of commissioning.' 88 Other
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arrangement did not become official Admiralty policy and was revisited three years later as
the Head of Air Branch noted in April 1943:
'When... Arbroath, Yeovilton, Crail and St Merryn were nearing completion
early in 1940, arrangements were made to appoint certain officers and to draft
nucleus parties of ratings to these Stations at suitable periods in advance of the
dates of commissioning, in order that the process of commissioning might be
carried out smoothly and efficiently. Since then a number of other Stations in the
United Kingdom have been brought into use, but of late no fixed procedure for
commissioning has been followed. ,89
An Air Branch Acquaint of 1 May 1943 approved a commissioning procedure for new
stations with a nucleus party arriving between three and four months before the
commissioning date. DNAO and DACR would open an Admiralty paper six months
beforehand laying down the commissioning date of each station, its functions and squadron
requirements. 90
Some stations transferred from the RAF required considerable work on their
facilities as observer Charles Friend discovered on arrival at RNAS Ford in the autumn of
1939:
'I and the rest of the 36th Course were dismayed to be accommodated in bell
tents, that station not having yet been provided with enough huts... It was a bit
much... to join the Navy and be made to live in a tent at the edge of an
aerodrome! The winter of 1939/1940 was bitterly cold and snowy, and inhabiting
a tent and changing into flying clothing in a very draughty hangar was not exactly
paradise. ,91
The war dislocated training with the Observer School at RNAS Ford being extensively
bombed in 1940. This led to the commissioning of RNAS Piarco in Trinidad, but the
problems of training overseas were graphically demonstrated when the first course sent out,
No.43, was lost when the liner Arandora Star was torpedoed in the Atlantic on 2 July 1940.
Desmond Wilkey, one of the trainees in No.44 course recalled the situation when they
arrived: ' ...by the time we got there they were very anxious to get some [observers] trained
so they truncated our course a bit... They even took about six of our most promising
89 Minute by Head of Air Branch, 16 Apr 1943, ADM 1/13596B.
90 Air Branch Acquaint, 1 May 1943, ADM 1/13596B.
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recruits early out of the course to bring them back to England to man squadrons.t'" The
advantages of Piarco included ample sea room for navigational exercises, good sea
conditions and excellent all year round flying weather." Not only was the aerodrome
operated by Pan American Airways available, but the Governor offered local labour to
build the accommodation for 150 Officers, 170 Chief Petty Officer and Petty Officers and
730 ratings. 94 Lieutenant Ronald Gellatly was posted to Piarco to train observers and
undertake anti-submarine patrols in April 1942:
'The huts were the same for both ratings and officers, except that the officers
were split into small cabins. At the end of each hut were lavatories and shower
baths. Wash basins and jugs were in each cabin. There were much larger wooden
huts at each end of the camp for officers and other ranks messes. Near these each
had a small swimming pool and tennis courts. ,95
Those sent to Piarco were fortunate not to have endure the surroundings at Arbroath, the
other Observer Training School, like Air Mechanic George Aymes in the winter of 1940:
'The living area was constantlyunder water... and there were more people in the
camp than would normally be accepted... but conditions were not conducive to
healthy living... there was an epidemic of cerebrospinal meningitis ... There
were actually forty of us who went downwith it and... only two of us survived. ,96
Anthony Corkhill, pilot of the Walrus aircraft of RMS Devonshire was appointed to RNAS
Hatston in the Orkneys in January 1940 and endured a similar experience: ' ... oh dear, it
was still only partially built. We lived in wooden huts. We had wooden benches on which
one would normally sit at a table, but no tables. We sat astride wooden benches to eat and
we had no doors and no windows ... it was a sea of mud in Orcadian gales ... ,97 Hatston
had commissioned on 2 October 1939, but when completed there were few better air
stations for training, especially during the summer and early autumn, as pilot George Sadler
of 835 Squadron recalled June 1942:
91 C. Friend, IWMlDoc 86/37/1, 13.
92 D.G.J. Wilkey, IWM/SA 14150, Reel!.
93 Minute by Anstice for DNAD, 26 Ju11940, ADM 116/4176.
94 Minute by Head of Air Branch, 30 Aug 1940, ADM 116/4176.
95 R.S. Gellatly, IWMlDoc P13, 85.
96 G.A. Aymes, IWM/SA 16355, Reel 2.
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' ...The days were long.... The airfield with lush green grass had runways but
ninety feet wide, different from most air stations ... Considering that the station
was something of an outpost, it was quite well appointed. The wardroom had one
unusual feature - the best stockedbar I experienced in the whole of my service. ,98
By August 1941 there were twelve air stations in Britain including the headquarters
at RNAS Lee-on-Solent and a core of training establishments such as the Fighter School at
Yeovilton, the Air Gunners' School at Worthy Down, the Torpedo School at Crail, the
Armament Training Squadron at St Merryn plus Observers' Training School No.2, and
Deck Landing Training School at Arbroath. Eastleigh was used to accommodate squadrons
forming and Donibristle, Machrihanish, Hatston and Twatt for disembarked squadrons.f"
One of the easiest ways to increase the capacity of a station was to assign a satellite
aerodrome to provide another runway and accommodate spare aircraft. Captain Moody,
DNAD, recommended satellites for Arbroath, Crail and Yeovilton in January 1941, but
admitted: ' ... since the Navy started late in the hunt for aerodromes, there is little likelihood
of sites being found near Naval Air Stations that would be suitable for use as a satellite for
night flying... ' 100 A site at Zeals was earmarked for Yeovilton, but this was requisitioned by
the RAF and other locations were not likely to be so suitable: 'The remaining sites all suffer
from the usual disadvantage of this area of England, i.e. that to get a level space it is
necessary to go to the low lying parts, where the ground is unserviceable for four months of
the year... ' 101 Satellites for Yeovilton were opened at Haldon in August 1941 and Charlton
Hawthorne in January 1943 and Henstridge in April 1943 when Haldon was reduced to a
care and maintenance basis. 102
In November 1941, DNAD laid down a requirement for six new stations, but half of
this programme had to be deferred at the end of the year. To meet the remaining
requirement Burscough and Ronaldsway were requested in August 1942 and Crimond in
September. By the end of August 1942 the only new major bases were Fearn for four
disembarked squadrons and Stretton for two disembarked squadrons.i'i' 835 Squadron
arrived at Stretton on 22 September: 'Unlike its beautiful winged namesake, it was a rather
dark and depressing comer of industrial England near Warrington. Accommodation was
98 Sadler, Swordfish Patrol, 40.
99 Statement of Air Stations and Air Sections at RAP Sections in United Kingdom by Air Branch, 14 Aug
1941, ADM 1/13603.
100 Minute by DNAD, 11 Jan 1941, ADM 1/13594.
101 Letter from CO, RNAS Yeovilton to RANAS, 30 Jan 1941, ADM 1/13594.
102 Ben Warlow, Shore Establishments ofthe Royal Navy: Being a list ofthe Static Ships and Establishments
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poor, consisting mainly of Nissen huts which were uncomfortable and inadequately
heated. . . all in all, it was an undistinguished and unmemorable experience.' 104
Unsurprisingly the most palatial surroundings were found at Lee-on-Solent and pilot
George Sadler was based there in May 1942: 'Daedalus was the Fleet Air Arm HQ, the
most prestigious of the naval air stations with splendid accommodation and facilities.
Unlike many other stations it was not situated miles from civilisation...' 105
Many air stations were located near the coast to fulfil their naval roles and pilot
Anthony Corkhill, 819 Squadron, was pleased to be seconded to Coastal Command for four
months in 1942: 'They were very happy months for the simple reason that we were ashore
in the summer at RAF airfields that were near civilised towns, which was a very strange
thing to happen to one in the Fleet Air Arm because we had no Naval Air Stations
anywhere near civilisation.' 106 RNAS Machrihanish was a classic example located on the
shores of the Clyde primarily to accommodate disembarked squadrons and 835 Squadron
was based there in October 1942:
, ... [it was] not a very happy ship, partly due to the transient nature of its visitors
(it was called the Clapham Junction of the FAA) and partly due to a very exacting
regime of night flying training often in difficult weather conditions and
surrounding hills which led to the loss of a number of crews. It was also very
isolated which made any leave under a week's durationhardly worth taking.'107
The expenence of RNAS Fearn illustrates the time lag between a station
commissioning, becoming operational and building up to full capacity. Commander S.B. de
Courcy-Ireland, joined as Commanding Officer in September 1942:
' ... [Fearn] commissioned officially on I" August 1942; by which time the Ship's
Company had increased to four Officers, 2 P.O's [Petty Officers] and 30 ratings.
They were still outnumbered by the Defence Force!. .. the officers lived on No.2
site and the Ship's Company on No.1 site, both a quarter ofa mile from the Mess
huts. There was no water, no drainage and no sanitation... There was a Lieut
Commander Flying and no aircraft, a Torpedo Officer but no Torpedo Section or
d ,108torpe oes.
104 E.E. Barringer, IWM/Doc 91/17/1,64.
105 George Sadler, Swordfish Patrol, 35.
106 A.D. Corkhill, IWMlSA 14157, Reel 4.
107 E.E. Barringer, IWM/Doc 91/17/1,66.
108 S.B. de Courcy-Ireland, IWMlDoc 92/4/1, 301.
Chapter 3
83
825 Squadron was the first to arrive in October 1942 when the hangars and control tower
still under construction. By the summer of 1943 there were 1500 personnel including 200
Wrens who assumed numerous roles: 'The Wrens took over more and more men's work,
cooks, stewards, regulating, aircraft fitters, torpedo maintenance, writers, drivers and so
, 109 Th . . d ·1 . don... e station continue to grow unti It accommo ated 3000 personnel in the spring
of 1944.
Naval Air Expansion Programmes and UK airfield requirements, 1942-1945
From October 1942 until May 1945 the requirements for naval air stations in Britain
can he directly linked to the Naval Air Expansion Programmes discussed in Chapter 2.110
Air Branch Memorandum A.01479/42 of 14 October 1942 formed the basis of air station
expansion from 1942-1946. The requirement for air stations was reviewed in an Air Branch
memorandum of 3 December 1942, at a meeting on 10 March 1943 and in Air Branch
memoranda on 23 June 1943,25 January 1944 and 10 May 1945.111
In a letter to the Under Secretary of State, Air Ministry, on 10 October 1942 the
Head of Air Branch reported the vastly different circumstances caused by the surge III
American carrier production:
, ...plans for increasing the strength of the Fleet Air Arm are largely governed by
the rate at which new aircraft carriers can be brought into service... In recent
months it has been found possible to plan for a greatly increased number of
carriers over the next three years, the majority of which are to be providedby the
conversion of American merchant ships. This has necessitated a... consequent
expansion of the requirements for shore facilities for Naval air squadrons in the
United Kingdom. It would be quite impossible for the Admiralty to meet these
latter requirements without the cooperation and assistance of the Air Ministry. ,112
The point was also made that due an insufficient number of airfields the problem of
overcrowding was becoming acute with First Line squadrons housed at training
establishments leading to large complements such as 195 aircraft at Arbroath, 192 at
Donibristle, 169 at Yeovilton and 151 at Worthy Down. 113
109 Ibid, 304. . '
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programme see Appendix 1.
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Out of the twenty-two requirements specified in October 1942, nine were earmarked
for 1943, seven for 1944, three in 1945 and another three with no specified date. The
facilities for 1943 included an Air Gunner School and a station for working up squadrons in
Canada, an Observer School in Britain, one TBR and two fighter stations in the Irish Sea
area, and two Receipt and Despatch Units (RDUs), one near Liverpool and one near the
Clyde. 114 By December 1942 Burscough had been identified as a site for one of the fighter
stations in the Irish Sea area, a site at Crimond as the new Observers' School while the civil
airport at Ronaldway in the Isle of Man was a possibility for the TBR station. The Air
Gunners' School was up and running at Halifax in Nova Scotia. However, the Canadian
Government had refused the Admiralty's request for more facilities for working up
squadrons on the basis that it was outside what had been agreed in the Ottawa Training
Agreement. 115 This serious omission in the programme was filled by the USN with
increased facilities at Quonset and the temporary loan of Eglinton and Maydown in
Northern Ireland from the RAF. 116
Both the Canadians and Americans made substantial facilities available for pilot
training releasing bases in Britain for more advanced training and disembarked squadrons.
Pilot John Ough was at No.14 Service Flying Training School at Kingston, Ontario in the
autumn of 1944: 'We were at once impressed by the airport's size, its triangle of twin
runways and, most of all by the large numbers of awe-inspiring, formidable-looking
Harvard aircraft...' 117 The best USN facilities were placed at the FAA's disposal and pilot
Norman Hanson was one of the first to experience American hospitality at Pensacola:
'Our party was the second to arrive... To the US Navy, Pensacola was known as
"the Annapolis of the Air". Sixteen thousand men, together with a great number
of families in married quarters, were stationed there... The living quarters were
luxurious by British standards of that time. We lived eight to a room in spacious,
. d d . . ,ll8well-equippe onrutones...
In the plans of December 1942 thirty-three squadrons were earmarked to form or rearm in
the USA leaving forty single-seater squadrons to be formed elsewhere between April 1943
114 Memorandum by A.H.M. Irwin for Head of Air Branch, 14 Oct 1942, ADM 116/5321.
115 Message from Canadian High Commission to Dominions Office, 10 Jan 1943, ADM 1/13512.
116 Memorandum attached to Admiralty letter, 3 Dec 1942, ADM 116/5321.
117 John Ough, Crumbs! (Bumstown: General Store Publishing House, 1999). 99. . .
118 Norman Hanson, Carrier Pilot: An Unforgettable True Story of Wartime Flying (Cambndge: Patnck
Stephens, 1979),26.
85
and October 1944. With working up taking four months and rearming lasting two months,
accommodation was needed for ten squadrons simultaneously.l"
After the Canadian decision a request to the USN was made for extra facilities for
working up: ' ...a further seventeen squadrons of nine aircraft each. If agreement could be
obtained this would result in all Corsair squadrons being formed in U.S.A. ,120 This
agreement left eight Avenger and fifteen Martlet squadrons to be formed in UK which were
covered by the loaning of Eglinton and Maydown from the RAF. In all thirty-six squadrons
totalling 800 Officers, 6000 ratings and 600 aircraft were formed in the USA and 2100
pilots trained under the Towers Scheme, named after Admiral John Towers USN, between
1941-1945.
Shore facilities were also needed for one-third of embarked and Alternative
Armament squadrons. Dreyer noted that the prospect of meeting requirements was
hampered by the government ban on new construction projects:
, .. .it will be necessary to obtain financial approval for each new Station in tum.
The situation is further complicated by the existing ban on works' proposals at
home, which at the date of this report [13 January 1943], has the effect of
suspending the letting of contracts for the new Naval Observer School at
Crimond and also for the new Fighter Station at Burscough, both of which are
vital to the implementation of the expansion programme.' 121
F.A. Whitaker, Civil Engineer-in-Chief, commented that delays in the programme were
endemic: ' .. .in every case, the estimated completion dates were much later than those
required by the approved programme, the delays varying between three and nine
months.' 122 Captain Renwick, Deputy Director of Air Material, pointed out the need to
complete existing stations: ' .. .in the event of there actually being any surplus labour it
would be employed on works which are already in hand but not completed owing to
shortage of labour, ego the Orkney airfields.' 123
The Head of Air Branch concluded in February 1943 that the major problem was
the time for airfield construction and the amount of prior warning this required:
119 Message from Dominions Office to Canadian High Commission, 15 Dec 1942; Minute by Head of Air
Branch, 2 Feb 1943, ADM 1/13512.
120 Minute by Head of Air Branch, 2 Feb 1943, ADM 1/13512.
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'It appears necessary therefore to state normal requirements some 2 to 3 years
before they are needed. Requirements for aircrew training have to be ready for
use some 15 months before the actual First Line expansion takes place in order
that the crews may be trained. In case of training stations therefore, the
requirement must be raised nearly 4 years before the actual First Line expansion
takes place.' 124
Given a four-year period for the procurement process to come to fruition and the lack of
pre-war planning the possibility of the FAA achieving its targets for airfields appeared non-
existent without RAF assistance. However, the situation was made worse because airfields
were not given the same priority in the expansion programme as the other elements:
'Approval for our requirements cannot, at present, be obtained until they can be
justified up to the hilt in terms of ships, aircraft and personnel known to be
forthcoming. Since these items can be, and are, produced in a matter of months
under current conditions, it follows that our air stations will inevitably be out of
phase with the rest of our expansion and will lag far behind. ,125
In addition to a perceived lack of priority within Admiralty planning there had been
much discontent at the assignment of air stations from the Air Ministry. The Aerodrome
Board was responsible for identifying possible sites suitable for development into air
stations. Captain Moore, Assistant DNAD, reported in October 1942 that the situation was
improving: 'The Aerodrome Board now give D.A.M. every assistance subject to the
limitation that sites already found can be offered to Royal Navy by Air Ministry
permission... ,126 However, Captain Bridge, DNAO, reported in February 1943 on the
number of poor sites offered to the Admiralty by the Air Ministry and Aerodrome Board:
, ...much valuable time been spent in eliminating useless sites and satellite stations which
(for several obvious reasons) were not required by the R.A.F.' 127 What was needed was a
bi-service organisation to identify possible sites in the first instance as Captain Renwick,
DACR, observed: ' ...This difficulty cannot be obviated until all potential airfield sites
throughout the world are held in pool for development by whichever Service has the
d he ti ,128greatest nee at t e time.
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At an Admiralty meeting on 10 March 1943, six months after the initial statement of
requirements, delays were evident on several projects. The Observers' School at Crirnond,
required by September 1943 was not expected for completion until January 1944. The
fighter station at Burscough, earmarked for September 1943 would not be fully operational
until May 1944 and the TBR station at Ronaldsway would be ten months late in July 1944.
The second fighter station, based at the former RAF Angle, would be operational with half
its proposed capacity by July 1943, its original completion date. On the other hand some of
the 1944 projects would come on line early thanks to a juggling of resources; both the
fighter school at RNAS Henstridge and the new Torpedo School at RNAS Fearn scheduled
for April 1944 would be in business in July 1943.129
F.A. Whitaker, Civil Engineer-in-Chief, blamed the delays at Burscough on the
lack of constructional labour: 'The contracts for the construction of Burscough have been
placed... Unfortunately, the indication is that labour will not be forthcoming in the next
few months in the quantity and quality required.' 130 The First Lord informed the Secretary
of State for Air that Air Ministry help was essential: 'The building situation is now so
difficult that we shall be quite unable to provide the shore facilities needed for the
expansion of the Fleet Air Arm in 1943 and 1944, unless you can see your way to help us
still further by transferring several more suitable RAF stations.' 131 Archibald Sinclair
replied that two airfields would be transferred and three loaned including Eglinton and
Maydown to cover the shortfall left by the refusal for facilities in Canada. These would
bring the total to fourteen transferred to the FAA, three on loan and FAA units based at ten
more. 132
Such apparent generosity cut little ice among the Admiralty Departments including
Captain Renwick, DACR: ' ...the Admiralty's claims to airfield sites do not receive a
satisfactory priority and, consequently, the general position is that the Admiralty can only
claim such sites as the Air Ministry do not require.' 133 He was fully supported by Captain
Bridge, DNAO: ' ...our requirements to provide shore accommodation and training
facilities for Carriers' Squadrons available in 1944 cannot possibly be met by now
searching for almost non-existent, suitably situated construction sites.' 134 Out of the sites
which had been offered only Grimsetter was entirely acceptable. Eglinton and Maydown
whilst entirely welcome were only on loan until May 1944 and Angle and Abbotsinch were
129 Report of meeting on 'Air Expansion Programme in U.K', 10 Mar 1943, ADM 116/532l.
130 Minute by C.E-in-C., 27 Feb 1943, ADM 116/5321.
131 Letter from First Lord to Secretary of State for Air, 15 Mar 1943, ADM 1/14905.
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of doubtful value: ' ...Abbotsinch is a very doubtful asset altogether; but we shall have to
make the best of them, at any rate for the present. ,135
In early May 1943 there was some relief with the announcement that the proposed
Alternative Armament squadrons announced in Naval Air Expansion Programme of 1942
would not be formed until 1945. 136 Captain Moore, the Assistant Director of Plans (Air),
proposed on 3 May that the Admiralty should plan for the next two years within its own
resources:
'It is quite possible to build our own additional requirements in time for 1945 if
we get down to it now. We have a clear opening to do so since the Air Ministry
have said that they cannot do any more for us. There is no longer anyreason why
we shouldbe led up the garden path... by the Air Ministry. ,137
Therefore he proposed the request should be limited to Eglinton and Maydown only. If no
further sites were available for transfer, nine new air stations would have to be built by
December 1945. These requirements could be offset if the loan of Eglinton and Maydown
were renewed beyond October 1944 and if facilities in the USA for working up, equivalent
to three stations, were retained. Out of the remaining four sites, two sites were provisionally
earmarked, but difficulties were foreseen in obtaining stations near Liverpool and on the
Clyde with torpedo and air firing ranges for the autumn of 1945.138
The revision in memorandum A.401/43 on 26 June 1943 listed urgent new
requirements as the construction of a new station for a Naval Operational Training Unit
(NOTU) and the School of Air Combat. The expansion of RAF Abbotsinch, transferred to
the FAA, and RNAS St MeITYll, the latter to take Air Gunners' and Fighter Schools' Air
Firing Units, were also needed. To meet requirements in December 1944, RAF Grimsetter
would be handed to the Navy with an additional capacity of twenty-four aircraft and RNAS
Stretton expanded. A site for a new fighter station near Stretton would have to be found.
Requirements for 1945 comprised a new TBR station in January on the Clyde, a new
fighter station near Liverpool by April and a new station near the Clyde or Scapa Flow by
June with facilities for fighters and TBRs. 139
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One of the difficulties in relying on the Air Ministry was the possible change of
facilities available. The Admiralty Board approved the use of RAF Angle as a Fighter
Direction Centre on 16 June 1943, but received a letter from the Air Ministry eight days
later offering RAF Dale instead as Angle was needed for flying boats involved in anti-
submarine operations.l'" Similarly in early July a request was received to exchange RNAS
St Merryn in Cornwall for RAF Talbenny in Pembrokeshire, to accommodate Coastal
Command units for anti-submarine operations in Bay of Biscay. RANAS vigorously
opposed the move since St Merryn was the only naval Air Gunnery School and any transfer
would cause training to be halted completely for up to three months.t '"! In fact the RAF
withdrew its request a few days later.
Despite complaints over lack of resources it is not clear to what extent there was an
actual shortage of manpower; F.A. Whitaker, Civil-Engineer-in-Chief suggested in early
1943 that labour was sufficient: ' ...the labour force allotted to the Admiralty in February is
8.1% of the building labour in the country (the Fleet Air Ann share is 1.3%); any
contribution made by using existing RAF Stations will be relatively small.' 142 There
certainly seems to have been some debate over whether the Admiralty had enough labour
and if it was using it properly according to Head of Air Branch five months later: ' ... the
Admiralty labour force for the current period has been onIy 31,000, as against a theoretical
allocation of 38,000, may be in part due to our inability to use our labour, but in some
measure it must be attributable to the Ministry of Labour's inability to give it to us. ,143
One of the most significant changes in airfield requirements occurred in December
1943 when in line with the Admiralty decision to organise the FAA in Wings and Carrier
Air Groups, rather than individual squadrons, it was decided that it was no longer
appropriate to continue the policy of dispersing squadrons, but that resources should be
concentrated at established bases. 144 These new requirements called for the expansion of
Burscough, Fearn, Twatt and Machrihanish to accommodate Carrier Air Groups each with
a capacity of seven squadrons of ninety-two aircraft plus other units, which in the case of
Machrihanish meant a total of 174 aircraft. 145
Burscough had only been accepted because of a lack of other suitable sites and
except for Fearn and Machrihanish, it was the only station capable of expansion. It was not
ideal because of poor weather conditions in Lancashire which had a serious impact on
140 Minute by DNAO, 15 July 1943, ADM 1/13590.
141 Report from R.A.N.A.S. to Secretary of Admiralty, 12 July 1943, ADM 1/13590.
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training schedules. Burscough's poor weather and facilities combined to give it a pretty
notorious reputation as observer instructor Gordon Wallace remembered in 1944:
'There seemed to be mud everywhere and short wellies became the rig of the
day... Our living quarters was the ubiquitous Nissen hut. .. To go to the bathroom
you had to venture out partly dressed into the elements with the wind blowing up
into one's nether regions. Most of us developed severe colds and the evenings
often found me in the sick bay inhaling Friar's Balsamunder a towel.' 146
Owing to difficulties in getting approval for construction work in mid-1944, the expansion
of Burscough would have to be a long-term objective. A similar experience occurred over
Culdrose: ' ...no works construction [has] yet commenced... considerable financial
objections will be raised to this proposal for construction of a new Station at this stage of
the war.' 147
In December 1944 the proposed expansion of Burscough and a new station at
Penston on the Firth of Forth were abandoned due to the large scale reduction in planned
first line strength.l'" Just as the decision to introduce Carrier Air Groups had a major
impact on requirements, the reduction in the long-term First Line expansion programme in
the autumn of 1944 from 2689 aircraft to 1605 removed a number of difficulties including
the envisaged deficiency of facilities for 130 First Line aircraft by January 1946.149 An Air
Branch's memorandum on 10 May 1945 postponed the expansion of Fearn, Inskip and
Twatt with only the work at Machrihanish to continue. In addition labour difficulties meant
that little progress was made on the other new requirements and given government policy
this was unlikely to change: ' ... the long period required for construction because of
continued labour difficulties make it certain that major airfield works begun now would be
of use for only a very limited period... the trend of Government policy is towards using the
country's works labour and materials for housing and other reconstruction schemes... ' 150
Despite the reduction of First Line commitments in the long term immediate
requirements in 1944-1945 actually rose: ' ...our total requirements for airfields have in fact
increased during the past year because of the increased training commitments arising from
145 Ibid.
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technical developments, the greater complexity of air warfare and other causes. ,151
Accordingly a number of RAF stations would be transferred by June 1945 for duties not
foreseen in January 1944; these included RAF Drem for a Night Fighter School, RAF
Peplow for an Instrument Flying School, RAF Woodvale for a Liverpool FRU, RAF
Macmeery for a Rosyth FRU and RAF Ballyherbert and RAF Nutts Comer for Fighter
Schools while RAF Locking was needed for a RN Artificers Training Establishment and
RAF Warton as an Aircraft Repair Yard. A new TBR School was needed in Scotland to
replace RNAS Crail, which was not suitable for larger types of aircraft entering service. 152
Repair Yards
In addition to stations for training and disembarked operational squadrons, facilities
were needed for aircraft maintenance and repair and the first consideration was to support
the Fleet at Scapa Flow. In May 1939 the Admiralty approved more repair capacity at
Evanton: ' ... for use immediately on the outbreak of war, the facilities for 120 hour
inspections and minor repairs of Fleet aircraft in ships at Scapa. These facilities will be
about 50% of those which will eventually be available at Hatston.' 153 Despite such planning
the RAF was expected to remain responsible for major repairs to FAA aircraft for a
considerable period:
, ... major repairs and overhauls of Fleet Air Arm aircraft, including, in the case of
first line squadrons, 120 hour inspections, will remain with the Air Ministry until
such time as a naval repair organisation has been built up... Present indications
are that it will not be possible for the Admiralty to assume this responsibility
before about April, 1941.,154
It is indicative of the pre-war situation that while the Navy was getting facilities for minor
repairs into operation these were largely manned by RAF personnel.
The primary repair depot in Britain was planned for Bedenham near Gosport. Vice
Admiral Preece, Civil Engineer-in-Chief concluded that this was the most suitable site as it
had easy access by rail and sea and was near both Gosport airfield and Portsmouth
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.




dockyard. 155 The Fifth Sea Lord was concerned that if Bedenham did not proceed then
considerable increases were necessary in aircraft production:
' ... the only alternatives left to us are either to go ahead forthwith the original
Bedenham scheme or else place orders to give production of something like 45
additional airframes and 30 engines a month to make good the anticipated
deficiencies in the Fleet Air Arm for lack of repair andmaintenance, involving an
annual expense in the region of £4 million. Apart from the expense this would be
a large additional strain on the productive capacity of the country.' 156
This statement perfectly illustrates the often ignored relationship between aircraft repair
and production. The success and failure of FAA aircraft production programmes are widely
analysed, but the capacity of repair depots to maintain those aircraft in service has rarely
been given attention. The difficulty of simultaneously planning for the long term and
meeting short term commitments under wartime conditions was soon apparent with the
Bedenham scheme. Originally construction was planned to take two years and the
establishment manned by civilian labour to undertake all inspections, overhauls and
modifications for first and second line squadrons in Britain. In February 1940 it was
decided that the priority must go to establishing limited facilities at the earliest opportunity
and to build an Aircraft Repair Shop and a half size Engine Repair Shop, which should be
operational in December 1940.157
The facility at Bedenham became known as Fleetlands, which still exits today as a
facility of the Defence Aviation Repair Agency. Despite being the FAA's main repair
facility there was a crisis over the shortage of labour at the end of 1943 and the Admiralty
successfully appealed to the Ministry of Labour: ' ...the Admiralty's demand for labour at
Fleetlands has been given super preference and arrangements have been made for the intake
of 60 skilled and 180 unskilled workers. ,158 It's long term future was emphasised by Rear-
Admiral Bedale, DAMR: 'As Fleetlands is permanent and as there should, as soon as
Germany is defeated, be little difficulty in providing labour to man it, it would seem to be a
short sighted policy not to make every effort to man it in the meantime.' 159 The FAA faced
a constant battle to remind the relevant ministries that the peak of its effort would be
against Japan rather than Germany.
155 Minute by C.E-in-C., 17 Feb 1939, ADM 116/4039.
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Another forgotten element of air logistics was the air store depots to support the air
stations and repair depots. They came low down on the list of priorities and at the start of
the war construction of bespoke depots was sacrificed to concentrate resources on the
construction of air stations. Two depots were established in requisitioned storage at
Coventry and Woolston near Southampton.l'" The need for a third depot was identified in
1940 and a site at Almondbank in Scotland identified in early 1941. Its construction was
made more urgent by the fate of the original depots: ' ...proposals for providing it were
being pursued when heavy air attacks destroyed more than half of the Woolston storage and
practically all the storage at Coventry, with large quantities of valuable stocks.' 161 The
depot at Almondbank, near Perth, would be based on the example of an RAF Maintenance
Unit with 200,000 square feet of storage space, 10,000 feet of workshops and
accommodation for 100 staff. To save time and cost it was proposed to use ten Bellman
hangars, which were surplus to requirements to provide storage space.
With the large-scale expansion plans announced in the autumn of 1942 this was
never going to be enough and E.S. Wood, the Director of Stores, confirmed on 30 July
1943 an additional 340,000 square feet at Almondbank and new depot of 300,000 square
feet in South Wales at Llangannech due for completion by 30 June and 31 March 1944
respectively. The size of air store depots on 1 July 1944 would be 600,000 square feet at
Almondbank, 430,000 at Stafford, 300,000 at Llangennech and 120,000 at Copenacre. The
choice of Llangennech was determined by the availability of labour rather than its
hi I . hili 162geograp ica suita 1 tty.
The expansion of air store capacity was directly related to the aircraft expansion
programmes which envisaged an increase in the first line from 875 in January 1943 to 2464
in January 1946 and 2685 at end of 1946. For the total aircraft strength of 1887 on 1 July
1943, 810,000 square feet of storage space was required, rising to 1,450,000 for 3035
aircraft on 1 July 1944 and 1,900,000 for 4242 aircraft on 1 January 1946. To meet the
increase between 1944-1946 another 200,000 square feet each at Almondbank and
Llangennech and 50,000 square feet in the Midlands. Once again the choice was
determined by the labour question:
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161 Admiralty Memorandum No.1140 for Treasury Inter-Service Committee, 3 Feb 1941, ADM 1/11852.
162Memorandum by Director ofStores, 30 Ju11943, ADM 1/15382.
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' .. .it is clear that the major requirement for air stores will continue to be in
Scotland. It is out of the question, in view of staffing difficulties, to contemplate
setting up another Depot in Scotland... the proposedexpansion in SouthWales ...
will make Llangennech a more economically worked unit from the staffing point
of view.' 163
It was not only the increased number of aircraft which affected the air stores requirement
but also their size and complexity as Lll. Ream of the Air Store Department noted in
September 1943:
'American type spares present a new and considerable problem; and the major
spares for new British types, e.g., Barracuda, are taking up nearly twice the space
required for older types. Everything is bigger. Previously all our propellers in
stock (not many) were cased. Now they come in stands and they must be given
covered storage. ,164
In October 1943 the Air Store Department had to deal with 140,000 different items rising to
160,000 when all the types of American aircraft were in service. The extension at
Llangennech was approved in December 1943 and that at Almondbank in May 1944. It
would be mid-1945 at the earliest before these facilities would be available and adequate
storage guaranteed. 165
Overseas planning, 1939-1942
The establishment of base requirements overseas in the Second World War differed
from those for training and disembarked squadrons in Britain, Canada and America because
they were dictated by changing strategic and operational requirements, rather than the
overall Air Expansion Programmes as carriers could be deployed to any theatre.
A comprehensive memorandum by Captain Larcom, DNAD, in May 1939 laid out
the Overseas Base Requirements of the FAA for 1940 and 1942.166 The Defence
Requirements Committee had set 1942 as the limit to which plans could be made. Larcom's
primary purpose was to raise the issue of which organisations were responsible for the
FAA's shore facilities for consideration by the Committee of Imperial Defence. The only
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facilities in the interwar period constructed purely for use by the FAA, although manned by
RAF personnel, were at Bermuda and Simonstown.l'" The remainder were shared with
RAF squadrons.l'" All air bases were under administrative and operational control of the
RAF. Existing facilities were wholly inadequate for war requirements given the small
peacetime forces they had been expected to support. In the Far East for example, Hermes
and Eagle were the mainstay of the China Station between 1925 - 1939 with one usually on
station. Eagle carried only twenty- four aircraft and Hermes a mere twelve.
The Air Division's plans were based on four types of administrative arrangement.
Some existing airfields were to be transferred from the RAF to Naval control 169 while other
RAF facilities were to remain shared by the two Scrvices.l" Certain Civil Aerodromes, to
be taken under military control, were also to be shared171 and small naval detachments - air
sections - were to be deployed at selected RAF and RCAF stations. In
The overseas requirements will be analysed according to bases for trade routes,
which could be largely predicted from the outbreak of war and those for the Far East which
grew into an enormous undertaking that were far easier to plan on paper than to put into
effect. Nor was there a total reliance on static air stations through the use of maintenance
shipping and mobile air facilities.
Requirements for trade routes
In addition to existing facilities on trade routes at Bermuda and Simonstown, the
Admiralty applied to Treasury Inter-Service Committee on 27 March 1940 for approval for
aerodromes at Gibraltar, Dakar, Halifax and Kingston, Jamaica. At RCAF Dartmouth,
Halifax, the Canadians agreed to provide the necessary labour and materials to carry out the
works for $190,000. 173 Dartmouth was a classic example of a base being built before
carriers were available to use it and the Commanding Officer, HMS Canada, of which
Dartmouth was one unit, reported in October 1942 that it was a waste of resources:
'While I am necessarily ignorant of our naval air policy, as also of our materiel
resources for implementing it, I remain altogether astonished that after over three
years of war, such admirable resources as exist at Dartmouth in space, equipment
167 Minute by Head of Air Branch, 9 Jun 1939, ADM 116/4664.. .
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and skilled labour should be employed to so little purpose, and be, for lengthy
periods, to all intents and purposes, lying fallow.174
The Naval Air Expansion Programmes envisaged large numbers of CYEs and MAC ships
coming into service, but these were not due until 1943. When those ships did come into
service more resources were needed at Dartmouth as Air Branch signalled in August 1944:
'In addition to those requirements laid down in November 1943, there was a need for three
disembarked MAC ship flights of twelve aircraft plus three spare MAC flying crews and
six Swordfish for loan to MAC crews for flying practice with accommodation for 422
personnel.i " The CO, RNAS Dartmouth reported the vastly greater use of the station in
1944: 'A total of 106 Mac Ships for 1944, as compared with a total of 15 for 1943, was one
of many increased commitments which had to be dealt with during the past year.' 176
An example of the need to meet new operational requirements at short notice was
the request by C-in-C Western Approaches for facilities in Iceland in March 1943: 'It is
anticipated two escort AlC [aircraft] carriers will be ready for operational service by is"
April. Request steps may be taken to ensure that adequate spare AlC and necessary parts,
maintenance stores and ammunition may be available in Iceland and Argentia by that
date. ,177 Aircraft were flown ashore from HMS Archer on 5 May with three Officers, seven
Petty Officers and twenty-three ratings sent to RAF Kaldadarnes, forty-eight miles from
Reykjavik. Unfortunately just two months later the RAF announced that Kaldadarnes was
to close and the navy was unable to take it over as Captain Moore, Assistant Director of
Plans (Air), commented: 'The trouble is that we are simply not in a position to put down
"penny packets" of Naval Air Facilities all round the world.' 178 Co-incidentally after
Archer delivered the aircraft and personnel no CYE's used bases on the North Atlantic
trade routes for the next four months, but Admiral Horton, C-in-C Western Approaches
remarked this was no indicator for the future: 'The period also coincides with the complete
lull in If-Boat warfare along the northern route and cannot be taken as any criterion for the
future ... our actions must to a large extent be dictated by the movements of the enemy and
at this juncture it is impossible to state whether or not Iceland will be used by escort
. . h futu ,179carriers In t ere.
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In the spring of 1944 it was decided to rationalise some units established on the
outbreak of war: ' ...closing down the small Fleet Air Arm storage units (e.g. Argentia _
Gibraltar - Freetown etc) which are expensive in manpower and material. .. Very little use
has been made of the scattered stored reserves in the last 12 months. ,I80 In addition the
Admiralty Board agreed that CVE's should carry a larger number of reserve aircraft and if
necessary damaged aircraft [be] thrown overboard. ' 181
Expansion in the Far East
On the outbreak of war Far Eastern forces were divided between the East Indies and
China Stations and the forces envisaged for 1942 make interesting reading, both because of
the scale of provision and the priorities between the various fleet commands. The East
Indies Station, based on Aden and Trincomalee, would support the carrier Courageous with
twenty-four aircraft, nine seaplanes aboard Albatross and six cruiser-borne catapult aircraft
The major forces were allocated to the China Station centred on Sembawang airfield
in Singapore and the requisitioned Singapore Civil Aerodrome. At Singapore in 1942 the
navy anticipated an impressive array of carriers as at any other naval base in the world; Ark
Royal, Glorious, Indomitable, Implacable and Indefatigable with a total capacity of 225
aircraft. Fifty-four seaplanes, twenty-four reserve aircraft and a further twenty-four 'planes
for the Fleet Requirement Unit and Target Training duties concluded this substantial
complement of 327. Storage would be needed for 340 reserves, with the aircraft repair ship
Unicorn carrying a further forty. The monthly capacity of aircraft maintenance facilities
was to be ten light repairs, eighty major inspections, thirty aboard Unicorn, and thirty
complete overhauls. 182
However, these plans were far in the future given that air facilities in the Far East
were substantially incomplete or non-existent. The main airfield at Sembawang required
substantial work before being handed over to the Navy. Construction of a repair yard at the
same location was essential. Meanwhile the repair of naval aircraft would continue at RAF
Seletar and in lieu of the completion of Sembawang, provision for four squadrons was
sought at RAF Tengah. In Hong Kong RAF Kai Tak was to be shared by the two Services,
until the new RAF airfield at Pat Heung was completed when the former would be handed
over for sole use by the FAA. Shared air bases at Aden and Trincomalee were for the use of
East Indies forces. 183 The FAA had no choice but to continue with the peacetime practice of
180 Minute by Civil Lord, 29 Mar 1944, ADM 1/16422.
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sharing bases for the foreseeable future: ' ... the Admiralty will have to rely upon the co-
operation of the Air Ministry in the provision of storage and packing and repair and
maintenance facilities at these places for the next few years at any rate.' 184 As it turned out
the FAA was dependent on some Air Ministry and RAF resources, for example the packing
of aircraft for transportation overseas, right up to the end of the Second World War.
The Far East was clearly the target when in November 1937 the Admiralty Board
adopted the policy: ' ...of providing Fleet Air Arm Depot Ships for servicing part of the
first line aircraft and housing some of the reserves, and thus reducing the shore
requirements.v'F' The result was Unicorn, a 14,750-ton aircraft maintenance depot ship,
designed to maintain 100 aircraft from three Illustrious class carriers in areas of the world
where shore facilities were lacking. On the basis that each aircraft flew for twenty hours a
month, all 100 would require either a 120, 240 or 360 hour overhaul every month. These
overhauls were estimated to take three, four or five days respectively. Accommodation was
provided for thirty erected and serviceable aircraft and twelve crated sparcs.l'"
The expense and complexity of Unicorn's design has attracted criticism on the
grounds that she was over-engineered for her role. She possessed two hangars, one
equipped with an extensive range of workshops, the other for serviceable aircraft and with a
full flight deck resembled a smaller version of the fleet carrier Ark Royal. 187 Such criticism
is entirely unjustified. For the accommodation and repair of aircraft, areas of a large volume
- hangars - were the only solution. If aircraft were to be tested for airworthiness before
being flown off to the fleet carriers a flight deck was essential. The ship carried two lighters
which proved extremely useful in ferrying aircraft to and from the shore or other ships.
Given that when she was designed it was not known what shore facilities would be
available it was logical to assume that she may have to undertake all the repair and testing
herself. During Operation 'Iceberg' between March-May 1945, in support of the US
invasion of Okinawa, this exact situation arose. No shore facilities were available on Leyte
in the Philippines and sustained air operations were possible only because of Unicorn's
presence there acting as the forward air base. The only problem in giving her a carrier's
configuration was the tendency to press her into service as an operational carrier as
happened at Salerno in September 1943.
The major problem was that while the RAF was happy to accommodate
disembarked naval squadrons and repair their aircraft at Singapore in peacetime. in a war
184 Minute by Head of Air Branch, 9 Jun 1939, ADM 116/4664.
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the situation would be very different; for example rather than aircraft being overhauled at
RAF Seletar, the Air Ministry advised ' .. .it may be necessary for the Admiralty in war to
set up a separate organisation at or near Singapore for that purpose. ,188 With only a small
number of maintenance personnel at this time, this would have been very difficult. It was
envisaged that the peacetime arrangements in Ceylon could continue, despite the increase
in the number of reserve aircraft from thirty to fifty-five, major inspections from two to ten
per month and overhauls from one to five. It had not been intended in peace or war that
overhauls would be undertaken at Trincomalee, but in Singapore or Karachi instead.
In the early months of the war, the Commodore, Malaya, reported that the majority
of RAF repair facilities at Singapore were being used by the navy' ... the greatly increased
number of Fleet Air Arm machines that have come in from ships since the war started,
owing to the extra flying that has been necessary on patrols.' 189 The obvious difficulty
would arise when the RAF began significant operations and took up the majority of the
repair capacity. Then naval maintenance personnel would be required. In addition he
recommended that a FAA Officer, of sufficient seniority to co-ordinate resources with the
Commanders-in-Chief, should be appointed to supervise aircraft maintenance
requirements.
By a remarkable co-incidence the papers of this very officer, Lieutenant-Commander
C.N. Colson, appointed Naval Air Maintenance Officer, China and East Indies Station on
25 December 1939 are available in the Imperial War Museum.l'" Colson went on to
become one of the most experienced naval air officers in the Far East serving in a series of
appointments for the next six years. 191 As well as recommending detailed improvements to
facilities at the various bases, Colson disagreed with the RAF view that Singapore's aircraft
maintenance capacity could not be increased:
, ... they [RAF] consider that their facilities are not large enough to cope with FAA
work as well as their own in the event of war action occurring in the areas for
which they cater. With reservations I do not agree with this view. In Singapore
there is a large skilled native population which supplies a large proportion of the
188 Letter from Air Ministry to Admiralty, 10 Aug 1939, ADM 116/4664.
189 Report 'Administration of Fleet Air Arm Materiel at Singapore' from Commodore Malaya to C-in-C
China, 2 Dec 1939, ADM 116/4664.
190 Commander C.N. Colson. IWMlDoc 78/38/1.
191 Colson served as Naval Air Maintenance Officer, Far East, 1941-1942; Air Engineer Officer to
Commodore Naval Air Stations, Ceylon, Oct 1942 - Aug 1943; Assistant Staff Officer to Rear Admiral Naval
Air Stations, Indian Ocean, Aug 1943 - Dec 1943; Superintendent Aircraft Maintenance Yard, HMS
Tarnbaram, Dec 1943 - Jan 1945; Superintendent Aircraft Maintenance Yard. HMS Valluru, Jan - Nov 1945.
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[RAP] labour force... and I suggest that steps could easily be taken to augment this
force from this source.' 192
Full details of the accommodation to meet the FAA's Far East requirements were
drawn up at a joint Admiralty and Air Ministry meeting on 11 June 1940. RAF Sembawang
would be transferred to the FAA to house the five disembarked squadrons of the 1940
programme, but bases outside of Singapore would be needed for the remaining five
squadrons of the 1942 plan. Similarly only half of the reserves could be maintained on
Singapore Island and the remainder within 400 miles. Repairs would continue to be
undertaken at RAF Seletar, with a new engine repair site planned for Kuala Lumpur until
the FAA's own facilities were completed at Sembawang. At Trincomalee, facilities would
continue to be shared until new RAF accommodation was ready at the end of 1942.193
The handover of Sembawang by the Air Ministry was expected to occur in August
1941. To make it fully operational further stores buildings, workshops, torpedo facilities
and bombing ranges were needed and the Air Ministry agreed to undertake this on an
agency basis for completion by the handover date. Construction of the repair yard from
scratch would take two and a half years. 194
At the same time the Fifth Sea Lord highlighted the danger of neglecting air
facilities through current wartime experience: 'The provision of storage and repair
facilities for Fleet Air Arm aircraft in Singapore...has been strongly emphasised by the
complete absence of such facilities for our Fleet Air Arm now operating in Egypt.' 195 Rear-
Admiral Tom Phillips, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff and best-known for his ill-fated
command of Force Z, clearly had a much firmer grasp on naval air strategy than tactics.
Phillips' minute of 1 November 1940 cut straight to the heart of the argument regarding the
pivotal role of logistics in the successful deployment of air power:
'The whole basis of our sea power rests on having adequate bases for repair
facilities all the world over. It may be expensive but it is one of the things we have
to pay for being a world empire. So far as our surface ships are concerned we have,
in the course of generations past, slowly developed these facilities from year to
year. With the coming of the air corresponding facilities for the maintenance of
192 Letter from Lt Cdr Colson to C. in C's China and East Indies, 20 Jun 1940, IWMlDoc 78/38/1.
193 Minutes from meeting on Fleet Air Arm Requirements held at the Air Ministry, 11 Jun 1940, ADM
1/11850. . .
194 Notes of meeting on Naval Air Requirements in the Singapore area held by AIr Matenel Dept, 9 Oct 1940,
ADM 1/11850.
195 Minute by Fifth Sea Lord, 31 Oct 1940, ADM 1/11850.
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aircraft at all our bases abroad are just as necessary as the facilities for the
maintenance of the ships. The trouble is that one generation has to face up to the
whole expenditure for this provision for aircraft whereas the provision for ships has
been spread over many generations.' 196
Phillips was extremely critical of the RAF, whose system of bases the navy had to rely on.
He appeared to have a clear and farsighted appreciation of the role of logistics as a great
enabler in maintaining strategic options for the planners: 'They [the R.A.F.] are at present
the least mobile of all the three Services, and when one wants to operate aircraft in any
area months have to be spent getting the facilities ready.' 197
In mid-1941 Admiral Layton, then C-in-C East Indies, questioned the concentration
of aircraft maintenance facilities in Singapore, the cornerstone of naval air policy in the Far
East. Layton thought it unwise to ignore the provision of facilities in the rest of the Indian
Ocean, noting that all planned operations were west of Singapore and there was an obvious
paucity of facilities throughout the theatre. Dependence upon Singapore might also be a
risky venture: 'Intended facilities as laid down in Admiralty letter A.084/40 of 6/3/1940
are mainly situated in Malaya where they are vulnerable, and to and from which freight
shipping is even now most inadequate.Y" Colson, Layton's Naval Air Maintenance
Officer, believed the plans overlooked the fact that carrier aircraft often required shore
facilities, more often than they were likely to be based at Singapore. In the foreseeable
future, sharing the increasingly congested RAF facilities at Singapore was inevitable and
Colson also noted the base's susceptibility to enemy bombing. 199
Layton's scheme, inspired by Colson, involved the transfer of the Eastern theatre's
main aircraft repair yard from Sembawang at Singapore to Colombo, and an increased
capacity for aircraft storage and major inspections at China Bay in Ceylon. He also
proposed a minor repair yard at Durban for use by the South Atlantic and Far East fleets
and the transfer of facilities from Aden to Mombasa in Kenya. Given that the Admiralty
was committed to Singapore, the Colombo scheme was never likely, but DNAO agreed to
some repair facilities in Durban, establishing a Naval Air Section at RAF Port Reitz in
Mombasa and the expansion of China Bay in Ceylon.2oo In October 1941 the only naval air
facilities in the Far East were at Aden, Ceylon and Durban. Work had not yet started at
196 Minute by VCNS, 1 Nov 1940, ADM 1/11850.
197 Ibid.
198 Message from C-in-C East Indies to C-in-C China, 23 Jul 1941, ADM 1/22775 .
199 Appreciation of Fleet Air Arm Maintenance, Far Eastern Theatre by Lt Cdr Colson, Naval Air
Maintenance Officer, Far East to C-in-C East Indies, 21 Jun 1941, IWMlDoc 78/38/1.
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Singapore; the bases at Sembawang and Port Swettenham, formerly Penang, would not be
complete at least another twelve months and the repair yard at Khatib was not scheduled
for completion until March 1943.201 As a result of Layton's intervention, it was agreed that
HMS Unicorn would be sent to Ceylon on completion in October 1942.,202
With the fall of Singapore, the immediate task of supporting a fleet comprising five
battleships, two aircraft carriers and a host of escorts manned by 15,000 officers and men
fell on Kilindini, the port of Mombasa, in East Africa where it arrived on 7 May 1942. The
first FAA personnel to arrive were 150 technical ratings who sailed into Mombasa on board
HMS Alaunia on 3 May 1942. J.F. Drew, the Naval Store Officer at Kilindini between
1942-1945, commented on the great expansion of air facilities in his final report:
'The amount of work on the Fleet Air Ann Section at Kilindini grew very
rapidly, and stores from the United Kingdom, Durban and United States of
America arrived in ever increasing quantities. These were required to maintain
squadrons of the Fleet, together with the major Repair Yard at Nairobi and Air
Stations at Tanga, Port Reitz, Voi and Mackinnon Road... With the closing of
Air Establishments in East Africa the FAA Depot completed closing down in
mid '44. ,203
Mackinnon Road and Voi were some fifty and ninety miles from Mombasa respectively,
and Tanga in Tanganikya about seventy miles distant.
For the Eastern Fleet the campaign in the Indian Ocean can be divided into two
halves. Firstly, the defensive posture assumed in 1942, the capture of Madagascar excepted,
based at Kilindini. Secondly, the preparations for the offensive after Ceylon became the
main fleet base in 1943. For the FAA operationally there was a simple demarcation line,
since between the departure of the Fleet Carrier Illustrious in January 1943 and the arrival
of the Escort Carrier Battler in October, Admiral Somerville's fleet had no carriers at all.
Strategy dictated that clearing the Mediterranean was afforded top priority in 1943.
Logistically, of course, there could be no such halt to the planning and preparations since
the air bases, primarily in Ceylon, Southern India and South Africa, in addition to East
Africa, were vital to the enable a large fleet to operate in 1944 and beyond.
200 Summary of shore facilities existing and projected for naval aircraft on the South Atlantic Station and in
the Eastern Theatre by Head of Air Branch, 15 Oct 1941, ADM 1/22775
201 Ibid.
202 Minute by Head of Air Branch, 21 Oct 1941, ADM 1/22775.
203 History of Naval Store Department, Kilindini, by Naval Store Officer, 12 Dec 1945, ADM 116;5813.
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The move to Ceylon depended upon the strategic situation, progress on base
facilities in Ceylon and the despatch of reinforcements for the Eastern Fleet.204 A
significant addition to air facilities occurred in October 1942 when both the repair yard in
India at Coimbatore and the air station at Katukurunda in Ceylon were commissioned. A
station at Puttalam, Ceylon, was operational by February 1943. Elsewhere in the theatre
further naval air stations were opened at Wingfield, formerly Capetown airport, in South
Africa in July 1942 and RN Air Sections were established at South African Air Force
(SAAF) Stations at Stamford Hill, Durban and Wynberg in South Africa and at Diego
Suarez on Madagascar by the end of the year.205
At the end of 1942 Admiral James Somerville, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Eastern Fleet, received a signal from the Head of Air Branch indicating the long term
requirements for Naval Air Stations and shore facilities.i'" It was necessary to
accommodate two-thirds of the squadrons operating from escort carriers, one-third from
fleet carriers and the alternative armament squadrons for both types.207Accommodation for
a total of twenty-one squadrons was necessary by the end of 1943, another eighteen by the
end of 1944 and a further forty-one by mid 1945 at a total of fifteen naval air stations in
South Africa, East Africa, Ceylon, Southern India, Diego Suarez, Mauritius and Aden. It
should be noted that of the forty-one squadrons earmarked for 1945, thirty-five of these
were provisional and their deployment was dependent on the overall strategic situation.
Three Class B Repair Yards to be built initially in South Africa, Mauritius and
Trincomalee which were: ' ... to service and repair ship-borne aircraft, erect and equip
cased aircraft, break down damaged aircraft into serviceable components and carry out
complete engine overhauls of certain types. ,208 Air Stores Depots were planned for
Durban, Kilindini and Ceylon and sufficient resources allocated to re-equip ten re-captured
air stations. These proposals also called for: ' ...transportable equipment to re-equip
captured bases as Fleet moves East'209, a forerunner of the Mobile Naval Air Bases. By
1945 four repair yards would be established in Ceylon and Southern India including the
one at Coimbatore; Katukurunda and Puttalam were other possible candidates. Nine such
yards were envisaged throughout the Far East.
204 Minute by Military Branch, 2 Dec 1942, ADM 12977.
205 Unpublished notes on Staff History of British Naval Aviation, 1919 - 1945, Volume III, 474, NHB.
206 Message 2243A from Head of Air Branch to C-in-C Eastern F~eet,.19 Dec 1942, AD.M 1/12809.
207 Alternative Armament Squadrons were squadrons equipped WIth different types of aircraft from those on
the carrier depending on the role it had to perform. For example a c~er could.embark fighter squadrons in
lace of strike aircraft if it was to provide fighter cover for an amphibious landing.




The most imposing feature of this plan is the sheer size of the planned deployment
and this provoked much Admiralty debate. Rear Admiral Rawlings, Assistant Chief of
Naval Staff (Foreign), was concerned with apparent over provision and lack of co-
operation with the RAF:
'1 hope that full regard has been given to sharing of aerodromes where possible and
practicable with the RAF. 1 see no reason for exclusiveness on the part of either
Service and I'm quite sure the tax payer will hold the same view. Thus to earmark,
construct and maintain a naval aerodrome at Kilindini for Carriers, sounds an
extravagance... it [the plan] is inclined to be Rolls Royce and impossible to upkeep
in peacetime.210
Vice-Admiral Cunningham, the Fourth Sea Lord, supported Rawlings' assessment:
'1 agree with A.C.N.S. (F) that the proposals appear to be unduly Rolls Royce...
1 feel that this vast problem requires greater consideration before we accept a
works programme for our carriers alone seems to be far in excess of those
required for the general maintenance of the Fleet as a whole. ,211
The alternative view, that without air bases worldwide in the modem era, the navy would
be as impotent as if it had lacked dockyards in the past and previously advocated by Vice-
Admiral Phillips, was adopted by Admiral Kennedy-Purvis, the Deputy First Sea Lord:
'While it may appear "Rolls Royce" to provide shore facilities in more than one
area, this must be done unless the activities of the Fleet are to be limited to one
area e.g. facilities in Kilindini are of no value to a fleet based in Ceylon and vice
versa. When chain of world wide, though inadequate, facilities for ships has been
built up over a period of centuries, it only natural that the requirement of similarly
inadequate facilities for naval aircraft in a period of a few years should appear
large. ,212
At the strategic level of planning it is most important for the exploration of all possible
options. While to take Rawlings' specific example, increasing facilities at Kilindini would
have been wasteful given the plan to base the fleet on Ceylon, it is Kennedy-Purvis' view,
210 Minute by ACNS (F), 12 Dec 1942, ADM 1/13509.
211 Minute by Fourth Sea Lord, 17 Nov 1942, ADM 1/13509.
212 Minute by Deputy First Sea Lord, 8 Dec 1942. ADM 1/13509.
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that a substantial investment in air stations was essential for navy to reap the full benefit
from its large investment in air power, which holds sway with the benefit of hindsight.
While new construction could be avoided where shared facilities were available and the
proposals for 1945 were dependent on the unfolding strategic situation, an extensive
airfield programme would be necessary in 1943-1944 to support a fleet in the Far East.
As early as the beginning of 1942 discussions even took place on possible facilities
in Australia, somewhat remarkable given the paucity of facilities in the Indian Ocean.
However, there were not enough air stores to supply Australia in addition to Trincomalee as
Mr Carter, Deputy Director of Stores, explained:
' ... at present it would be necessaryto rely on Trincomalee to send the stores where
required in this area [Australia] and the question of providing an aircraft supply
ship to follow the Fleet had alreadybeen discussed with Director of Stores and was
now being considered...,213
The Australian authorities were informed in April 1943 that unless there was great change
in the war in Europe it was not anticipated that much use would be made of facilities in
Australia before mid-1944. In addition there remained great uncertainty over Far East
strategy:
'Commander Pedder [Plans Directorate] explained that the reason for the delay in
reaching a decision on the scale of facilities to be provided in Australia was that the
joint strategy for future operations in the Far East had not yet been defined. ,214
A naval war against Japan would be rather different to one with Germany as Captain
Charles Lambe, the Director of Plans, put it in June 1943: ' ...the provision of maintenance
and supply facilities will present a peculiar problem. ,215 The peculiarity being that mobile
facilities would be needed in addition to the permanent, larger but more distant dockyards.
His solution was in line with Far Eastern naval strategy since the 1930s: ' ...we must also
provide adequate mobile facilities capable of moving forward from base to base in step
with the area of operations as the latter advances, i.e. they must be, as far as practicable, in
the form of repair ships and auxiliaries as opposed to shore facilities.'216
213 Note of meeting held by DNAD, 6 Feb 1942, ADM 116/4727.
214 Note of meeting held by DNAO, 22 Apr 1943, ADM 116/4727.




The first proposals earmarked Two Mobile Fleet Base Organisations (MFBO), one in
the Indian Ocean and the other in the Pacific. Each would be capable of maintaining a very
large fleet of four battleships, two fleet carriers, four light fleet carriers, fifteen escort
carriers, fifteen cruisers, fifty destroyers and a host of smaller vessels.i'" Apart from
simply being too big, the MFBO concept suffered from the same weakness as the
American Lion and Cub bases, namely that it was inflexible and assumed the requirement
for a base of a certain size. The main effort in the Far East was seen as the reconquest of
Malaya with Pacific strategy taking a background role:
'American resources and manpower are much greater than the British, therefore
operations in the Pacific would be an American commitment, with the exception
that the British Navy would provide a fleet of all classes of warship to swell the
order of battle of the United States Navy... This fleet would be operating with
British types of naval aircraft. ,218
Hence the logistical difficulties associated with the Indian Ocean strategy were assumed to
be much greater than those in the Pacific where the Americans would provide the
backbone of the logistic support. The Fourth Sea Lord agreed an overhaul of the logistic
organisation was required:
'1 have felt for some time that our supply organisation, although entirely adequate
when our fleet was operating from pre-established bases, was not so adequate to
deal with the situation which has arisen since the move to offensive strategy with
consequent necessity to operate from temporary and improvised bases. ,219
By August 1943 the proposals for mobile air units now came under the umbrella of the
Mobile Naval Airfield Organisation (MNAO). This tri-service proposal for the swift
occupation of captured Japanese airfields saw the Army responsible for construction and
repair of air stations. They would be jointly operated by the RAF and RN as local
conditions demanded. A total of ten stations were earmarked, five equipped with mobile
operational equipment for quick occupation of forward airfields and the remainder with
transportable equipment to follow up the advance. The operational capacity of each station
217 Among the smaller ships were fifty escort vessels. twenty submarines and fifty amphibious ships.
218 Memorandum on Mobility of Fleet Base Organisation by Director of Plans, 10 lui 1943. ADt\l 1113~13.
219 Minute by Fourth Sea Lord, 5 Aug 1943, ADM 13213.
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was for four squadrons totalling forty-eight aircraft. Four units of Royal Marine Engineers
were to be placed under operational Army control to assist with construction duties.22o
When first examining at the policy for Mobile Naval Air Units (MNAUs) the Senior
Officer, Mobile Naval Air Bases was less than complementary; noting that no staff
requirement had been drawn up and without a clear plan the project was in danger of
becoming unwieldy and unworkable:
'A preliminary look into this subject... does more than suggest that like Topsy "It
has just growed [sic]". This form of upbringing is unlikely to produce a healthy
child. It tends to rickets in youth and obesity in later years. Both are disastrous to
anything whose principal aim is mobility. ,221
He anticipated that vehicles for the MNAUs should not need special landing facilities or
shipping, they would use administrative facilities from whichever of the services was in the
area and some of the carrier's maintenance personnel might follow the squadrons ashore.
These proposals were designed to make the bases as mobile and flexible as possible and
avoid the situation where they would: ' .. .lock up hundreds of tons of valuable technical
equipment and stores, a very great number of officers and men and each one would present
quite a formidable problem in sea transportation, landing and shore transport. ,222 One
central base would be established, probably in southern India or Ceylon, where equipment
for units could be stored accompanied by a nucleus of experienced personnel before
despatching them to the front line as required. Previous proposals were based on forming
the units in Britain, similar to Mobile Torpedo Maintenance Units.
The first three units had to be ready for operations by January 1945 and a further
two by May. Each unit was to be equipped to service any four naval squadrons over a
period of four weeks. The base was expected to be operational within two days of arrival at
the site. The Air Ministry agreed that the MNAO: ' ... should be supplied as far as possible
with standard RAF material and vehicles from RAF sources. ,223 and the Army Council
gave approval for it to be: ' ...equipped on Army lines and with unit equipment from War
Office sources ... ,224 In hindsight the major Achilles heel of the proposals was the
assumption of an Army presence in the theatre for construction and administrative
facilities. The availability of Royal Marine Engineers to provide construction units was
220 Letter from Head of Air Branch to Air Ministry and War Office, 20 Aug 1943, ADM 1/15743.
221 Survey ofMNAUs by Senior Officer, Mobile Naval Air Bases, Sep 1943, ADM 1/15743.
222 Ibid.
223 Letter by Air Ministry to Admiralty, 18 Jan 1944, ADM 1/15743.
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also very problematic. However, this planning was crucial as in the event the only FAA
shore facilities in the Pacific were several Mobile Naval Air Bases (MONABs)
As far as air logistic shipping was concerned the Joint Planning Staff put forward a
provisional list of logistic shipping for the advance on Japan to the Ministry of War
Transport in the autumn of 1943.225 The FAA requirement involved three groups of ships.
each to maintain 250 aircraft and comprising two aircraft engine repair ships, one aircraft
component repair ship and one air store issuing ship (ASIS)?26 However, it was estimated
that: 'Owing to the general demand on shipbuilding resources it is unlikely that the new
ships entailed would be forthcoming before 1945.,227 Captain Bedale, the Director of
Aircraft Maintenance and Repair, was unhappy with the progress of planning for repair and
maintenance facilities and concluded that he was:
being forced more and more to the conclusion that the only way to be
reasonably certain of meeting our [maintenance] needs will be re-introduce the
Aircraft Maintenance Ship... It is not necessary, nor desirable, that these should
be such fine and elaborate ships as Unicorn, in fact a slow, broad beamed hull
with little sub-division and probablyno flight deck, wouldbe better. ,228
Bedale was not suggesting that Unicorn's design had been a mistake, but that when
supported by engine and component repair ships and ASIS the new aircraft maintenance
ships would have to undertake a lot less work than Unicorn operating on her own.
Detailed consideration was given to the provision of ASIS in December 1943. Four
vessels were originally thought necessary, but the Director of Stores questioned the need
for so many ships because of the arrangement then in existence with the USA:
'The current agreement between the British and United States Admiralties
provides for the U.S. Navy undertaking the responsibility for the provision of air
stores common to both Navies, and for the storage and issue of both common and
. t ,229
non common air sores.
If this undertaking was taken at face value, the only British responsibility was to supply the
Americans with non-common air stores. It was the Americans' duty to distribute them. In
224 Letter by War Office to Admiralty, 13 Dec 1943, ADM 1/15743.
225 Leonard, History ofthe Fleet Train, 28-30, NHB T1884.
226 Ibid, 29.
227 Message by Head of Military Branch II to C-in-C Eastern Fleet, 30 Oct 1943, ADM 1/13301.
228 Minute by DAMR, 9 Oct 1943, ADM 116/4978.
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the Home-Patterson agreement of December 1942 the Americans agreed that as they were
the power responsible for the theatre, naval, victualling and air stores common to both
navies would be supplied to the RN. The Director of Stores recommended that one ship be
completed as an insurance policy against the failure of the American to supply but to
' ...avoid giving the appearance of willingness on the part of the Admiralty to take over the
U.S. supply responsibilities. ,230 The Deputy Director of Aircraft Maintenance and Repair,
Captain Jameson, was much less certain of the supply arrangement: 'It is considered
unlikely that the U.S. Navy will be able to implement the agreement. ..outside the
continental United States. ,231 After a conference on logistics held in the United States In
February 1944, the Director of Stores conceded that: ' ...all the logistic support for the
British Pacific Fleet will eventually have to provided by us.' Three ASIS would be needed
to support Pacific operations with an assembly of up to 1,000 aircraft. Captain Jameson
reinforced his message on the significance of their role by emphasising the impotence of
the repair groups without them:
'If the A.S.LS. cannot undertake the replenishment of the Repair Ship Groups,
their mobility will be seriously impaired, especially as the ships making up the
Group would be unable to continue to maintain and repair aircraft at more than a
fraction of their designed capacity when on passage. ,232
The resources of the ASIS would be expected to cover the normal maintenance demands of
the operational carriers and what was termed the 'casual and urgent requirements of repair
ships'. In the event of the supply system breaking down limited help may still be
forthcoming from the Americans: ' ...the U.S. authorities have expressed the willingness to
assist from their stocks and other facilities at forward bases whenever they possibly can. ,233
By early 1944 the Ministry of War Transport urgently required a decision so it could
place orders for ships from the limited merchant ship building capacity. The Director of
Plans (Q) estimated the total number of first line naval aircraft for a war against Japan at
850.234 Unicorn would service 100 and similar to the plan from the autumn of 1943, a
further three groups of ships were required for the remaining 750. The composition of each
group was altered with the requirement for an aircraft maintenance ship, aircraft engine
229 Minute by Director of Stores, 19 Dec 1943, ADM 1115727.
230 Ibid.
231 Minute by DAMR, 24 Dec 1943, ADM 1/15727.
232 Minute by DDAMR, 22 Feb 1944. ADM 1/15727.
233 Minute by Director of Stores, 14 Feb 1944, ADM 1/15727.
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repair ship, aircraft component repair ship and air stores issuing ship. Provision of the
ASIS, two of which were under construction, was not considered a problem.t"
The major stumbling block was the availability of aircraft maintenance ships,
requiring large internal spaces where complete aircraft could be accommodated. To adapt
standard merchant ships would be too complicated and time consuming, so two half-
completed Colossus Light Fleet Carriers were redesigned to perform this duty, each with
had a maintenance capacity of 125 aircraft.r" Unicorn would perform the aircraft
maintenance ship role in the third group. Three engine repair ships and two component
repair ships were ordered to provide the requisite facilities for a reduced total of 750
aircraft?37 The Director of Aircraft Maintenance and Repair noted the drop in maintenance
facilities afloat and forecast the need for increased provision ashore.r" The chronic
shortage of shipping was illustrated by an amazing suggestion that Argus, the world's first
flush deck carrier in 1918 and worn out by 1944, should be converted into an aircraft
maintenance ship?39 Unsurprisingly, the Director of Naval Construction dismissed this
concept out of hand.
The navy could not afford to wait for a firm decision about Pacific strategy and the
deployment of forces in that theatre. By then it would be far too late to prepare the
necessary logistic forces. Nor could it accept the advice of Admiral Ernest King during
correspondence with Admiral Percy Noble, Head of the British Admiralty Delegation in
Washington in January 1944:
' ...we [the Americans] do not favour dependence solely on aircraft repair ships
for upkeep of carrier aircraft. Our experience convinces us that support of these
facilities, to be effective, must in large degree be supplied by shore-based
facilities... we are convinced that a low standard of performance would result if
. . d ,240
this system of support were not mamtame .
Commander Duckworth, attached to Admiral Daniel's mission to the Pacific in the spring
of 1944, also stressed the need for a balance of facilities: 'Advanced base facilities should
as far as possible be mobile and shipbome; there are however, certain facilities notably air
235 ASIS were Fort Colville and Fort Langley.
236 Aircraft maintenance ships were HMS Perseus and HMS Pioneer. .
237 Port Quebec, the third component repair ship was already under construction.
238 Minute by DAMR, 9 Feb 1944, ADM 1/17043.
239 Minute by Head of Military Branch II, 13 Feb 1944, ADM 1/1~043. .




which must be installed either wholly or partially on shore ... ,241 While repair facilities
would not be wholly afloat as King believed, the British had no provision to build air bases
in the forward area, having no comparative organisation to the American Construction
Battalions or 'Seabees'. In the Pacific the FAA was totally dependent upon airfields
handed over by the Royal Australian Air Force or the United States Navy. Duckworth
concluded that the Seabees: ' ...have proved the most important single factor in the rapid
establishment of advanced bases and airfields without which the U.S.N. might still be in
Pearl Harbor but the Japanese would probably be in Australia. ,242
In spite of the logistic limitations, the discussions between the British and
American Chiefs of Staff at the Sextant conference in Cairo from 22-25 November and 4-6
December 1943, primarily to consider an invasion of Western Europe and operations in the
Mediterranean, also confirmed the possibility of a British fleet deploying to the Pacific the
following year. Under these proposals, a force headed by a battlecruiser, two fleet and up
to eight escort carriers would be operational in the Pacific by mid 1944, to be joined by the
end of the year by another two battleships, two fleet, two light fleet and nine escort
carriers.243 While such a Pacific deployment was unrealistic given Britain's other naval
commitments and the lack of carrier availability in early 1944,244 it was decided to
despatch a group of officers to the United States and Australia for discussions on Pacific
naval air logistics.
Rear Admiral Charles Daniel, later Vice Admiral (Administration) of the British
Pacific Fleet and in charge of the mission to Australia, submitted his preliminary report to
the Admiralty on 10 May 1944. It had been delayed by disagreements between London and
Canberra including over the mission's terms of reference?45 The key difference between
operating in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific was the greater tonnage of shipping needed to
supply a fleet in the Pacific. Churchill limited the size of a Pacific Fleet to the amount of
logistic shipping that could be spared to support it.246
Throughout 1944 the schedule for the Pacific deployment was gradually put back as
the Head of Military Branch II signalled to Admiral Somerville in mid-March: 'The British
Pacific Force will not now be required to leave the Eastern Fleet at the end of March. 1944.
The movement has not yet been decided upon but will probably not take place before
241 Report on US Naval Organisation and Logistic Problems in the Central and South Pacific by Rear Admiral
Daniel to Admiralty, Enclosure No.2 Paper on Advanced Base Organisation by Commander Duckworth. 3
May 1944, ADM 1/16330.
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243 Willmott, Grave ofa Dozen Schemes, 44-45.
244 For details of fleet carriers under construction or in refit see Ibid, 59.
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August.,247 By mid 1944 a more realistic forecast for carrier requirements in the Far East
by the end of the year called for five fleet and thirteen escort carriers, although not
specifying the division of forces between the two oceans.248 In the end whatever the
strategic plans, it was the lack of logistic facilities that prevented British naval forces from
entering the Pacific in 1944. As the First Sea Lord, Admiral Cunningham, explained to the
Chiefs of Staff Committee in October:
'It might be possible to arrange for participation by British units in the earlier
[Philippine] operations but this could not be a sustained effort since the bases
upon which the main fleet would depend were at present in American hands. It
would take about two months for these to be prepared for British use after the
Americans had handed them over. ,249
Operationally the Indian Ocean remained relatively quiet for much of 1944. Between
March and November the Eastern Fleet conducted periodic air strikes against Sumatra,
Java and other Japanese possessions usually involving two Fleet Carriers. The CVEs
Ameer, Atheling, Begum and Shah arrived in the theatre carrying supplies of reserve
aircraft and were then employed on convoy escort, aircraft ferrying or anti-submarine
hunting duties.250
In addition to supporting these operations, the facilities ashore were utilised by
training squadrons preparing for the Pacific and Ameer became a deck-landing carrier.
Ceylon became the base for aircrew training before Pacific operations. By the end of 1944
Katukurunda was the largest Royal Naval Air Station in the world and in November the
Barracuda squadrons of three, Fleet Carriers were re-equipped with Avengers at Ceylon
without difficulty. The stage was set for the ground-breaking operations of the British
Pacific Fleet which will be covered in the final chapter.
Conclusion
The commissioning of air stations by the RNAS was in tandem with the overall
expansion of the service whereas the FAA struggled to get an adequate number of air
stations since the carrier programme of the mid-1930s were not accompanied by matching
shore facilities. Since stations for training and disembarked squadrons were needed before
246 Leonard, History ofthe Fleet Train, 41, NHB T1884.
247 Message from Head of Military Branch II to C-in-C Eastern Fleet, 17 Mar 1944, ADM 1/14837.
248 Minute by DNAO and DAWT, Enclosure II, 4 Ju11944, ADM 1/16487.
249 Minutes by Chief of Staff Committee Meeting No.331, 7 Oct 1944. CAB 122/1095.
250 Unpublished notes on Staff History of British Naval Aviation, 1919 - 1945, Volume III. 520, NHB.
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the squadrons to equip the earners could become operational it was a senous flaw
,
although inevitable given the split of responsibilities in the inter-war era.
Whereas the large number of American CVEs was accepted on the basis that
American aircraft would equip them, but the corresponding shore facilities were not
guaranteed. The decision to adopt the Carrier Air Group and Wing organisations and
expand existing facilities to accommodate them allowed the cancellation of some new
stations, which would probably have been impossible to build. If the air expansion
programme had not been curtailed in the autumn of 1944 then the FAA would have
encountered real difficulties in providing enough air stations to meet it.
The RNAS had a free reign over choice of sites, but the FAA had to go through the
Air Ministry's Airfield Board, which was frequently accused by the Admiralty of
nominating second rate facilities. While it is clear that the FAA could not have expanded
without the airfields and other resources transferred or loaned from the Air Ministry, the
USN and other air forces, such great dependency caused the process to be much more
difficult. At least the FAA did not have to consider pilot training facilities, which were
provided by the RAF, RCAF and USN.
The RNAS's expansion occurred at fairly even pace given the introduction of new
weapons into service; for example non-rigid airships in 1915 and flying boats in 1917 and
there was a protracted gestation period for rigid airships, which were the most labour and
materiel intensive in the provision of base facilities. The relative simplicity of aeroplanes
in the era was a considerable boon as airfields with grass runways were easy to provide.
The lack of airfields was not the brake on expansion for the RNAS that it was for the FAA.
The number of stations operated by the RNAS in Britain depended on the operational
requirements so stations for aeroplanes in the air defence role were closed and more bases
opened to cover new tasks, for example for anti-submarine bases in Cornwall to cover the
Western Approaches. There were only limited deployments abroad where materials and
labour for construction were more difficult to obtain and they built up at a gradual pace.
The relationship between airfields and the deployment of naval air power was most
clearly illustrated when considering the build up for operations Far East; there were no
carriers in the theatre for a long period in 1943, but planning and construction of airfields
proceeded apace and consideration given to maintenance shipping and mobile air stations
for the eventual deployment in 1944. The provision of a considerable network of air
stations in the Indian Ocean was one of the finest achievements of British naval aviation.
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Chapter 4 - National Economics and Aircraft Production
Overview
Of all the topics discussed in this thesis, the greatest controversy has surrounded the
procurement of aircraft for the FAA in the inter-war years and during the Second World
War. There is little dispute that in this period British industry failed to produce the up-to-
date aircraft the navy required. Quantity and quality were both sadly lacking. The large-
scale expansion overwhelmed the capacity ofthe aircraft manufacturers to meet the demand
forcing an increasing reliance upon the United States Navy at a time when the latter's air
arm was also growing rapidly
It is not proposed, nor IS there space, for an exhaustive account of aircraft
production and readers should study Geoffrey Till's Air Power and the Royal Navy for a
fine account of the inter-war years and Norman Friedman's British Carrier Aviation
presents a highly detailed account of not only inter-war, but more importantly wartime
production.' John Abbateillo's thesis 'British Naval Aviation and the Anti-Submarine
Campaign, 1917-1918' is most a useful source for the First World War.2
This chapter will concentrate on certain key elements, notably the administration of
aircraft procurement, which provides a vivid contrast between 1914-1916 when the navy
had sole responsibility and the more complicated arrangements which existed after 1918.
The Admiralty appeared capable of evaluating designs in the early years of aviation, but by
1939 the advanced aeronautical requirements, coupled with the small size of the Air
Department did not allow such effective assessment. In the case of the Second World War
it is also possible to compare actual production with the estimates which were drawn up as
a result of the naval air expansion programmes which are outlined in Chapter 2. For the
RNAS figures comparing estimated and actual production are only available for 1917-1918.
The procurement organisation was firmly established in 1939 and firms had already
been earmarked as responsible for naval work; small pre-war orders meant there was little
urgency to adopt mass production techniques and there was no competition for orders.
While the aircraft industry was in its infancy in 1914 the Air Department was able to
exploit the Admiralty's wide range of industrial contacts and utilise Britain's versatile
engineering industry. The contribution of industry was a considerable factor in the success
of a procurement strategy, not least the competence ofmanufacturing firms. The significant
I Til Air Power and the Royal NG':v. 86-110; Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, 155-176 and 202-217.




contributions of Shorts, Sopwith and Handley Page in the First World War are undoubted
while the two major firms between 1939-1945, Fairey and Blackburn had a variable record
and their products were outclassed by American designs.
The ability to develop new types of aircraft in wartime proved a considerable
handicap for the FAA, long lead times being common with RAF aircraft. Progress in
aeronautical design with the introduction of monoplane fighters with high-powered engines
had opened a gap between the performance ofFAA and land-based aircraft. The aeroplanes
in use for naval roles at the end of World War I had a similar performance to land-based
types. Unsurprisingly given the relative lack of technical complexity, the development time
for RNAS aircraft were considerably shorter allowing the introduction of entirely new
types.
First World War
Aircraft Orders and Production
A fundamental problem in assessing the relationship between aircraft orders and production
is the lack of concrete figures for the latter until 1917-1918 so until that period in the war
there are few benchmarks to gauge the success of the productive effort. The formation of
the Air Department Progress Committee in 1917 enabled the adoption a more systematic
attitude to planning.
Early in the war Churchill, the First Lord, encouraged aircraft procurement on a
large scale. The major difference compared with the Second World War was that the Air
Department had complete autonomy in procurement until 1916. In April 1915 he directed
that there should be 1000 aeroplanes, 300 seaplanes and 400 pilots by the end of the year
although there was no formal expansion programme. Commodore Sueter, the former
Director of the Air Department, appeared before a meeting of the Finance Committee in
October 1915 to explain the large unauthorised orders ofAmerican aircraft:
'Commodore Sueter explained that he had ordered a very large number of
machines under instructions from the late First Lord to buy all the aircraft he
could lay his hands on. He also stated that an engagement had been entered into
with American firms to place orders for 1,000 machines, which only 350 have so
far been delivered."
.3 Minutes of Finance Committee meeting, 28 Oct 1915, ADM 1i8433/270B.
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In April 1916 Lord Curzon, Head of the Air Board, highlighted this order as an example of
Admiralty extravagance: ' ...the order of 1,100 Curtiss machines in the United States at a
cost of £1,750,000, only a third of which were fortunately supplied, while these turned out
to be useless as war airplanes and could only be used for school work. ..,4 A revised order
placed with Curtiss included the first America flying boats while the majority of the order
was for 90hp Curtiss J.N.3. trainers. While these were unsuccessful at first, the modified
J.NA. was used extensively by the RNAS and RFC for training. In drawing up such an
ambitious programme there was little knowledge of the ability of manufacturers to fulfil it
since aviation production was in its infancy.
From 1917 it is possible to gauge the success of production compared with
requirements and the following tables, compiled by the Ministry of Munitions, compare the
anticipated and actual production of aeroplanes and seaplanes in 1917-1918:
Table 3. Production of aeroplanes, October 1917 - June 1918 5
Anticipated Actual production Difference
production
October 1917 1465 1371 -94
November 1320 1785 +465
December 1360 1498 +138
January 1918 2097 2362 +265
February 2176 2289 +113
March 2439 2591 +152
April 2527 2121 -405
May 3127 3083 -44
June 2922 2661 -261
Total 19433 19761 +329 (+ 1.7%)
As can be seen the anticipated production rose dramatically from 1360 in December 1917
to 3127 in May 1918 and output managed to keep pace until April 1918 when a deficit of
405 was recorded.
4 Memorandum from Lord Privy Seal to War Committee, 16Apr 1916, inDoc.121, Roskill, Documents
Relating, 346. 8 MUN S/'") I') 196') 35Tablesofestimatedandactualoutputofaeroplanes,MayI917-Junl91 , .- - _.
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Table 4. Production of seaplanes, May 1917 - June 1918 6
Anticipated Actual production Difference
production








September 116 109 -7
October 139 100 -39
November 146 158 +12
December 149 122 -27
January 1918 159 123 -36
February 145 113 -32
March 119 94 -25
April 123 78 -45
May 178 157 -21
June 173 145 -28
Total 1865 1499 -372 (-20%)
The figures for seaplanes are available over a somewhat longer period, not that this affects
the overall analysis; if only October 1917 - June 1918 are included the deficit is still 18%.
In October 1917 there were seventeen firms producing seaplanes and flying boats with a
maximum monthly capacity of 142 aircraft, individual companies capable of producing
between four and sixteen machines.' The most successful type of seaplane was the Short
184, over 650 ofwhich were built by Shorts and ten-subcontractors.
The relationship between air requirements and production IS well illustrated
through the example of the H12 Large America flying boats. The first fifty were ordered in
the autumn of 1915, but on trials in 1916 it became apparent that the 160hp Curtiss engines
were unsatisfactory and these had to be replaced with 250hp Rolls Royce ones. Due to the
shortage of Rolls Royce engines the contract was not fulfilled until the autumn of 1917.
8
In
April 1917 the Director of the Operations Department laid down an establishment of 180
Large Americas in home waters for 1918. To supplement the 1915 contract, additional
6 Tables of estimated and actual output of seaplanes, May 1917 - Jun 1918, MUN 5/212/1960/26.
7 Minute from Controller ofAeronautical Supplies to Minister ofMunitions. 14 Oct 1917, MUN
5/212/1962/3 .




orders were placed for another 331. Four months later the overall requirement including
those for the North Sea barrage and the Mediterranean was 426. Given an estimated six-
month service life, annual production of 850 would be needed; it was soon apparent that
such a figure was impossible to achieve so the requirement was reduced to 378. Due to
continuing manufacturing delays, the US Navy was approached in September to take over
proposed stations in Ireland and at Brest. When agreement was reached on 19 October,
requirements were limited to 234, the largest reduction from 150 to 54 being for the
Northern Barrage. However, the Air Board could not even guarantee this, forecasting 170
machines by 31 May 1918, there being only 34 in service in October 1917.
At the end January 1918 orders placed 75 Felixstowe F.2a's and 100 F.3's making
506 flying boats in total. By 31 May 1918 only 105 of the 506 had been produced plus the
50 H.12's in 1917. In addition ten three-engined Porte flying boats were built in the
autumn of 1917, but only two or three were fitted with engines because the Rolls Royce
better utilised in Large Americas. Only nine flying boats, out of the establishment of 54
were available for northern barrage in middle of June 1918.
Administration of RNAS procurement
From the earliest days ofnaval aviation, the RNAS followed the standard Admiralty
policy of allowing private firms to tender for contracts and this proved a better system than
that of the Royal Flying Corps, which largely relied on the Royal Aircraft Factory: ' ...the
prestige of the naval service amongst engineering firms constituted one of the advantages in
providing magnetos, engines and components, which would otherwise have been very
difficult to obtain... In addition, most of the firms employed on Admiralty contracts for
aeroplanes were pioneer aircraft firms. ,9 Close relationships with companies such as Shorts
and Sopwith paid dividends, as they were willing to carry out experiments on the
Admiralty's behalf and designed some extremely effective aircraft; Shorts became
renowned for their seaplanes, Sopwith for aeroplanes and Handley Page for heavy bombers.
Sopwith produced the small Schneider and Baby seaplanes for seaplane carriers in addition
to the famous line of single-seater fighters, largely for use of the Western Front; the Pup
entered service in September 1916, four months before the first RFC squadron was
equipped with the type, the Triplane, solely in naval service, operated between February -
November 1917 until replaced by the famous Camel. When the Navy required bombers in
1915 for work on the Belgian coast: ' ... five firms designed a machine to meet certain
9 Report 'Aircraft Design and Production, 1914-1918' by J.e. Nerney, 9, AIR 1/678/~l/13/~ 186.
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specified requirements. The most successful of the machines produced was the Short land
machine with the 250 R.R. engine. She carried 8-1121b bombs under the wings, the only
place available, and was in use in small numbers at Dunkirk for about a year, when she was
superseded by the Handley Page 0/100.,10
The rules of procurement are revealed in a letter to Short Bros in December 1915:
'The contractors will be given an absolutely free hand with regard to design and
construction... The firms building successful machines are to agree to have their machines
built by other firms either by sub-contract or by a Royalty to be fixed by the Admiralty.' 11
Sueter, the Superintendent of Aircraft Construction, noted in July 1916 that competition
was crucial to keeping the RNAS's aircraft up-to-date:
'With the rapid advance in the development of aircraft, it is quite impossible to
standardise our Machines. The Army did it with the B.E.2.C. and have failed. I
have been pressed over and over again to standardize, but as you have seen, the
popular machine of today may be in a few months quite outclassed. Our system
has on the whole been successful. We go to several firms. They know if they do
not produce a good design, other firms will get more orders. This trade
competition is good and makes us quite independent of anyone firm...' 12
In 1916 the Admiralty had thirty firms building aeroplanes and seaplanes, fourteen
manufacturing engines, eighteen making propellers and sixteen instrument makers. The
Admiralty specified in their contracts that the firm which designed the aircraft would not
have a monopoly on production and frequently sub-contracted orders. Thirty of these
firms, including Shorts and Handley Page were engaged solely on naval work.f Close
naval relations with senior manufacturers provided a better quality product as C. Draper,
Commanding Officer No.208 Squadron, recalled in 1918: 'Up to the formation of the
R.A.F., the aircraft supplied by the Navy from Dunkirk were, in finish, workmanship and
performance, superior to anything supplied by the R.F.C. While the R.F.C. had Camels
from ten different contractors, ours were mainly of Sopwith's own manufacture.l'" The
commissioning of engineers into the RNVR also enabled the manufacturers to be
supervised effectively; one engineer officer was allocated to a group of up to three
10 Report 'The Development ofBombing Machines and their Bomb Gear', 1915. AIR 112301/215/3.
II Letter from DAS to Messrs Short Brothers, Dec 1915, ADM 1I664117/122n05.
12 Minute from SAC to Admiral, 3 Ju11916, AIR 112642.
I.' List of firms carrying out Admiralty contracts, 1916, ADM 1/2594.
14C. Draper, The Mad Major. (Letchworth: Air Review Ltd, 1962),83.
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companies to act as the representative of the Director of Air Services." There were
seventy-eight of these inspectors in 1916, of whom forty-three were employed at
aeroplanes and seaplane manufacturers, twenty-six at engine firms, five at propeller
makers and four at component and instrument companies.
In 1916 Commodore Murray Sueter, formerly the Director of the Air Department,
was appointed Superintendent of Aircraft Production with four Assistant Superintendents
responsible for the design, airships, production and engines plus an Armament Captain.
The Design Superintendent had responsibility for seaplanes and aeroplanes, the Airship
Superintendent for kite balloons and airships other than rigids, the Production
Superintendent for the inspection of aircraft under construction except rigid airships, the
Engines Superintendent for the design and construction of engines and the Armament
Captain for armament, wireless telegraphy, electrical apparatus and gunnery training. The
Director of Naval Construction remained responsible for the design and construction of
rigid airships and the Engineer-in-Chief for the design of their engines.l" In November
1916 the Air Department had 300 officers and men to supervise these tasks and administer
the operations ofthe RNAS. 17
The irony of placing Sueter in charge of production was that he believed that the
only dividing line between Admiralty and War Office lay in operations and that the best
results could be achieved by both services working together. He wanted what he referred to
as an 'Air Navy' to undertake procurement outside of Admiralty control. Sueter saw the
large expansion of the service as problematic since many officers lacked the technical or
scientific knowledge necessary for aeronautics.l''
The procedure for placing naval aircraft orders was laid out in March 1916 for Lord
Derby's Committee. The Construction Committee, presided over by the Superintendent of
Aircraft Construction recommended the number and types of machines and orders to be
placed. The proposals were then approved by the Director ofAir Services and the Third Sea
Lord before contracts were placed by the Director ofContracts. 19
It was not unusual for close coordination between designers, manufacturers and
users. A good example can be found in the field of non-rigid airships; RNAS officers had a
15 Report 'Aircraft Design and Prod~cti~n, 1914-191.8' by ~.c. Ne~ey, 9, AIR 1/678/21/13/2186. !
16 Diagram ofAir Department orgamsation and relatI~ns WIth Admiralty J?epartments and the Board, _1 May
1916, AIR 2/127 & History ofDevelopment of the AIr Department, Admiralty, 1912-1916, AIR
1/674/21/6/59. . .
17 Draft conclusions ofWar Committee meetings, 27-28 Nov 1916, in Doc.151, Roskill, Documents Relating,
~84~~tes on Training, Research and Administration of an Air Navy by Commodore Sueter, 24 Jun 1916, AIR
2/163.
19 Memorandum 'procedure in force for placing Admiralty Aircraft Contracts', May 1916, AIR 2/127.
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direct input into designs working in conjunction with civilian engineers. Specifications for
a simple non-rigid design were issued to private companies in 1915, but it was a team of
naval engineers who came up with the design for the Submarine Scout. The majority of
non-rigid airships were built at naval air stations such as Kingsnorth and Wormwood
Scrubs with crews often standing by during construction before they accompanied the ship
to its operational station. When problems arose, for example with the first batch of long-
range 'North Sea' type airships, the decision was taken to resume production on an
improved version of the Coastal class, the C Star to minimise dclays.i'' The following table
details the success ofthe airship programme:
Table 5. Airship production 1914-1918 21
Type Before 1914 1915 1916 1917 To 31 Total
Aug 1914 Oct 1918
Various 6 1 1 - - - 8
Rigid 1 - - - 4 3 8
Parseva1 1 - 1 - 2 - 4
S.S. - - 29 22 6 3 60
S.S.Z. - - - 1 24 46 71
S.S.P. - - - - 6 - 6
S.S.T. - - - - - 13 13
North - - - - 5 7 12
Sea
Coastal - - 35 - -- 35-
C. Star - - - - 10 10-
Total 8 1 31 58 47 82 227
The production of a large number ofnon-rigid airships was one of the great success stories
of naval aviation. Following the identification for a Submarine Scout (SS) type in early
221915 design was undertaken by a naval team led by Commander Cave-Brown-Cave.
Production proceeded rapidly and by mid-June, twenty-four chassis had been completed,
but problems were encountered with the quality of the fabric for the envelopes.
Nevertheless, twenty SS ships were due for completion by the end of July and another
20 Development ofAirsh ip Service 1914-1918, AIR 1/726/122/3.
21 Ibid.
22 J.S. Middleton, IWM/SA 38, Reel 3.
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seven by mid-August." At the same time thirty Coastal non-rigids were ordered all of
which were delivered by the end of 1916 plus four for Russia and one for France.24
From December 1915 the Superintendent of Aircraft Construction was responsible
for a rigid airship's aeronautical excellence, especially fighting and scouting, and was
consulted by Director of Naval Construction and Engineer-in-Chief The Director of Air
Services was to choose the most experienced officers and men from non-rigid airships to
man them. The Superintendent of Aircraft Construction, Director of Naval Construction
and Engineer-in-Chief were jointly responsible for ensuring that contractors were supplied
with information for construction and handling arrangements for the ship on trials. 25
Approval for six S.S.P. (Pusher) airships was given in January 1916, but this type
was quickly superceded by the S.S. Zero, seventy-one of which were eventually built plus
two each for France and the USA. A twin-engined S.S. airship, known as the Mullion
Twin, on account ofthe air station where it was designed entered service in 1918.
For longer range patrols in lieu of delayed rigid airships the North Sea type was
approved in early 1916, although the first was not completed at Kingsnorth until January
1917 and entered service at Pulliam in April and a dozen were built. In view of the delays
to the North Sea airships, an improved version of the Coastal, the C. Star was ordered in
late 1917 and ten were built before construction was terminated in favour of the Mullion
Twins?6 It was estimated that in production terms a C. Star airship was the equivalent of
three S.S. Zeros and a North Sea type equalled five Zeros. 27
In August 1917 the Admiralty had a fleet of seventy non-rigids." The final order of
the war was for 103 S.S. Twins in July 1918 costing £772,500 with spares on the basis of
100% spare envelopes, 50% spare engines and 30% other parts costing £355,350?9 In
January 1918 it was agreed that the responsibility for the construction of airships and their
sheds should be retained by the Admiralty even when the RAF was formed.i''
Procurement by the RNAS and the RFC
The success of naval aviation in co-operating with manufacturers on a wide range of
types was not entirely favourable in the long term since it was not coordinated with the
RFC and the latter complained that the navy was monopolising resources. In February 1916
23 Minute from DAD to First Sea Lord, 9 lun 1915, AIR 1/148/15/80.
24 Decisions of airship conference, 19 lun 1915, AIR 1/2553.
25 Letter from Secretary of Admiralty to DAS. 28/12/1915, AIR 2/127.
26 Report on SS, North Sea, Coastal and C Star airships, 1915-1918, AIR 1/727/152/5.
27 Minutes of second Airship Progress Meeting, 4 Mar 1918, AIR 1/306/l5/~26/168. . _
28 Admiralty Appreciation for War Cabinet, 30 Aug 1917, in Doc.l85, Roskill, Documents Relating, 530-)31.
29 Minute by Vincent L. Raven, DCAP, 13 luI 1918, AIR 2/163.
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General Henderson, GOC, RFC accused the Navy of monopolising engine production"
with the result that the following month the RFC was seven squadrons and 275 aircraft
below its approved establishment on the Western Front." Around the same time the War
Office accused the Admiralty of monopolising French production: 'While the Army looked
to the French supply as supplementary and as a reserve... the Navy have apparently
considered the French market as the main source from which to provide their land
aeroplanes for war purposes...,33 In fact this is extremely complimentary about naval
aircraft procurement since its was the RNAS and not the RFC which fully appreciated the
quality of the French machines, which until 1916 were largely superior to their British
counterparts.
The War Cabinet established an Air Board under Lord Curzon in May 1916 to co-
ordinate the supply of resources between the two air departments. Curzon suggested that
the Board should have 'general responsibility' for financial proposals with organisations
were required to submit quarterly statements for the formation of new units and alteration
of establishments, proposed orders for new aircraft and works costing over £2000. He met
steadfast opposition from Arthur Balfour, the First Lord: ' ... the Navy cannot consent to
regard itself as subject to any other Department in respect either of the organization of its
Air Service, the designs of its air machines, or the use to which they are to be put. ,34 In
August 1916 the Admiralty ignored the Air Board's proposals by ordering 2% million
pounds of aircraft and engines without consulting it. The Secretary of the Admiralty
justified this decision on the grounds that no inter-service competition was involved: ' ...no
materiel was ordered from Contractors who habitually supply the Army; and that the Navy
will do their best to supplement the resources of the Army should the need for this arise.,35
The incident demonstrated the Admiralty's independence in aircraft procurement through
its large range of contacts and extensive purchasing power, but in the long term could only
weaken its position as the government wished to streamline production. Vaughan-Lee,
Director of Air Services, fully supported the continuation of Admiralty control on the basis
ofthat the RFC had lagged behind the navy:
30 Operations Committee Minute No.29, 2 Jan 1918, in Do~.211, Roskill, D.0cuments Relating, ~95"
31 Note from GOC, RFC to War Committee, 28 Feb 1916, in Doc.99, RoskIll, D.ocuments Relatzn?, _R5.
32 Note from Imperial General Staff to Joint War Air Committee, 13 Mar 1916, m Doc.109, Roskill,
Documents Relating, 319. .
33 Memorandum 'Remarks by Major-General Sir David Henderson on the Note by the Naval Representatives
on the Joint War Air Committee', 31 Mar 1916, in Doc.11 L Roskill, Documents Relating, 324.
34 Minute from First Lord, 25 Ju11916. ADM 1/8464/187.
35 Letter from Secretary of Admiralty to Secretary ofAir Board, 18 Sep 1916, ADM 1'R4M I187.
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' ... the Royal Flying Corps has always been about four or five months behind the
Royal Naval Air Service in adopting new types. Especially is this the case in
regard to engines - e.g. the orders under discussion, amounting to from 6,000 to
8,000 Hispano Suiza 200hp engines, were entirely initiated, and are being carried
through, by our officers.,36
In 1917 the design and supply of naval aircraft was transferred to the Air Board and the
Ministry of Munitions, through the Department of Aeronautical Supplies which absorbed
the design departments of the Admiralty and Air Ministry; one of this department's
primary task was to standardise production - there were 100 different types of aeroplanes
and seaplanes being produced for the RFC and RNAS in 1917. The Air Board was
responsible for the quantity and designs of aircraft ordered whilst the Ministry of
Munitions would oversee production.Y The Controller of Aeronautical Supplies adopted
the RFC method of aircraft inspection to develop manufacturing capacity and the
Admiralty policy of aircraft design, which placed responsibility on the staff of the aircraft
companiea." This began a process, which was to result in the formation of the Air Ministry
which controlled aircraft production of the inter-war years and then the Ministry of
Aircraft Production during the Second World War.
The RNAS was also a supplier of aircraft and equipment to the RFC in a role
reversal of the situation between 1939-1945 when the FAA was dependent on the RAF. As
early as mid-December 1914, twelve Vickers and six Maurice Farman aeroplanes were
supplied to the RFC.39 By June 1915, sixty-five aircraft had been supplied and agreement
reached for the transfer of another 100. When the RFC was faced with a reduction in
strength of three squadrons in June 1916 due to a failure of supply of French Clerget
engines the Admiralty approved the transfer of twenty Sopwith Type 9400 aircraft, twenty
Nieuport two-seater machines, plus 20 Bristol Scouts.40
Foreign production
Nor did the RNAS restrict itself to firms in Britain using the American Curtiss
Company which pioneered the use of flying boats, the first of the H4 Small America type
entered service in 1914, and H12 Large America in April 1917. As previously mentioned
Curtiss also supplied a large number of training aircraft. Other important foreign aircraft
36 MinutebyDAS, 13 Nov 1916, in Doc.l41, Roskill,DocumentsRelating, 410.
37 Memorandum of functions ofAir Board, 19 Jan 1917, ADM 1/8478/6.
38 Report' Aircraft Design and Production, 1914-1918' by lC. Nerney, 12, Air 1/678/21/13/2186.
39 Minute by DAD, 11 Dec 1914. ADM 1/8405/61.
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included Nieuport Scouts, which equipped eight naval squadrons on Western Front in
1916-1917, and Caudron G4 twin-engined bombers, a forerunner of the Handley Page
0/100.
Pre-war French manufacturers led aircraft and engine design." In The First Air
War, 1914-1918, Lee Kennett describes the development of aero-engine technology from
the Gnome to the Hispano Suiza.42 For the early period of the war, French production was
crucial to overall procurement; for example in January 1915 the prospect of meeting
production targets in the next three months were entirely dependent on the large number of
Renault and Canton-Unne engines which had been ordered.f Sueter also noted the
restrictions on French orders at a conference in April 1915: ' ...there were great difficulties
in obtaining deliveries because the French Government only allowed [the] War Office and
Admiralty 15% of their output. This cut the number of French machines available to a very
low figure.t''" Overall the French contribution up to 27 February 1918 was 836 aeroplanes
and eighty seaplanes and flying boats. 45 French engine production was especially important
as the following table shows:
Table 6. Production of aircraft and engines, 1916 - 1917 46
1916 1917
Aircraft (UK) 5,716 13,766
Aircraft (Imported) 917 (659 France) 1,016
Engines (UK) 5,363 11,763
Engines (Imported) 1,864 (France) 4,902
The great dependence on French production in the early years of the war was revealed
when the British Ambassador in Paris informed the Foreign Office on 9 June 1915 that
General Joffre would cut off aeronautic production unless a previous agreement to supply
fifteen per cent of Lewis guns to the French was maintained." The Director of the Air
Department replied that Joffre's requests must be met: 'All the Naval aeroplanes which are
40 Letter from DAS to Director General ofMilitary Aeronautics, 28 Jun 1916, AIR 1/659/17/122/619.
41 'Aircraft Design and Production, 1914-1918' by J.e. Nerney, 2, AIR 1/678/21/13/2186.
42 L. Kennett, The First Air War, 1914-1918 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999),102-106.
43 Minute by DAD, 5 Jan 1915, ADM 1/656/17/122/557.
44 Report ofconference held by First Lord, 3 Apr 1915, ADM 1/8433/270B.
45 French aircraft received byRNAS up to 27 Feb 1918. AIR 1/676/21/6/1820. .
46 lH. Morrow Jnr, The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921 (~as~mgton:. .
Smithsonian Institute Press, 1993). 185 and 251; S.W. Raleigh and H.A. Jones, The IJ ar in the Air: Being The
StOlY Of The Part Played 1n The Great War By The Royal Air Force, Vol III (Oxford: Claredon, 1931), App
X~~legram from British Ambassador. Paris to Foreign Office. 9 Jun 1915, AIR 1668/17/122n76.
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operating in the Dardanelles on purely military work are French machines, as also were the
machines which successfully attacked Zeppelins and Zeppelin sheds on the Belgian
coast. .. ,48 Nevertheless at the beginning of 1916 relations between the Admiralty and
French manufacturers presented an unprecedented opportunity:
' .. .it is highly improbable that the R.N.A.S. will ever fmd themselves in a more
advantageous position to place order than at the present time. It is obvious to
those who have followed the results of production in both countries that (a) the
type of war machine and of engines being produced in France is far superior to
those of England, and (b) the production of France is incomparably superior...the
only comparable machine to any in France is the 1~ Stutter Sopwith...,49
In the case of Messrs Nieuport they not only gave the RNAS preference on production
over all other Allies, but also on occasion over the French Government. In March 1916 the
RNAS and RFC formed a Joint Army and Navy Purchasing Commission in Paris and met
weekly to report on orders and deliveries.50
In July 1916 it was also proposed to purchase 400, 200hp engines from the Hispano
Suiza Company for the RNAS in tandem with the War Office, French and the Russians
who wished to purchase 100 each. The raw materials would be sent out from Britain,
except the aluminium supplied by the French Government.51 Squadron Commander Briggs
went to Spain to approve the order, but in the aftermath of his experience before the
Finance Committee in 1915 Sueter, SAC, refused to allow this as it had not been given
financial approval and Squadron Commander Briggs was summoned to explain his 'short
circuiting' ofofficial procedures.f
Engine production
Aircraft engines were the most complex components and the number of engines
was the limiting factor on production. An agreement with the RFC at the beginning of the
war saw the navy monopolize high-powered engines, initially for use in seaplanes. One of
its navy's best decisions was to ask Rolls Royce to develop a 250hp engine, later the Eagle,
the first of an extremely successful range of Rolls Royce power plants. The Eagle was
difficult to mass-produce due to its complexity. Output was only 875 in 1917 and
48 Minute by DAD. 15 Jun 1915, AIR 1/665/17/122nI5. ..,
49 Statement of RNAS relations with Aeroplane Constructors and Firms 10 Pans. Jan 1916. AIR 1/148/15/78.
50 Minutes of conference held in Paris, 8 Apr 1916, AIR 1/630/17/122/23.
51 Minute by DAS, 7 Jul 1916, ADM 1/2644.
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production of the Eagle attained a peak ofonly thirty-eight units per wcek" The following
table shows production ofvarious Rolls Royce engines:
Table 7. Production of Rolls Royce engines, 1915-1917 54
Type 1915 1916 1917 1918
Eagles 25 485 875 2695
Falcons - 62 625
Hawks - 85 115
Total 25 632 1615
Repairs - 12 327
However Rolls Royce engines had an unparalled reputation and Pilot Thomas Williams
praised the 80hp Hawk engine in his SS Zero airship: ' ... in June of 1918 - one of my last
flights at Anglesey - I did one flight of over twenty six hours with a Rolls Royce engine. I
never hesitated, if necessary, to switch my engine off in the air knowing that I could re-
start it again.,55 In 1916 the RFC had invited Napier and Rolls Royce to design a 200hp
engine, but Rolls Royce withdrew from the competition due to interference from the Royal
Aircraft Factory. Napier proceeded with a Royal Aircraft Factory design for a 200hp
engine, but large quantities were ordered before engine was unsuccessful resulting in
considerable waste of time and effort. The effect of this decision was still being felt at the
end ofthe war:
' ... this failure to develop the Rolls-Royce engine to the full at this period had a
most profound and disastrous influence on aircraft production... this influence
was felt most keenly in 1918 when the shortage of high-power engines precluded
the full expansion of the strategic bombing offensive against Germany... The
effect of this happening might have been even more serious had not the
Admiralty... given considerable orders to Messrs Rolls-Royce and extended their
works.,56
52 Minute by SAC, 8 Ju11916, AIR 1/2644.
53 'Development ofAircraft Production, 1917-1918' by r.c. Nerney, 162-163, AIR ~/678/21113/21.38.
54 Engine power is 250hp Eagle, 190hp Falcon and 75hp Hawk; 'Development ofAircraft Production, 1917-
1918' by J.C. Nerney. 162, AIR 1/678/21/13/2138.
55 T.B. Williams, IWM/SA 313, Reel 6.
56 Report 'Aircraft Design and Production, 1914-1918' by J.e. Nerney, 6, Air 1/678/21/13/2186.
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In July 1917 the Air Board planned a programme of 4,000 engines a month by the
autumn of 1918, the equivalent of 7,000 because a further seventy-five per cent were
required in the form of spares. Henceforth a priority would be given to materials, labour
and machine tools for the aircraft programme.i" Aeronautics was the last large area to place
a serious claim on industry during the First World War and so operated at a disadvantage.
In addition the expanding RFC and RNAS were also in the market for mechanics to
maintain their machines. In the autumn of 1917 it was estimated that forty-seven men were
needed to maintain one aircraft in service at the front and 120 men were needed to produce
one aircraft a month, so the production effort absorbed seventy-five per cent of the labour.58
However, the difficulties of such a large expansion in engine production were highlighted
by the problems with the series of new engines introduced in 1917, whose production
statistics are highlighted below:
Table 8. Estimated engine production and deliveries, September 1917 - June 1918 59
Types Estimated total Estimated surplus Actual deliveries Actual deficit
B.H.P. and Fiat 4,115 1,183 2,374 558
Hispano-Suiza/ 7,219 1,055 3,711 2,453
SunbeamArab
Clerget and B.R.l 4,580 1,064 2,486 1,030
The supply of Sopwith Cuckoo torpedo bombers was one an example ofa serious delay due
to these difficulties. The 200hp Hispano Suiza engine was selected before its development
was completed and serious defects were experienced, causing its replacement by the new
Sunbeam Arab. Unfortunately the Arab was still undergoing trials and not immediately
available." Pilot Phillip Bristow commented on production standards in 1918: 'Engines too
were manufactured by any firm with the right machine tools, and not unnaturally, quality
varied accordingly. Thousands were produced in this way, but against this, losses were
enormous, more perhaps by accident or poor workmanship than by enemy action. ,61 In The
Birth of Independent Air Power Malcolm Cooper relates the failure of the air expansion
programmes planned by the Ministry of Munitions in 1917 to the wholly inadequate
57 Report 'Development ofAircraft Production, 1917-1918' by J.c. Nerney, 43-44, AIR 1/678/21Jl3/2138.
58 Ibid 3 AIR 1/678/21/13/2138.
59 H.A. Jones, War in the Air: Being the Story a/thepartplayed in the Great War hy the Royal Air Force, Vol
VI (Oxford, Clarendon, 1937),42.
60 Letter from Secretary of Air Ministry to Secretary ofAdmiralty, 16 Sep 1918, AIR li643/17 /122 257.
61 c.P. Bristow, 'CP. Bristow's Memoirs - Part 2', Jabberwock Ais, Autumn 2002, 13.
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airframe and engine production capabilities.f Lord Cowdray, President of the Second Air
Board, reported in October 1917 the problems coordinating aircraft and engine orders:
'Owing to the much longer period required for the production of engines than of
aeroplanes, orders for the former must be placed for relatively long periods ahead, before it
is known what types of aeroplanes will be required when the engines become available. ,63
On average in took thirty-four weeks to get an aircraft from design to production, but sixty-
four weeks for engines.i" Aircraft could be produced far more quickly than engines and in
the summer of 1918 40% ofaircraft produced for the RAF came without engines.f
Inter-War Years
Administration ofFAA procurement
At a first glance it is easy to lay blame at the Air Ministry's door for the unsatisfactory state
of the quantity and quality of naval aircraft in 1939. After all it had ultimate control over
aircraft design and procurement since 1918. However, there is little evidence 0 f a deliberate
policy towards the FAA as Andrew Gordon explained in his study of inter-war
procurement: 'Judging from some of the types with which the RAF sought to stem the
blitzkrieg in 1940, it cannot really be asserted that the Air Ministry singled-out the Fleet Air
Arm for particular contempt.l'" In her excellent account of Coastal Command's anti-
shipping operations, Christina Goulter recalled the similar experience which that service
had endured:
'Not all sections of the Royal Air Force benefited from the injection of defence
funding after 1933, and just as maritime aviation was to suffer proportionately
greater cuts in relation to other branches of the air force in the period of
disarmament after the First World War, the maritime aspect grew most slowly
. f h '.c d ,67when expansion 0 t e air rorce occurre .
When examining the size of the FAA it is important to note that as it was purely ship-based
and the government refused to sanction the construction of aircraft without a carrier to go
62 Malcolm Cooper, The Birth ofIndependent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World War (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1986),84-96 . '
63 Report from President of the Second Air Board to the War Cabinet, 12 Oct 1917, 10 Doc.l99, Roskill,
Documents Relating, 567. ..
64 Report 'Development ofAircraft Production, 1~17-1918'. by r.c. N~rne:, 5. AIR 1/678/21/132138.
65 Abbateillo, 'British Naval Aviation and the Anti-Submarine Campaign. ,86.
66 Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement Between The Wars, 227. ,. . .
67 Christina 1.M. Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command s Anti-Shipping
Campaign, 1940-1945 (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 72.
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with them. Nor did the Admiralty appear particularly enthusiastic about producing the
number of aircraft it was allowed; in 1925 the Admiralty Board approved total of 334
aircraft by 1938, but this was reduced to 289 in 1927 and 251 in 1928 on the basis that
carriers would not be provided with their full aircraft complement.f As a result was
reduced to a trickle' ... from the beginning of 1929 until 1932 the funds provided by the
Admiralty were so small that only eighteen aircraft were added to the Fleet Air Arm.' 69
Small aircraft complements also encouraged the use multi-role aircraft to maximise the
carrier's capabilities.
As Hone, Friedman and Mandeles have suggested in their excellent account of inter-
war air power development, the effect of dual-control was rather subtler than purely Air
Ministry bias and more the process the Admiralty used for deciding what aircraft it wanted:
'That the Fleet Air Ann did not do as well technically as its competitor in the
USN can be laid largely to the absence of interacting organizations that would
have allowed the proper level of assessment of professional technical advice
within the Royal Navy. The absence of such organizational arrangements
permitted a chain of unfortunate technological errors to remain uncorrected until
World War II.'70
The impact of the Admiralty drawing up specifications and using the aircraft while the Air
Ministry designed and built them was encapsulated by Admiral Caspar John, who went on
to serve in the Ministry of Aircraft Production during the Second World War: 'The
Admiralty was not competent to say what it wanted and the Air Ministry was not competent
to advise.' 71 While all observers and seventy per cent of pilots were naval officers, all the
senior administrative personnel were from the RAF. Thus all the leading lights of the naval
air service in the First World War were removed from the navy's orbit and the possibility of
attaining senior naval positions in later years. This reduced the 'air-mindedness' of the navy
and meant the Admiralty was entirely dependent on the Air Ministry's advice as the official
history of British Naval Aviation made clear:
' ... all the higher technical and administrative responsibility was held by Air
Force officers; thus, tactical progress and administrative development as well as
68 Till Air power And The Royal Navy, 89.
69 S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1935: Volume L The Defensive (London: HivlSO, 1934),31.
70 Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman and Mark D. Mandeles, American & British Carrier Development
1919-1941 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999),132.
71 Till, Air power And The Royal Navv, 102.
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the majority of air training problems were controlled from outside the Navy.
Herein lies the principal explanation of British backwardness in naval aviation as
compared with that in the United States and Japan.i"
It left a far more complicated organisation than was really necessary for the successful
development of naval aviation and compared poorly to the close co-operation between the
United States Navy and their Bureau ofAeronautics:
,... the naval commands attempting to develop the tactics of naval aviation; the
naval constructors, designing the aircraft carrying ships; the R.A.F. personnel
acquiring practical experience in handling of the aircraft operated from ships; and
the Air Ministry staff and design departments upon whom the Navy depended for
progress in aircraft design, air tactics and air equipment.'73
One major criticism of FAA aircraft in this period is their reliance upon RAF types.
Since all the armed services were short of finance it made sense for much of the inter-war
era to use adapted RAF machines as the performance of carrier-borne and shore-based
aircraft were largely similar. Some of the specialist naval aircraft, the Short seaplane,
Supermarine Seagull and Fairey HID seaplane were not particularly successful anyway. But
this reliance also put the FAA at the mercy of Air Ministry designers who looked to build
the best aircraft without taking into account naval considerations and probably not knowing
the reasoning behind the some of the Admiralty's specifications, such the need for two-
seater aircraft for navigational purposes. The comparison with the system in the United
States could not have been more striking where naval officers were involved in every stage
ofthe process:
' .. .it was thought possible to adapt a Royal Air Force type of aircraft to work
from carriers or to suit naval tactical requirements, it was customary to view
those [naval] requirements as a detraction and hindrance to the normal aircraft
development. The opposite view, held by the American system, where the
development was stimulated and directed by naval officers, was to look upon an
aircraft as being deficient if it did not meet the requirements.'74
72 Naval Staff History, The Development ofBritish Naval Aviation 1919-1945: Volume 1 (London: HMSO.
1950), 10, ADM 234/383.
73 Ibid, 17. _
74 Naval Staff History, The Development ofBritish Naval Aviation 1919-194): Volume 1,35, ADM 23.+ 383.
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The navy was also unfortunate that aircraft capabilities were transformed by the
change over from biplanes to monoplanes which occurred in the mid-1930s with the
development ofhigh-powered engines:
' ...beginning of the steep improvement in aircraft engines that produced high-
performance aircraft. At just this time, fmances contracted, denying the Royal
Navy the chance to increase the rated capacities of its carriers... Then
rearmament, oriented mainly against Germany, presented the RAP with ample
reason to constrict purchases of naval aircraft.,75
Even if the navy had been granted more finance for production it is by no means clear it
would have been able to take advantage of it. It needed its own research and design budget
and technical advisers to discover the actual possibilities of the aircraft performance rather
than assuming their limitations. For example the consequences of multi-role specifications
were serious: ' ...The sixty-knot [catapult launch speed] and weight limits began to make it
impossible for the Fleet Air Arm to take advantage of the improvements in aircraft
technology.t" The Admiralty specified that aircraft should operate from carriers and ships'
catapults. By contrast the United States Navy operated specialist aircraft from catapults
permitting the design of high-performance carrier-borne machines. This comes to the crux
ofHone, Friedman and Mandeles' argument:
'The Admiralty's carrier aircraft did meet its requirements, but unfortunately
those requirements were not generated by organizations interacting in an
experimental setting... In particular, the Royal Navy assumed that, to operate
from a carrier, an airplane had to suffer limited performance. The assumption had
a dramatic - and deadening - effect on the Royal Navy's estimates of
. ,77
requrrements.
The ultimate example of this can be seen in the specifications what became the Blackburn
Firebrand, the great white hope for the navy's fighter units during the war. The major
problem was that while it was touted as a single-seater in all other respects it had the
characteristics of a two-seater:





'In 1939 Director, Naval Air Division ... [Captain Larcom] stung by complaints
[from the Air Ministry] that the Admiralty's demands for two-seaters were
ruining performance, released a specification for a single-seater that would still
meet standard requirements for range and take-off speed. He suggested that it
would differ very little from the unsatisfactory two-seaters. The Blackburn
Firebrand, which met the specification, proved his point. It ended up as a torpedo
bomber.i"
It was very much a VICIOUS circle with the Admiralty demanding specifications than
imposed serious restrictions on performance, but the Air Ministry not understanding the
former's reasoning and either unwilling or unable to suggest improvements: ' ...neither the
administrative arrangements under which they [the aircraft] were supplied, nor the personal
experience of those chiefly responsible for their design, appear to have been of the kind
best calculated to produce the right types ofcarrier aircraft. ,79
Due to financial stringency in the 1920s when a number of firms went bankrupt the
Admiralty was forced to deal with a relatively small number of companies who faced little
competition in their area of specialisation. The procurement bottlenecks which affected the
navy more widely were replicated in the field of naval aviation. Sopwith, perhaps the most
famous manufacturer of naval aircraft in the First World War, went bankrupt in the 1920s
and by the mid-1930s the Admiralty was largely dependent on only two manufacturers,
Fairey and Blackburn. The substantial criticism, which was directed at these firms by the
Admiralty during the Second World War, should be tempered with the recognition at the
lack of orders they had received for many years and the sudden requirement for mass
production ofnaval aircraft.
British production
The difficulties of a small industrial base and a disjointed procurement process can
be illustrated by development of strike and fighter aircraft respectively. The famous Fairey
Swordfish, the most important strike aircraft in the early war years, was the result of
consultation in the early 1930s between Fairey's and Captain H.C. Rawlings of HMS
Devonshire, a future Director of the Naval Air Division. The prototype flew in 1934 and
the aircraft entered service in 1936.80 The requirements for the Swordfish's replacement.
the Albacore, were issued in June 1936. While Fairey's submitted monoplane and biplane
78 Ibid, 119.




designs, it was decided that it was too risky to order a monoplane because of the long time
it would take to develop and complete trials. Initial orders for 100 Albacores were placed
in 1937, increased to 400 in October 1938 but there were delays due to problems with its
Taurus engine.81
Subsequent discussions regarding the priority between the Swordfish and Albacore
highlighted two major problems of the procurement process. Firstly, the small orders
hardly encouraged the manufacturers to invest in mass production techniques. Secondly, in
the late 1930s the Admiralty was entirely dependent upon just one factory, Fairey's at
Hayes, for the production of its strike aircraft. Therefore there would a gap between
production of one type being completed and the next type getting under way while the
factory was re-tooling. Delays in production of the Albacore brought these problems to a
head in the autumn of 1938 as Captain Boucher, Director ofAir Material, explained:
,... the Admiralty is in the position of having consecutive types of this class of
aircraft emanating from the same factory. This means it is impossible to have
production of the two types simultaneously. The factory organisation allowed for
the existing Swordfish production to overlap the initial trials of its replacement
(the Albacore) but now delays in production of the latter have brought us to the
position where Swordfish production has practically come to an end... at best, if
the Albacore is a success and free from all except normal "teething" troubles
there will a gap of a month or two in production... ,82
Boucher foresaw an even greater problem if the Albacore was a failure when the factory
might take up to four months to re-organise. Given the production problems with the
Albacore and the need for the maximum number of strike aircraft in the short term with the
unstable international situation it was only matter of time before it was decided to reinstate
Swordfish production. The Fifth Sea Lord and representatives of the Air Ministry meeting
on 27 September concluded that the Hayes factory should re-tool to produce 200
Swordfish starting in February 1939.83 In the light of the Swordfish's subsequent
unparalleled war record it is worthy of note that it would have gone out of production in
October 1938, but for the paucity ofaircraft production facilities.
81 M.M. postam, D. Hall and J.D. Scott, Design and Development ofWeapons: Studies in Government and
Industrial Organisation (London: HMSO and Longmans. Green & Co, 1964), 134 & 146.
82 Minute by DAM, 11 Sep 1938, ADM 1/10114.
83 Minute by DAM, 17 Sep 1938. ADM 1/10114.
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Unfortunately for the FAA the position regarding strike aircraft was positively
healthy when a comparison is drawn with the production of fighters. It is in this sphere that
the total incompatibility of dual control with procurement was revealed. The Air Ministry's
inability to deliver was apparent to the Head of Air Branch as far back as 1933 during
discussions on the future Blackburn Skua:
' ...we do not yet know whether the Air Ministry will be able to pronounce that the
aircraft when produced [author's italics] will be a capable fighter... In any case at
least four years will elapse before it is in production and the Commander-in-Chief
is asking for fighters now.' 84
If the Air Ministry, the FAA's technical advisor, was unable to state what would or would
not be a capable fighter it placed the Admiralty in a difficult position at this early stage.
Rear Admiral C.E. Kennedy-Purvis, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staffin 1936, sheds very
interesting light on the procedure or lack of one which was adopted by the Admiralty in the
design process:
'It is perhaps unfortunate that this aircraft [Skua] will be in production before the
D.B.R. [Barracuda], but this is because it was not developed to Staff requirement
in accordance with a settled policy: it merely grew out of the idea that a dive-
bomber was required and could probably best be designed with a fighter type.,85
In addition to the navy's uncertainty, the evidence appears to suggest that the Air Ministry,
allegedly in charge of the design and development of aircraft, knew little better of how the
aircraft might expected to perform:
'At present the Admiralty is being blown hither and thither. In the case of the
Skua, for example, the Air Ministry have informed the Admiralty that this aircraft
has grave defects as a dive bomber. This led to the Admiralty contemplating the
abandonment of this function in the Skua, but the Air Ministry are now apparently
pressing that the dive bombing function should be retained.,86
84 Minute by Head ofMilitary Branch, 19 Dec 1933. ADM 119007.
85 Naval StaffHistory, The Development ofBritish Naval Aviation, Volume 1, 77, ADM 234383.
86 Minute by Head ofMilitary Branch, 6 Oct 1938, ADM 1/10113.
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Relations were similarly strained over the future of Blackburn Roc, a four-gun turret
fighter, when the Air Ministry proposed in September 1938 that it should be cancelled
,
although according to the Admiralty no new evidence was produced. Captain C.M.
Graham, DNAD, raised the fundamental issue, also highlighted by Geoffrey Till and
Andrew Gordon that the Air Ministry was the judge and jury on naval air matters:
'Constitutionally the Air Ministry are the Admiralty's technical advisers. If we
are confident of their efficiency there would be no question that the Roc would be
rejected out of hand; our doubts in the matter are, however, justified by the fact
that it has taken four years to come to an adverse decision. But since Admiralty
has no technicians to advise is this matter we are not competent to insist pressing
forward with the contract.'87
In the event the Air Ministry decided to continue with production of the Roc, although it
proved singularly unsuccessful in service. But the lack of technical competence within
Admiralty was to remain a problem for much ofthe war.
Second World War
Administration of FAA procurement
The Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) was formed in 1940 under Lord Beaverbrook
with responsibility for aircraft production for the RAP and the FAA. In one of its first acts
on 17 May 1940 the Admiralty was informed that sub-contractors had been ordered to give
first priority to five RAF types, the Hurricane, Spitfire, Blenheim, Whitley and Wellington;
Captain Slattery, Director of Air Material, predicted serious consequences from this move:
' ... all the aircraft manufacturers engaged on Fleet Air Arm production will be seriously
impeded by the non-arrival of component parts and raw material. ,88 Production of the
Fulmar and Albacore were most seriously affected. While this instruction remained
formally in place for only three months, Slattery believed that as a result of this decision the
FAA was afforded secondary importance in the minds of many MAP staff for a
considerable time. A scheme for a folding wing version of the Spitfire was abandoned in
1940 due to a lack of production capacity and there was a clash over the availability of
Sabre engines for FAA Firebrands and RAF Typhoons in February 1941 when
87 Minute by DNAD, 3 Oct 1938, ADM 1/10113.
88 Paper from DAM to Fifth Sea Lord, 20 May 1940, ADM 116/5348.
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Beaverbrook informed Alexander, the First Lord, that he could provide two Sabre engines
for the Firebrand prototypes, which resulted in a scathing response from Alexander:
,.. .I note with appreciation that you can let me have two engines for the
prototypes, though actually I need three. The rest of your letter, to use an old
saying, asks me to rely on the "sweet by and by". The need for a fighter of this
performance to protect the Fleet is already apparent, and cannot wait as long as
that. The Navy has a just claim to its share of the best products of the British
aircraft and aero-engine industry. The allocation for which I ask must be small in
comparison with the production which will be providedfor the R.A.F.,89
The navy was also seen to be getting something of a raw deal when the facilities at
Westlands and Boulton Paul were transferred for the production of the Barracuda. The
previous products from both factories had been withdrawn from service, hence their
availability. In January 1943 Admiral Dreyer, Chief of the Naval Air Service, blamed the
production deficiencies on MAP's failure to supply Barracudas, folded wings for Seafires
and the long delays for the Firebrand and Firefly. He also pointed out because of the
priority given to the bombing of Germany the FAA had a relatively small proportion of
British aircraft production capacity, only eleven per cent compared with the twenty-two per
cent which was allocated in America to the USN. Dreyer had especially strong views
regarding the availability of aircraft for the Battle of the Atlantic: 'We should not also
bomb Germany with the Blood ofthe Merchant Navy. ,90
The following month Lord Chatfield, former First Sea Lord, put forward a motion
in the House of Lords criticising the administrative chain for the supply of aircraft to the
FAA and Coastal Command." Rear Admiral Portal, Assistant Chieffthe Naval Staff (Air),
did not believe this would be beneficial: 'Public discussion ofmatters which are the subject
of constant and delicate negotiations between the services, can do nothing but harm; it
generally leads to other controversial issues being raised ... and so retards the progress
which we hope we are making towards the establishment and maintenance of good
relations ... ,92 Boyd, the Fifth Sea Lord, agreed with this assessment: 'I am quite sure that
with the present contribution of the M.A.P. the administrative is satisfactory. ,93
89 Letter from First Lord to Minister of Aircraft Production, 7 Feb 1941, ADM 1/13488.
90 Report from CNAS to Admiralty, 13 Jan 1943, ADM 1/13484.
91 Minute by A. Clifton-Taylor, Cabinet Section, 15 Feb 1943, ADM 1/13963.
')2 Minute by ACNS (A), 18 Feb 1943, ADM 1/13963.
93 Minute by Fifth Sea Lord, 19 Feb 1943, ADM 1/13963.
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However, as in the inter-war years when the Air Ministry came in for serious
criticism from the navy, it should not be assumed that MAP was solely to blame for failures
of aircraft procurement. There is also evidence that for some years the navy had not taken
aircraft production seriously; for example no members of the FAA Advisory Committee,
which advised on the transfer of the FAA between 1937-1939 had any technical expertise.
It was not until March 1941 that a Chief Naval Representative (CNR) and a technical staff
were appointed to MAP to represent the navy. By August 1943 there were forty-four naval
officers and technical civilians on CNR's staff and the office handled 1400 Admiralty
papers per month." Churchill had criticised the Admiralty's procurement policy in mid-
1942: 'In my opinion, the Admiralty themselves are very largely to blame for the present
very satisfactory condition of the aircraft of the FAA ... by not having a clear view of what
was wanted [and] by repeated alterations [to designs]. ..,95 In his assessment of wartime
procurement in June 1943, Commodore Slattery, CNR and former Director of Air Material
at the Admiralty, placed considerable blame for the lack of proper direction of aircraft
procurement in the latter part of 1941 and the summer of 1942 on the Admiralty rather than
the MAP:
'The outlook of the Board of Admiralty to aircraft has been one of scepticism.
They have never been convinced until six to nine months ago that they were
really important. They realised it was a new factor but did not really understand
the possibilities because they did not know anything about the technical side and
were unable to state their case to the Cabinetor Chiefs of Staffmeetings. ,%
The lack of adequate technical expertise within the Admiralty to advise on aircraft
programmes, undoubtedly a hangover from the dual control arrangement until 1939,
remained for a considerable period of the war. In a debate on Navy Estimates in March
1943, Mr Hopkinson MP, an engineer who had served in the Department of Aircraft Repair
and Maintenance for eighteen months, criticised the Admiralty's aeronautical experience:
'It is a lack of a technical staff strong enough, and of great enough experience in
aircraft design and construction to be able to criticise designs and to save the
94 Extract from Aircraft Supply Council 14/43,3 Aug 1943, AVIA 46/136. .
95 Minute by Prime Minister, 5 Aug 1942, PREM 3/171/9, taken from Till, Air Power and the Royal ;\my,
106.
96 Interview with Commodore Slattery, CNR, 25 Jun 1943. AVIA 46/136.
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country from having to put up with inferior machines ... there is no one at the
Admiraltycapable of saying what design shouldbe.""
Admiral Boyd, the Fifth Sea Lord, commented: 'As usual the Admiralty is blamed for a
national deficiency' and he blamed the lack of aeronautical engineers in the aircraft
industry on a slump in engineering as a whole in the inter-war years." In order to improve
the Navy's assessment of new aircraft designs Alexander, the First Lord, suggested it
should hire a suitably qualified Chief Designer. However, Boyd did not believe there were
any suitable candidates:
'The difficulty lies in getting a big enough man. There are a lot of experts who
are capable of limited criticism on one or other aspect, but I doubt if anybody in
the M.A.P. is really confident to criticise design as a whole ... All Chief
Designers are working with firms, and, although it would be economical at
£20,000 a year to attach one as our aircraft critic, I doubt whether anybody would
allow one to leave his present work. ,99
The Fifth Sea Lord had had offers from engineers whom he regarded as second rate and
therefore did not make an appointment fearing 'second rate criticism' and preferred to rely
on: ' ...M.A.P. with all its limitations and its lack of first class men, is a better
.c. d ,100saleguaf '"
Aircraft specifications
Before analysing the success of naval aircraft procurement in meeting production
expectations it is useful to examine what types of aircraft the Admiralty wanted throughout
the conflict. The autumn of 1940 saw the navy largely operating pre-war types; the
Swordfish and the new Albacore in the strike role with the new Fairey Fulmar two-seater
fighter operating from carriers in the Mediterranean. On the back of the experience with
Fulmars, 181 Martlets single-seater fighters had been ordered from the USA 101
In July 1941 problems were being experienced with the development of the
Barracuda and it was acknowledged that British aircraft production was not capable of
97 Extract from Navy Estimates Debate, House of Commons, 17 Mar 1943, ADM 1/14901.
98 Minute by Fifth Sea Lord, 13 Apr 1943, ADM 1/14901.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Naval Aircraft, Periodical Summary No.1, Period ended 20th Sept 1940,6, C.BJ053 (l), Admiralty




being expanded to meet the requirements of the new CVEs coming into service and two
types of American strike aircraft, Chesapeake dive-bombers and Grumman torpedo
bombers, later known as Avengers, were earmarked for this purpose. Fulmars and Martlets
were the standard carrier fighters and in the latter the navy had a fighter with a performance
capable of matching land-based types: 'Several opportunities have occurred during the past
month of comparing the performance of the Martlet with Hurricanes flown by the Royal
Air Force. Dog-fights have been arranged in which the Martlets have had not the slightest
difficulty in shooting down the Hurricanes at heights up to 15,000 feet.' 102
By the end 1941, the Admiralty had approved staff requirements for three types of
carrier-borne aircraft; the single-seater fighter, the two-seater strike escort and night fighter
and the torpedo-bomber reconnaissance aircraft. The need for the single-seater fighter, not a
requirement in the late 1930s, now drove the policy:
, ... the main reason which led to the adoption of a three-type policy was the
paramount necessity of providing a really high performance fighter for Fleet
defence. The only way that this could be attained was to confine this type to the
bare requirements of Fleet defence, which entailed abandonment of navigational
facilities and a considerable reduction in endurance, these latter being previously
required for a fighter which might be calledupon for striking force escortduties.l'"
In the short term Martlets and Sea Hurricanes would have to fill the single-seater fighter
role pending conversion of the Supermarine Spitfire V and trials of the new Blackburn
Firebrand. In the middle of 1942 the experiences of the British in the Indian Ocean and
Americans in the Pacific also changed the perception of the capabilities of strike aircraft:
, ... even with the advent of the Barracuda, the T.B.R. type with its limited speed
and performance and poor armament is no longer suitable for reconnaissance or
attack in clear weather by day in face of fighter opposition unless escorted... ,104
The provision of long-range high-performance carrier-borne fighters for the FAA was not
achieved until the introduction of American Grumman Hellcats and Chance Vought
102 Naval Aircraft Progress and Operations, Periodical Summary No.3, Period ended 13 Ju11941, 6, C.S.
3053 (3), AL. .
103 Naval Aircraft Progress and Operations, Periodical Summary No.4. Penod ended 25 Dec 1941,8,
C.B.3053 (4), AL. -
\04 Naval Aircraft Progress and Operations, Periodical Summary No.5, Penod ended 30 Jun 1942,8, C.S.30)3
(5), AL.
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Corsairs in 1943. By the end of 1942 the imperative of getting the maximum number of
aircraft into service as quickly as possible to feed the large expansion programme solved
the navy's dilemma over variety of types for production: ' .. .it has been decided to adopt
the short term policy of developing the Seafire, Barracuda and Firefly to provide improved
Fighter, Reconnaissance and Torpedo-Dive-Bomber aircraft.' 105 Three years into the war
the debate on the design and suitability of fighter types was still continuing:
' ... for the defence of the Fleet we require a single-seater day fighter of the highest
possible performance, It is the policy that, ifpossible, its armament shall be four 20
mm guns. The problem of how to provide this aircraft with an endurance matching
that of the striking forces had not yet been solved... It may yet be necessary to
resort to distinct "short-range" and "long-range" types of day fighter.'106
The answer, of course, was simply that no British designed aircraft could solve this
conundrum. The Hellcat and Corsair easily filled the gap when they entered service in
1943, illustrating the stark contrast between the doctrines the two navies.
By mid 1943 the Admiralty had bowed to the inevitable also decided to accept a
division in their reliance on British and American production: 'The present policy is to
concentrate British designers on developing short-range high-performance interceptor
aircraft, while we rely on the American long-range single-seater aircraft and our own
Firefly for the escort role.' 107 This decision was approved in the first report of the Aircraft
Design Sub-Committee of the Future Building Committce.l'f It was also confirmed that no
further TBR designs would be considered after the Barracuda:
,... the Design Committee recognised the implications of departing from this
"maid of all work" type which has proved so successful, but felt that with the
increase in the number of carriers which will be available in future, an increase in
the number of types, with the object of securing aircraft of generally better,
performance, could now be more readily accepted than in the past.,109
105Naval Aircraft Progress and Operations, Periodical Summary No.6, Period ended 31 Dec 1942,9,
C.BJ053 (6), AL.
106 Ibid.
107Naval Aircraft Progress and Operations, Periodical Summary No.7, Period ended 30 Jun 1943, 13,
C.BJ053 (7), AL.
108 First report ofAircraft Design Sub-Committee of the Future Building Committee. 4 Jul 1943, ADM
1/15013.
109 Paper 'Naval Aircraft - Progress with New Design, Mar-Jun 1943, byCNR. 15 Jun 1943. ADM 1/15013.
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At the end of 1944 the appearance of the jet engme was recognised as
revolutionising the potential of fighters, although in the short term the high fuel
consumption was seen as limiting its application to short-range fighters. As a result of the
successful performance of Corsair and Hellcat fighter-bombers, the Admiralty made finally
acknowledged that single-seaters could perform the strike role: 'The successes of the
Corsair, and similar shore-based aircraft, in the fighter bomber role, have made it appear
that for many types of daylight operation, single-seater, high-performance aircraft are more
suitable as a striking weapon, than the previous two-to-three seaters in use in the Navy.dlO
By the end of the war there was a concentration upon single role aircraft and the
pre-war assumption that carrier-based aircraft were by their very nature inferior to land-
based counterparts had been long since abandoned: ' .. .it being the policy that all roles ...
shall continually be met with the most efficient type of aircraft which can be operated from
a carrier (and in some cases it is considered they may well be superior to their shore-based
counterparts) ... ,111 Reflecting the much closer relationship between the Admiralty and
aircraft manufacturers forged during the war, the latter would not be rigidly bound by the
official specifications:
' ... for whatever role an aircraft design is required, it must be fundamentally a good
aircraft of its type. The designers therefore are not tied down by crippling staff
requirements. They are informed of the approximate weight, size, speed, endurance,
weapon-carrying capacity, etc., as a guide to the main characteristics which it will
. ~ h he recui t ,112be necessary for the aircratt to ave to meet t e requiremen s...
Despite the improved system of aircraft procurement, the complexity of modem aircraft
meant there was still a considerable development period: ' ...it should always be
remembered that from the time an aircraft is projected until the time it appears in service is
. d b lik 411 ,113on an average three years. In time ofpeace It may be expecte to e more 1 e 12 years.
Aircraft orders and production
The failure to consider the development of a high-perfonnance single-seater naval
fighter in the inter-war period led to a total dependence on the RAP and American
110Naval Aircraft Progress and Operations, Periodical Summary No.1 0, Period ended 31 December 1944, 12.
C.B.3053 (10), AL. .






production. In both cases the navy depended on the goodwill of these organisations for
supply. Admiral Lyster, the Fifth Sea Lord, contacted Admiral Little, Head of the British
Admiralty Delegation in Washington in September 1941 to emphasise the necessity for
American fighters to meet expansion requirements. A complement of 120 aircraft for ten
squadrons was required by the spring of 1942, but only half could come from RAF
production. The only British single-seater, the Firebrand, was not due to commence
production until the summer of 1942 and therefore five squadrons of Martlets were
needed. 114 The British Aircraft Commission in Washington informed MAP in January 1942
that a long-term target of 440 fighters was not possible through a reliance on the Martlet
alone as only 300 of this type was available. Therefore efforts were to be made to obtain
eighty of the new Corsairs.i" The early Hurricanes supplied to the navy were aircraft
which had previously been in service with the RAF as the Vice Admiral, Naval Air Stations
noted in September 1941: 'One particular case may be quoted; N.2455 has since October
1939 been in two different Royal Air Force Squadrons, took part in the Battle of Britain,
and was twice extensively damaged, once by forced landing and once by enemy action,
before being converted to Sea Hurricane.' 116 The primary concern was the effect on the
morale of the aircrews: 'Many of the Pilots joining will be young and enthusiastic officers,
joining an Operational Squadron for the first time, and to be given an aircraft which can
only be described as a "cast off from the Royal Air Force" causes a considerable damping
of their ardour.' 117 However, as Captain Huskisson, DAM, pointed out the Admiralty had
no contracts for the production of Hurricanes at that time and therefore simply had to
. ft '1 bl 118accept whatever aircra were avai a e.
Alexander, the First Lord informed Churchill in October 1942 that to meet the
expansion plans under Programme A, which envisaged 2689 first line aircraft in July 1946,
there would be a deficiency of up to 1000 fighters and 1500 TBRs exist in mid-1943. To
reduce the fighter deficit by 500, production at Supermarine would not be closed down in
March 1943 and production was to be increased at Westlands as soon as possible. Peak
capacity for Swordfish, Barracudas and Fireflies would be maintained from latter half of
1944 when current contracts were due to expire, to the end of 1946.119 Negotiations were
also continuing for increased production from the USA. The following month Vice Admiral
Power, Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Home) and Rear Admiral Rawlings, Assistant Chief
114 Letter from Fifth Sea Lord to Head ofBAD. Sep 1941, CAB 122/142.
115 Telegram from BAC to MAP, 6 Jan 1942, CAB 122/142.
116 Letter from VANAS to Secretary of the Admiralty, 21 Sep 1943, ADM 1/13522.
1\7 Letter from VANAS to Secretary of the Admiralty, 21 Sep 1943, ADM 1/13522.
118 Minute by DAM, 6 October 1941, ADM 1/13522.
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of Naval Staff (Foreign), complained that there was a considerable disparity between the
approval of naval air expansion programmes and aircraft production:
'The lack of priorities for the Fleet Air Arm still exists, as shown by the fact that
the Cabinet on the one hand have approved our carrier building programme and
on the other hand have denied us the right to any additional aircraft productive
capacity. The result has been that we have been forced to go to America for at
least 40% of our immediate requirements. This source of supply is becoming
increasingly uncertain and the future types are unsuitable.' 120
The following table shows the aircraft production totals for 1942:
Table 9. Aircraft production, 1942 121
Type Quantity

















While the British naval production dominated as far as strike aircraft were concerned, the
largest contributor of fighters was the RAF with the Americans also making an important
qualitative input in this field. The views of Power and Rawlings were reinforced at the
119 Minute from First Lord to Prime Minister, 25 Oct 1942, AVIA 9/42.
120M~nute from ACNS (F) & ACNS (H) to VCNS on Question by Lord Cork, 23 NO\ 1942. AD\1205/18.
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beginning in January 1943 when MAP informed the Admiralty that no further British
capacity could be allocated to production of naval aircraft so the FAA would be dependent
on America for half of its production. It was hoped to increase British production in 1945.
but this would not be possible in 1944 owing to a shortage ofmanpower.
Expansion Programme B which supplemented Programme A In January 1943
envisaged a reduction of first line strength on 1 January 1944 to only 1150 opposed to
1745. 122 Even under these circumstances MAP forecast that the deficiency in TBR
production would be equivalent to those required for eight CVEs at end of 1943 and as
there would be serious shortage of single-seaters the Air Ministry was to be asked to
convert 200 Spitfires to Seafires. The following month, Alexander, First Lord, informed
Sinclair, the Secretary of State for Air, that on account of latest MAP plans and the
comparative failure of Lyttleton Commission to the USA to obtain the additional fighters
and TBRs:
'It is clear that 1943 is going to be a bad year for us. It will be impracticable to
form a single alternative armament squadron, and we estimate that even if all our
existing shore-based squadrons are disbanded and reserves of all kind reduced to
a minimum, there will still be shortages during the year of about 700 T.B.Rs and
200 single-seater fighters.' 123
The difficulties were borne out by the actual production for British types ill 1943 as
demonstrated by the following table:
Table 10. Forecast and actual British aircraft production, 1943 124
Type MAP forecast in June Actualproduction in Deficit
1942 1943
TBR 2360 1201 -1159
Fighters 981 375 - 606
Total 3341 1576 - 1765
Admiralty delegations also visited Washington in November 1942 and June 1943 to agree
future six monthly allocations. The agreement in June 1943 was to cover the first six
121 Paper 'Fleet Air Arm - Facts and Fi~ures' by Air Branch, 16 Jan 1943. ADM 116'5348.
122 M orandum from Air Branch to First Lord, 12 Jan 1943, ADM 1/14873.
123 Le~:r from First Lord to Secretary ofState for Air, 2 Feb 1943, ADM 1/14873.
124 Minute from e.OJ. to Captain EJ.S. Clarke, 6 Apr 1944, ADM 1/17095.
Chapter -+
146
months of 1944, but during the following mission of December 1943 the Americans
greatly altered their offer:
Table 11. Monthly assignments of US aircraft for the first six months of 1944 125
Type Assignments Assignments scaled US offer
agreed in June 1943 down for US production In December 1943
shortfalls
Wildcat 60 50 20
Corsair 60 53 118
Hellcat 40 40 13
Avenger 45 43 23
Helldiver 30 21 1
This table graphically illustrates the problem of depending on the USN, for while the
aircraft were generally excellent, the FAA was subject to changing USN requirements. The
only action that could be taken regarding British production was a request for a quick turn-
over of capacity after the defeat of Germany.
Britain's overall manpower crisis also had an effect on aircraft production as
detailed in the revised of aircraft programme of January 1944. At that time the naval
production utilised six per cent, which was estimated to rise to nine per cent by 1945,
although this had to take into account that MAP was required to reduce its overall
manpower by 155,000.126 The FAA could make some easy concessions since the Firebrand
would not enter fighter production and Swordfish production would cease. It would also
see a reduction in the number of Fireflies available:
Table 12. Effects of manpower reductions in naval aircraft production, 1944-1945 127
Aircraft Factory Reduction,1944 Reduction, Estimate of overall
first half 1945 labour saving
Firefly Fairey (Hayes), 80 75 5,000
General Aircraft
Firebrand Blackburn (Brough) - - 3,000
Swordfish Blackburn (Sherburn) 405 325 8,000
~-_.,,----_ .._---_.._----- ~ ~--
125 Minute from First Lord to Prime Minister, 22 Mar 1944, ADM 1/17095.
126Minute by DAE, 21 Jan 1944. ADM 1/16580.
127 Note by Minister ofAircraft Production and First Lord, 20 Jan 1944. ADM 1 16580.
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For 1943-1944 sufficient figures are available to make comparisons between the success of
British and American procurement as is demonstrated in the following table:
Table 13. Forecast and actual aircraft production, April 1943 - March 1944 128




Swordfish 620 623 +3
Avenger 690 604 - 86
Helldiver 140 20 - 120
Total 2377 2072 - 305
Fighters
Seafrre 375 333 - 42
Hurricane IIC 24 24 -
Wildcat 509 359 - 150
Hellcat 298 229 - 69
Corsair 505 578 +73
Firefly 303 104 - 199
Total 2014 1627 - 387
The only British aircraft to meet production targets were the Hurricane, which was
produced in small numbers and the Swordfish which had been built since the pre-war era.
The most notable statistic was the success of Corsair procurement and this can primarily
attested to the efforts of Lieutenant Commander Smeeton, the senior Admiralty
representative with the British Aircraft Commission in Washington in 1941-1942. Initial
orders of the Corsair were small compared with the Hellcat because there were concerns
that the Corsair with wings folded would be too tall for the hangers of British Fleet
Carriers. Smeeton informed the Admiralty it was likely that the Corsair could be modified
and pressed for all American offers to be accepted as Captain Bridge, DNAD noted:
' ... [Smeeton] lays great stress on the fact that if aircraft are refused now the opportunity
'11 . ,129WI not come again.
When all the arguments had been made for the requirements for US aircraft.
Admiral Lyster, the Fifth Sea Lord. acknowledged Smeeton's crucial role in the acquisition
process:
128Minute from C.GJ. to Captain E.J.S. Clarke, 6 Apr 1944. ADM 1/17095.
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'The ever changing situation of the war causes us to re-cast our ideas frequently ...
I am, however certain that we shall never have enough aircraft to meet our future
commitments and I welcome the initiative shown by Lieutenant Commander
Smeeton in earmarking this proportion of American aircraft for us and considerhe
should be fully supported.' 130
Lieutenant Commander Douglas Parker, CO of 1842 Squadron, flew Corsairs in the Pacific
in 1945 and recalled his immense gratitude to Smeeton for originally taking a chance in
obtaining the aircraft:
, ...we were very very lucky to get those aircraft, very lucky indeed. Thanks to a
particular naval officer of the Fleet Air Arm, Dick Smeeton, who when Naval Air
Attache in Washington saw that these aircraft were proving a bit unpopular with the
Americans who... were going largely for the Hellcat fighter. He opted to buy the
Corsair on his own initiative without reference to their Lordships and the Treasury.
In fact he ordered the first 200 of his own responsibility before getting it endorsed
by their Lordships and the government of the day. A very bold decision and one
that was of immense value to the British Navy.' 131
The fortuitous nature of Smeeton's intervention can be seen from the fact that almost one-
third of the American aircraft delivered to the FAA were Corsairs; 314 in 1943, 1423 in
1944 and 230 in 1945. 132 This was primarily due to the initial deck landing problems
experienced by USN in operating the aircraft which resulted in the RN being the first navy
to use it operationally from a carrier in April 1944. By the end of the war the Corsair was
widely in widespread service with the USN and acknowledged as the best naval fighter of
the war.
The British and American production totals for 1944 enable a comparison to be
made between their relative contributions:
129Minute by D.NA.D., 29 April 1942, ADM 1/11941.
130 Minute by Fifth Sea Lord, 18 May 1942, ADM 1/11941.
13\ D.G. Parker, IWM/SA 15533, Reel 3. ., .




Table 14. Aircraft production, 1944 133






















The most interesting statistic to come out from between Table 9 and 14 was that while
British aircraft production had tripled in 1942-1944, American production was over seven
times what it had been two years previously and had overtaken the British effort in overall
terms. Thereby, despite the failure to meet individual targets American production was the
key ingredient in enabling naval air expansion to proceed. The figures do not tell the story
of the operational utility of the aircraft. When it came to the navy's most sustained air
operations in 1945, the Avenger, Corsair and Hellcat were the aircraft of choice, the
Barracuda being replaced in squadrons of the British Pacific Fleet in November 1944 and
the Seafire only being used because not enough Hellcats were available to replace them.
The decision in mid -1944 that first line expansion should peak at a 10wer strength
at an earlier date caused the Fifth Sea Lord to contact the British Admiralty Delegation in
Washington, with the monthly requirements of thirty-three Avengers, eighty Corsairs and




aircra on 1 October 1945. The reply ill October 1944 was not encouraging with a total
of only eighty Avengers, 316 Hellcats and no Corsairs available in this period.v" In the
event the actual production was far more generous with 240 Avengers, 230 Corsairs and
316 Hellcats supplied to the Royal Navy up the end of the war against Japan in which they
played a key role.
Failure of British aircraft manufacturing
A major difficulty faced with the production of naval aircraft in Britain during the
Second World War was the dependence on only a few manufacturers. Fairey's was the
leading naval aircraft manufacturer during the inter-war years, especially in the 1920s when
Sir Richard Fairey was in personal change. However, by the late 1930s the senior staff were
not of the same calibre and the finn was unable to cope with orders in wartime: ' ...there
was no other firm so well qualified to design FAA types as Faireys. On the other hand, their
production efforts were disastrous.' 136 The Swordfish was never mass produced and did not
need any jigging or tooling and when the firm tried to put the Albacore into mass
production serious difficulties were encountered. Fairey's position was not helped by the
MAP which firstly restricted materials to the firm and then insisted on too many
programme changes; the factory at Hayes went from Swordfish to Albacore to Firefly and
that at Stockport from Battles to Fulmars to Barracudas.
One of most serious failures of an aircraft company during the war occurred at
Fairey's in 1942. 137 In the spring of that year the full extent of the disaster which had
befallen the Barracuda programme became clear when Ernest France, in charge of a section
of Fairey's Design Department at the Stockport works, wrote to Alexander, the First Lord,
over the actions ofone ofhis colleagues:
'A person [Mr de Lisser] holding a position of some responsibility has informed
me that, last Friday, he wrote to two Members of the House (Keyes and Sueter)
giving them a great deal of inconvenient although accurate information
concerning the present position and past progress of the machine [Barracuda]
d b ,138referre to a ave.
133Notes on naval air matters for information ofMinisters by Air Branch. 19 Feb 1945, ADM 1/17399.
134 Message from Fifth Sea Lord to Head ofBAD, 23 Sep 1944, ADM 1/16414.
135 Message from Naval Air Repreentative, BAD to Fifth Sea Lord, 29 Oct 1944, ADM 1/16414.
136 Interview with Commodore Slattery, CNR, 25 Jun 1943, AVIA 46/136. . . ')
I37 Keith Hayward, The British Aircraft Industry (Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1989). .:.3.
138 Letter from Ernest France to First Lord, 16 Mar 1942. ADM 1/12575.
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De Lisser had revealed that despite three and a half years of design work, the aircraft was
still unsatisfactory in flight trials and there would be a considerable delay before it would
be in mass production. Three days later France was interviewed by Colonel Neville.
Assistant Director of the Naval Intelligence Division, to investigate the claims and this
meeting revealed inestimately more devastating evidence ofthe Barracudas failings:
'As an example of the muddles which have been made, France told me that the
trouble with the flaps and tailplane was discovered and reported as a result of
Wind Tunnel tests. Nothing, however, was done to correct the defect until it again
became apparent when the prototype was in trial. .. production will always be bad
because, owing to faulty design, the machine is all "bits and pieces" and is thus
difficult to manufacture and maintain. France considers that this is largely due to
the inefficiency of the man who has been in charge of the design of the
Barracuda.' 139
Admiral Lyster, the Fifth Sea Lord, was unable to refute any of De Lisser or France's
criticisms when he reported on the matter to Alexander, but also pointed out the other
organisations with responsibility for delays to the Barracuda; namely the War Cabinet
Defence Committee (Supply) for not giving the Barracuda priority earlier in the war, the
subsequent production suspension by the MAP between June and September 1940 and the
Air Ministry's unilateral decision of September 1939 not to proceed with production of the
original engine, the Rolls Royce Exe, leading to a six month delay before the re-designed
version with the Merlin engine was approved.l'" In fact after the interviews Neville was
much more concerned about the future of Barracuda production than pressing his
investigation further: 'Both France and de Lisser impressed me most favourably and are
genuinely anxious to produce constructive proposals to improve matters. The urgent need
.c. ., 1 t ,I41lor action IS on y too apparen .,.
A detailed report by De Lisser in April 1942, forwarded to Lyster by Neville,
highlighted some of the bizarre specifications which had hampered the design from the
start:
139 Letter from Assistant Director ofIntelligence Division to First Lord, 19 Mar 1942, ADM 1/12575.
140 Minute from Fifth Sea Lord to First Lord, 20 Mar 1943, ADM 1/12575.




'Barracuda specification contained the ridiculous requirement that it must be
possible to fold and unfold the wings when the machine is suspended from a
crane. This is entirely impracticable... a seaplane chassis were also demanded.. 142
Bearing in mind the instability of the aircraft in service, de Lisser was able to reveal serious
shortcomings of early design decisions:
'At this time [end of 1939] the Chief Designer etc. began to take a full interest in
T.S.R. with unfortunate results. Since the calculated centre of gravity of the
machine was too far forward, the front fuselage was shortened by six inches and
the rear fuselage was lengthened by six inches and other measures taken to move
the centre of gravity back. This was a ridiculous decision bearing in mind that the
c.g. [centre of gravity] was estimated not measured...d43
Alexander himself was similarly unimpressed with progress when he visited Fairey's
factory at Hayes:
'The history of the design, development and production of the Barracuda has, as
you know, been one of continual disappointment... Some time ago I visited
Hayes myself to see how things were progressing and, although I am bound to
admit that any views formed as a result of such a visit can only be superficial, the
impression with which I came away was not very favourable to the management
of the firm. ,144
Combined with its infamous reputation in service, the Barracuda's production nightmare
qualifies it for the title of one of the worst aircraft ever to fly under the White Ensign. At
the sixteenth general meeting of Fairey Aviation Company on 3 April 1945, the Chairman,
Mr A.E. Wright reported:
'A year ago to-day, the Fairey Barracuda torpedo-bomber, which your company
is manufacturing in large numbers for the Royal Navy came into the news with a
highly successful attack on the German battleship Tirpitz.. .In the same month,
but on the side of the world, the Barracudas made a devastating attack at Sabang.
These two operations themselves indicate the widespread and diverse degree of
142 Report 'Design ofTSR aircraft at Fairey Aviation Co' by K.A. de Lisser, 1 Apr 1942. ADM 1112575.
143 Ibid.
144 Letter from First Lord to Minister of Aircraft Production, 11 Apr 1942. ADM 1/12575.
Chapter -+
153
requirements by the Admiralty which we are proud to have met
effectively...Very large numbers of Barracudas have gone into service... ' 145
The report of this meeting has been inserted into the Record Book of 814 Squadron which
was equipped with Barracudas in 1944. Next to the above comments, two observations
have been added 'At least we are glad that somebody makes something out of them.' and
'Are you kidding.' which seem to sum up the aircrews' view on this aircraft rather well. 146
Shortly after the inquiry over the Barracuda, the prototype Fairey Firefly crashed on
26 June 1942 causing a serious delay in production so only nineteen aircraft were produced
in 1942 and 107 in the first six months of 1943. As a result three further orders had to be
placed for Albacore spares which took 1,769,500 man hours to complete, the equivalent to
eighty Firefly aircraft.
The continuing failures of Fairey's production were graphically highlighted by
Admiral Laurence, CNR, in a report to Admiral Dreyer, CNAS, in November 1942:
, ... there are four ingredients in the production of aircraft, namely, material, machine tools,
labour and efficient factory management... Faireys are supplied with the sufficiency of the
first three ingredients. Nothing has held up the production of the Barracuda and the Firefly
except inefficient management.' 147 Dreyer compared this with the rather better situation
when he was Director ofNaval Ordnance in the First World War: ' ...1 found myself in the
happy position of having engineer inspectors at all the firms from which we were getting
gun mountings ... and inspectors of steel at all the firms from which were getting guns and
ammunition. Thus, all the time 1. .. had my hand on the pulse of each of these firms .. .' 148
The MAP eventually took decisive action appointing an industrialist, Mr Marden, as its
representative at the company. In addition the Fairey Co-ordinating Group was formed in
December 1942 to bring together the Fairey Aviation Company, General Aircraft Limited
and Aero Engines Limited and 600 sub-contractors in an attempt to remove production
bottlcnecks.i" The appointments of individual naval overseers at aircraft factories, in a
similar manner to Dreyer's previous experience began in the spring of 1943, with Acting
Commander P.L. Mortimer being first in post at Fairey's factory at Hayes.l'"
145 814 Squadron Record Book, July 1944 - Nov 1945,202, ADM 207/12.
146 Ibid.
147 Minute from CNR to CNAS, 27 Nov 1943, ADM 1/14010.
148 Letter from CNR toFirst Sea Lord, 29 Nov 1942. ADM 1/14010.
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However, this was by no means the end of Fairey's problems. Commodore Slattery,
CNR, was scathing at Fairey's inefficiency regarding the Firefly programme in a letter to
Alexander, the First Lord, in November 1943:
'Fairey's failure to make their [Firefly] programme last week is reported to be
due to a shortage of ailerons but it might equally well have been due to a shortage
of almost anything else; by that 1 mean that the planning at Hayes is still so
chaotic that if it is ailerons this week it will probably be rudders next week and
elevators the week afterwards, and so on to the end of the year... 1 regret that 1
can only say that until this firm is put on a proper basis there can be no
confidence in the Firefly programme.'151
Alexander, the First Lord, conveyed details of the continuing difficulties, now a rather
tiresome burden, to Stafford Cripps, the Minister of Aircraft Production: '1 know Slattery
has been talking to you about the continued failure of production at Fairey's Hayes factory.
It is hardly possible to estimate what the Navy have suffered in this war from the unending
shortcomings of this Works.'152 Having been involved in the first attempt to reorganise
Fairey's in 1942 with the appointment of Marden, Cripps was SYmpathetic to Alexander's
complaint, but believed things were not as bad as the navy was making out:
'1 am very conscious of the difficulties with this firm but the present output - or
lack of it - is not merely a question of inefficient production. There have been
some very difficult technical problems and the sub-contract position at General
Aircraft has also been chaotic. 1 think Marden has done an excellent job and the
affair is now 4/5 straight. The worst pot is Hayes; the Barracuda production is
. 11 ,153nowgomgwe .
Cripps blamed poor relations between the Chairman, Sir Richard Fairey and Marden for
slowing down the rebuilding process and reported that he had selected the industrialist
Clive Baillieu to be appointed Chairman to complete the job, this time without any
interference from Fairey. The disarray of the navy's largest aircraft manufacturer four years
into the war demonstrates the extreme frustration it had to bear by depending on British
companies. The full impact of Fairey's failure can be seen from the following table:
151 Letter from CNR to Secretary to the First Lord, 18 Nov 1943, ADM 1/15003.
152 Letter from First Lord to Minister ofAircraft Production, 20 Nov 1943. ADM 1/15003.
153 Letter from Minister of Aircraft Production to First Lord, 23 Nov 1943. ADM 1115003.
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Table 15. Forecasts of deliveries of Barracudas and Fireflies until the end of 1943154
Date of forecast Barracuda Firefly
December 1941 2070 850
July 1942 1748 799
November 1942 1314 515
January 1943 625 239
The navy had attempted to get a new range of aircraft companies involved in naval work,
but with little success as a report from the Aircraft Supply Council noted in August 1943:
'However, despite every effort to bring new Finns in on the work, it appears that
the Navy may remain largely dependent on Faireys and Blackbums. The reasons
for this are two-fold. Firstly some of the firms ... find themselves too busy with
current commitments. De Havillands is a very good example of this. Secondly
Faireys and B1ackbums, with their long years of experience... have such a much
better grasp of the problems to be solved that they seem to put in the more
. d . ,155
attractive eSlgns - on paper.
Blackbums had successfully improvised to establish a factory near Leeds to produce the
Swordfish when Fairey's began production ofthe Albacore at Hayes:
' ... the Leeds-Sherburn group for production of the Swordfish, a remarkable
example of how capacity can be organised out of holes and comers. The capacity
is made up of garages, locomotive shops, etc. and they are capable of producing
55 Swordfish a month, plus 40 per cent spares.'156
But the experience with the Blackburn Firebrand was hardly one to inspire confidence in
the company.
Indeed the evidence that the Admiralty's patience had expired was visible from the
details of the Future Aircraft Programme in August 1944. Aircraft manufacturers were
divided between first and second class firms; the former comprised Vickers (Weybridge),
Vickers (Supermarine), A.V. Roe, Hawker, Bristol, De Havilland, Handley-Page and
Shorts while the latter consisted of Fairey, Armstrong Whitworth, Airspeed, Westland.
Miles, Boulton-Paul, Saunders-Roe, English Electric, Blackburn and Gloster. As Head of
154 Minute from Minister ofAircraft Production for D.C.(S) (43) yd meeting, 4 Jan 1943. ADf\l 1/14873.
155 Extract from Aircraft Supply Council report 14/43,3 Aug 1943. AVIA 46/136.
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Air Branch remarked: ' ...the Admiralty may expect to be much better served than hitherto
,
because instead of our having to rely almost entirely on Faireys and Blackburns, who are
graded as "Second Class", we are likely to have at our disposal some of the capacity of
other firms who are rated as "First Class.": 157 In these circumstances it was hardly
surprising that the navy was more than happy to place an extensive reliance on American
capacity.
Dependence on American aircraft production
In a report on 11 February 1944 the Head of Air Branch assessed the main reasons
for the FAA's dependence on American aircraft production.F'' Firstly, Naval Staff
requirements for aircraft types had radically altered as the war progressed as a result of
combat experience and the tactical uses for which carriers were used. The major difficulty
for the British naval aircraft industry was that most of the changes resulted in a requirement
for increased production of single-seater fighters, the type in which British production was
unquestionably weakest. For example, as the FAA came increasingly into contact with
land-based aircraft in the Mediterranean, a high performance interceptor was needed to
defend the Fleet. In April 1942 Admiral Somerville, C-in-C Eastern Fleet, demanded more
fighters to supplement his Martlets and Hurricanes and announced that he was going to
increase the fighter complement carried by his three Fleet Carriers. I59 The Far Eastern
experience led to the proportion of fighters being increased at the expense of TBR's. The
operational decision to use CVEs to provide fighter cover for amphibious landings in the
Mediterranean led to a considerable number of ships being equipped with fighters only. The
FAA had no choice but to depend on American fighters given the failure of new British
types to meet their specification, crucially the complete non-appearance of the Fairey
Firebrand the only specific naval single-seater fighter under development in Britain during
the early years ofthe war:
'While the production plans formulated towards the end of 1942 and at the
beginning of 1943 were not altogether unsatisfactory as such, very severe
disappointments were experienced in the achievements of British production in
156 Interview with Commodore Slattery, CNR, 25 Jun 1943, AVIA 46/136.
157 Minute by Head of Air Branch, 10 Nov 1944, ADM 1/17395.
158 Report from Head of Air Branch to A.C.N.S. (Air), 11 Feb 1944, AD~ 1/16408. , .
159Michael Simpson, ed, The Somerville Papers: Selections/rom the Private and O./jzCIGI C?rrespon~enc(' of
Admiral ofthe Fleet Sir James Somerville, GeE, GEE, DSO (Aldershot: Navy Records Society, 199»).404.
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1942 and 1943... it became clear during 1943 that the Firefly and Firebrand
would not prove suitablefor the functions for which they were intended.' 160
Fortunately the American Martlets, Hellcats, Corsairs were of high quality and filled the
role admirably. Of 6330 American aircraft supplied, 4232 were single-seaters. In
comparison the 2100 Seafires was by far the largest production run for a British single-
seater, but the ninety-minute endurance and weak undercarriage emphasised the
comparative failure of British production; more Seafires were lost as a result of deck-
landing accidents in the Pacific than all other causes put together.
Secondly, the British aircraft industry proved unable to increase its capacity to meet
the navy's demands, mainly because of: ' ...the view of higher authority that R.A.F. needs
were more urgent ... ' 161 both in the critical early phase of the war during the Battle of
Britain and later with the strategic bombing offensive on Germany. There was also a lack of
manpower and resources, which affected the entire British war effort. It took about eighteen
months for new British production capacity to come on line and therefore it was unable to
respond effectively to the rapidly developing air expansion programmes. Hence it was
accepted at an early stage that if the Americans were to supply a large number of CVEs
then they should also provide a large percentage ofthe aircraft to equip them. Nor was there
a possibility of British manufacturers producing a large surplus of any type as occurred
with the Corsair, albeit under somewhat fortuitous circumstances.
Conclusion
Ironically just at the end of the Second World War the future for British naval
aircraft procurement looked promising for the first time in many years as Geoffrey Till
explained:
'The operation of aircraft like the Mosquito and Spitfire 21 from carriers in 1944,
the construction of such aircraft as the Hawker Sea Fury and Sea Hornet, and the
carrier landing of the world's first naval jet fighter, the British de Havilland
Vampire in 1945, all showed in the end that given adequate support British naval
aircraft could compare very favourably with the world's best land or sea-based
. ft ,162aircran.
160 Statement 'Fleet Air Arm - Aircraft Requirements and Production Arrangements since Outbreak ofWar'
by Air Branch, Feb 1944, ADM 1/16408.
161 Report from Head ofAir Branch to ACNS (Air), 11 Feb 1944, ADM 1/16408.
162 Till, Airpower and the Royal Navy. 109.
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However in terms of those aircraft in front line service it is difficult to disagree with Ian
Cameron's rather damning assessment: 'Between the first day of the war and the last, the
Fleet Air Ann received not one single British aircraft which wasn't either inherently
unsuited to carrier-work or was obsolete before it came into service.' 163 What was not in
doubt was that the arrangements which had existed in the inter-war period seriously
hampered the navy's ability to conduct a successful procurement strategy and as Geoffrey
Till noted this took several years to put right: 'By the end 0 f the Second World War the
Navy had built up a strong body of technically minded officers and had re-established the
close links with both the American and British aircraft industries which it had enjoyed in
the First World War.' 164 Indeed the contrast with the excellent relations enjoyed by the
RNAS with manufacturers between 1914-1918 and the world class aeroplanes, airships,
seaplanes and flying boats which they produced is enormous and clearly demonstrates the
need for a coherent procurement process. The FAA was extremely fortunate that American
aircraft were not only provided in large numbers, but were also generally of excellent
quality. This allowed it to expand to a size which otherwise would have been impossible
and to conduct its operations with a considerably greater degree ofeffectiveness.
163 TXT' OII''T'he Morning: The storv ofthe Fleet Air Ann in the Second World Hal' (London:Ian Cameron, rr mgs 'j I j lVII • . •
Hodder & Stoughton, 1962), 16.
164 Till, Airpower and the Royal NQ1:r, 103.
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Chapter 5 - Operations and Co-ordinating Resources
Overview
The operational tasks of the RNAS in the First World War were extremely diverse with
different resources required for each situation. Seaplanes from seaplane carriers operated
with the Grand Fleet. Seaplanes and non-rigid airships were responsible for anti-submarine
patrols in home waters in the early years of the war and aeroplanes were employed for the
air defence of Britain. The deployment of seaplanes, aeroplanes and kite balloons to the
Dardanelles also opened up new possibilities, as Churchill observed in April 1915: ' ...The
possibility of working a squadron or squadrons of aeroplanes from an oversea base had not
been foreseen; this operation was now being carried out with great success, and has
materially altered preconceived ideas as to the means of employment of aircraft. ' 1
Initially in World War I the RNAS had few restrictions placed on the types of
operations it conducted. Pre-war planning encompassed support for the Grand Fleet and
anti-submarine patrols from the stations on the East Coast. However within a few months
the air defence of Britain, reconnaissance for the army and long range bombing had been
undertaken. The changing leadership at the Admiralty also had a significant impact on how
its airpower was utilised, with an emphasis on strategic bombing in 1916. There was little
need to considerably prioritise resources until 1917 when increased requirements on the
Western Front, for coastal anti-submarine patrols and Grand Fleet aviation put a strain on
the supply ofpilots.
The Fleet Air Arm's experience in theory should have been restricted to ship-based
operations according to the terms of the Inskip award in 1937 under which the RAF
retained control of Coastal Command? The reality was rather different and the lack of
carriers until 1943 saw the employment of squadrons with Coastal Command and in army-
co-operation roles. The navigational skills which naval crews utilised for flying over the sea
were employed in the Western Desert where they flew pathfinder missions for the Desert
Air Force. The need to use carriers for ferrying aircraft, especially in the Mediterranean
also put pressure on the few available carriers.
The large-scale expansion required during wartime put senous pressure on
operational effectiveness as some squadrons were disbanded to provide cadres of new
squadrons and in later years to enlarge existing units. When large numbers of American-
built CVEs, ordered for the Battle of the Atlantic, entered service they were required for
I Minutes of conference on aircraft. 3 April 1915. ADM .l!8433/~70B. ') _-,
2 Letter from Minister for Coordination ofDefence to Pnme Minister, 21 Jul 1937, CAB - L )_6.
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many more roles; for example providing fighter cover for amphibious landings and
transporting aircraft, especially from the USA. As a result some squadrons equipped for
anti-submarine operations were on the sidelines for long periods. The large-scale expansion
of the FAA in 1943 was accompanied significant changes in its organisation to enable it to
conduct more substantial operations than hitherto.
The First Wodd War
Fleet operations
Ofthe original operations earmarked in 1914 considerable problems were encountered with
the provision of support for the Fleet because of the fragility of seaplanes, but substantial
progress was made on a number of operational issues. Seaplane carriers needed to be fast
enough to keep station with the fleet and Sueter requested such a ship as early as 14 August
1914.3 The ex-Cunard liner Campania was duly converted in 1915. Another significant
development was the first take offby an aeroplane from a carrier when a Bristol Scout took
off from Vindex's flying off deck on 3 November 1915.4
However, the replacement of the dynamic Fisher and Churchill regnne at the
Admiralty with the conservative Arthur Balfour and Henry Jackson in 1915 followed by the
appointment of an officer with no air experience, Rear-Admiral Vaughan-Lee, to the post
of Director of Air Services, heralded a period when naval aviation lacked innovation and
urgency. The new regime also lacked the respect of many in the RNAS as Lieutenant Isaac
recalled in December 1916:
'The naval airmen have no confidence in the Air Board while Admiral Vaughan
Lee and the Third Sea Lord [Rear Admiral Tudor] are there to represent the
Admiralty. Neither of these officers is an airman, nor either even taken any
interest in, nor given any encouragement to the development of aviation ... ,5
One result of this leadership change was that in July 1915 air stations were placed under the
command of the Commander-in-Chiefof the local naval district rather than under the direct
command of the Director of Air Services in the Admiralty: 'The Royal Naval Air Service is
to be regarded in all respects as an integral part of the Royal Navy, and in future the various
Air Stations will be under the general orders of the Commander-in-Chief of Senior Naval
3 Minute by DAD, 14 Aug 1914. AIR 1/631/17/122/36.
4 Report by CO, HMS Vindex, Nov 1915, ADM 1/8432/253.
5 Report from Lt Isaac to Major Baird, New Air Board, Dec 1916,3, IWMlDoc 99i75/1.
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Office in whose district they are situated....,6 This meant that development in operational
procedure was not uniform across the service.
The lack of urgency was most evident regarding fleet aviation. For example.
Admiral Jellicoe had first raised the use of kite balloons on ships in mid-1915. but it was
not until October 1916 that an establishment was approved for use with the Grand Fleet.
Trials on Engadine with the Battle Cruiser Fleet in October 1915 convinced Beatty that kite
balloons could largely negate the advantage hitherto possessed by the High Seas Fleet in
terms of reconnaissance.' The resistance remained within the Admiralty which highlighted
the difficulties ofair balloon operationr'
'It is not considered possible to keep inflated balloons bagged down on deck, and
there are two alternatives. The first is to carry the necessary hydrogen and inflate
the balloon just when it is required. The draw back to this is the hydrogen is very
explosive and takes up a lot of room. The second is for each ship to receive its
Kite Balloon from shore or a Depot Ship before leaving harbour... ,9
However, Major Baird of the Air Board placed the blame for lack of progress squarely on
the Admiralty's shoulders:
'It has taken the Admiralty 41 days to decide to refuse to give us what we asked
for, namely:- "any recent Reports from Admiral Sir John Jellicoe on the subject
of Kite Balloons... " we cannot be responsible for recommending an air policy
unless we are in possession of Admiral Jellicoe's views. What we do know is that
in spite of the reports dated June and October, 1915, both of them laying stress on
the great value of kite balloons, our Fleet is still groping about in the dark and
relying apparently exclusively on valuable Light Cruisers to do its scouting.'10
The Admiralty informed Beatty in January 1917 that the equipping of Light Cruisers with
balloons was limited by production of winches, totalling twelve per month. I I However,
between 16 March - 29 October 1917, balloons were used by the Grand Fleet on no fewer
than 159 occasions on ships and once from the submarine K5, their availability no longer
6 Admiralty Weekly Orders, 29 Ju11915, ADM 1/632/17/122/71. . ..
7 Report from Vice Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet to Secretary ofAdmiralty, 31 Oct 1915, AIR L636/171 122/
J~~ter from Secretary of Admiralty to C-in-c' Home Fleet, 1 Sep 1915~ AIR li636il7/122/13~.
9 Memorandum on 'Naval Kite Balloon Service' from Secretary of Admiralty to Secretary of AIr Board. 24
Aug 1916, AIR 2/127.
10Minute by Major Baird, Air Board, 29 Aug 1916, AIR 2/127.
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restricted by resources: 'Demands on the Air Department for personnel and material for
Grand Fleet services largely in excess of anticipated requirements have been promptly
met.' 12
When Admiral Beatty became C-in-C Grand Fleet he appointed a Committee to
report on the fleet's air requirements which recommended improvements in a number of
operational spheres including reconnaissance using flying boats and more integral
reconnaissance and fighter aircraft for the fleet." As Beatty noted:
' ...our present aerial arrangements for the Grand Fleet are inadequate, the more
so when it is considered that the German High Sea Fleet is amply provided with
Zeppelins and a squadron of six seaplane carriers. The recently joined seaplane
carrier "Manxman" had proved to be totally unfit for service with the Battle-
Cruiser Fleet owing to the lack of speed.' 14
Aeroplanes were also used to equip capital ships and cruisers with Beatty's full support:
'Every effort should be made ... to develop the use of naval aircraft for fleet purposes in
every possible respect.' 15 In December there were seventy-four two-seaters and 107 single-
seaters in service with the Grand Fleet and as the number of ship borne aircraft increased in
1917 it was also proposed to employ the obsolete seaplane carriers, Engadine, Riviera and
Empress in a ferrying role to supply aircraft to the ships of the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow. 16
The aeroplanes could be maintained in good condition in their workshops until they were
deployed onto the warships.
In 1918 the majority of naval air squadrons at Dunkirk were transferred to the
control of the Commander-in-Chief, BEF, and for the first time since 1914 the RNAS
devoted its full attention to maritime aviation. This included a proposal for an attack on the
High Seas Fleet in Wilhelmshaven with torpedo aircraft. The development of the aeroplane
torpedo-bomber was suggested in September 1916 and the prototype flew in June 1917. but
only ninety delivered by Armistice despite Beatty's repeated complaints.l If the Admiralty
had afforded a higher priority to maritime aviation in 1916-1917 it is highly likely that this
aircraft would have been available in greater quantities. Efforts continued to get more
11 Letter from Secretary of Admiralty to C-in-C Grand Fleet, 7 Jan 1917, AIR 1/636/17/122/131.
12 Report from Vice Admiral Commanding, Second Battle Squadron to C-in-C Grand Fleet 3 Nov 1917, AIR
1/661/17/122/651.
13 Report from Committee ofRoyal Naval Air Service to Rear Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron,
26 Jan 1917, AIR 1/648/17/122/382.
14 Letter from C-in-C Grand Fleet to Secretary of Admiralty, 11 Jan 1917, AIR 1/651/17/122 447.
15 Letter from C-in-C Grand Fleet to Secretary of Admiralty. 21 Jan 1917, ADM 1/8478 10.
16 Report by Air Division, 13 Feb 1918, AIR 1/308/15/226/188.
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aircraft to sea and by the end of the war each capital ship had a 1~ Strutter for
reconnaissance and a Sopwith Camel to engage Zeppelins. The air establishment of the
Grand Fleet had risen to 388 aircraft and 204 pilots, four carriers and thirty-seven other air
capable ships, a far cry from the paucity of resources which had attended fleet aviation two
years before. 18
Coastal Patrolling and Convoy Escort
The need for coastal patrols in the North Sea was one of the first tasks apportioned
to naval aircraft before 1914. The threat posed by the U-boat became apparent in late 1914
and from early 1915, as described in Chapter 4 a large fleet of non-rigid airships were
successfully developed by the navy forming the backbone of anti-Ll-Boat patrols. While the
airships were not particularly effective at sinking U-boats their deterrent effort was
considerable. The increasing airship effort during the war can be seen from the table below:
Table 16. Summary of hours flown by airships, 1915-1918 19
Station 1915 1916 1917 1918
(1 Jan - 31 Oct)
Anglesey 20 1193 1559 3982
Barrow 60 54 20 17
(Constructional)
Caldale - 70 346
-
Cranwell (School) - - 825 3924
East Fortune - 289 2212 3966
Folkestone 101 1144 1912 6370
Howden - 504 2132 4770
Kingsnorth 16 750 211 400
(Constructional)
Longside 440 1310 4207-
Luce Bay 35 405 1757 4432
Mullion - 360 2889 7936
Pembroke 343 2349 4767-
Polegate 107 1252 2985 7921





Wormwood Scrubs - 116 35 230
(Constructional)
Total 339 7078 22389 53554
As can be seen patrols around the coast of Britain were greatly expanded in 1917-1918. At
the beginning of 1917, the airship stations at Longside, East Fortune, Howden, Pulliam,
Mullion and Pembroke all possessed their authorised complement of coastal airships for the
first time and were able to implement a systematic scheme of patrols could be established
so there were no gaps between the patrols of the various stations. With the start of the
convoy system in April, airships were employed on convoy escort duties while seaplanes
and flying boats were used for patrols, although they could be called-in by airships to make
an attack.20 The Channel bases were afforded top priority for resources; for example in
February 1917 no 240hp Short seaplanes were available for South Shields seaplane station
in the north-east."
With the resumption of the unrestricted V -boat campaign ill 1917, a greater
emphasis was placed on operations in home waters and efforts re-doubled in the anti-
submarine war which was transformed with the introduction of Large America flying boats
with their six hour endurance paving the way for the famous Spider Web anti-submarine
patrol diagram in the Channel and similar patrols in the Western Approaches and the Irish
Sea. The Spider Web patrols from Felixstowe began on 13 April 1917 and in the first
eighteen days, twelve of which were flying days, the five flying boats available made
twenty-seven patrols sighting eight If-boats and bombing three. More resources were
needed especially at Killingholme which in April 1917 had only one Large America, which
was due for overhaul, two Short seaplanes, both out of action and six Baby Sopwith
seaplanes, four of which were fitted with incorrect propellers. To carry out its duties
successfully six Porte boats, twelve Large Americas and six Baby Sopwiths were
requestcd.r' In addition flying boats were to be used in an anti-Zeppelin role as the
Operations Division noted in April 1917: ' .. .it is desired to use the Large Americas and
other seaplanes at Felixstowe, Yarmouth and Killingholme to attack hostile airships which
may approach the East Coast during daylight hours while engaged in reconnaissance trips
20 Development and Operations of the RNAS in Home Waters: Part II- Submarine Campaign, 1917-1918,
AIR 1/677/21/13/1902.
2\ Minute by DAS, 21 Feb 1917, AIR 1/656/17/122/549. .




over the North Sea. ,23 Following interception of German radio transmissions flying boats
shot down L22 on 14 May and L43 on 14 June 1917. Figures are available from the
Portsmouth Group to illustrate the co-ordinated anti-submarine effort in 1917:24
Table 17. Anti-Submarine patrols conducted by the Portsmouth Group, 1917 25
Anti-Submarine Patrols No. of Patrols Hours Mileage
Seaplanes from Calshot, 1540 3515 213584
Bembridge, Newhaven,
Portland & Cherbourg
Airships from Polegate 406 1822 43649
Kite Balloons from Tipnor 29 1239 14341
Total 1975 6576 270954
The average seaplane patrol lasted for 2.2 hours compared with 4.4 for airships and 42.7 for
kite balloons. Wing Commander Bigsworth, CO Portsmouth Group, praised the effort
Polegate Airship Station commanded by Flight Commander Ivon Fraser: ' ...this Airship
Station apparently being considerably above any other Airship Station in the Royal Naval
Air Service in the number of patrols carried out, and mileage flown during the period. ,26
Bembridge's performance was also singled out for a high intensity of operations despite the
availability ofonly a few seaplanes.
By January 1918 there were 291 seaplanes including about fifty flying boats and
twenty-three aeroplanes for anti-submarine patrols. Fifty-four non-rigids airships and a
number ofkite balloons were allocated for convoy escort. As sixty per cent ofU'-boat losses
occurred within ten miles of the coast flights ofDH6 aeroplanes were allocated to this role
as an interim measure?7 Overall the anti-submarine operations were an impressive
achievement and a full appreciation can be gained from the work ofJohn Abbateillo.
28
23 Minute byDOD, 25 Apr 1917, ADM 1/8485n8. .'
24 Group comprised RNAS Calshot, RN Seaplane Station Lee-on-Solent and sub stations at Bembndge,
Portland, Newhaven (from 11 May) and Cherbourg (from 26 Jul), RN Airship Station Polegate (from 23 Jul)
and RN Balloon Section Tipnor (from 28 Sept).
25 Report from CO, Portsmouth Group to DAS, 2 Dec 1917, AIR 1/659/17/122/609.
26 Ibid
27 Letter from Vice Admiral, East Coast of England to Secretary ofAdmiralty, 3 Mar 1918, ADM 1/851770.





The deployment of naval aircraft on the continent was certainly not one which had
been foreseen before the outbreak of war. However, Commander Samson's Eastchurch
Squadron accompanied the Royal Marines to Belgium in 1914 and after the Allied retreat
ended up being based at Dunkirk. Nor did the RNAS on the continent confine itself purely
to the use of aircraft and it developed armoured car squadrons, armoured trains and anti-
aircraft units as shown by the following table:
Table 18. RNAS personnel, May 1915 29
Officers Men
Air Service 594 4225
Armoured Cars 194 2250
Armoured Trains 13 100
Anti-Aircraft Corps 84 1464
Total 885 8039
In June 1915 the RNAS's activities were rationalized and the armoured cars, trains and
anti-aircraft corps transferred to the Army.30
Two months later an establishment for Dunkirk and Dover was approved, for six
squadrons at the former and two at the latter; each squadron comprising six machines, six
pilots, four observers and four spare machines. At that time there were two squadrons at
Dunkirk and on completion of another two squadrons at Dover they would relieve the two
at Dunkirk and such an exchange would take place every month, but the overall
establishment would not be achieved in the immediate future:
'At present owing to the shortage of officers - five Pilots and forty ratings having
recently been sent to the Dardanelles - this organisation cannot be fully worked
to, but in view of the great importance attached to a vigorous Aerial offensive on
the Belgian Coast, it is hoped that these... might be replaced as early as
ibl ,31pOSSI e.
29 Statement of Personnel ofRNAS, 29 May 1915, AIR 1/2562.
30 Register of the Commission's Memorial at Arras, 18 Mar 1930: Part II - Air Services, AIR
1/677/21/13/1891.
31 Letter by CO, RNAS Dover to Vice Admiral, Dover Patrol. 20 Aug 1915, AIR 11629/17,120'20.
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By the end of September the two squadrons at Dover were ready to go to Dunkirk and
another two, Nos 5 and 6 Squadrons, were being formed, but required more officers and
Petty Officers:
'It is considered most desirable to maintain four squadrons at Dunkirk in order to
maintain a thoroughly effective coast patrol, and at the same time to have
sufficient machines and pilots to protect the fleet from hostile aircraft attacks and
also to carry out the bomb attacks against the enemies [sic] gun positions ... ,32
In November 1915 four squadrons of six pilots were estimated as necessary for Dunkirk for
operations over the winter months, but it was clear that Lambe, the Commanding Officer at
Dover, had considerably greater ambitions for the following year:
,...with the large number of Pilots now being trained in England, and the vastly
improved types of Aeroplanes which may be expected, a far more vigorous
offensive policy as regards Aeroplanes can be undertaken in the Spring of 1916...
and it may be confidently anticipated that successful attacks will be possible on
German soil... ,33
The Admiralty gave approval for two more landing grounds to be established at Dunkirk,
but laid out guidelines for the use ofthe aircraft:
'It must be... understood that the inland work of the Royal Naval Air Service is
to be for the training of personnel in contact with the enemy. The units stationed
at these two Aerodromes may be regarded as available in connection with
Military operations at times when Naval Air work proper is not required to be
carried out.' 34
By 1916 Dunkirk's duties encompassed patrolling the Channel to safeguard BEF shipping,
attacking submarine bases in Belgium, spotting for bombardments of German installations
on the Belgian coast and raiding the Channel end of the German lines on the Western Front,
freeing French aircraft for the Battle of Verdun. On 1 May 1916, there were III aircraft at
Dunkirk and this rose rapidly to 250 by 15 August."
32 Letter from CO, RNAS Dover to Vice Admiral, Dover Patrol, 11 Sep 1915, AIR 1/629/17/120120.
33 Letter from CO, RNAS Dover to Vice Admiral, Dover Patrol, 16 Nov 1915, AIR 1/629/17/120/13.
34 Letter from Secretary of the Admiralty to Vice Admiral, Dover Patrol, 13 Dec 1915, AIR 1/629/17/120/13.
35 First Lord's RNAS fortnightly returns, 1916, AIR 1/150/15113/2&3.
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The major problem, as explored in Chapter 2, was that the navy had a rather liberal
attitude to what was 'naval air work'. Dockyards, arsenals and other installations involved
in naval productive capacity had been regarded legitimate targets for the RNAS since early
in the war. The Navy was better placed to attack German military installations on account
of its monopoly on high-powered engines required for large bombers; indeed the only long
distance air raids, on Cologne, Cuxhaven, Dusseldorf and Lake Constance, had been
conducted by the RNAS. 36
The RNAS's most controversial deployment of the war was that of No.3 Wing to
Luxeuil in northern France in 1916. The major battle between the RNAS and RFC revolved
around which organisation would carry out long-range bombing and thereby have first call
on large aircraft and engines. There was also discontent within the Admiralty at the
perceived failure of defensive air operations as the Second Sea Lord noted in February
1916: 'The defensive use of seaplanes and aeroplanes is daily showing itself to be of little
value and it is open to grave doubts whether we are wise in spending more money on
. . ,37
expensive coast stations.
The Admiralty's investment in its offensive policy was perhaps most manifest when
it took the unilateral decision to deploy No.3 Wing to Franco-German border to support the
French bombing offensive against German industry. Aware of certain RFC opposition,
Vice Admiral Oliver, Chief of the War Staff proposed on 5 April 1916: 'Possibly the
simplest way of doing it would be to say nothing on this side [of the Channel], but make
arrangement with the French and then do it. ,38 It was this wholly unsubtle strategy that the
Admiralty chose to adopt despite the fact that the navy still retained the secondary role of
air defence of the UK and the establishments of home stations would have to be reduced to
provide enough pilots. At the end of May Oliver reiterated that since it was a combined
operation, 200 miles from the British front, the Army's permission was not necessary. The
deployment of No.3 Wing was delayed by the need to meet RFC requests for aircraft, but
pressed ahead nevertheless. By February 1917 no fewer than ninety-five 'Class I'
aeroplanes were based there with a further fifteen in transit out of total in the RNAS of
336.39
Even before the War Cabinet ruled that the operations of No.3 Wing should cease,
the first naval squadron reinforced the RFC on the Somme in October 1916 and another
36 Minute from DAS to COS, 17 Feb 1917, ADM 1/8449/39A.
37 Minute by Second Sea Lord, 25 Feb 1916, ADM 1/8449/39A.
38 Roskill, Documents Relating, 344.
39 First Lord's RNAS fortnightly returns, 1-15 Feb 1917, AIR 1/150/15/11311.
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four squadrons followed three months later.40 Pilots for these squadrons were taken from
Luxeuil, coastal and air defence stations in Britain plus the Eastern Meditcrraneant' The
remainder ofNo.3 Wing was withdrawn in the spring of 1917 to provide reinforcements for
squadrons operating on the Western Front where losses were heavier than on naval
operations. Some pilots found themselves almost exclusively employed on land operations
and Wing Commander Bell-Davies VC who served at Dunkirk, the Dardanelles and with
No.3 Wing noted in early 1917:
'I had volunteered for aviation because I thought it would be useful in [the] naval
war; but with the war in its third year I had never even seen the Grand Fleet. We
had worked with ships in Gallipoli, indeed, but they had really been acting only
as floating batteries in support of the Anny.,42
In one way the RNAS was unfortunate in its timing since two months after the withdrawal
ofNo.3 Wing, the German Gotha raids on London took place and the independent bombing
missions against targets in Germany were firmly back on the agenda, the Handley Pages of
the RNAS providing the backbone ofthis force. It is interesting that the Admiralty regarded
the bombing of German steel works as a legitimate naval target, but the support of the RFC
on the Western Front as an unwanted distraction. There is an interesting juxtaposition with
the situation during the Second World War when the RAF insisted that the strategic
bombing of Germany was a top priority and therefore initially refused to allocate long
range aircraft to Coastal Command for the Battle of the Atlantic. On the other hand the
enforced disbandment of No.3 Wing in April 1917 forced the navy to concentrate on its
maritime priorities.
Operations in the Mediterranean
The Mediterranean remained a low operational priority throughout the war. The
recommendations of Wing Captain, formerly Colonel, Sykes, RFC, on the resources
necessary to support forces at Gallipoli were not accepted and allocations ofheavy bombers
to target Constantinople were frequently promised, but not delivered.
In October 1915 Sykes reported that if aircraft were provided on a similar ratio to
the Western Front, then 168 aircraft were required to support the thirteen divisions on
40 Development and Operations of the RNAS in Home Waters: Part III - Belgian Coast Operations, 1917.
AIR 1/677/21/13/1930.
4\ Minutes of Air Board's Thirtieth meeting, 11 Dec 1916, ADM 1/8449139A.
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Gallipoli. The priority was for more aeroplanes so that seaplanes could be used more
effectively: ' ...as specialist and costly craft they should not, when avoidable, be used for
work, which aeroplanes could carry out equally well. Hitherto it has been unfortunately
necessary to use seaplanes for such work. ,43 General Headquarters, Eastern Mediterranean
requested a further two Wings, a total of 120 aeroplanes and two seaplane carriers, the
suggestion being that aircraft could be withdrawn from home stations. The reality was that
approval was given for an establishment of only fifty aeroplanes, nineteen seaplanes, three
airships and three kite balloons.44
With the withdrawal from Gallipoli, no great expansion of the RNAS's presence
was likely; an aeroplane wing at hnbros, an Airship Base at Mudros, two seaplane carriers
and two kite balloon ships. No.2 Wing would be brought up to a strength of three
squadrons by the transfer of some personnel and material from No.3 Wing, the remainder
ofwhich would return to Britain.45
The provision of heavy bombers for the Eastern Mediterranean demonstrated the
relatively low priority afforded to the theatre. The basis of the request was the supposed
impact of bombing Constantinople: 'Intelligence reports ... indicate that service of great
material value to Allied cause in the East would result from heavy bombing of
Constantinople and that ill feeling between Turk and German already strong would be
much intensified.'46 Four Handley Pages were allocated to the British Aegean Squadron in
October 1917, but were diverted to France. A signal was then received from the Admiralty
on 20 October: 'Six Caprioni bombers will shortly be delivered and orders are being issued
for them to be flown to Otranto.Y' Within a week the promise of the Caprionis was also
withdrawn. The question re-surfaced in March 1918 when the Air Ministry signalled that
due to the independent bombing programme over Germany and operations against German
submarine bases no Handley Pages were available until Mayor June. In lieu six DH9's
were due to be sent out at the end of March. Nos 144 and 146 Squadrons were due to
complete working up in June before being sent to the Aegean, but the C-in-C
Mediterranean was informed on 21 June that were going to the Middle East and No.4 Naval
42 R. Bell-Davies, Sailor in the Air: The Memoirs a/Vice Admiral Richard Bell-Davies (London: Peter
Davies, 1967), 158. .
43 Report from Wing Captain Sykes to VA, EMS, 21 Oct 1915, AIR 1/654/17/122/503.
44 Minute to First Lord, 20 Nov 1915, AIR 1/654/17/122/503.
45 Letter from Wing Captain RNAS, EMS to VA, EMS, 9 Jan 1916, AIR 1/649/17/122/420.
46 Message from RN AS Mudros to Fifth Sea Lord, 17 Oct 1917, AIR 1/673/17/134/40.
47 Message from ADOD to C-in-C Mediterranean, 20 Oct 1917, AIR 1/673/171134'40.
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Group respectively.l'' Throughout the war the navy provided only the minimum of forces
necessary to maintain operations in the Mediterranean.
The Crisis of 1917
There were major developments in a number of areas of naval work in 1917',
sufficient seaplanes, airships and especially flying boats became available to enable
systematic anti-submarine patrols around Britain's coast for the first time. In addition
aeroplanes were first employed from cruisers and capital ships of the Grand Fleet.
Therefore there was a renewed emphasis on the naval aspects of the RNAS's roles when its
support for the Army was most needed.
The losses suffered by naval squadrons operating with the RFC were far greater
than those suffered by units in naval roles. In January 1917 the Director of Air Services
gave the Army squadrons priority: ' ...the provision of fighting squadrons asked for to assist
the Army in the field should take precedence of the personnel and machines for No.3
Wing ... ,49 but it was clear that this decision was not made willingly: 'Squadrons operating
with the B.E.F. in the Field, a purely Military operation in no way connected with the
Navy. This latter operation has been undertaken with reluctance by Their Lordships, not
being a Naval Operation, and is due to the urgent representation of Field Marshal Sir D.
H · ,50mg...
By the end of March, Nos 1,3, 6, 8 and 10 Squadrons were operating with the RFC.
It was impossible to provide for these squadrons from the resources of the Dunkirk
command alone; machines and pilots from home and Mediterranean stations were
withdrawn, bombers were removed from No.3 Wing at Luxeuil and converted into fighters
while twenty Sopwith 1)6 Strutters allocated for Romania were also requisitioned for use
on the Western Front. 51 The remaining squadron was removed from Luxeuil on 15 April
and its aircraft and machinery were to be handed over to the French. In August 1915 there
were only twenty pilots at Dunkirk, by August 1916 this had risen to sixty and the
prediction for August 1917 was 298.
Between January - March 1917 pilot wastage in the Dunkirk command was 10.10/0
per month and 15.2% for April. April 1917 was the RFC's worst month of the whole war
and earned the title 'bloody April'. Naval squadrons were deployed in advance of their
48 Letter from Secretary of Admiralty to C-in-C Mediterranean, 21 Jun 1918, AIR 1/649/17/122/406.
49 Minute by DAS, 24 Jan 1917, ADM 1/8449/39A.
50 Minute by DAS, 30 Jan 1917, ADM 1/8478/10.
Chapter 5
172
usual training programme to take part in the Battle of Arras and therefore had not built up
the requisite experience of air gunnery and fonnation flying. Therefore it would require
sixty pilots per month to maintain its complement of 300.52 Captain Lambe had requested
267 additional pilots by the end of July and despite the arrival of 281, squadrons were still
below strength and further action was necessary.
Some pilots were withdrawn from anti-submarine stations in south-west England in
the summer of 1917, but this was not enough and there followed a progressive
rationalisation of squadrons on the Western Front. First the number of pilots per squadron
were reduced from twenty to eighteen and later fifteen. Then Nos.6 and 11 Squadrons were
disbanded in August and No.9 Squadron withdrawn the following month to maintain Nos 1,
8 and 10 Squadrons up to strength. Nos.l and 10 Squadrons were subsequently withdrawn
from RFC service in November, leaving only No.8 Squadron in the army co-operation
role. 53
Intensive operations on the Western Front coincided with an increase of inshore
anti-submarine patrols in February 1917, especially in the Western Approaches, the
introduction of the 'Spider Web' patrol pattern in the English Channel in April and the
employment of aeroplanes from cruisers and capital ships of the Grand Fleet. Therefore late
in 1917 fifty per cent of the pilots graduating from Cranwell were needed for anti-
submarine patrols and twenty-five per cent for the Grand Fleet.54 As Jellicoe recognised in
August 1917: 'It must be recognised that it is one thing to lay down policy, and another,
quite a different one, to carry it out after three years of war, when difficulties of every sort
connected with the supply of labour and material are met with in every direction ... ,55 The
difficulty of prioritising resources in 1917 when there were a number of competing
operational demands presaged frequent such crises in the Second World War.
Second World War
Wartime expansion and a shortage of resources
The FAA was faced with an immediate difficulty given its small size and the operations it
was expected to undertake. In addition some experienced squadrons were disbanded to
provide cadres for new squadrons as part of the FAA expansion programme and to supply
51 Development and Operations ofRNAS in Home Waters: Part III - Belgian Coast Operatio~s, 1917, AIR
1/667/21/13/1930; Minutes ofAir Board's 30 th meeting, 11 Dec 1916, ADM 1/8449/39A; Minute by DAS, 31
Dec 1916, AIR 1/651/17/122/460.
52 Letter from CO, RNAS Dunkerque to Vice Admiral, Dover Patrol, 8 M~y 1917, AIR 1/6?0/17 /122/662.





reinforcements to the units operating in the Mediterranean. Captain Larcom, DNAD, made
clear his opposition to the decommissioning of existing squadrons in December 1939: 'We
have already had experience of the ill effects of splitting up Squadrons haphazard[ly] ...
The advantages of practising what we preach are the more marked in the present case,
because 815 (after some early misadventures) is being worked up systematically under
Naval direction ashore ... ,56 The majority of aircrew were from 811 Squadron who had
survived the sinking of HMS Courageous and the life of this famous squadron began
inauspiciously: ' ...great difficulty was experienced in obtaining the necessary stores and
equipment ... No flying was carried out for the first fortnight, owing to the lack of
equipment to make the machines serviccablc.v" At the outbreak of war Norrie Martin was
serving as a Flight Commander in 810 Squadron on HMS Ark Royal. In January 1940 the
ship returned to Britain for refitting and the squadron lost many aircrew to provide an
experienced cadre for new squadrons: 'All our pilots were highly trained and we had only
one fatal accident during the whole South Atlantic operations. The squadrons were
decimated on our return to England, and a large number of our best pilots were taken away
to form new squadrons for the brand new carriers that were coming into cornmission.Y'
In May 1940 Martin was appointed CO, 821 Squadron, based at Hatston in the
Orkneys and again served on Ark Royal. However in November 821 was disbanded and its
aircraft were sent as reinforcements to the Middle East while the pilots were absorbed by
other squadrons. Due to the need to reinforce Malta, 821 and 823 Squadrons were
disbanded on 30 November 1940 and the twelve best aircraft transported to Gibraltar in
HMSArgus.
During the Norwegian campaign Vice Admiral Wells, Vice Admiral, Aircraft
Carriers complained that he lacked sufficient front line squadrons to exchange those
disembarked. As a result squadrons were overused and a number of aircrew relieved after
suffering from stress and Captain Moody, DNAD, admitted that a policy to form
supernumerary squadrons was abandoned in 1938 on cost grounds.Y For the ill-fated attack
on the Scharnhorst at Trondheim in July 1940 the number of aircraft to be employed was
limited by the number of pilots with previous dive-bombing cxperience/" Pilot Donald
Gibson of 803 Squadron complained that: ' ...most of the experienced pilots at dive-
55 Admiralty Air Policy, Appendix I by First Sea Lord, 23 Aug 1917, AIR 1/677/21/13/1901.
56 Minute by DNAD. 7 Dec 1939, ADM 1/10738.
57815 Squadron Diary, 1939-1941, Entry for Oct 1939, ADM 207/13.
58 W.H.N. Martin, Memoirs, 30, IWM/Doc 98/1/1. . . )
59 Report from Vice Admiral, Aircraft Carriers to Secretary of Admiralty. 20 Aug 1940, ADM 199 X-+ 7 &
Minute by DNAD, 25 Oct 1940, ADM 199/847.
60 Minute by DNAD, II Jul 1940, ADM 199/840.
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bombing had by then been killed or taken prisoner and most of the pilots in the squadrons
were people like myselfwho were straight out of flying schools and when I was actually in
the dive I had ... four Messerschmitts on my tail. ,61
The use of limited forces, due to scarcity of resources, continued into 1941. Only
one carrier was usually available in the Mediterranean and at the Battle of Matapan in
March 1941, HMS Formidable had only fourteen strike and thirteen fighters available
which placed a heavy strain on the available crews.62 By 12 May her fighter complement
was down to four and on the day she was hit, 25 May, it was only twelve. Most famously in
the hunt for the Bismarck, HMS Victorious was hurriedly equipped with nine Swordfish
from 825 Squadron and six Fulmars from 800Z; for some of the Fulmar observers it was
their first time in a two-seat aircraft and their aircraft did not possess homing bcacons.r'
Nor were these squadrons properly worked up. 828 Squadron, equipped with Albacores,
was fully operational and serving in the Orkneys, but the local AOC Coastal Command
would not release it in time.64
When talks took place in November 1942 about the possibility of reinforcing the US
Pacific Fleet which had been reduced one operational carrier Admiral Cunningham insisted
that sufficient forces should first be allocated to Operation 'Torch': 'I feel it is 0 f primary
importance not to reproduce the situation we had in 1941 in [the] Eastern Mediterranean
when, owing to carrier losses, we had neither a sea borne nor a shore based air striking
force with the results of which we are aware.t'" The results which Cunningham referred to
were the serious losses during the evacuation from Crete when nine major warships were
sunk and a further fifteen damaged.
The relatively small-scale of the FAA's operations until a large number of carriers
became available in 1943 and a misconception over naval air operations resulted in an
amazing attack by Churchill in July 1943 who complained that the FAA was not suffering
enough casualties; there had been only thirty killed, missing or prisoners in the three
months up to 30 April out of a total strength of 45,000: 'We cannot however keep such a
large mass of high-class personnel of the highest quality in a condition of non-activity so
far as actual contact with the enemy is concerned.l'" Rear Admiral Portal, Assistant Chief
61 D.C.E.F. Gibson, IWM/SA 9696, Reel 1.
62 Report from CO, HMS Formidable to Rear Admiral, Mediterranean Aircraft Carriers, 10 Apr 1941, ADrvl
199/781.
63 Despatch from C-in-C Home Fleet to Secretary ofAdmiralty, 27 May 1941, ADM 199/838.
64 David Brown, Carrier Operations in World War II: Volume 1The Royal Navy (London: Ian Allan, 1968),
22.
65 Message from NCXF to Admiralty, 20 Nov 1942, PREM 1/363/1.
66 Minute from Prime Minister to First Lord, 23 lui 1943, ADM 1/14990.
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of the Naval Staff (Air), rebutted Churchill's criticism usmg the extremely pertinent
example ofthe Grand Fleet in the First World War:
'In Naval air work periods of spectacular activities and achievements alternate
with periods of dull routine, mainly comprising intensive training and the normal
operations of escort and patrol... the value of the force cannot be assessed on
positive and visible achievement over a particular period. If that were so it could
be said that the Grand Fleet achieved little over a protracted period of the last war
but none the less the German Fleet surrendered. ,67
Admiral Boyd, the Fifth Sea Lord, reported that between September 1939 - June 1943 the
average monthly casualty rate of flying personnel in operational units was 2.04%. The
worst period was the quarter ending 30 June 1940 when there were 105 casualties out of
819 aircrew, a monthly loss rate of 4.53%, coinciding with the Norwegian campaign and
the loss of HMS Glorious. This was closely followed by the next three months when 115
out of 900 became casualties, a loss of 4.46% per month. The 220 casualties during these
six months amounted to twenty per cent of the 1051 casualties over the whole period and
were clearly unsustainable.f
Boyd highlighted the FAA's three major roles; firstly, engaging enemy surface units
which resulted in the destruction of the Bismarck and the successes at Taranto and Cape
Matapan. Secondly, in convoy work, especially to Malta, Russia and the major role in the
Battle of the Atlantic and thirdly, supporting land operations including those in North
Africa and Syria where successes were offset by the disasters in Greece and Crete. In the
long term he predicted that the FAA would be the navy's main striking force when
significant operations were undertaken in the Far East and Pacific.69
Availability of fighter squadrons
While a number of strike squadrons were broken up to provide cadres for new
squadrons or reinforcements, the situation regarding fighter squadrons was desperate. The
pre-war assumption that carriers would not have to engage land-based aircraft resulted in
their being only four naval fighter squadrons in 1939, in comparison with twelve strike
squadrons. One further fighter squadron formed in 1939, four in 1940, eight in 1941,
thirteen each in 1942, 1943 and 1944 and five in 1945, but the extensive training
67 Draft letter from ACNS (A) to Prime Minister, 16 Aug 1943, ADM 1/14990.
68 Report from Fifth Sea Lord to F~rst Lord, Tabl~ D. 30 Aug 1943, ADM 1/14990.




programme and slow aircraft construction programme took time to come fruition. Overall
fifty-seven fighter squadrons were formed during the war compared with only thirty-three
strike squadrons.I"
Such was the situation even in 1943 that when the decision was taken that the FAA
should play a significant role in providing cover for amphibious landings, the navy
requested that some RAF Spitfire squadrons be trained in carrier techniques and their
aircraft modified, in case it became necessary to rotate squadrons during intensive action.
The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations) informed the Chief of the Air Staff of the
navy's requirements at the end of 1942: 'The Naval Staff now state that their requirement
in Spitfire aircraft and Spitfire pilots for this operation will be about 140, and the time that
they will be required for shipping for embarkation for the operation would be about the 1st
March.,71 A lack of any finn operational commitments saw the scheme proceed slowly.
The Director of Operations at Fighter Command reported on 13 June that he doubted any of
the crews would ever be used action and due to the dislocation caused by the training
programme, recommended the scheme should abandoned: 'We were aiming at training 100
pilots. Up to date a total of 59, including one Squadron Commander and four Flight
Commanders, have completed this training satisfactorily... Since we initiated this training I
have heard nothing more whatever as to whether these pilots and the arrester gear are ever
likely to be used.' 72
By the time of a meeting between the Vice Chiefs of the Naval Staff and Air Staff
held on 4 November 1943 100 pilots had been trained. At this meeting the requirement was
reconsidered and provision for 200 RAF pilots and their aircraft to operate from carriers at
three months notice was agreed.r' Discussions between the Assistant Chiefof the Air Staff
(Fighters) and the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Air) and the Fifth Sea Lord on 23
October brought an interesting new revelation of the Admiralty's plans for their
employment:
,... the 200 pilots will be required for Far Eastern operations about the end of
1944, Captain Moore [Plans Division] pointed out that this commitment is not a
definite one, but was put forward... if it was thought that maximum effort ought
70 See Appendix 2 for details of the formation of squadrons between 1939-1945.
71 Letter from ACAS (Ops) to CAS 16 December 1942, AIR 20/845.
72 Minute from DF Ops to ACAS (Ops), AIR 20/845. . .
73 d I:". ti between YCAS and ACAS on 'Training and equipment ofR.A.F. fighter pilots toAgen a lor mee 109 ~
operate from carriers', AIR 20/845.
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to be switched to the Far East with the least possible delay after the collapse of
Germany. ' 74
While the air cover for amphibious operations in 1943-1944 did not require employment of
reserve squadrons and hence the RAF pilots were not employed operationally, it
demonstrated the FAA had few fighter reserves. It also raises the obvious question ofwhy
did the Navy not press for the transfer ofRAF pilots, in the knowledge that their use was a
feasible proposition. In the Pacific the FAA was seriously short of pilots and RAF aircrew
would have only required a deck landing training programme, rather than the full aircrew
training schedule.
Shore-based operations, 1939-1943
The pre-war planning for the FAA had been based around the carrier construction
programme and RAF Coastal Command was tasked with providing shore-based maritime
reconnaissance and strike capability. However, as Head of Air Branch commented in
March 1942 this was not adhered to: 'By the Cabinet decision of 1937, the operation of
shore based first line squadrons was reserved to the Air Ministry, but this ruling has been
departed from on more than one occasion during the present war.' 75
The lack of carriers in service until 1943 resulted in a number of FAA squadrons
being employed ashore, especially in the Mediterranean. 830 Squadron arrived at Malta as
early as June 1940 and joined by 828 Squadron in October 1941 were a thorn in the side of
Axis convoys Aircraft from 830 Squadron sank thirteen ships totalling 68,000 tons in 1941
alone. Many FAA squadrons which operated in the Mediterranean were put shore from
damaged carriers. 815 Squadron armed with Swordfish had a splendid record of action after
disembarking from Illustrious operating from Greece, Crete, the Western Desert and
Cyprus in 1941. It was an excellent example of FAA resourcefulness and squadron
mobility; for example when operating in Cyprus the squadron was supported from Dekheila
in Egypt.76 Some squadrons spent a considerable time ashore after unp lanned
disembarkations; 826 Squadron left Formidable in May 1941 and spent the next two and a
half years either in the Western Desert or at Malta before disbanding in October 1943. 803
Squadron had an extremely varied career abroad serving in Egypt from May - June 1941
and Syria from June - August. It then became part of the RN Fighter Squadron in the
Western Desert from August 1941 - February 1942 before moving to Ceylon in March and
74 Minute from ACAS (F) to YCAS, 23 October 1943. AIR 20/845.




embarking in Formidable and then Illustrious between April - December. A further
deployment followed in East Africa from December 1942 - August 1943 before the
squadron was eventually disbanded.i It appears some squadrons abroad were allowed to
continue until their equipment was effectively exhausted in the case of 828 and 830
Squadrons in Malta. 78
The FAA's duties may have been even more extensive as Churchill, then First Lord,
proposed in January 1940 that the FAA should take over all of Coastal Command's duties
in the North Sea so: ' ... the Fleet Air Arm, which then, and then alone, would have a task
proportioned to its cost, and worthy of its quality.t " To achieve this, eight squadrons would
have been withdrawn from carrier duties. Bearing in mind that the FAA had only twelve
strike squadrons at the outbreak of war this would have been impossible. In August 1942
the navy proposed to increase the employment of FAA aircraft with Coastal Command in
the UK from two to five squadrons: 'It would be much appreciated if 812, 816 and 833
Squadrons each with 6 Swordfish could be accommodated at one or more of your stations
and employed under the same terms as 811 and 819 Squadrons as from 7th September.' 80
The difficulty in converting US CVE's was the reason for the availability of spare
squadrons: 'There are now several fully trained F.A.A. Squadrons, with no carriers, due to
the delay in the American conversions. It is proposed that some of these should be
employed in the Channel for attacks on "E" boats etc on the lines of84l Squadron.' 81
By mid-1943 CVE's were becoming available in much greater numbers, as will be
discussed later in this chapter, and the need for more aircraft to man them led to a heated
debate in the Admiralty over the continued support for Coastal Command. Captain Lambe,
the Director of Plans, was in no doubt that carriers should have top priority:
'In the past we have felt bound to acquiesce... [to shore-based squadrons] in
NORWAY, CRETE, SCAPA (NS patrols), MADAGASCAR, the CHANNEL
and above all the MEDITERRANEAN where we have been filling a gap for over
two years in spite of frequent efforts to withdraw our squadrons for their proper
duties... almost every local authorities ... attempted to use our reserves for
carriers so painfully accumulated at strategic points. The fact that we have as yet
suffered no major set back resulting from an inadequate supply of squadrons for
76815 Squadron Diary, 9 Oct 1940 - 2 Dec 19~1. ADM 2?7/13. ,
77 Information from relevant squadron entries In Ray Sturtivant and Theo Ballance, The Squadrons a/the
Fleet Air Ann (Tonbridge: Air Britain, 1994).
78 Minute by DNAD, 28 July 1942. ADM 1/11742.
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carriers has resulted from a combination of carrier casualties and tactical needs
which we can only regard as fortuitous. ,82
Captain Wright, DAWT, proposed a far more pragmatic approach: ' .. .it is foolish to let it
become a rigid law hampering our own operational freedom... We may dislike seeing
aircraft carriers empty, but it is clearly our duty to place squadrons ashore under the Royal
Air Force and accept empty carriers if our operational conscience decrees this to be the
t f acti ,83 C . Icorrec course 0 action. aptam Ecc es, DOD (H), recommended that six Swordfish or
Albacores be available to each the Nore, Portsmouth and Plymouth commands to cover
East Coast and Channel convoys.f" In the event in the autumn of 1944 no fewer than seven
squadrons, four Swordfish and three Barracuda, were still operating under Coastal
Command.f The FAA had also provided a number of shore-based squadrons to cover the
D-Day landings in 1944, although this was a one-off for such a critical operation, rather
than part ofwider pattern ofemployment.
Ferrying ofRAF aircraft, 1940-1942
One use which the RN certainly did not envisage in the inter-war period was the
need to reinforce RAP forces overseas through the use of carriers. The Norwegian
Campaign sent the tone when Furious carried RAP Gladiators & Hurricanes across the
North Sea and later Glorious transported No.263 Squadron to Lake Lesjaskou.
The most significant operations were those for the reinforcement of Malta and to
Takoradi in West Africa. Malta presented a unique problem, an unsinkable aircraft carrier
it may have been astride Axis supply routes from Italian ports to Libya, but it was also very
difficult to support logistically. The majority of the aircraft for the island were delivered
via aircraft carriers and no fewer than 700 were delivered from thirty-three carrier trips
between August 1940 and October 1942.86 As the numbers suggest the effort was
considerable with Force H escorting eleven ferrying trips to Malta between April -
November 1941. Between March - July 1942 a further ten trips were made delivering 275
Spitfire for the defence of Malta, although it must be remembered that these were written
off at an average rate of seventeen per week. A trip by Fairey Albacores in March 1942
highlighted the difficulty ofmaking such a flight with inexperienced aircrews:
82 Minute by D ofP, 21 Jun 1943, ADM 1/16412.
83 Paper by DAWT, 12Joo 1943, ADM 1/16412.
84 Minute by DOD (H), 12 Jun 1943, ADM 1/16412.
85 MinutebyD ofP,25Nov 1944, ADM 1/18576. . ,
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'With the exception of [the] senior pilot and senior observer the crew of
Albacores have had no first line experience, pilots have never flown off nor
landed on [a] carrier, observers have done practically no night navigation and
night wind fmding and are inexperienced wireless operators. Consequently I am
not very happy about their ability to fly off and navigate to Malta in dark.,87
The British earners Argus, Ark Royal, Eagle and Furious made the majority of the
journeys, but their limited availability and capacity resulted in USS Wasp making two trips
in 1942. Churchill sent a telegram to President Roosevelt appealing for the loan of Wasp:
'Malta can only now muster 20 or 30 serviceable fighters. We keep feeding Malta
with Spitfrres in packets of 16 loosed from Eagle.... This had worked a good
many times quite well but Eagle is now laid up for a month... we estimate that
Wasp could take 50 or more Spitfires... a powerful Spitfire force could be flown
into Malta at a stroke and give us a chance of inflicting a severe and possibly
decisive check on the enemy... ,88
To provide the American carrier with expertise on ferrying operations and the Spitfire
aircraft, HMS Eagle's Commander Flying and Lieutenant Commander Air Staffplus three
RAP officers and an RAF Flight Sergeant were flown from Britain to Gibraltar to sail on
Wasp.89 In all forty-seven Spitfires accompanied by thirty-four RAF officers, two Warrant
officers, thirty-two Flight Sergeants and Sergeants, eighteen Corporals and seventy-nine
aircraftsmen embarked on Wasp.90 The Spitfire Mk 5Cs flew off 550 miles from Malta and
all landed safely on 20 April. 91 The contribution of these trips to maintaining Malta's
resistance astride Rommel's supply routes cannot be underestimated and carriers were
essential to this task.
Italy's declaration of war also put great strain upon RAF resources in the Middle
East. At the time there were only 300 first-line aircraft in the theatre and the most modem
fighter was the Gladiator bi-plane.Y The defeat of France removed the possibility of
reinforcing the RAP in Egypt by flight delivery from Britain. With the Mediterranean
effectively closed to merchant ships, except those with a heavy naval escort on vital
missions, the easiest option was to transport crated aircraft to the port ofTakoradi in West
87 Message from SO, Force H to Vice-Admiral Malta, 12 Mar 1942, ADM 213/545.
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Africa and then fly them on the 4000 mile route from Egypt via Khartoum. Initial plans in
June 1940 called for the monthly supply of forty-five fighters, forty-five medium bombers,
and thirty seven other 'planes per month although it was admitted: 'The above figures are
calculated on a theoretical basis and do not represent what can be spared or what will
actually be consumed. ,93 Sections of RAP personnel would be provided at Kano, Geneina
and Khartoum where the aircraft would make overnight stops during their four-day trip.
Operation 'Stripe' in November 1940 was one of four crucial trips made by the
navy to reinforce the RAP in the Middle East in the early stages of the fighting against the
Italians. HMS Furious left the Clyde in early November to embark thirty-four aircraft for a
ferry trip to Takoradi. The ship retained six Skuas of801 Squadron, disembarking 801, 816
and 825 Squadrons and associated maintenance personnel and equipment." The need to
ferry Hurricanes with non-folding wings necessitated twenty-two aircraft stored in
Furious' lower hangar with wings removed; on arrival offTakoradi these aircraft would be
assembled in six hours by the forty-five embarked RAP maintenance personnel. The
remaining twelve were ranged complete in the upper hangar together with the six Skuas. 95
Furious flew off the thirty-four Hurricanes and three Fulmars on the morning of 29
November. One Hurricane crashed into the sea and the pilot was killed. Six of the RAF
aircraft commenced their journey to Egypt by 0940 the same morning, with the remainder
following in batches of six at daily intervals.I" Argus and Furious made a total of four trips
on this route between September 1940 and March 1941 supplying 142 Hurricane fighters
. I . h M di 97at a crucia stage In tee iterranean war.
From the spring of 1941 reinforcements became available direct from the United
States, the first shipment of 100 Kittyhawk fighters and 20 Maryland light bombers sailing
to Takoradi on the Norwegian merchant ship, Tamerlane. At this stage of the war one of the
major problems was the unavailability of American shipping: 'The whole cargo had to be
entrusted to this one vessel, owing to inability to charter other ships. No. U.S. ships can be
chartered under present legislation. ,98 By the autumn there was the prospect of increasing
numbers of Kittyhawks and Boston medium bombers being delivered directly from the
USA to Red Sea saving on British shipping capacity and ferry pilots. Up to the end of
92 Michael Armitage, The Royal Air Force, 2nd edn (London: Cassel, 1999), 122.
93 Notes for the Officer Commanding the future RAF Station at Takoradi, 27 Jun 1940. AIR 2/7248.
94 Telegram from DOD (H) to C-in-C Home Fleet, 4 November 1940. ADM 2'23/676.
95 Telegram from DNAD to HMS Furious, 5 November 1940. ADM 223/676.
% Telegram from RAF Takoradi to HMS F~ous, 29 Nov~~ber 1940. ADM 223/676. .
97 Unpublished notes on StaffHistory of British Naval AVIatIOn, 1919 - 1945, Volume Ill, Appendix IIB.
NHB.
98 Notes on shipment of aircraft and materials supplied to Africa, Mar 1941, AVIA 38/445.
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November 1941,2136 aircraft arrived in the Middle East. Of these 887 came via sea and air
via Takoradi, 491 by air, 487 by sea via the Cape and 271 on aircraft carriers.f"
A final diversion of resources came at the start of the war in the Far East, when the
navy's most modem carrier HMS Indomitable was diverted to Port Sudan and delivered
fifteen Hurricanes to Singapore and thirty-three to Batavia in Java on her first mission 100
and a further fifty aircraft to Ceylon on the second.101 While the aircraft at Singapore and
Java could make little different to the overall result, the Hurricanes formed the backbone of
the defences in Ceylon when the island was raided by Japanese carrier forces in April 1942.
Co-ordinating the employment of Escort Carriers, 1942-1944
The issues surrounding the employment of CYE's are particularly interesting
because they highlight the difficulties of co-ordinating the use of carriers and the work-up
of squadrons when the operational needs of the navy were changing. During 1943, when
thirty of the Royal Navy's forty-four CYE's were commissioned, the Battle of the Atlantic,
the primary reason for the construction the ships, had declined in importance as measures
against the U'-boats became increasingly effective and the threat diminished. Henceforth
they were deployed on a number of other tasks which were then regarded more important
than trade protection.102
An excellent example of the unpredictable nature of the war, in which some
squadrons were continuously employed whilst others had long breaks between front line
action, can be seen from the experience of 835 Squadron, an anti-submarine Swordfish
squadron. After working up during the first three months of 1942 the squadron spent twenty
months of inactivity apart from one spell afloat in June 1943. The reason was that the
squadron was awaiting a CYE for anti-submarine operations when they were being used for
other purposes. Then between January 1944 - March 1945 the 835 Squadron was almost
continuously afloat, largely on the CYE Nairana supporting North Atlantic and Arctic
convoys.!?' Similarly Observer John Neale joined 822 Squadron at the beginning of 1942
and spent a frustrating six months: ' ...the squadron fretted, flying on exercises when
possible, moving to other naval bases at Crail, Donibristle, Machrihanish and Lee-on-
99 Minute from DWO to CAS, 19 Dec 1941, AIR 8/942.
100 Minute from CAS to Prime Minister, 29 Jan 1942, PREM 1/142/1.
101 Minute from Chiefs ofStaff to Prime Minister, 24 Feb 1942, PREM 1/142/1.
102 See Appendix 3 for full details ofCVE availability, Aug 1943 - Nov 1944.
103 Lieutenant Commander E.E. Barringer, The 835 Story, 1-2. IWM Doc 91/17/1.
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Solent. Other Squadrons, in the same fix, came and went - 818, 820, 825 - all marking
time with no aircraft carriers to work from.' 104
The experience of 835 and 822 illustrates the problems encountered by trade
protection squadrons at a time when priorities were changing and the squadrons simply had
to continue training ashore until ships became available. The cause was the small number
of ships available. Consider the situation in February 1941. Of the remaining pre-war
carriers, Argus, previously used for deck landing training, was in the Clyde preparing to
ferry RAF aircraft to Gibraltar, Furious was ferrying RAF aircraft to Takoradi in West
Africa, Ark Royal was serving with Force H in the Western Mediterranean, Eagle was
operating with Mediterranean Fleet based at Alexandria, and Hermes was searching for
service raiders in the South Atlantic. Of the new armoured carriers only Formidable was
available, steaming to replace her seriously damaged sister Illustrious in Cunningham's
Mediterranean Fleet. There were therefore only four carriers in front line service, with two
other on ferrying duties which did not operationally benefit the FAA, although were
essential for the war effort. The losses of Ark Royal in November 1941, Hermes in April
1942 and Eagle in August 1942 further exacerbated the FAA's predicament. In addition
one of the major problems in expanding an air arm compared with other sectors of a navy
can be seen from the figures of the USN calculating the time taken for the personnel to be
trained and get into the front line. For a Third Class Electricians Mate serving in the Pacific
Fleet the time was thirty-three weeks, a Sonar Officer for a newly commissioned destroyer
fifty-one weeks and to a deploy carrier pilot to the forward Pacific area eighty-three
weeks. 105
One consequence of the lack of carriers noted in mid-1943 was that the expansion
of the FAA was not matched by adequate operational experience of new squadrons. The
raids carried out on Norway earlier in the war were now discontinued and accordingly
'1 . th . 1 . 106 AFighter Command took twenty FAA pilots to give em operationa expenence.
similar arrangement was agreed for Seafire pilots in March 1944.107 The need to rush
squadrons into action at Salerno in September 1943 meant there was insufficient time for
them to work up with their carriers and subsequently it was recommended that should be
allowed to work up together.i'" As a result prior to Operation Dragoon in August 1944.
104 Lieutenant-Commander J.Neale . The Incredible Stringbag and Me. (Hailsham: J and K Publishing.
1997),118
105 Eccles, Operational naval logistics, 122.
106Notes on Fifth Sea Lord's second periodical meeting, 7 Jul1943, ADM 116/5057.
107 Notes on Fifth Sea Lord's sixteenth periodical meeting, 29 Mar 1944, ADM 116/5057. ,,_ .
108Conclusions ofmeeting held at Admiralty, 20 Oct 1943. in Appendix A, Report from Staff Officer (Air) to
C-in-C Eastern Fleet, 13 Nov 1943, AIR 23/2512.
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twenty-eight aircraft and fifty-two pilots from three squadrons ofNo A Wing were attached
to the Desert Air Force.109 A lack of experience was startlingly obvious during Operation
'Tungsten' against the Tirpitz on 3 April 1944; of the five types of aircraft, the Barracuda,
Corsair and Hellcat had little previous operational use. Three of the four types of bombs
had not been used by the FAA beforel lO and the Captain of HMS Victorious recalled that
eighty-five per cent of the 650 men of 52 and 47 Wings had never been to sea in a ship
before this attack. III
The major addition to the RN's carrier strength was the large number of CVEs, but
it was not until 1943 when the majority entered service. Three CVEs were commissioned in
1941 followed by six in 1942, thirty in 1943 and seven in 1944.112 Six CVEs were
converted in Britain and thirty-eight built in the United States. The peak periods for
delivery were August and November 1943 when six vessels were delivered in each
month. I 13
The big change from the time of ordering the CVE's in 1941 and 1942 and the
majority entering service in 1943 was the growing numbers of duties for which the ships
were required, in addition to the convoy escort role for which they were originally ordered.
HMS Biter was the first CVE to commence regular North Atlantic convoy work in April
1943 with four in service by June and seven by the start of 1944. In fact the major burden
of trade escort later in the war was undertaken by MAC ships, the first of which Empire
MacAlpine entered service in May 1943 and no fewer than eighteen by the end of 1943. By
the autumn of 1944 there was no requirement for CVEs in the Atlantic. 114
109 Report from CO HMS Stalker to C-in-C Mediterranean Station (Naples), 29 Jul1944, ADM 199/116.
110Report from Vice-Admiral, Second-in-Command, Home Fleet to C-in-C Home Fleet, 10 Apr 1944, ADM
199/844.
III Report from CO, HMS Victorious to Vice Admiral, Second in Command, Home Fleet, 5 Apr 1944, ADM
199/844.
112 Commissioning dates of the Royal Navy's escort carriers were:
1941 UK - Audacity 20/06.
US - Attacker 30/09, Archer 17/11.
1942 UK - Activity 29/09.
US - Avenger 2/03, Biter 6/04, Dasher 2/07, Battler 31/10, Stalker 21/12.
1943 UK - Pretoria Castle 29/07, Vindex 15/11, Nairana 26/11.
US - Hunter 9/01, Tracker 31/01, Fencer 3/01, Searcher 7/04, Chaser 9/04, Ravager 25/04,
Striker 29/04, Pursuer 14/06, Ameer 20/07, Begum 2/08, Trumpeter 4/08, Emperor 6/08,
Slinger 11/08, Empress 12/08, Khedive 23/08, Nabob 7/09, Shah 27/09, Patroller 22/10,
Atheling 28/10, Premier 03/11, Ranee 08/11, Thane 19/11, Speaker 20/11, Queen 7/12,
Ruler 22/12.
1944 UK- Campania 9/02.
US - Rajah 17/01, Smiter 20/01, Trouncer 31/01, Puncher 5/02, Reaper 18/02, 1:biter 06i02.
Information from: David Hobbs, Royal Navy Escort Carriers (Liskeard, Cornwall: Maritime Books, 2003).
113 Aug 1943 - Begum. Trumpeter, Emperor, Slinger, Empress a~d Khedive.
Nov 1943 - Premier, Ranee. Vindex, Thane, Speaker and Nairana. _




In October 1942, Captain Bridge, DNAD, was one of the first officers to suggest
that CVE's would have to be improved to encompass the whole range ofoperational tasks:
,.. .it is quite certain that, in view of the very inadequate number of Aircraft
Carriers available and the time required to build more, these ships will often be
used in other than convoy operations. It is therefore essential that they should be
equipped with aircraft capable of full offensive (as opposed to defensive) work
with the Fleet. ' 115
A key point was that for CVEs to operate offensively and employ fighters modifications to
the ships would be required. The refit of HMS Battler, one the first of the American-built
CVE's to be significantly altered, took ten weeks and Captain Eccles, DOD (H)
commented: ' ... the importance of these escort carriers is so great at this time. It is possible
that we are being too "Rolls Royce" in fitting these ships with modem equipment.' 116
Eccles suggested that Archer, Dasher, Biter and Battler be modified to operate fighter
aircraft and Attacker, Fencer, Hunter and Stalker maintained to carry only strike aircraft.
In February 1943 Captain Lambe, the Director of Plans, noted that the tasks Cvfis
would be expected to perform were providing air cover for amphibious operations and
convoys to Russia requiring high performance fighters and on trade routes when aircraft of
a lesser performance could be utilised. I 17 The main alterations to operate fighter aircraft
were a longer flight deck and fighter direction facilities taking seven weeks, with all ships
requmng increased bomb room protection, taking five weeks, after the loss of HMS
Avenger.
There was pressure to get the requisite number of ships into the Battle of Atlantic:
and Captain Huskisson, DAM, commented: '1943 is certain to be a critical year as far as U-
boat warfare is concerned and D.A.M. does not feel justified in laying up vitally needed
new Escort Carriers for periods of at least two months if it can be avoided.' 118 In addition a
critical report by the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board of 27 August 1943 was naturally
concerned with the employment of the maximum of carriers on trade routes: .....failing a
drastic reduction in delay in getting British eVEs into operation consideration be given to
the U.S. Navy manning some or all of the next 7 eVEs allocated to Britain with a view to a
115 Minute by DNAD, 17 Oct 1942, ADM 11956.
116Minute by DOD (H), 18 Jan 1943, ADM 1/14842.
117Minute by D ofP, 7 Feb 1943, ADM 1/14798.




higher proportion of these vessels being employed on A/S operations with the minimum
delay.,J 19
In reply the Admiralty accepted there would have been four more CVE's in service
on trade routes ifno alterations had been made but: ' ... there would undoubtedly have been
unable to meet unexpected calls for fighter support which we are now meeting in the
Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean early in 1944.,120 The Admiralty felt that it had to
address its long term priorities: 'We cannot, just for the sake of some temporary window
dressing to please the Americans, allow a large proportion of our carriers to go out to the
Eastern war quite unfitted to carry out what will be then most important offensive
duties.' 121 The other issue was simply that the U-Boat threat was declining in late 1943 and
did not have the priority it once demanded: ' ...with the present decrease, (even if only
temporary), ofU-Boat activity against Atlantic convoy routes in our zone, and the growing
requirement for fighter escort carriers in all spheres, Their Lordships consider that our
policy is sound.' 122 The availability of fighter aircraft were a further limitation on the
number of CVEs that needed to be fully converted. Captain Byas, DNAO, noted that in
addition to the current complements for Formidable, Illustrious, Indomitable, Furious and
Unicornt", six CVEs could be equipped with Seafire L.lICs and lICs while leaving: ' ... a
reasonable number of fighter squadrons continually disembarked to obtain the training
f he vari ·,124necessary or t e vanous operations.
However, at the end ofAugust 1943 the Admiralty received news from Tacoma that
the rate of CVE construction was accelerating which would result in ships waiting for
alteration at Vancouver for up to three and a halfmonths. The British Admiralty Delegation
in Washington suggested that a solution was that five unmodified CVEs be allocated to
ferrying duties.125 Initially there was resistance to this idea with Captain Lambe, the
Director of Plans, insisting that unmodified vessels could not act in such a capacity in
operational theatres and the Director of the Anti-U-Boat Division wanted them employed
on relatively low risk trade routes, for example in the South Atlantic.
By the beginning of October Lambe had substantially changed his view due to a
cnsis in the aircraft supply situation. Firstly, since August the number of operational
119Extract from report ofAllied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, 27 Aug 1943 in message from BAD to
Admiralty, 4 Sep 1943, ADM 1/12857. . ')
120 Letter from Secretary of Admiralty to Deputy Secretary, BAD, 7 Sep 1943. ADM 1/1-857.
121 Memorandum by Plans Division, Aug 1943, ADM 1/12857.
122 Ibid.
123 Complements were: Formidable - 30 fighters, 12-18 T.B.R: IlIustrious.- 30 fighters, 12 T.B.R:
Indomitable-40 fighters, 15 T.B.R:Furious-12 fighters, 18 T.B.R.: Unicorn r i's fighters, 18 T.B.R.
124 Minute by DNAO, 5 Jun 1943, ADM 1/14806.
125 Telegram from BAD to Admiralty, 31 Aug 1943, ADM 1/12857.
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aircraft expected in Ceylon by February 1944 had risen by 250%. Secondly, there was
insufficient merchant shipping to transport aircraft from the United States and thirdly, the
FAA had a lower priority for shipping than the RAF. In the short term the use of CVE's
would circumvent the merchant shipping issue and create a supply stream independent of
the MAP and the RAF. The backlog in the United States was a particularly thorny issue,
since the Americans were unlikely to allocate further aircraft if the current batch was still
sitting on Roosevelt Field. There was no time to position reserves for the Far East before
the arrival of the fleet, but these would have to arrive in the same phase of operations as
the deployment of the Fleet Carriers themselves.V" The ships then available for ferrying
included the aircraft transports Athene and Engadine, the captured Italian seaplane carrier
Miragua, and the operational CVE Searcher. The decision to employ Empress, Patroller
and Ranee for ferrying to the Indian Ocean was greeted with satisfaction by Captain
Caspar John, BAD's Naval Air Representative, in a telegram to the Fifth Sea Lord, Rear
Admiral Boyd, on 17 November:
'From experience, I can say without reservation that without these eVEs we
should not have got the aircraft to where they are required in time... We are
under hot fire from the U.S. Navy regarding the accumulation of aircraft which
has resulted from the bad shipping position. Twice already I have been attacked
officially with the threat to cut our assignments on the grounds that we cannot get
rid of what aircraft we get. I managed to resist the first attack, the second came
yesterday.,127
At this time there were 310 aircraft at Roosevelt Field awaiting shipment and ferrying in a
CVE rather than being sent in crates in commercial vessel had considerable advantages;
aircraft could be shipped complete with all their secret components and so did not require
such substantial reassembly on arrival. The requirement for CVE transportation was
predicted to rise substantially: ' ... from 5 in the first quarter of 1944 to 13 in the last quarter
of 1944. These figures are based on cargo of 60 aircraft in each ship, allowing a round
voyage from U.K. to U.S.A. to the Eastern Theatre of 3 months, and a round voyage from
U.S.A. to U.K. of 6 weeks.' 128 This proposal was rejected by Captain Lambe who limited
the availability 0 f CVEs to six, the rest being dependent on commercial shipping.
The following table shows the operations undertaken by CVEs in 1944:
126 Minute by D ofP, 3 Oct 1943, AD.M 1/13752. . ., ?
127 Letter from Naval Air RepresentatIve, BAD to FIfth Sea Lord, 17 Nov 1943, ADM 1/16j·L.
128 Minute by DNAO & DAE, 18 Nov 1943. ADM 1/16342.
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Table 19. Operational tasks undertaken by Escort Carriers, 1944 129
Operational Task No. of individual operations % of overall effort
Convoy escort 64 35.9
A/S hunting groups 17 9.5
Support of land operations 23 12.9
Enemy shipping strikes 20 11.2
Minelaying strikes 12 6.7
Ferry service 42 23.5
Search for blockade runner 1 0.3
Total 178 100
As can be seen that only one-third of CVE operations were convoy escort compared with
twenty-three per cent on ferrying duties and twenty-four percent supporting land operations
and in strikes on enemy shipping. This provides a contrast with Fleet Carrier operations
where sixty-two per cent were directed against coastal shipping, largely in Norway and land
targets in the Far East:
Table 20. Operations undertaken by Fleet Carriers, 1944 130
Operational Task Number of operations Carriers employed- Carriers employed -
HomeWaters Far East
Tirpitz 4 10 -
Coastal shipping and 17 12 13
land targets
Minelaying 2 2 -
Sweep 2 - 2
Photo Recce 1 1 -
Not known 1 1
-
Total 27 26 15
Not only was increasing requirements competing for resources in 1943-1944, but Captain
Lambe, the Director of Plans, predicted a significant change in the geographical distribution
of the FAA with forces in the Far East doubling from thirty-one per cent of its strength at
the beginning of 1944 to sixty-two per cent at the beginning of 1946.
131
129 Memorandum No.132 by Department ofOperational Research, 1954, ADM 219494.
130 Report No.6/49 by Department ofOperational Research, 1949, ADM 2191344.
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Review of squadron organisation, 1943-1944
The rapidly increasing number of carriers and squadrons afloat made it necessary to
make some significant organisational changes to enable them to operate together. The
inspiration came from American practice; the USN's Carrier Air Groups (CAGs) were
formed six months before the carrier commissioned and after between six and nine months
at sea would be relieved by a replacement Air GrOUp.132
The main FAA air fighting unit, hitherto the squadron, would be the CAG sub-
divided into two or more Wings. A CAG would usually consist one TBR Wing and one
Fighter Wing each comprising three squadrons which may be from different carriers. On 21
October 1943, Head of Air Branch proposed the formation of the following Wings:
Table 21. Proposed Wing organisation, October 1943 133
Wing No. Squadrons Aircraft Carriers
4 Naval Fighter 807,808,879,886,809,897 Hunter, Attacker & Stalker
7 " Fighter 800,804,881,882,896,898 Emperor, Pursuer & Searcher
8 " TBR 827,830 Furious
15 " Fighter 1830, 1831, 1833 Illustrious
21 " TBR 810,847 Illustrious
24 " Fighter 887,894 Indefatigable
30 " Fighter 880,899 Implacable
31 " TBR 832,845 Victorious
45 " TBR 822,825 Indefatigable
47 " Fighter 1834, 1835, 1836 Victorious
52 " TBR 815,829 Implacable
Each Wing would undergo three weeks of training to obtain a high standard of cohesion
between squadrons. Fighter and TBR Wings then worked together for a further two weeks
of Group training. The formation of Wings also encouraged the increase in the size of
squadrons; Vice Admiral Lyster, FOCT, informed the Admiralty in May 1944 that it was
uneconomical for 887 and 894 Squadrons, each comprising twelve Seafires, to form No.24
Fighter Wing. As a result the size of these squadrons was increased to twenty-four
machines and operated as such in the Pacific.
131 Letter from Air Branch to Deputy Director ofStores (A.ir), 9 Sep 1943, ADM 1/15382. _
132 R rt from CO, HMS Victorious to Secretary ofAdmiralty. 1 Sep 1943, ADM 1,1338).




The other revolution was the introduction of the 'operational tour' proposed in April
1944 by Captain Wright, DAWT. Until the spring of 1944 training schedules were
sufficient to provide the relief of one crew per squadron per month. Each crew would
remain in the front line for between twelve and fifteen months followed by a six to nine
month rest period. However Wright's operational tour would apply to the whole squadron
rather than just individual crews. Each squadron would carry twenty-five per cent extra
crews to cover casualties; in the event that more casualties were suffered the unit would be
disbanded. 134 Captain Grantham, the Director of Plans, supported this concept and hoped
that it would lead to more efficient use of resources and would end criticism that the FAA
drove its aircrew to their deaths because ofoverlong tours. 135
To speed up the formation of new squadrons to enable the operational tour to
become reality a new system of aircrew training and squadron working up was proposed in
May 1944; the key difference was that aircrew received all operational training with the
squadron rather than through specialist training schools. The Commanding Officer, senior
pilot and senior observer would train at the School of Air Warfare prior to formation of the
squadron and would then be supported by Staff Instructors at the working up station. Three
strike squadrons, 812, 814 and 837, and 898 Hellcat fighter squadron were authorised to
form under this system and for the strike squadrons there was a considerable improvement:
'It was found to be possible to work up a strike squadron in 5-6 months. Under the old
scheme the corresponding period would be 8-9 months. A 30% saving of time was thus
achieved.' 136 An average of 23.7 hours flying per aircraft was achieved compared with
14.2 at flying schools, accidents were reduced from 51 per 10,000 hours to 28.5 and
training wastage slashed from 20-25% to only 3-5%. These improvements were attributed
to the fact that pilots were keener to learn once they were part of their operational unit, they
had the same instructors throughout their training and since they were allocated the same
aircraft for training as for operations, they were more interested in maintaining them in
good condition. It is interesting how the prospect of more prolonged operations, which
eventually were to come to fruition in the Pacific, led to the most wide-ranging changes in
the organisation ofsquadrons during the war.
134 Minute by DAWT, 9 Apr 1944, ADM 1/17426.
135 Minute by D ofP, 1 Jul 1944, ADM 111 7426.




Operationally the RNAS had a far more stable existence than the FAA. It could
expand its operations at its own pace and did not suffer any serious losses until it deployed
a number of squadrons on the Western Front in 1917. The fact that the great majority of its
operations were conducted in Britain and France meant that maintaining operations was
relatively easy. In contrast the FAA was in the frontline of naval operations from the start
of the Second World War, but ironically a lack of carriers, the FAA's raison d'etre
according to the naval expansion programmes, enabled it to playa significant shore-based
role. Whereas in the First World War the Admiralty had a surplus of resources and wished
to pursue a campaign of strategic bombing but was thwarted, for the first few years of the
Second World War the FAA was unable to fulfil all its obligations because of a lack of
carriers. When the fruits of these expansion programmes became available in significant
quantities during 1943 the navy's operational tasks had also grown and with the worldwide
nature of the FAA's operations it was necessary to employ a significant number of Cvfis
on supply rather than front line duties something that earlier planners had never envisaged.
It was not until the Pacific in 1945, as will be discussed in the final chapter that the FAA
was able to maximise its operational capabilities.
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Chapter 6 - Tactical Logistics and Aircraft Maintenance
Overview
Aircraft are a complex weapon system with a large number of personnel required to
maintain them compared with their operation. The ratio often non-flying personnel to one
aeroplane appears to have been relatively constant throughout this period; No.2 Wing in
1915 had twenty-two aircraft, sixteen pilots and 200 men, while the nominal complement
of a squadron of sixteen single-seater fighters in 1945 was five officers, eleven rating pilots
and 160 other personnel. Maintenance personnel required extensive training and many of
those in the First World War already had considerable engineering experience. Aircraft in
1914-1918 were much more rudimentary and unreliable. Seaplanes were more expensive to
maintain and had a shorter service life than aeroplanes, on account of corrosion caused by
sea and potential damage while taking off and landing. Airships and flying boats both had
large fixed facilities and as such were the most maintenance intensive, while the impact of
hotter climates on maintenance regimes was quickly appreciated. For the FAA there was
overwhelming dependence on RAF training facilities and the difficulty of keeping pace
with large wartime expansion. The worldwide nature of the war caused added difficulties as
did the need to maintain aircraft in more intensive and disparate operations than had been
envisaged hitherto.
In many accounts of naval aviation, the aircrews get all the plaudits, while the
maintenance personnel, the majority of the squadron, are simply forgotten. This is perhaps
not surprising since aircrew were in the front line undertaking the operations with all the
glamour and danger which they bring. While there are a number of autobiographies of
naval aircrew, both pilots and observers, only two published accounts by maintenance
personnel have been located during this study.' This gap has been filled, firstly, through the
resources of the Imperial War Museum especially the Sound Archive and secondly, by an
appeal to Second World War veterans in 2004.
First World War
Recruitment and Training
The Navy's expertise in technology proved an undoubted advantage in the pre-war
days of the RNAS: 'The maintenance personnel consisted of engine-room artificers and
electricians for the maintenance of the airframes, and seaman, stokers and Marines, who
I Bill Drake, A Bit ofa "Tiff': Reminiscences ofFifty Years in Naval Aviation (Bishops Waltham: Platypus
Books, 2003) and C. Tapley. Tango for a Sailor (Wotton-under-Edge: Masley, 1992).
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assisted the artisan ratings, and also handled the aircraft. ,2 Pre-war training for mechanics
was undertaken at Eastchurch: 'The subjects taken naturally depended upon whether a man
was to be trained as an engineer, a Carpenter (Rigger) or general duties, such as clerks,
storemen... ,3 Training included the principles of flight, internal combustion engines,
maintenance ofmachines and engines, aircraft repairs and handling.
From the records in the Imperial War Museum it is apparent that the majority of
fitters and riggers had considerable engineering experience prior to joining the RNAS. An
apprenticeship was an essential qualification at the start of the war. A recruitment poster in
August 1914 required that applicants had experience in one of the following trades; aircraft
repair, carpentry, boat-building, fabric work, fitting or turning, maintenance of petrol
engines, coppersmith, electrician, cycle mechanic or driver.4 Leading Mechanic Arthur
Beeton had completed his marine engineering apprenticeship in 1912 before working at a
machine shop on the Hamble River building speedboats and repairing seaplanes at RNAS
Calshot.5 Rigger Eustace Evans had just completed a five-year apprenticeship in general
and automobile engineering when war broke out, while Air Mechanic Conrad Mann served
for a similar time at the boat builders Robert Alders in Brightlingsea." Air Mechanic Henry
Stubbington was an apprentice for seven years with Howard Philips, a lighting engineering
company.' C.E. Maude of the Air Department noted on 11 August 1914 that a recruitment
poster for maintenance personnel was a priority since the RFC had already been issued one.
Three days later Maude had to retract his instructions: ' ...this poster should not be too
lavishly displayed, and should be subject to immediate withdrawal, as it is understood that
the similar poster in the case of the Military brought an overwhelming number of
applicants. ,8 The navy had no shortage ofvolunteers for maintenance roles.
Recruits demonstrated their skills in trade tests, which were undertaken at Hendon
in the early days. Air Mechanic J.H. Connelly undertook a trade test in three parts,
practical, oral and interview," Following the test the instructors graded successful
candidates and this appeared somewhat arbitrary as W. Jeffries discovered: ' ...because I
did not tip the C.P.O. [Chief Petty Officer] Engineer I was graded as a Leading Mechanic.
The person following me could not do the set sum, and was not an experienced Engineer
2 Air ChiefMarshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte, The Forgotten Ones: The Story ofthe Ground Crews
(London: Hutchinson, 1961),33.
3 RNAS summary, Jan-Aug 1914, AIR 1/674/21/6/21.
4 Ibid.
5 A.G.Beeton, IWM/SA 8323, Reel 1.
6 E.E.H. Evans, IWMlDoc 74/139/1 and C.A. Mann, IWM/SA 28, Reel 1.
7 H.R. Stubbington, IWM/SA 298, Reel 1.
S Minute by C.E. Maude for DAD, 11 Aug 1914, ADM 1/8390/255.
9 Joubert de la Ferte, The Forgotten Ones. 36.
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when it came to handling tools, but gave the C.P.O. 10/- and was graded P.O. [Petty
Officer]. ,10 Arthur Beeton had a similar experience recalling that if he had paid the
instructor he could have been a Chief Petty Officer instead of a Leading Mechanic. I I On the
other hand Chief Petty Officer Engineer Middleton turned down the possibility of a
commission on the basis that it would be a short war:
,... the Warrant Officer who seemed to be very satisfied passed me through to the
Officer who wanted to know if I wanted a Commission and I said "Well how long
will that take?" and he said "Oh well, it'll take three months" and so I said "Oh
I'll think the war will be over before then. I'll go in, give me what you can'" and
so I was given Chief Petty OfficerEngineer. ,12
Middleton's tests included dismantling a radial aeroplane engine. As a former machinist at
the Itala Motor Company at Weybridge where he did repair work for Brooklands airfield,
Middleton passed with flying colours.r'
In June 1914 the Air Department laid down its initial training programme. This
commenced with six weeks instruction at Sheerness Air School for disciplinary and
technical training followed by practical instruction on seaplanes at Eastchurch and Isle of
Grain or on airships at one of the airship stations.l" In practice training initially proved to
be rather more rudimentary, perhaps not surprising given the embryonic nature of the
RNAS and air power itself On the day of his arrival at Sheerness, Arthur Beeton was
posted to Samson's squadron at Dunkirk, on the basis that he had used a rifle during four
years in the Territorial Army, rather than any engineering skills. I5 W. Jefferies was also
ordered to report the transport section of Samson's Eastchurch Squadron immediately after
arriving to Sheerness. I6 By contrast Air Mechanic Conrad Mann, who volunteered for the
RNAS in June 1915, had over a month at Sheerness before being posted to Felixstowe
Experimental Naval Air Station.l Ernest Hancock undertook his basic training at Chatham
Barracks in 1916 and this was followed by engine instruction ofdoubtful value:
10 Letter from W. Jefferies to Ms B Hudson, IWMIDoe Mise 13 (290).
11 A.G.Beeton, IWM/SA 8323, Reell.
12 1.S. Middleton, IWM/SA 38, Reel 1.
13 Ibid.
14 Report by DAD, 12 Jun 1914, AIR 1/663/17/122/685.
15 A.G. Beeton, IWM/SA 8323, Reel 1.
16 Letter from W. Jefferies to Ms B Hudson, IWM/Doe Mise 13 (290).
17 C.A. Mann, IWM/SA 28. Reel 1.
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'., .we went to the old Sunbeam works at Acton, north of London, and there we
had what was called training and that was dismantling and re-assembling
completely out-of-date aero engines such as the Gnome Le Rhone and
Monosoupape rotaryengines etc. This was so elementary that it was farcical. ,18
Hancock had spent five years on an apprenticeship with the Vauxhall and West Hydraulic
Company in Luton working on steam engines, condensers and boilers. While he had not
previously worked on aircraft engines, he clearly regarded his engineering skills as
transferable and Vauxhall's training far superior to the Navy's. These examples
demonstrate the importance of the apprenticeship in the role ofthe air mechanic as opposed
to the naval training, which was largely an introduction to military life. The mechanics in
this era were far more skilled than the pilots whose aircraft they repaired. The Instructions
for Care and Maintenance of Air Service Materiel issued by the Director of the Air
Division on 6 June 1915 included specific advice for the management of mechanics: '., .for
the early part of their training should be out to work with an experienced mechanic. The
extreme importance of their work and the fact that bad workmanship may lead to a fatal
'd be noi d h ,19accr ent are to e pomte out to tern.
By 1916 new entry ratings were first sent on a three week disciplinary course at
Sheerness before going on either a six week engineering course or a four week carpentering
and erecting course.r" By December 1917 new recruits joined the RNAS at Crystal Palace,
were posted to Tregantle for their disciplinary course before attending their training courses
at Chingford, Cranwell or Crystal Palace. Ratings training as armourers went to Eastchurch
for eight weeks." From mid-1916 all RNAS officers and men, training on aeroplanes,
seaplanes, airships or kite balloons would go to RNAS Cranwell for a finishing course and
d . 22gra uation.
Armourer William Hawkins volunteered for the RNAS in December 1916 and after
basic training at Crystal Palace attended Eastchurch where he dismantled weapons
including revolvers, rifles and Lewis guns and learnt how to fuse and arm bombs.
Instruction also took place on the Trombone bombsight and making alterations to the l80lb
anti-submarine bomb.r' By the end of 1917, Eastchurch was providing eight-week courses
18 E.W. Hancock, IWM/SA 8950, Reel 1. . . . if-
19 Instructions for Care and Maintenance ofAIr Service Matenel from DAD, 6 Jun 1915, ADM 1/_)40.
20 General Memorandum No.l6 by DAS, 2 Mar 1916, AIR 1/668/17/122/774.
21 Report on 'Training ofRNAS Ratings', 22 Dec 1917, AIR 1/663/17/122/692.
22 Armitage, The Royal A ir Force, 53.
23 »i», Hawkins, IWM/SA 19, Reel 1.
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for armourers and gunIayers and three weeks training for WIT (Wireless telegraphy) ratings
in addition to instruction for observers plus armament officers and instructors.t"
Air Mechanic First Class Henry Stubbington was appointed to the seaplane carrier
Campania in 1916 and before joining the ship undertook specialised training at the
Sunbeam Works in Wolverhampton and the Rolls Royce factory in Derby to learn about the
types of engines to be maintained. At the end of 1916 the Admiralty despatched two Large
America flying boats to Houton Bay in the Orkneys, but no one in the sixty strong party
could maintain their Rolls-Royce engines. As a result Stubbington found competition for
his services between Commander Holmes at Houton Bay and Commander Tomkinson of
the Campania."
Some mechanics became specialists in their respective fields. Chief Petty Officer
Engineer Middleton joined the air station at Famborough in 1914 and served on airships
throughout the war. He was involved in the design of the first Submarine Scout in 1915
and the construction of the first Coastal ship, CP4, which he then accompanied to Longside
airship station in Scotland for trials in the summer of 1916. He joined the first rigid airship
R9 at Barrow for two months and was then posted to a party to test rigid airships for the
remainder of the war.26
The initial flood of volunteers began to dry up in 1915, but the prospect of
conscription in January 1916 changed all this according to Lieutenant Le Bailly in charge
ofRNAS recruiting between February 1915 - August 1916:
,... by early 1916, a crowd of 2,300 assembled every morning, and we had to
close the doors at 9.30 a.m. Soon we... reached 150 recruits per day, kitted up
and dispatched to Crystal Palace. Undoubtedly the intelligent youth of the nation
realised that the life of an aircraftsman was heaven compared with the hell of the
trenches.'27
In December 1917, the Admiralty Committee considering personnel requirements for the
New Aircraft Programme found there was a shortage of recruits:
'For several weeks there has been a considerable shortage of Ratings (especially
Mechanics) entered for the R.N.A.S. and there is at present a deficiency of 1348
24 Summary ofnotes on training ofRNAS personnel, 1914-1918 byMr lC. Nerney, Sep 1917, AIR
1/678/21/13/2082.
25 H.R. Stubbington, IWM/SA 298, Reels 5-6.
26 J.S. Middleton, IWM/SA 38, Reels 1-4. .
27 R.F. Le Bailly, Reminiscences ofsen'ice in WW!, 6, Fleet Air Arm Museum 2001/138/0002.
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on full requirements which are now estimated at 750 a week. The entry of 750 a
week would gradually reduce the shortage and by the 30th June 1918, the full
strength required by the Aircraft Programme shouldbe attained. ,28
To address a lack of Air Gunners, Wireless Operators and Aircraftsmen, the Second Sea
Lord hoped to transfer some naval ratings to fill these gaps. From 1 January - 30 June 1918,
12000 ratings were to undergo training followed by a further 3850 from 1 July - 31
December. This training programme would raise the ratings strength of the RNAS from
32058 on 1 September 1917 to an estimated 48500 on 31 December 1918.29 The RFC had a
much greater problem recruiting enough mechanics due to the larger size of the service; the
army was combed for suitable mechanics, but it was realised that it would need to train its
own maintenance personnel. At first a variety of locations were used, but in June 1917
Halton Park was chosen as the location for the RFC's No.1 School of Technical Training.
At the beginning of 1918 Halton had 1700 staff training 6000 men, 2000 boy mechanics
and 2000 women.i'' An interesting set of figures are available for the number ofofficers and
men employed by the RNAS on ground duties in 1916 - 1917:
Table 22. Officers and men on ground duties, April 1916 - August 1917 31
Aeroplanes & Airships Kite Balloons Depots &
Seaplanes Workshops
1-30 Apr 1916 260 Officers + 120 + 2300 30 + 1300 n/a
7600 Men
1-14 Ju11916 369 + 6000 149 + 2300 25 + 1300 n/a
15-28 Feb 1917 459 + 9654 165 + 3912 33 + 1052 9319
16-30 Jun 1917 579 + 12266 180 + 4091 36 + 1077 10123
16-31 Aug 1917 671 + 17298 184 +4824 37 + 1796 12191
The vast majority of maintenance personnel, 62 - 72%, were employed working on
aeroplanes and seaplanes with 20 - 26% on airships and the remainder working with kite
balloons. From the available figures between February - August 1917 it can be seen that
more than one-third of the overall total were in depots and workshops. In addition to
maintaining engines or airframes, roles ranged from armourers and wireless mechanics, to
28 Report by Admiralty Committee on 'Personnel for New Aircraft Programme', Dec 1917, Doc 21.+ in
Roskill, Documents Relating, 601-602.
29 Summary ofnotes on training ofRNAS personnel, 1914-1918 byMr lC. Nerney, Sep 1917. AIR
678/21/13/2082.
30 Armitage, The Royal Air Force, 20.
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Pre-war it was common practice to return aircraft to the manufacturers for repair
since the cost of new aircraft appeared as a separate entry on Naval Estimates compared
with that allocated for aircraft repair: 'When an old aircraft was returned for repair, the
contractor was enabled to design an entirely new aircraft, though he was supposed to
incorporate something ofthe old one.,32 Engine unreliability was an inherent problem in the
early years of aviation and C. Draper, appointed Commanding Officer of Gosforth
aerodrome in December 1914 had a number of forced landings: ' ...1 made no fewer than
six myself in three months ... Let it be said at once that none of these had anything to do
with care and maintenance, and there was no reflection on the mechanics. ,33 The
inaccessibility of airship engines was highlighted by a trip of airship No.4 from
Famborough in April 1914:
' ... the starboard engine cut out, but was going again within five minutes. Shortly
afterwards a tappet guide of the starboard engine was carried away and was
replaced in 40 minutes, which I consider a very creditable bit of work as it was
necessary to lie on the engineand... put his head through the siderails...,34
From mid-1915 air stations were instructed that aircraft written off should be dismantled
and any re-usable parts should be retained for further use: 'All serviceable parts such as
eyebolts, strut fittings, engine bearers, &c should be sent to the RNAS Store at Wormwood
Scrubs. ,35 The policy of dismantling aircraft for spares was pursued unofficially by
squadrons in the Second World War, before its official adoption under the title of 'reduce
to produce'.
A series of visits to air stations by the Director of Air Services between April -
August 1917 revealed a wide range of maintenance standards. RNAS Newlyn in Cornwall
appeared to operate an inflexible policy:
31 First Lord's RNAS fortnightly returns, Apr 1916 - Aug 1917, AIR 1/150/15/113/1-3.
32 Bell-Davies, Sailor in the Air, 75.
33 Draper, The Mad Major, 48.
34 Report byCO, HMA No.4, 21 Apr 1914, AIR 1/659/17/122/612.
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'There appears [to be] a great tendency at this station not to endeavour to obtain
the maximum possible service from the machines and engines they have. The
general idea seems to be simply [to] demand on the White City [depot] for a new
part and keep the machines out of service indefmitely until the part is
forthcoming, instead of trying to repair or make other parts... ' 36
In contrast the maintenance at Dover was praised for its quality both in rebuilding
machines and overhauling engines despite less than ideal conditions. The Handley Page
Squadron at Manstone was commended for keeping its aircraft operational given the state
ofthe airfield:
'During the last week the whole place has been under water. I was much struck
by the extraordinarily good condition these machines were in after many months
of service, having been out in all kinds of weather. They are being completely
overhauled and fitted with unarmoured power units... ,37
Maintenance at some stations was hampered by a shortage of aircraft and spares. Six new
Short seaplanes powered by 240hp Renault Mercedes engines supplied to Calshot were all
out of action due to repeated engine defects, most of which required complete removal of
the engine. Training at RNAS Cranwell was suffering because of the lack of spares for
80hp Gnome engines and four repaired engines were being supplied to alleviate the
shortage. Cranwell also required an overall increase in its repair capacity:
' ... the workshops' output is approximately 35 - 40 machines a month... On the
other hand the smashes per month are between 60 and 70, and will, in all
probability, increase... it may be necessary to increase the workshops staff by
about 70 - 80 hands, and allocate another 200' x 100' shed for the repair of
machines.,38
In May 1917 Commodore Samson conducted an investigation for the Air Department as to
the efficient use ofmanpower at naval air stations:
35 Instructions for the Care and Maintenance ofAir Service Materiel from DAD. 6 Jun 1915, ADM 1/2540.
36 Report ofvisit by DAS to RNAS Newlyn, 29 Apr 1917. AIR 1/150/15/108. ..
37 Report ofvis it by DAS to Handley Page Squadron, Manstone, 8 Aug 1917. AIR 1115015 108.,




, .. .I am afraid that I was not too enthusiastically received at one or two soft
billets, like Wormwood Scrubs and the White City, where quite a number of men
were stationed doing practically nothing. I can claim to have saved a good many
men, and built up the strength of our fighting units, by having had a number of
men removed from quiet peaceful jobs to active units overseas and on the
coast.,39
The intensity of flying boat patrols at Killingholme in 1917 resulted in a shortage of
volunteer engineers for afternoon flights once novelty of the two shillings extra flying pay
had worn off and the men appreciated the serious impact on their evening's leave. The
Commanding Officer was unable to increase pay, but instead offered extra leave, which
quickly solved the problem/"
Operations in France
The first deployment to the continent by Samson's Eastchurch Squadron was a
somewhat ad hoc affair:
'Mr Brownridge, a carpenter, RN, was my repair officer, and what he didn't
know about the repair and upkeep of aeroplanes wasn't worth knowing... In
addition to the aeroplane men, who were about seventy in number, I had twenty
specially enlisted transport drivers ... the majority being very highly skilled motor
mechanics and testers from the Rolls-Royce, Wolseley and Talbot motor-car
firms. ,41
In the early days aircraft were not equipped with bomb racks and Brownridge made a bomb
carrier for Samson's aircraft carrying eighteen 16lb bombs which could be drop singly, in
threes or altogether. C. Draper, a pilot in No.3 Wing based at Ochey in northern France in
1916, recalled that an aircraft returned with a bomb caught in the flaps and as two
mechanics were helping to guide it back into the hangar it was dislodged and exploded
killing Leading Mechanics A. Simms and Jock Fraser. 42
A detailed picture is available of Dunkirk's maintenance requirements. In January
1916 approval was given for the force at Dunkirk to be expanded to three Wings. Each
Wing comprised twenty-four pilots, eight observers and seventy ratings complemented by a
39 Air Commodore Charles R. Samson, Fights and Flights (London: Ernest Benn, 1930),355.
40 H.R. Stubbington, IWM/SA 298, Reel 9.
41 Samson, Fights and Flights. 4.
42 Draper, The Mad Major, 59.
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Headquarters workshop at Dunkirk was manned by two officers and forty-three men. The
Reserve Squadron at Dover was manned by six pilots, two observers and seventeen ratings.
These were supported by one officer and nineteen men in the workshop and two officers
and thirteen men in the Central Store Depot at Dover. To assist in the operation of seven
seaplanes from Dunkirk were seventy-one ratings and eighty ratings for the eight machines
at Dover.43 By January 1917 each of the three flights ofNo. 1 Seaplane Squadron at Dover
was manned by four officers, two Petty Officers and twenty-eight ratings while the four
flights of No.2 Seaplane Squadron at Dover each had four officers and thirteen ratings.l"
For the reorganisation at the Dunkirk and Dover in December 1917 the following
maintenance personnel were required:
Table 23. Maintenance requirements at Dunkirk and Dover, Dec 1917 45
CPO PO Ratings Total
Fighter Squadron 3 12 117 132
Bombing Squadron 2 17 186 205
(D.HAs)
Reconnaissance 2 16 179 197
Squadron
Dover Seaplanes 8 14 181 203
Dunkirk Seaplanes 5 15 148 168
A report on Dunkirk's Large America seaplane No.8695 in October 1917 concluded that
out ofninety-six days on station, it was unfit for service on forty-eight days while on thirty-
two days when it was available the weather was unsuitable for flying. The principle reason
for unserviceability was hull damage, with engine trouble a secondary factor/" Repairs at
this station were hampered by the lack of a heavy crane or overhead run-way which were
necessary to gain access to hull of a Large America, nor were such facilities available at
Dover. 47 In 1918 it was estimated that flying boats, which remained largely in the water,
would have a service life ofonly 6 months.
For the aeroplane squadrons at Dunkirk it was decided in December 1916 that a
Central Repair Depot should be established at St Pol with: ' ...the two outlying Wings so
43 Letter from DAS to Vice Admiral, Dover Patrol, 19 Jan 1916, AIR 1/665/17/122/709.
44 Letter from CO, HM Seaplane Station, Dover to SO, RNAS Dover, 27 Jan 1917, AIR 1/641/17 122<216.
45 Letter from SO. RNAS Dover to DAS, 17 Dec 1917, AIR 1/663/17/122/693.
46 Letter from SO, RNAS Dunkerque to Vice Admiral. Dover Patrol, 15 Oct 1917, AIR 1/64~.17 /lni'238.




constituted that they are enabled to carry out minor repairs only... ,48 This depot, a
forerunner of the Aircraft Repair Yards in the Second World War, would undertake all
major repairs and was stocked with large quantities of stores, spare parts and engines.
Unfortunately this presented a tempting target for German bombers, which delivered a
series of devastating raids in the autumn of 1917. Philip Bartlett, a No.5 Squadron pilot,
recalled the damage caused on 24 September: ' ... a large bomb wrecked the engine and
repair shops. Both were entirely gutted and some 200 rotaries (Clergets, Le Rhones and
ARs) destroyed, as well as all the lathes and other machinery. Certainly a warm day in
more senses than one. ,49 A further devastating raid took place on 1 October:
'The damage at the Depot is colossal - one large and one small hangar utterly
destroyed and all the other hangars perforated and their sides blown out. The
small arms store wrecked and an enormous crater filling the site of the former
bomb store... 200 bombs were dropped... and, in all, 200 engines and 150
aircraft destroyed, including some at St Pol aerodrome. The Depot is being
disbanded. ,50
The result was that' ...the Aircraft Depot was at once decentralised into various sub-depots
and parks.'51 Such attacks brought maintenance personnel into the front line, a raid on
Ochey airfield on 15 November 1917 resulted in one air mechanic of No.6 Squadron being
killed and several wounded.Y For the regular supply of engines to France a service was
started between Cardiff and Nantes in January same month of three colliers per month each
with a capacity for 100 - 200 tons of material.53 The following month, Lambe, the Senior
Officer at Dover complained of a chronic shortage of spares: 'I think that the Air
Department. .. has totally forgotten the supply of spare engines for our new machines.
Lately we have had no spare engines supplied at all, and we have always lived from hand to
mouth ... ,54 Old Nieuport machines had to be stripped of their 1l0hp Clerget and 80hp Le
Rhone engines to provide spares.
The intensive operations by former naval squadrons during the critical spring and
summer of 1918 saw a considerable demand placed on maintenance personnel. In May and
48 Letter from so, RNAS Dover to Vice Admiral, Dover Patrol, 8 Dec 1915, AIR 1/629/17/120/13.
49 Squadron Leader c.p.a. Bartlett, In the Teeth ofthe Wind: The Story ofa Naval Pilot on the Western Front,
1916-1918. Edited by Nick Bartlett (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 135.
50 Ibid, 87.
51 History of207 Squadron RAF (late No.7 Squadron RNAS), 12, AIR 1/695/21/201207.
52 History of216 Squadron RAF (late No.16 Squadron RNAS). 3-4, AIR 1/695/21/20/216.
53 Procedure for organisation ofengine material in France, 1 Mar 1917, AIR 1/151/15/114.
54 Letter from SO, RNAS Dover to Naval Assistant to Fifth Sea Lord, Feb 1917, AIR 1/151/15/114.
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June 1918, No.206 Squadron carried out up to five operations per day often starting at 3am
and not finishing until 9pm and the squadron history recorded an appreciation of the
maintenance effort:
'The mechanics were working all night, night after night, and anyone walking
around the hangars, would see them sleeping, dead beat, for an hour, whilst one
of the Squadron Raids was away. On many occasions, when fine weather was
continuous, this was the only sleep they got. Their spirit, pride in their Squadron,
and unflaggingenergy and cheerfulness was magnificent ... ,55
For example Pilot Philip Bartlett of No.5 Squadron flew on four raids on 23 March 1918
taking off at 08.51, 11.25, 14.26 and 16.59 with thirty minutes rest between sorties when
mechanics had to refuel and rearm the aircraft. 56
Overseas operations
In logistic terms the RNAS's deployment to the Dardenelles was a ground breaking
one for aviation - the first long-term, relatively large scale operation conducted in an
overseas theatre. In addition the early types of aeroplanes and seaplanes were exposed to
the hotter Mediterranean climate which caused further difficulties. The first ten aeroplanes
were delivered in crates onboard a merchant ship and Squadron Commander Samson
recalled their arrival at Tenedos on 26 March 1915:
'We had to unload them from the Abda, transport them in ships' boats, then
disembark them on to an open beach, and finally haul them up to the aerodrome,
about a quarter of a mile distant. When it was realised that the Maurice Farman
aeroplanes were stowed in packing cases 47 feet long, it can be readily
understood that we were faced with quite a considerable task.,57
To land the cases a battleship's launch and sailing pinnance were lashed together and a
platform built over them onto which the crates were placed. Once ashore a hundred sailors
and sixty Greeks hauled the crates up the road to the airfield in a two-day operation. Some
packing cases were turned into workshops and stores rooms. However, in November 1915 a
fire destroyed the main workshop and some stores resulting in a chronic spare shortage and
55 History of206 Squadron R.A.F. (late No.6 Squadron RNAS), 3, AIR 1/695/21/20/206.
56 Bartlett In the Teeth ofthe Wind, 135.
57 Samson, Fights and Flights, 220.
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Samsom was called before a Court of Inquiry: ' ...1 found it difficult to convey to the Court
that a battleship was an entirely different thing from a collection of buildings roughly
constructed out of aeroplane packing-cases ... The censure was, I felt, unfair. .. ,58
When the operation began on 25 April Samson established a landing ground at Cape
Helles on the tip of the peninsula from which two aircraft operated in daytime, but the
losses proved prohibitive: 'It was a hectic spot, as of course it was within full view of the
Turks, and well within field-gun range ... I lost five aeroplanes there, hit by shells, and at
last it got too expensive, and we gave up the use of it.' 59
The history of No.3 Squadron recorded the influence of the tough environment:
'Throughout the operations in the Peninsula, the unit experienced all the trials and
difficulties attendant upon aerial work in a semi-tropical climatc.T'' The Commanding
Officer of Ark Royal also praised the efforts of the RNAS: 'Many of the units had only
recently been formed and had no experience of service away from good sheds and other
conveniences. The heat, flies and dust rendered the work of Officers and men on shore very
laborious ... ,61 Lieutenant Bell-Davies found his 80hp Gnome powered Henri Farman
aircraft to be hopeless in the conditions: 'They were badly underpowered and very lightly
constructed. Under the strong sun they warped; the fabric slackened and soon rotted. ,62
Voison pusher biplanes powered by Canton-Unne engines which arrived in May were a
great improvement due to their steel construction, but like most aircraft in that climate had
to be run at full power when climbing to operational height.
The seaplane depot ship HMS Ark Royal arrived at Tenedos on 17 February. She
was a revolutionary ship which supported the RNAS's deployment in the Mediterranean
throughout the war and presaged the role ofHMS Unicorn and other air maintenance ships
during World War Two. Such was her utility that it was suggested later in the war that a
second similar vessel should be obtained in case Ark Royal was lost. Up to 31 May 1915
eleven seaplanes were operated from the ship and the maintenance of these was
problematic due to five different types of seaplanes and three types of engines: 'The
innumerable difficulties encountered... owing to the numerous types of machines and
engines, point strongly to the desirability of... a homogeneous type. A considerable
difficulty is reported in obtaining spare parts and other stores from England. ,63 Over the
whole year flights were made on 178 days, an average of 2.46 hours per flying day. In the
58 Ibid, 277 -278.
59 Ibid 238-239.
60 Hist~ry 0[203 Squadron RAF (late No.3 Squadron RNAS), 1911-1923,2, AIR 1/6951211:20203.
61 Report from CO, HMS Ark Royal to Rear Admiral & SNO, Salonika, 5 Feb 1916, AIR 1/649/17/122 -lI8.




first three months the shortage of spares from England resulted in seaplanes Short No.l36
and Wight No.l72 being rendered unserviceable on 3 March and 4 April respectively.
Wight No.173 and Sopwith No.807 had unsatisfactory performance and were dismantled to
provide spares for other aircraft. Seaplanes No.922, 1437 and 1438 were embarked for
spotting on the cruisers HMS Doris and HMS Minerva but the were not stored in ideal
conditions: 'The exposure combined with the effects of firing the ships' 6" inch guns has a
very detrimental effect on the machines and, when they return from these ships they always
require a thorough overhaul. ,64 The Short seaplanes were old, the Wights often failed to
take off and could not gain sufficient height, while the Sopwiths had such a slow rate of
climb that much of their time in the air was wasted on gaining the required height. Engine
reliability improved during the year with the arrival ofmore modem types:
'One in every 3.88 flights was brought to a premature conclusion through engine
trouble, which supervenes on the average 3.43 hours flying. These averages
however, have improved in the last six months flying since the ship has been
supplied with modem Short seaplanes which do not necessitate the engine being
continually run at full power. ,65
Many of the same problems attended Samson's aeroplanes. The initial deployment
comprised five officers and twenty-seven men with touring cars, two light tenders and two
lorries, the latter containing Samson's aeroplane No.50, petrol, oil, bombs, tools and
spares." The number of maintenance personnel did not keep pace with the increase in
aircraft as Colonel Sykes, RFC, recommended in his report in July 1915:
' ... Commander Samson has to retain the transport drivers of the Squadron for
work with the aeroplane stores etc., and has not returned them to Alexandria ... If
80 to 100 well trained men could be added to the number in the field the whole
could be organized into definite sub-units, and a more equal distribution of the
work would lead to increased efficiency. ,67
On average Samson had only seven pilots, against Sykes' estimate that three squadrons
were needed. The arrival of two pilots in August 1915 increased this to a peak of eleven.
63 Report from Colonel Sykes to Secretary of Admiralty, 9 Ju11915, 1, AIR 1/62;~17/12.
64 General remarks by Commander, HMS Ark Royal, 1 Joo 1915, A~ 1/36L 151-_8/49. .. ')
65 Report from CO, HMS Ark Royal to Rear Admiral & SNO, Salonika, 5 Feb 1916, AIR 1/649/17/12_418.
66 Samson, Fights and Flights, 215.. , ') I I ')
67 Report from Colonel Sykes to Secretary of Admiralty, 9 Ju11915, AIR 116_517/L.
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Sykes also recommended the acquisition of a repair and store ship to support SS airships in
the Dardanelles equipped with a gas generating plant, workshops, an engine testing house
and instrument repair ship. With the ship in attendance, a minimum ofpersonnel, stores and
. ld b 68·equipment wou e deployed ashore. In the spnng of 1916 a Central Repair Depot was
proposed for Mudros and thirty-five ratings were to be sent out from England: ' ... [it]
should enable a great economy to be affected in the demand for machines from England, as
many repairs can then be undertaken which, due to lack of staff and time, are at present
impossible ... ,69 The need for adequate maintenance in the demanding climate of the
Mediterranean was reinforced when Samson's seaplane returned to the Ben-My-Chree on
13 September 1916 and experienced a somewhat unusual problem:
' ... after alighting and whilst taxi-ing to the ship the engine fell out of the bearers
and the propeller flew off into space. Subsequent examination showed that the
front spars of the fuselage were rotten with age and usage. Of course, like the
majority of our seaplanes, it had seen hard service from some time in hot
climates."
Deployments in Mesopotamia and m the tropics of East Africa produced similarly
demanding conditions; in the latter experience wood warped and glue melted causing
seaplanes to almost fall apart. Modem aircraft also require a much enhanced maintenance
in such demanding conditions.
Inter-war years
The impact of dual control on the FAA is usually emphasised in the terms of an inefficient
aircraft production system and a lack of senior air minded naval officers. The fact that
aircraft maintenance was run entirely by the RAF is often overlooked. This was important
because of the difficulty of building up a naval air maintenance organisation largely from
scratch, with few experienced air engineer officers and a lack of training facilities. When
the government announced the transfer of the FAA to the RN in July 1937, the maintenance
situation was thus:
68 Ibid. . . h Moo' S d 8 A
69 Letter from Wing Captain, RNAS Headquarters, Mudros to VAC, Britis iterranean qua ron, pr
1916, AIR 1/649/17/122/422.
70 Samson, Fights and Flights. 334.
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'There were no naval maintenance ratings of any kind, and it was anticipated that
for the then authorised rate of expansion of the Fleet Air Arm to 450 aircraft (in
carriers and catapults) by 1942, approximately 8,000 of these ratings would be
required. Something like a half of that number was needed immediately, since the
number of aircraft in 1938 was slightlyover 200... ,71
Leading Aircraftsman Perry Carter, on a two-year secondment to the navy, was aboard
HMS Courageous with 821 Squadron in 1938 when the request was made for volunteers:
' ...ground staff under the rank of Sergeant to volunteer to change from the Royal Air Force
to the Royal Navy. For this consideration each Airman on changeover would be promoted
to Petty Officer.' 72 But volunteers themselves were never going to be enough and it would
be necessary to compel some RAP personnel to join the FAA. The problem was that the Air
Ministry did not have the power to do so, except for a temporary attachment, which would
not be adequate in this case. Sir Thomas Inskip, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence
proposed the following solution to the First Lord, Duff Cooper, in April 1938:
' ...units of the Fleet Air Arm should be organised in two components, (a) a
purely naval component consisting wholly of naval pilots, observers and ratings
including any present Air Force personnel who transfer voluntarily from the Air
Force to the Navy; and (b) an Air Force component consisting ofR.A.F. officers
and men who are unwilling to transfer to the Navy.' 73
Kingsley Wood, the Air Minister, wrote to Cooper on 28 July to confirm the period of the
loan: ' ... the time limit should not exceed five years as I quite see that our original proposals
for three years, ifrigidly adhered to, might be embarrassing to you if the response of Royal
Air Force personnel on the transfer question was small ... ,74 To meet the FAA's
requirements 150 RAP officers and 1,500 ratings, which later rose to over 2,000, were
transferred to the navy.75
To replace the RAF men with naval personnel in the medium term, the training of
naval maintenance ratings began immediately under the auspices of the RAF, but there was
concern at the lack of expertise of naval personnel: 'Lower standards had to be accepted,
both in the length of training where artificers are concerned and in the proportion of skilled
71 Naval StaffHistory, The Development ofBritish Naval Aviation 1919-1945: Volume 1, 11, ADM 234/383.
T2 P.S.J. Carter, Under four Monarchs: Come and be one ofus. The Autobiography ofan Erk, 98-99. IWM
Doc 90/11/1 .
73 Letter from Minister for Co-ordination to First Lord, 26 Apr 1938, ADM 1/9714.
74 Letter from Air Minister to First Lord, 28 Ju11938, ADM 1/9714.
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to unskilled men. Commands and the administrative posts had to be filled by officers who,
in many instances, had no previous technical or specialised experience.' 76 Rear Admiral
Bell-Davies VC, appointed Rear-Admiral Naval Air Stations in the autumn of 1938, also
noted the requirement for civilian mechanics: 'The biggest problem was the provision of
technical ratings. The Air Ministry had agreed to lend a certain number of air mechanics,
but until naval ratings could be recruited and trained we should have to rely largely on
civilian mechanics for workshop staff.' 77
The Second World War
Recruitment and Training
In Hostilities Only Brian Lavery has detailed the changes to the training for Air Artificers,
Air Fitters and Air Mechanics during World War Two.78 The Navy supervised the training
of a number of important maintenance personnel, for example courses for Air Engineer
Officer candidates at Loughborough College, a postgraduate course for Air Engineer
RNVR officers at RNAS St Merryn and all training for Air Artificers was undertaken at
ATE Torpoint, Rosyth and RNATE Newcastle. However, Wren Air Mechanics were the
only ratings whose training was wholly undertaken by the navy, while Air Fitters had their
basic training at RNTE Watford and Fulham. 79 For detailed accounts of the training of
artificers at Newcastle-under-Lyme and Wren Air Mechanics at HMS Fledging see Ship
Without Water and The Fledglings respectively, both by Graham Bebbington.t"
But the majority of training for Air Fitters and Air Mechanics between 1938-1943
was carried out by the RAF at Hednesford, Henlow, Kirkham, Locking and Melksham as
the following table shows:
75 Article by DAMR in 'Maintenance Matters', 1945, ADM 1/17430.
76 Naval Staff History, The Development ofBritish Naval Aviation 1919-1945: Volume 1, 11, ADM 234/383.
77 Bell-Davies, Sailor in the Air, p.231. . ..
78 Brian Lavery, Hostilities Only: Training the Wartime Royal Navy (London: National Maritime Museum,
2004), 115-117. . . . f 9 3
79 Report from Rear Admiral (E) D.C. Ford to Vice-Admiral Sir F. Turner, Engineer-in-Chie ,21 Dec 1 -+ ,
ADM 1/17685. T
80 Graham Bebbington, Ship Without Water: The Story ofHMS Daedalus ~I(Leek: Chumet \. alley Books..




Table 24. FAA ratings trained by the RAF, 1938-1943 81
Type of Instruction Total No. Total No. Total No failed Total No. still in
entered qualified /discharged for training
other reasons
P.O. Air Fitters & (E) 361 259 40 62
Leading Air Fitters (A) 378 301 29 48
Conversion (E) and
(A)
Air Fitters (E) 3457 2255 487 715
(A) 3423 2336 352 735
Air Mechanics (E) 3244 1503 320 1421
(A) 3291 1572 279 1440
Air Mechanics (E) 2908 2427 473 -
ex RAF Locking (A) 2938 2414 502 -
Air Fitters (0) 310 37 - 273
Air Mechanics (0) 3237 2153 101 983
Air Fitters (L) 361 Nil Nil 361
Air Mechanics (L) 1891 143 16 1732
Air Mechanics (L) 1914 1834 80 -
ex RAF Melksham
Total 27713 17234 2679 7770
Unsurprisingly the Navy was anxious that it should be training its personnel in its own
establishments. In September 1942 Captain Huskisson, DAMR, estimated that an
establishment to handle the training of all Air Maintenance ratings, except Air Artificers,
Radio Mechanics and Wrens, would require for accommodation for 5,000 and there was not
time to undertake such an ambitious project.82 Even if the Air Ministry were willing to
release establishments for naval use, which it was not, it would be impossible to man them.
The Head of Air Branch came to a similar conclusion during review in January 1943 citing
the lack of instructors and administrative personnel even if the facilities were transferred. 83
In June 1944 the Flag Officer Naval Air Stations believed that the training of maintenance
ratings wholly by the navy was desirable for a number of reasons:
81 Report from Rear Admiral (E) D.C. Ford to Vice-Admiral Sir F. Turner. Engineer-in-Chief, 21 Dec 1943,
ADM 1/17685.
82 Minute by DAMR, 24 Sep 1942, ADM 1/17468.
83 Letter from Head of Air Branch to RANAS, 13 Jan 1943. ADM 1/17468.
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' ...due in part to the fact that difficulty was found in getting the Royal Air Force
to agree to modification of syllabus to suit Naval requirements, but still more to
the perfectly natural and understandable effect on the morale, enthusiasm and
interest of the Naval ratings through their being housed, trained, drilled and
punished by another Service. ,84
While the navy may have been concerned about the effect on naval ethos that training by
the RAP might have, no serious complaints were raised by senior naval officers about the
standard of RAF technical training which was generally regarded to be of a high standard.
In the event it was not possible to train all FAA maintenance personnel in naval
establishments until after the end ofthe war.
Given the shortage of naval maintenance personnel there were a valuable
commodity as Air Mechanic R.H. Law discovered when he completed his training in 1940
and reported to RNAS Lee-on-Solent:
' ... an Admiralty Fleet Order came out saying that volunteers were required for
flying duties so I requested to change category and went off in front of the
commander and he said "Good lord, do you think we've spent all this money on
teaching you to be an air mechanic and then you go on to fly? You'll probably
crash the first time you go up and we've lost all that money. So, no not
granted.",85
Many recruits had engineering backgrounds and were made to take trade tests in a similar
manner to their First World War counterparts, although the subsequent allocation of rank
was rather fairer. Joe Ainley, who worked for Armstrong Siddeley Motors as an apprentice,
took a trade test at HMS Sultan and admitted: 'I just scraped through'. He joined No.6
School of Technical Training at RAP Hednesford where he trained as an Air Fitter
(Engines), the three year peacetime course compressed into nine months.f" John Holland
completed a four-year engineering apprenticeship at BP and leI before joining the FAA in
1940 and ended the war as a Petty Officer Air Fitter (Engines),87 while Roy Maber had
84 Letter from FONAS to Secretary of Admiralty, 5 Jun 1944, ADM 1/17468.
85 R.H. Law, IWM/SA 18701, Reel l , ,
86 Ruler's Reign: The Story ofa Lend Lease Escort Carrier and Her Squadron. 1943-1946 by Some ot Her
Ship's Company and 885 Squadron Personnel, Chapter 9, p.3, unpublished.
87 Letter from John Holland to the author, 23 Sep 2004.
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served a two-year apprenticeship at Shelly's Boatyard, Gosport, building luxury cabin
cruisers, before joining the FAA as a Air Mechanic (Airframes). 88
Wartime Expansion
The size ofthe maintenance organisation increased rapidly as Captain Ford, DAMR,
reported in February 1940: 'The number of Officers and Ratings now forming the
maintenance branch (including those under training) now total some 120 Officers and 5000
ratings. ,89 By October, it had expanded still further and: ' ...now consists of a body of about
150 Officers and 7000 ratings in addition to some 700 civilian workmen, and is increasing
rapidly... The department is responsible for. .. the facilities for repair of some 1200
Aircraft. ,90
In numerous operations the continued support of the RAF was indispensable. Air
Mechanic (Airframes) Roy Maber recalled his time aboard HMS Eagle in 1940: 'RAF
maintenance staff were very essential in the early days when us air mechanics were
inexperienced... The better trained air artificers did not appear on the scene until later in the
war.,91 When Air Fitter (Airframes) Cyril Tapley joined RNAS Hatston in the spring of
1940 he found that: 'Air Force personnel were still very much in evidence ... The senior
non-commissioned officer in charge of the workshops was in fact a Flight Sergeant.t'" and
while Pilot Donald Judd was with 826 Squadron at Dekheila, Egypt, in 1941: 'The
squadron ground crew were mostly naval ratings, who were made up the fitters, riggers,
armourers, etc., but the head of each 'trade' was an RAF sergeant. .. charge of the ground
crews was Flight Sergeant Stinchcombe. He ruled the... maintenance side, with an
organising ability and professionalism which inspired his ratings ... ,93
In December 1942, in accordance with the air expansion programmes, the Director
of Personal Services forecast a large increase of 10,500 Air Fitters and Air Mechanics in
the next fifteen months which would need the recruitment of 13,700 to take account of
wastage.I" To meet this target the monthly output would have to be increased from 750 to
1670.95 Captain Bedale, DAMR, stressed the importance of the role experienced
maintenance ratings would have to play:
88 Letter from Roy Maber to the author, 14 Aug 2004.
89 Minute byDAMR, 28 Feb 1940, ADM 1/16543.
90 Minute byDAMR, 10 Oct 1940, ADM 1/16543.
91 Letter from Roy Maber to the author, 28 Aug 2004.
92 Tapley, Tangofor a Sailor, 81. ..,
93 Donald Judd, Avengerfrom the SA}' (London: WIlham KImber, 1985),43.
94 Letter from DPS to Deputy CNAS, 12 Dec 1942, ADM 1/17468.
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' ...a projected increase of over 100% within 12 months in the total F.A.A.
maintenance strength without any comparable increase in the number of
experienced and supervisory ratings, will, if achieved, carry dilution beyond the
point where reasonable efficiency and safety can be looked for in the upkeep of
Fleet Air Arm aircraft.'?'
The importance of the continued support ofRAF should not be under-rated; in mid-1943 of
the 19,238 trained FAA maintenance personnel, 2,274 or 11.8 per cent were on loan from
the RAF.97 By the autumn of 1943 it was necessary to reduce requirements to taken into
account an overall shortage of 1800 ratings. This including cutting the increase in first line
aircraft for the year from 200 to 180, manning ofnew training squadrons at eighty per cent
and the formation of only one mobile airfield and no salvage sections in 1943.98 The strain
on the training system was unsurprising given the large number of aircraft carriers which
had entered service and that the number of shore establishments had increased from thirty
to seventy since 1941.99
At the end of 1943 the Director of Personal Services reported that for the first time
output was meeting requirements. This had been achieved through enforcement of
minimum scales of manning, an increased output from training and crucially 100 less first
line aircraft at the end of 1943 than originally planned. There was a surplus in Supervisory
rates and lower Airframe and Armourer trades, but the position was not so good in Engines
and Electrical trades due to a higher failure rate during training. This improved situation
would allow more supervisory ratings to be employed on instructional duties and provide
greater stability for air stations in Britain and training squadrons which often bore the brunt
of undermanning.l'" However there was caution against over confidence in the future:
'Under the recent Cabinet ruling on manpower allocation, the Naval Air Arm is roughly
3,000 men short of meeting absolutely essential commitments prior to the defeat of
Germany, and even this figure can only be achieved at the expense of emptying the pre-
entry and technical training establishments.' 101 Rear Admiral Bedale, DAMR, provided a
perspective on the range ofchallenges on 26 May 1944:
95 Minute by DPS, 10 Jan 1943, ADM 1/17468.
% Minute by DAMR, 15 Dec 1942, ADM 1/17468.
97 Minute from First Lord to Prime Minister, 15 Ju11943, ADM 1/14990.
98 Note ofSecond Manning Priorities Meeting for Air Maintenance Ratings held by Fifth Sea Lord. 22 Sep
1943, ADM 1/12638.
99 Minute by DAMR, 1 Sep 1943. ADM 1/16543.




'In Maintenance Personnel alone there has been an increase of nearly 100 per cent
in the last twelve months ... Further, the number of First Line operational aircraft
types has more than doubled since last spring. Many of the new machines are of
American design and construction, which, because of the inevitable differences
,
introduce special problems in maintenance and repair. In the case of one British
machine [Barracuda], the defects have thrown far more work on this Department
than could reasonably have been foreseen.' 102
Yet at the same time the delay at introducing more carriers and squadrons into service led
to the Director ofPersonal Services to propose a further loan ofpersonnel to the RAF:
'The men are coming off training at the rate of 400/week and taking into
consideration the formation of new 1st Line and Training Squadrons and monthly
relief action to the Eastern Theatre, it would appear that we shall be able to lend
the R.A.F. at least another 1000 men, with supervisors to the scale of 1 to 20 (i.e.
50) ... the Air Ministry should be asked whether they would like the "loan" ... on
the same conditions as the present loan of 3000 odd.' 103
Bedale had no objection in principle but wished to avoid: ' ... any suggestion that the F.A.A.
has made excessive demands for aircraft maintenance ratings.' 104 However, Captain
Grantham, the Director of Plans, strongly opposed such a move declaring that he was
' ... strongly averse to disclosing gratuitously a temporary surplus of maintenance ratings.
Without wishing to be a dog in manger. D. of P. would welcome the employment of the
surplus in the Royal Navy, if D.P.S. can by any means arrange it.' 105 Naval ratings were
already on loan to 41 Group RAF for the modification and preparation of naval aircraft for
service overseas. However, the majority were retained by the navy with the prospect of
taking over RAF Ayr and Evanton in September and further commitments at RAF
maintenance units and the formation of Hellcat squadrons at RNAS Wingfield. It was not
until December 1944 that 144 Air Mechanics were loaned to 24 Maintenance Unit of 43
ith the mai f naval ai ft106Group help WIt intenance 0 rcra .
The shortage of maintenance ratings at times during the war was highlighted by the
position in the Far East. It was reported in July 1943 that: 'Stations in East Africa, all of
102 Minute by DAMR, 26 May 1944, ADM 1/16543.
103 Minute by DPS, 26 May 1944, ADM 1/16701.
104 Minute by DAMR, 2 June 1944, ADM 1116701.
105 Minute by D ofP, 21 June 1944, ADM 1/16701.
106Letter from DPS to Commodore RN Barracks Lee-on-Solent, 6 Dec 1944, ADM 1/16701.
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which have been in commission for nearly twelve months are still far below complement,
and those in Ceylon and India have received only about one tenth of their requirements.' 107
Overall there was a deficiency of 1251 ratings and priority for personnel was to be given to
stations in India and Ceylon - Katukurunda, Coimbatore, Puttalam, Cochin and Colombo.
Three months later it was confirmed that 1000 maintenance ratings would be sent although
halfofthese were needed in Nairobi in East Africa. 108
In January 1944, Admiral Somerville, C-in-C Eastern Fleet, informed the Admiralty
that to meet the planned expansion of his command he would require a further 700
maintenance ratings by 30 May, although 500 were now available from East Africa. 109 A
further 250 ratings were despatched from the UK the following month. At the same time
the Captain Lambe, Director of Plans, was pessimistic about repair facilities:
' ...during the second half of 1944 the sum total of aircraft repair capacity in both
S.E.A.C. and the S.W. Pacific will be insufficient to support the Naval Aircraft
likely to be available in the area. Which portions of the available capacitycan and
will be manned it is impossible to forecast.' 110
The shortages were such that by the end of 1944 plans were drawn up for the despatch of
unskilled labour:
'It is understood that Their Lordships intend to dispatch to Ceylon at an early date
some 1,000 naval personnel who will have received some preliminary training in
aircraft repair work but will have little or no practical experience. It is also
understood that no white civilian labour, no skilled native labour and indeed very
little native labour of any description will be available in Ceylon.' III
The situation in the Far East in 1944 may be contrasted by the apparent abundance of
maintenance ratings in Britain where 3000 were on loan to the RAF, although a number of
these were attached to RAF maintenance units which undertook work on naval aircraft.
To complete the expansion of the FAA up to 1946 including the manning of a
further thirteen air stations, 17,000 maintenance personnel were needed to be transferred
107 Letter from RANAS, 10 to C-in-C, Eastern Fleet, 28 Ju11943. ADM 1/14690.
108 Note of Second Manning Priorities Meeting for Air Maintenance Ratings held by Fifth Sea Lord. 22 Sep
1943 ADM 1/12638.
109M~ssage from C-in-C, Eastern Fleet to Admiralty, 29 Jan 1944. ADM 1/16406.
110 Minute by D ofP, 4 Feb 1944, ADM 1/16406.
III Letter from Secretary of MAP to Secretary ofAdmiralty, 23 Dec 1944, ADM 1/24276.
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from the Air Ministry at a rate of some 2,000 per month from January 1945.112 Head of Air
Branch noted in mid-December that up to the end of February 1945: ' ...we could meet
about half of the total [manning commitment] as things stand at present. .. we shall not have
much sanction behind our approach to the Air Ministry for the airfields unless we have got
the men to put in them, especially as our shortage of maintenance ratings is well known to
the Air Ministry.' 113 So right until the end of the war the RAF continued to play an
important role and Flight Mechanic Ronald Neal was one of 500 RAP mechanics and fitters
transferred to the navy in May 1945. He was ordered to RAP Locking expecting to attend
his Flight Engineer's Course, but it turned out to be a one-month course on naval aircraft
such as Avengers, Barracudas, Corsairs and Seafires: 'A more reluctant bunch of trainees
would have been hard to find! Everyone passed with better than 70% marks! Most would
willingly have failed but were not allowed to!,] 14 Neal was then drafted to Gosling III at
Havant and took part in a memorable changeover ceremony: ' ...whilst there we were taken
to Portsmouth where we were "discharged from the RAP and called up for the RN" in
about 30 seconds flat. A pair ofRN Police armed with Sten guns ensured that no-one "did a
runner" .' 115
A notable addition to the expertise ofnaval maintenance personnel by the end ofthe
war were experts from the leading manufacturers to advise on repairs and alterations to
their equipment. In January 1944 representatives from four British firms; Bristol, Fairey,
Rolls-Royce and Vickers, and ten North American firms; Canadian Car, Chance-Vought,
Curtiss Props, General Motors, Grumman, Hamilton, Pratt & Whitney, Ranger, Sikorsky
and Wright were advising FAA units. The majority were ashore, mostly in the Far East, but
Mr Thomas Stanton of Chance-Vought embarked on HMS Illustrious in 1943 to provide
assistance with the Corsair and Barracuda advisors Mr Hillard and Mr Knowler were
embarked on Illustrious and Furious respectively. 116 There were also discussions about the
provision of repair parties of seventy men each from Vickers-Armstrong, Fairey and
Blackburn to supplement naval maintenance personnel in the Far East. As Captain
Jameson, Deputy Director of Aircraft Maintenance and Repair, remarked in October 1944
this practice was already followed in the RAP:
' ... Supennarine had already had to organise and maintain a large "On Site"
Working Party to service the "Spitfires" operating with the Royal Air Force...
112 Minute from Fifth Sea Lord to First Lord, 24 Nov 1944, ADM 1/17397.
113 Minute by Head of Air Branch, 18 Dec 1944, ADM 1/17397.




Some of them are already working overseas in France, Belgium, Holland etc. and
there is little doubt that a considerably increased number will be required to go
overseas ... in the near future.' 117
Approval for deployment of such repair parties with the navy was still pending at the end of
hostilities.
Reorganisation of maintenance procedures
During the inter-war period squadrons were responsible for their own maintenance.
With the small numbers of ships and squadrons before 1939, a system of self-contained
squadron maintenance had prevailed with Squadron Commander in charge and enough
stores and equipment were provided to enable the squadrons to undertake major
inspections. As early as August 1938 the Senior RAF Officer on HMS Furious proposed
that some sort of centralised system would lead to greater efficiency: 'Under the present
system it is a daily occurrence for hundreds of skilled man hours to be wasted when
squadron aircraft are flying, whereas under the suggested central scheme all skilled men
would be employed in workshops on essential work.' 118 In the first few years of the war the
squadron maintenance remained effective since the aircraft were of comparatively simple
design and there were enough experienced Petty Officers and Chief Petty Officers to
manage the maintenance procedures. However, as the war progressed, squadrons expanded
to up to twenty-four aircraft, the size and complexity of aircraft increased and there was a
diluti f . d . 1 1191 tion 0 expenence mamtenance personne .
In December 1941 the Commanding Officer of RNAS Worthy Down visited RAF
stations at Brize Norton and Upavon where centralised maintenance was in operation and
came away with a very positive impression. A six-month experiment was undertaken at
Worthy Down during 1942 pooling the resources of No.1 Air Gunners School, 755, 756
and 757 Squadrons and the station workshop. An Air Engineer Officer was in charge of all
repairs excluding daily inspections and minor running repairs. Initial results were
encouraging: ' ... a high total of flying hours has been achieved and is being maintained.' 120
Advantages included the centralised control of all maintenance personnel, aircraft
and stores and a greater co-ordination to maintain the required serviceability and flying
116 Minute by DAMR, 25 Jan 1944, ADM 1/17415.
117 Minute by DAMR, 20 Oct 1944, ADM 1/24276.
118 Memorandum 'Organisation of Training Carrier Units Based Ashore' from Senior RAF Officer, HMS
Furious to CO, HMS Furious, 3 August 1938. ADM 119896.




hours. Disadvantages of this system were the loss ofpersonal relations between aircrew and
maintenance personnel and their loss of interest in the performance of a particular aircraft.
Pilot Gerard Woods commented: 'In 1942, for reasons of efficiency, "centralised
maintenance" was introduced, a sort a garage system, removing pride of individual
ownership, though obviously making economical use of maintenance personnel at a time
when so much new technology was being introduced.' 121 In accordance with the success at
Worthy Down, the Binney Manpower Inquiry in January 1943 recommended an expansion
of centralised maintenance procedures: 'Should this be made general throughout the Fleet
Air Arm Training Stations, saving in personnel, especially highly trained ratings, will be
made. d 22 This did not prove possible in the short-term because of the large variety of types
used for training. While there was no official change of policy, a system of centralised
aircraft maintenance was adopted on several carriers commanded by an Air Engineer
Officer; aboard the carrier HMS Vindex routine inspections and minor inspections
undertaken by squadron ratings under the senior maintenance rating. More extensive work
was done by a party under command of the Air Engineer Officer.123 This allowed the
Squadron and Wing Commanders to concentrate on operational tasks and permitted a
pooling ofmanpower, tools and spares.
It was not until December 1945 that the Operational Research Section conducted a
detailed investigation into the efficiency of the different types of maintenance regimes. 124
Eighteen air stations were visited of which eleven conducted squadron maintenance, two
squadron centralised maintenance and five centralised maintenance. The average number of
maintenance ratings per 1000 flying hours a month was 504 for squadron maintenance, 547
for squadron centralised maintenance and 412 for centralised maintenance. The highest was
637 for squadron maintenance at Easthaven and the lowest 335 for centralised maintenance
at Yeovilton, the most efficient station. 125 As a result centralised maintenance was adopted
as standard across the post-war Fleet Air Arm.
The other significant hangover from the squadron system was that maintenance
personnel disembarked with their tools and equipment whenever the squadrons did so, to
maintain the aircraft ashore. In peacetime this was acceptable when there were few
squadrons many carriers spent long periods affiliated to the same station with the same air
120Report from CO, RNAS Worthy Down to RANAS, 10 Jun 1942, ADM 1/13569.
121 Gerald Woods, Wings at Sea: A Fleet Air Ann Observer's War 1940-45 (London: Conway, 1985),48-49.
122Report by Binney Manpower Inquiry, Part II, 5 Jan 1943, ADM 1/13569.
123 Report from CO, HMS Vindex, to C-in-C Western Approaches, 1 ~ul 19~4, ADM 1/16153.
124 Report No.1 2 from Operational Research Section attached to Admiral (Air), December 1945, ADM
116/5699.
125 See Appendix 4 for details of the maintenance at each station.
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base, for example HMS Hermes on the China Station supported from Kai Tak airfield in
Hong Kong. However, this system became unwieldy in wartime when squadrons were
frequently disembarked in between operations to a variety of stations. For the aircraft this
was reasonably easy but the maintenance personnel had to locate transport for bulky stores
and tools often arriving at the base airfield days after the aircraft; a typical routine is
demonstrated by 835 Squadron which arrived in the Clyde on 15 April 1942:
'The four Swordfish flew off and we made our way via RN Air Station
Machrihanish and RAP Sealand to RN Air Station, Lee-on-Solent, near Gosport
where we landed at 1700. Meanwhile Jack Teesdale [Stores Officer] was
inevitably left to pack up and arrange for the disembarkation of the ground party
and stores at Greenock from which they departed at 1640 on 16th April and duly
arrived at Lee-on-Solent via Glasgow, London and Portsmouth at 1300 the
following day.' 126
In addition the quantity of Squadron Mobile Equipment (SME) had reached such
proportions by 1943 that it had become a misnomer:
,... the bulk of Squadron Mobile Equipment items are essential for the efficient
maintenance of the Squadrons; and although it has been found possible to reduce
certain heavy items (e.g. Aeroplane Inspection Platforms), the total remaining
equipment is far too great for Squadrons so encumbered to be truthfully termed
mobile.' 127
Therefore it was proposed to form a number of Squadron Servicing Units (SSUs). These
units moved between air stations to where they were needed and were responsible for
conducting minor inspections on squadrons as they flew ashore. Each SSU was equipped
with enough stores to maintain twelve aircraft for fourteen days. No.1 SSU was attached to
897 Squadron at RNAS St Merryn on 9 May 1943 for one month's trial and following its
success Captain Byas, DNAO, proposed the formation of nineteen SSUs. The first Seafire
SSU would be allocated to RNAS Lee-on-Solent and the first Barracuda SSU to RNAS
Donibristle. Other stations to receive SSUs included RNAS Eglinton, Hatston and Stretton.
To concentrate the availability of spares and equipment certain stations were to concentrate
on fighters and others on strike aircraft. SSU's would be allocated to stations which did not
126 E.E. Barringer, The 835 Story, 33-34, IWMlDoc 91/1711.
127 Letter from RANAS to Secretary ofAdmiralty, 25 Feb 1943, ADM 1/13612.
Chapter 6
219
normally host disembarked units: 'S.S.U's will not be required at the stations (e.g.
Machrihanish) normally used for the reception of disembarked squadrons as these
normally carry stocks oftype stores.' 128
While the SSU provided useful assistance for squadrons flying ashore, there was
little that could be done about the quantity of SME as E.S. Wood, Director of Stores noted
in January 1945: ' ...proposals put forward during the war years towards effecting
substantial reductions in S.M.E. have not been supported by other departments mainly on
account of the tendency to detach squadrons to remote R.A.F. stations where maintenance
and servicing facilities were negligible or non-existent.t'f" That the problem continued to
afflict carriers is illustrated by an incident in HMS Venerable in February 1945: 'A
squadron has been known to arrive ... with a range of S.M.E. permanent and consumable
spares of over 900 items. It had to be relieved at once of most of its packing cases which
had reduced the hangar aircraft accommodation by three aircraft.' 130
Influence of American practice
The FAA's first detailed exposure to American maintenance practice occurred
during the attachment of HMS Victorious to the US Pacific Fleet in 1943 when very
different procedures became apparent. The USN operated on the theory of cure rather than
prevention and therefore the thirty-hour inspections were perfunctory taking only two to six
hours. Captain Wright, DAWT, noted that:
' ... the Americans have always favoured the "Never repair - scrap and replace
principle, they probably accept a short aircraft life. Hence "in the long run" is of
no particular importance; what matters is a high degree of serviceability for
immediate operations and this they seemableto produce.' 131
Many of the American mechanics had between two and four years carrier experience and
there was no dilution of skilled personnel as had taken place in the FAA.132 It was estimated
that the American maintenance scheme involved double the number of personnel and Vice
Admiral Lyster, Flag Officer Carrier Training, believed that it would not have suited the
FAA in the early years of the war: 'Efficient as it may be, there is one possible
disadvantage, in as much as such an organisation must tend to make squadrons very
128 Minute by Director ofStores, 27 Aug 1943, ADM 1/13612.
129 Minute by Director of Stores, 12 Jan 1945, ADM 1/17523.
130 Paper from Captain E.L. Tottenham to DAE, 5 May 1945, ADM 1/17523.
13\ Minute from DAWT to Fifth Sea Lord, 20 Sep 1943, ADM 199/838.
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dependent on outside personnel and will detract from the self-reliance which had stood us
in good stead in such fields as the Western Desert, Crete and Greece.,133 Air Mechanic
George Amyes based at Lewiston, Maine in 1943 recalled the lavish American practice of
maintaining Avenger engines:
' ...being British... you work on every part of the engine... They [the Americans]
had the engines split up into about sixteen different sections. There were about
sixteen different men working on one machine where we just had the one... The
economy of waste out there was something fantastic. They used to unship and
refit new engines just for the slightest fault... ' 134
Air Artificer Stuart Bridges was certainly aware of the American 'never repair - scrap and
replace' policy from a particular problem that he encountered when working on the
Corsair:
' .. .if ever you were involved in a mainplane change, there was a sheet metal fillet
between the actual wing and the fuselage... which went right round the top and
bottom of the wing, was held in place by literally hundreds of 2BA bolts each one
of which had to be unscrewed before you could get in at the joining parts of the
wing to the airframe... we were not over impressed with that particular design.' 135
The USN commissioned the Radford Report in 1944 to advise on the future of aircraft
maintenance and it recommended that: 'the life of individual Naval aircraft in combat areas
should be limited to a period when it would be no longer economical in local effort to repair
them, Combat Units being provided with a sufficiency of replacement aircraft to implement
this policy and less spare parts for repairs.' 136 Mr Massey Hilton, a Fairey Director, visited
the East Indies Station in 1945 to report on aircraft maintenance and approved of the
American repair policy:
'Minor repair of components is done, but nothing of a major nature or likely to
absorb more than 2,000 man hours per aeroplane. If the total damage is greater
than this figure, the aeroplane is reduced to produce or scrap... In view of the
132 Report from CO, 832 Squadron to Commander (Flying), HMS Victorious, 1 Aug 1943. AD1-1 199,838.
133 Minute from FaCT to Fifth Sea Lord, 19 Sep 1943, ADM 199/838.
134 G.A. Amyes, IWM/SA 16355, Reel 4.
135 S. Bridges, IWM/SA 21184, Reell.
136Reference sheet from Head of Air Branch to First Lord's Private Office, 12 Aug 1944. ADM ll17149.
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various adverse factors (shortage of experienced personnel and repair facilities
generally, climate etc) I think this policy is the right one.' 137
It was not until the operations of the British Pacific Fleet in 1945 that the system of 'scrap
and replace' was really adopted by the Royal Navy since the carriers were at sea for long
periods and so the only possible repairs were those within a carrier's capabilities.
Supply of air stores
The problems in estimating the supply of air stores to squadrons throughout the war
was highlighted as a serious issue by the post-war Naval Aircraft Maintenance Committee
report in 1946:
'We consider that in time of war having too many stores is an even greater evil
than having too few. Where there are shortages the fault is readily diagnosed and
the remedy is obvious. A build up of superfluous stores is not so easily noticed,
but at some stage the whole organisation for storage and distribution becomes
choked. Curing this ill is extremely difficult.'138
The Director of Stores noted in December 1940: ' ... numerous Swordfish aircraft have
reported deficiencies ... during the last few months. The importance of these shortages is
enhanced by the difficulty of obtaining spares from contractors. Supplies have been on
order for a lengthy period but it is virtually impossible to obtain deliveries.' 139 In the early
years of the war the orders for aircraft and spares were not generally well co-ordinated and
it took some time for firms to take orders for air stores particularly seriously as an
Admiralty report commented in January 1943: ' ... from a monetary point ofview it was not
now more profitable to a Firm to produce completed aircraft than spares. The
psychological aspect of this matter ought not, however, to be overlooked as there was no
doubt that a worker in a factory felt that his efforts were better repaid in seeing a
completed aircraft flown away than the parts he has made packed up as spares.' 140
As the service expanded the problem of providing sufficient air stores and
equipment was compounded by the fact that in November 1943 there were sixty-two
different aircraft types among the total of 2198 aircraft for first line and training duties. 14\
137Report from Mr Massey Hilton to FONAS (A), East Indies Station, 15 Jan 1945, ADM 1/17430.
138Report by Naval Aircraft Maintenance Committee to Secretary of Admiralty, 30 Apr 1946, ADM li19~64.
139 Letter from Director of Stores to RANAS. 23 Dec 1940, ADM 1/11148.
140Report ofmeeting held by RANAS, 4 Jan 1943. ADM 1/16451.
141 Minute by DAMR, 12 Nov 1943, ADM 1/13640.
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The Director of Stores noted: 'It will be almost impossible, unless the number of types in
general use is restricted to the utmost, to avoid serious breakdowns due to the
impracticability of providing spares for a large diversity of types at a great number of
stations, repair yards, etc., spread all over the Eastern Theatre.' 142 At the same time the
Directors of Air Equipment and Stores complained that the forecasts for the distribution of
equipment required improvement to enable the timely supply of stores and for the
arrangement for shipping of aircraft consignments.l'" They predicted that the most serious
problems would be encountered in the Far East because of the wide geographical spread of
FAA activity: ' .. .it would be essential, if requirements were to be met, for the supply aspect
to be held closely in view at every stage of planning both long term policies and the day-
today movements and allocations of aircraft in the preparatory stages.' 144 Captain Byas,
DNAO replied that the six month distribution forecast was updated monthly and the long-
term two-year forecast updated every six months. 145
Procurement of stores for certain types were problematic and the Director of Stores
complained in August 1944 about the availability of Barracuda spares: 'The position
continues to be unsatisfactory, especially of certain Minor Spares. The full seriousness of
the position has been impressed on the contractors, and ... to concentrate as far as possible
on items for which there is known expenditure will lead to some improvement.' 146 Supplies
of spares for American aircraft for the FAA and RAP were organised by the British
Aviation Supply Depot in Philadelphia: 'During the three years life of the Depot between
500,000 and 600,000 cases of stores were received, approximating to 60,000 tons, more
than half of which was for the Royal Navy.' 147 Between January 1944 and August 1945 the
Depot despatched 193,029 cases of air stores for the FAA. 148 When the US Navy
introduced new principles of maintenance in the spring of 1944 under the Radford Report,
which concluded that it was more efficient to produce new aircraft than repair old ones,
supplies of large types ofspares to the FAA were reduced.
149
The future of the Naval Air Arm Supply Organisation was considered by the
Baliol-Scott, Chisholm and Coxwell Committees all of which recommended the
continuation of the organisation in its existing form. The Baloil-Scott Committee in August
1944 concluded that the Naval Store Department was faced with: ' ... a prodigious increase
142 Minute by Director ofStores, 20 Nov 1943, ADM 1/13640.
143 Minute by DAE and Director ofStores, 16 Nov 1943, ADM 1/15392.
144 Minutes by DAE and Director of Stores, 4-7 Dec 1943, ADM 1/15391.
145 Minute by DNAO, 29 Jan 1944, ADM 1/15392.
146 Report by Director of Stores, 5 Aug 1944, ADM1/17149._
147 History of the Naval Store Department in North America, Chapter XXXVI, ADM 1161 )813.
148 Reports by BAD Washington, 1944-1945, ADM 199/1470 & 199/1471.
Chapter 6
223
in the range of stores ... due particularly to the rapid development of radio and scientific
equipment of many descriptions, and also to the great expansion of the Fleet Air Ann, for
which it had to supply a vast range of spare parts.' 150 It blamed the Air Ministry and its
successor, the Ministry of Aircraft Production for the lack of spares for the FAA: ' ... the
failure of the procuring organisation to meet requisitions is apparently attributable, to a
large extent, for the chronic condition of short supply which appears to prevail in the case
ofnumerous air stores.,151 Given the numerous complications which attended the supply of
air stores it is unsurprising that a number of squadrons retained more stores than were
actually required because ofthe likelihood that further supplies might not be forthcoming.
Experience of maintenance afloat
While maintenance personnel are not generally regarded as being in the front line
Air Mechanic (Engines) William Churchouse had an experience perhaps unique in the
FAA; between August - December 1941 he was on three ships which were torpedoed and
sunk. First SS Aguila on 13 August taking him out to Gibraltar, then on HMS Ark Royal on
13 November and finally HMS Audacity on 19 December taking passage back to Britain.
On his return to Britain Churchouse was appointed to RNAS Yeovilton and very much
appreciated not being sent to sea again during the war.152
Air Fitter Ted Whitley served in 819 Squadron aboard Illustrious in 1940 and
played a notable role in the Taranto raid, one of the FAA's most famous actions. Each
aircraft had two dedicated maintenance personnel and with the Swordfish flying anti-
submarine patrols from dawn until dusk the workload was considerable: ' ... the 30-hour
Minor Inspections came round in less than a week. There were no laundries, no night flying
rations and, as the mess decks were at sea level, the maintainers slept in the hangar on camp
beds.,153 By the time ofthe Taranto attack Whitley had been promoted Leading Air Fitter in
and was in charge of airframe servicing for six Swordfish. When there was a deck collision
among the second wave of aircraft for the Taranto raid it was Whitley's decision, as he puts
it of: 'A not quite 19 year old Leading Air Fitter, which aircraft went & which didn't. ..
With my chum Wilf Jones & RAF Sgt Sinfield we made the temporary repair that let Lts
. . ft th t ,154Clifford & Going visit Taranto on their own twenty mmutes a er e res.
149 History of the Naval Store Department in North America, Chapter XXXVI, ADM 116/5813.
150Report on Naval Store Department by Baloil-Scott Committee, 14 Aug 1944, ADM 1/16521.
151 Ibid.
152 W.J. Churchouse, IWM/SA 13749, Reel 1.




Acting Air Artificer 4th Class Cyril Tapley served with 820 Squadron on HMS
Formidable during Operation 'Torch' and found himself kept similarly busy to keep two
Albacores continuously on patrol:
'The atmosphere in the hangar was not really conducive to sleep. There was far
too much activity, but I had procured a "safari" camp bed and used this in order
to snatch a few hours rest in between our aircraft taking off and landing... The
whole squadron had been working flat out in order to keep all twelve aircraft
fully serviceable since we had left the Clyde.' 155
HMS Illustrious and HMS Formidable supported Operation 'Avalanche' between 9-11
September 1943 and maintained eight fighters continuously in the air for three days
completing 209 deck landings on Illustrious and 214 on Formidable. Maintenance
requirements would have limited a longer effort: ' ...the full effort could probably have
been maintained for one more day in FORMIDABLE and 3 more days in ILLUSTRIOUS.
Some extension of time to 30 hour inspection would have been required in both ships.' 1S6
During the infamous operations of Force V at the same time the supply of spares was
adequate with the exception of propellers which ran short due to the large number of
Seafire accidents.i'" It was not always the case that maintenance ratings were overworked.
Ten maintenance ratings were needed for CVEs employed in the ferrying role IS8 and Petty
Officer Air Artificer Joe Ainley was assigned to HMS Ruler in 1944:
'I was now serving in an aircraft carrier - with no [operational] aircraft. As a well
trained and experienced maintenance tradesman Air Artificer and the senior rate
in a workshop with sheet metal and allied equipment, I had to come to terms with
this situation. It was a cushy number but I am industrious by nature, so whatever I
could make, I did.' 159
Aircrew often expressed their appreciation of the efforts of maintenance personnel.
Midshipman Charles Friend of 810 Squadron on Ark Royal in 1940 recalled his first spell as
Squadron Duty Officer:
155 Tapley, Tango jor a Sailor, 108.
156Report from RA, Aircraft Carriers, Home Fleet to FOC, Force H, 14 Sep 1943, ADM 199/862.
157Note of meeting held by ACNS (A), 20 Oct 1943, ADM 1/12640. _
158 Telegram from Head of Military Branch II to BAD Washington, 27 September 1943, ADM 1I137:<~.
159 Ruler's Reign Chapter 9. p.5.
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,... I could depend utterlyon the Flight Sergeant or Chief Petty Officer to organise
the work, and with one exception... I found that our maintenance people, fitters,
riggers, armourers and electricians and so on were totally responsible, and
dedicated to keeping "their" aeroplanes at peak performance and fiercely
competitive in doing so.' 160
Lieutenant 'Percy' Gick, was Senior Pilot of 825 Squadron assigned to Victorious in May
1941 at short notice for operations against the Bismarck: ' ...we got this panic order to get
on board Victorious and as Senior Pilot I had a slight problem because Victorious had
absolutely no Swordfish stores at all. She was stored entirely for Albacores. Fortunately at
that time I knew all the stores people fairly well and they did a super job... ,161
An entirely more unsavoury incident occurred aboard HMS Ark Royal in September
1941 when Swordfish V.4414 of 810 Squadron made an emergency landing while on anti-
submarine patrol. The pilot reported failing oil pressure and undissolved brown sugar was
found in the oil tank and oil filters. After an investigation by Instructor Commander
Benstead, Air Mechanics Ernest Howe, Francis Burrage and James Walton were placed
under close arrest. 162 Walton was soon cleared and released, however, Air Mechanic High
Woolley was also implicated and arrested. There was insufficient evidence for a court
martial, but Howe and Burrage were discharged and Woolley re-drafted. In addition to poor
morale and discipline in 810 Squadron, Benstead highlighted that Squadron Officers took
no interest in the welfare of the men. There was a general state of dirtiness and untidiness
among the men and their equipment, a lack of aptitude among the leading hands and a
general low level of technical efficiency.l't' The Director of Personal Services concluded
that 810 Squadron: ' ... appears to have consisted largely of a gang of undisciplined rascals
none of whom should be retained in the Naval Service.,164 Admiral Lyster, the Fifth Sea
Lord, recommended drastic action: ' ... 810 Squadron is to be disbanded and reformed with
fresh personnel who have not been connected with the squadron during this black period in
its history. ,165 In addition to the Navy's insistence on high standards of maintenance, Petty
Officer K.R. Avery who served aboard HMS Stalker from March 1942 - January 1944
recalled the strict precautions precautions when planes were being refuelled:
160C. Friend, Only Friend survived the war: The story ofa seven year commission in the Fleet Air Arm 1939-
1946,30, IWMlDoc 86/37/1.
161 PD. Gick, IWM/SA 12097, Reel 1.
162 Report from CO, HMS Ark Royal to Director ofNaval Intelligence, 17 Oct 1941, ADM 178/269.
163 Report by Instructor Commander Benstead, 11 Oct 1941. ADM 178/269.
164 Minute by DPS, 9 Dec 1941. ADM 178/269.
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'When planes were being refuelled, there was a strict rile of No Smoking, with
imprisonment for the transgressors. To my knowledge two ratings had
imprisonment for this offence and one Officer who forgot he had a lighteron him,
which fell out of his pocket in the hangar... lost twelve months' seniority. ,166
One issue which was raised by carriers on a number of occasions was when they
received aircraft which had been poorly maintained. HMS Ark Royal received six
Swordfish from Gibraltar of 821 Squadron which were due to be flown off to Malta two
days later. Unfortunately five had not been fitted with long range tanks and three had
defective torpedo equipment. In addition both the Vickers guns and bomb carriers were
rusting.l'" Four Fulmars received by the ship around the same time were also found to be in
poor condition loaded with out-of-date ammunition and one with a defective rear gun.
Admiral Somerville commanding Force H noted: ' ...the fighting efficiency ofH.M.S. ARK
ROYAL... is largely dependent on the ability to bring into action replacement aircraft in
the minimum time after their receipt.' 168 Five months later three Sea Hurricanes were
transported to Gibraltar on board Furious, but could not be embarked in Ark Royal as
planned since there were no spares, tools or technical publications for Hurricanes on the
ship which meant it would have been almost impossible to keep them serviceable. 169
Experience of maintenance ashore
Since the squadrons of the FAA were equipped to operate from carriers, the need to
operate ashore in the Mediterranean presented a number of unusual difficulties. After the
sinking of HMS Ark Royal in November 1941, Acting Lieutenant Commander 'Percy'
Gick, was sent out to take command of 815 Squadron, which was based at Maaten Bagush
in the Western Desert:
,...we spent a couple of days scouring round the Desert just after the Italians and
Germans had been driven back picking up masses of vehicles. .. we had Italian
lorries, German lorries and staff cars... I found that there were half a dozen cooks,
Italian cooks, who had all worked in major London restaurants and six fitters who
had been the Alfa Romeo racing team and we were allowed to have them at
165 Minute by Fifth Sea Lord, 1 Jan 1942, ADM 178/269.
166. K.R. Avery, A Dose ofSalts. 301-302, IWMlDoc 87/46/1.
167Report from CO, HMS Ark Royal to FOe, Force H, 16 Jan 1941, ADM 1/11148.
168 Letter from FOe Force H to Secretary of Admiralty, 14 Jun 1941, ADM 1/11148.
169 Report from CO, HMS Ark Royal to Secretary ofAdmiralty, 31 Ju11941, ADM 199/847.
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Dekheila, not up in the Desert. But we just popped them in the back of an aircraft
and flew them up and they were absolutely marvellous. ,170
826 Squadron was disembarked after HMS Formidable was damaged on 25 May 1941 and
Lieutenant Haworth recalled a similar tale ofimprovisation:
'The first problem... was to make the Squadron self sufficient and mobile so that
could operate under the RAF in the western desert without returning to base at
Dekheila except for major aircraft inspections. The necessary motor transport was
not available from Naval or RAF sources, but by dint of scrounging from every
conceivable Army unit, a motley collection of vehicles was assembled, the prize
being a large Italian diesel lorry proved invaluable for carrying bombs ... other
essentials were enough tents to house some 120 Officers and men, camp beds and
ki '1 ,171coo mg utenst s.
826 Squadron was still dependent on RAF maintenance personnel and Haworth was
extremely complementary about their organisation:
'We were fortunate in having a selection of RAF other ranks for aircraft
maintenance, since the recently formed Fleet Air Arm had not yet trained their
own ratings. The Flight Sergeant combined the qualities of administrator,
disciplinarian and technical expert ... In addition we had four Sergeants in change
of engines, airframes, armament and electrics - all of them first class at their job
and suitable for Officer status ... ,172
Sub-Lieutenant Swanton was an Observer in 821 Squadron, which arrived at Dekheila in
Egypt on 9 January 1942.821 Squadron operated from a variety of small landing strips in
the Western Desert, one being Maarten Bagush, some 100miles west ofAlexandria:
' ... all work on the engines and airframes had to be carried out in the open.
Sometimes a canvas screen was rigged if it became necessary to change a
component while sand was blowing around. It was hot and uncomfortable, but
170P.D. Gick, IWM/SA 12097, Reel 2. . ' ._I




under the circumstances the maintenance crews did a splendid job in very trying
conditions. ' 173
Between 7-9 May, 1941 814 Squadron took part in one of the most unusual FAA
operations of the war when six Swordfish with a maintenance party of one Party Officer
and seven Mechanics were disembarked from HMS Hermes to Shaibah in southern Iraq to
assist British forces in putting down a rebellion. They remained there until 18 May flying a
total of 253 hours. Aircraft were afflicted by a number ofproblems including bomb carriers
failing to operate due to the very high temperatures and dust. Aircraft returned to Hermes
for thirty-hour inspections, but the overall serviceability was accorded to good fortune
rather than planning: 'Although the Squadron managed to achieve a total of 6 serviceable
aircraft ashore at all times, it is most strongly emphasised that this must be regarded as
quite exceptionaL.. it is incorrect from every practicable point of view to separate the
operational unit of a Squadron from the maintenance units ... ' 174
The same squadron spent a rather more unplanned period ashore in Ceylon in 1942.
Major Norrie Martin, Royal Marines, was Commanding Officer, 814 Squadron and
Lieutenant Commander (Flying) of HMS Hermes when the squadron had been put ashore
to Kokkalai before the ship was sunk on 9 April. The squadron was left with eleven aircraft,
but only six maintenance personnel, the remainder with all the spares and tools having been
left on board. 175 The following day Martin flew first to China Bay to inspect the damage
and then on to Naval Headquarters in Colombo where he was: ' ... told the shattering news
that the Far Eastern Fleet had withdrawn to Mombasa in East Africa and that I and my 10
pilots were to act, under R.A.F. orders, as Dive Bombers to repel the Japanese invasion,
when it came!' With no carriers on which to embark the squadron remained in Ceylon until
December 1942.
In contrast for the FAA squadrons which operated in Britain with Coastal Command
the maintenance facilities and supplies of stores were good. In July 1944, 848 Squadron
operating under 16 Group at RAF Manston in support of Overlord achieved a serviceability
rate of eighty per cent: 'The Squadron has had adequate supplies of spare parts due to the
listing as a "Limousine" Squadron.' 176 The squadron reported that the stores and spares
situation had been helped considerably by the arrival of Avenger SSU No.2 the previous
month. 854 Squadron flying from RAF Hawkinge at the same time reported serviceability
173 A. Swanton, The Other Side ofthe Coin, 11, IWMlDoc 92/5/1.
174 Report from CO, HMS Hennes to C-in-C East Indies, 24 May 1941, ADM 1/11459.




averaging nmety per cent. LIeutenant Ronald Gellatly, the Senior Pilot in 819 Squadron,
noted the unusual maintenance organisation in operation when the squadron operated from
airfields in Belgium on anti-E-boat patrols in the autumn of 1944:
'Eventually room was found for us at St. Croix, near Bruges just behind the front
line at that time. Accommodation there was limited as the 'drome had just been
captured, so it was decided that the Albacore Squadron and ourselves would only
send a flight each over at first, keeping Bircham Newton as a maintenance centre,
for major overhauls and repairs and a pool of aircraft ... ,178
Seven Swordfish were initially flown over to St Croix, moving a while later to the airfield
at Maldagem. Replacements aircrews went sent over from Bircham Newton in Kent from
the end of November and from January 1945 all the squadrons' aircraft and maintenance
crews were based at Knocke on the Belgian coast.
Conclusion
Aircraft maintenance IS a topic that has been frequently overlooked and it is
especially interesting to examine how this was carried out at the beginning in the early
years of aviation and the wide-range ofroles that maintenance personnel carried out during
that period. In both wars maintenance ratings were placed under considerable pressure by
the intensity of operations while problems caused by a shortage of spares or operating in
challenging conditions were similarly familiar. There was a very close relationship
between the navy and industry at the beginning of the First World War when aircraft were
returned to manufacturers for repairs and by 1943 manufacturers were providing engineers
in the field to advise on the maintenance of certain aircraft types. The challenge of
changing an organisation and procedures in wartime was shown by the inability of the
FAA to establish its own facilities to train maintenance ratings and the only partial
introduction ofcentralised maintenance, despite its apparent success.
176 Report ofProceedings for Jul1944 from CO, 848 Squadron, to Secretary ofAdmiralty, 6 Aug 19'+'+. AD~1
199/839.
I77 Report ofProceedings for Jul1944 from CO, 854 Squadron, to Secretary ofAdmiralty, 1 Aug 194'+. AD:"1
199/839.
178 R. S. Gellatly, 176, IWM/Doc P13.
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion: Pacific Endurance
The Experience of the British Pacific Fleet
Overview
It is proposed to bring together the various aspects of logistic provision which have been
analysed in the previous chapters with a study of the most ambitious FAA operations in the
period under review, those of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) in 1945. The operations of the
BPF highlighted naval logistic requirements because of the need for extensive support
afloat - the Fleet Train - in addition to naval bases while the FAA also required a
substantial logistic tail to maintain its carriers in action.
The strategic decision to deploy a Pacific fleet was not taken until the Octagon
conference in September 1944.1 The considerable bases built up in Ceylon and Southern
India bases were 2000 miles from Australia, the main base for Pacific operations, and that
in tum was up to 5000 miles away from the operational area. As result of the failure of the
British aircraft industry to produce machines combining endurance, high performance and
the robustness required for deck landings, the most noticeable feature of the fleet's aircraft
on commencing operations in March 1945 was that 70% of them were American-built. The
Avenger dive-bombers and Corsair and Hellcat fighters had longer ranges and were more
versatile for Pacific operations, the Corsairs and Hellcats being used as fighter-bombers.
Operationally the Pacific commitment saw the allocation of a large part of the
FAA's resources and all six of the navy's fleet carriers were involved. As the fleet
remained at sea in the operations zone for up to month several CVEs were allocated to ferry
replacement aircraft to the operational units. Some of these were stripped of their
squadrons, with their aircrew utilised as replacements for the front line carriers. Tactically,
it was a unique situation for FAA in the Second World War as the aircraft had to be
maintained afloat for far longer than normal. Carriers adopted the system of centralised
aircraft maintenance under the command of Air Engineer officers while there was a policy
of aircraft replacement rather than repair with damaged machines being pushed over the
side and replacement aircraft flown over from one ofthe replenishment carriers.
The operations in perspective
During the spring and summer of 1945 the BPF supported the invasion of Okinawa,
Operation 'Iceberg', between 26 March - 25 May and deployed off the Japanese coast in
I For details ofOctagon see Chiefs of StaffRecord ofProceedings: 'Octagon' Conference at Quebec. :; - 20
Sep 1945, PREM 3/329/4.
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the July/August operations from 17 July - 10 August. With four Fleet Carriers on station at
anyone time carrying between 230-250 aircraft, the First Aircraft Carrier Squadron (1st
ACS) was the spearhead of British effort in a theatre dominated by air power since day
one? Its operations had no precedent in the Royal Navy's history and in July and August
1945, the BPF conducted the most sustained and intensive air operations in the history of
the Royal Navy. On four out of eight strike days in a twenty-three day period, the First
Aircraft Carrier Squadron" mounted more than 200 offensive sorties over Japan, the record
being 254 on 9 August," HMS Implacable launched 130 sorties on 30 July, the greatest
number by a British carrier on any single day of the war. As Admiral Bruce Fraser.
Commander-in-Chief of the BPF noted, air power was very much in the ascendancy in the
Pacific war and gunnery afforded secondary importance: 'The nature of the Pacific War
with its absence of surface targets meant that the bombardment became the only offensive
role ofthe gun."
While this period was operationally remarkable in the light of the FAA's previous
experiences, the greatest achievement was in the field of logistic support; the fleet was
located off the coast of Japan, 2,500 miles from the nearest air base at Manus, 5,000 miles
from the main base in Australia and 17,000 miles from the United Kingdom. In Australia
and the forward area were eight CVEs, five aircraft maintenance and repair ships and eight
Mobile Naval Air Bases (MONABs) manned by 15,000 personnel to support some 250
front-line aircraft aboard four Fleet Carriers. The seven bases in Australia were provided by
the Royal Australian Air Force and the advanced base at Manus in the Admiralty Islands
was built and maintained by the United States Navy. These contributions were crucial since
the Royal Navy lacked any organisation to construct airfields abroad, and the Pacific
operations were approved at relatively short notice.6 Aircraft losses in the operational area
amounted to 334 planes and 235 replacements were supplied to the fleet, in addition to new
aircrew and aircraft spares. Since the losses in the last period of each operation did not
require replacing, the majority of requirements were successfully met.
Carriers had previously conducted short haul operations before returning to base.
Of eleven carrier operations between March - October 1944 each lasted an average of only
2 Carriers on station:
'Iceberg' - Formidable (from 14 April), illustrious (until 14 ~pril), Indefatigable ~ Victorious.
July/August- Formidable (until 11 August), Implacable (until 11 August), Indefatigable (from 20 July),
Victorious (until 11 August).
3 HMS Formidable, Implacable, Indefatigable & Victorious. .
4 Report from C-in-C, BPF to Admiralty, 6 Nov 1945; enclosure. report No.FORO 9 by Fleet Operational
Research Officer of 15 Oct 1945, ADM 199/118.
5 Report from C-in-C, BPF to Admiralty. 6 Nov 1945, ADM 199/1478.
Chapter 7
232
seven days with a total of 940 sorties in all these operations combined.' Never before had
carriers spent a month at sea between 700 - 2500 miles from the nearest land-based support.
Twelve strike days were mounted during 'Iceberg One', 26 March - 20 April, a similar
number for 'Iceberg Two', 4 - 25 May, and eight between 17 July - 10 August.' During this
time an unprecedented 7,500 sorties were launched. Without a regular supply of aircraft
and associated stores the carriers and hence the raison d'etre for the whole BPF would have
been rendered impotent within weeks.
There were four stages in the air logistic chain which by July 1945 extended some
17,000 miles from the United Kingdom to south of Honshu Island. First the transportation
of the raw materials - aircraft, either packed or erected, and their associated spares - out to
Sydney, 12,000 miles from Britain, and from America and the Indian Ocean. In Australia
were the means 'to process the material,9 and store reserve aircraft, an organisation which
comprised six MONABs and a Transportable Aircraft Repair Yard (TAMY). Forward of
Australia was the Forward Area Naval Air Station at Manus in the Admiralty Islands and
support afloat in the shape of the Fleet Air Maintenance Group (FAMG). Cvfi's acted as
ferry carriers from Australia to the forward base and in the replenishment role onwards to
the fleet.
An agreement between Admirals Nimitz and Fraser on 20 December 1944,
estimated that based on US practice, replacements required by the BPF would be 20%
aircraft and 15% aircraft engines per month; for the BPF this amounted to around 50
aircraft per month.i" A minimum of a month's supply of replacement aircraft were
recommended at the forward base with two ferry Cvfi's shuttling between this base and
Australia. The availability of airfield facilities at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides and
Manus, Admiralty Islands, were confirmed.11
6 The decision to deploy a British Pacific Fleet was not taken until the Octagon Conference in September
1944. The fleet arrived in Sydney in February 1945. . .
7 Report No.60/45 'Analysis ofBritish carrier strikes, 1944' by Directorate ofNaval Operational Studies,
May 1945, ADM 219/262.
8 Strike days were: .
'Iceberg One': 26-27 March, 31 March - 2 April, 6-7,12-13,16-17 & 20 Apnl
'Iceberg Two': 4-5, 8-9,12-13,16-17,20-21 & 24-25 May.
July/August operations: 17-18,24-25,28 &. ~O July, 9-10 ~~gust.
9 Unpublished notes on StaffHistory of Bntlsh .Naval Aviation, 1919-19~5, V~lume 3.573, NHB.
10 Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander Pacific Ocean Area and Admiral SIr Bruce Fraser, Commander-
in-Chief, British Pacific Fleet. .
II Memorandum of record of understandings reached in conference of 17-19 Dec 1944 concernmg
employment ofBritish Pacific Fleet, 20 Dec 1944, ADM 199/1742.
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Transportation of aircraft and spares to Australia
Transportation of spare aircraft to the Pacific from the UK involved the Air
Ministry, RAP, War Office and Ministry ofWar Transport in addition to the Admiralty and
units ofthe RN.
12
Naval aircraft requirements were submitted by the Admiralty two months
in advance and details forwarded to the War Office and Ministry 0 f War Transport for
allocation of shipping space.
The RAF had been responsible for the packing and embarkation of aircraft for naval
service abroad since 1941. The sole task of No.76 Maintenance Unit (76 MU) based at
RAF Wroughton was to pack single-engined naval aircraft.P Multi-engined planes were
packed by the appropriate RAF unit since all were ex-RAF types. No.76 MU reported daily
to the Air Ministry and the Admiralty so the allocation of shipping space could be kept up-
to-date. In 1945 the RAF packed 477 aircraft for naval service overseas, of which one-third
was dispatched to Sydney between March - June." However, the RAF was only
responsible for British aircraft and by 1945 the majority of the BPF's aircraft were
American." The British Aviation Supply Depot in Philadelphia, operational since August
1942, organised the delivery of923 aircraft to the RN during 1945. Among these were 220
Avengers, 230 Corsairs and 316 Hellcats, many destined for Pacific operations where they
spearheaded the British effort. 16
The Packing and Shipping Programme of 19 June 1945, reveals the full complexity
of the schedule.l Between March - June, ninety-nine packed aircraft left Britain for Sydney
aboard fourteen merchant vessels, while during May - June six ships with sixty aircraft
departed the USA for the same destination. Sailing time from the UK to Sydney was three
months. In addition HMS Begum sailed from the UK on 20 April with fifty-six erected
aircraft. During June HMS Vindex carrying sixty planes was to follow from the UK with
the Empire Lagan leaving the USA with forty-two Corsairs and Avengers at around the
same time. Reinforcements in the shape of thirty-seven American and six British aircraft
also were due to leave the Eastern Fleet aboard HMS Activity at the end of June. In the
12 For details of dispatch ofaircraft abroad see; An Analysis of the Packing and Shipping ofNaval Aircraft
throughout the war, 1939-1945, ADM 1/17528.
13 For details of 76 MU's role see Ibid.
MIb~. .
15 At the beginning of 'Iceberg' the 1st ACS had 167 American aircraft (65 Avengers, 73 Corsairs & 29
Hellcats) and only 51 British aircraft (9 Fireflies, 40 ~eafires & ~Wal:Us). .
16 History ofNaval Store Department in North Amenca, Appendix, Aircraft delivered to the Royal Navy,
ADM 116/5813.




same period the dispatch of aircraft engines to Sydney was as follows; thirteen from the
UK, twenty-six from the USA and forty-one from the Eastern Fleet. 18
Therefore in four months it was planned to dispatch ninety-nine packed and 116
erected aircraft from Britain with a further sixty packed and forty-two erected aircraft from
the USA and forty-three erected planes from the East Indies station. The rate of ninety
aircraft per month would have risen markedly if the BPF had operated two carrier groups in
the autumn of 1945; in January, 1944, it was estimated that by the summer of 1945 the
number of aircraft despatched from the UK and the USA to Sydney would increase from
180 to 300 per month. 19
The delivery of air stores followed a similar pattern with thirty-two merchant ships
delivering 6,870 tons of air stores to Sydney from 5 November 1944 until the end of April
1945. The biggest single delivery of 1400 tons arrived on Port Alma from America on 18
April. To put this quantity in context, before the ship's arrival there was a deficiency in
Sydney of 40,000 air store items.i" By 14 May, 3,000 tons of air stores had left Britain but
a further 1,400 was awaiting shipment. The main delay was caused by a five week gap
between the allocation of a shipment and the vessel sailing. This was a major improvement
over the situation on 9 December 1944 when only sixty-three out of600 tons was enroute."
Only six ships carrying 724 tons of air stores arrived in Sydney before the 1st ACS
on 10 February 1945, and almost no stores were ready for allocation: 'Indeed for all
practical purposes, we may say that Air Stores were non-existent when the Fleet arrived.,22
The carriers had been ordered to stock up on spares from the five Royal Naval Air Stations
in Ceylon before departure in mid-January and their position on reaching Australia was
believed to be thus: ' ... the fleet carriers were considered to be stored with aircraft
equipment and spares for six months, and it was thought that they would not call Sydney
depot for stock replenishment until 31st May, 1945.,23 But due to inadequate stocks at
Ceylon on arrival in Sydney the Fleet made extensive calls for spares and despite the help
of the Royal Australian Air Force and stocks from the Air Store Issuing Ship (ASIS) Fort
Colville only ten per cent of the 2,300 items requested were procured.i" It was not until July
1945 that sufficient air stores to cover most needs were in Australia and then the lack of,
18 Ibid.
19 Memorandum on Naval Auxiliaries required to support the British Fleet in the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
Annex F (Pacific Ocean), by Head ofMilitary Branch II, Jan 1944, ADM 1/16287.
20 Report on Pacific Air Store Requirements by Assistant Director ofStores, 1 May 1945, ADM 1165806.
21 Notes of meeting held by the Director ofStores, 14 May 1945, ADM 116/5806.
22 Ibid. .





personnel for administration and distribution was a hindrance. As will be seen later, lack of
air stores was a major problem for forward units.
Facilities in Australia and the forward area
Based in Sydney was Rear Admiral Portal, Flag Officer Naval Air Stations,
Australia, FONAS (A)25 responsible to Vice Admiral Daniel26 for the supply of aircraft and
stores to the forward areas and the maintenance and repair of aircraft beyond the capacity
ofthe FMAGs.27
Aircraft facilities in Australia were divided between the three major erection and
repair units and the four maintenance units. Newly arrived aircraft were despatched to the
two Receipt and Dispatch Unit's (RDU's), MONABs II and VII, plus Transportable
Aircraft Maintenance Yard I (TAMY I) where they were assembled, serviced and tested.
The planned capacity of MONAB II on arrival at Bankstown, near Sydney in
January 1945 was 100 aircraft per month. The first two loads of aircraft to reach Australia
arrived at Bankstown during January aboard Cvfi's Fencer and Striker. In February despite
inadequate numbers of officers and men and much inexperience in addition to the fact that
the airfield wasn't finished, ninety aircraft were completed - a fine achievement. About 100
aircraft per month were erected at Bankstown until the end ofthe war. The ad hoc nature of
the logistic system was highlighted by the: ' ... sporadic and uncertain ... ,28 deliveries of
aircraft to Australia which left the production lines at MONAB II idle at certain times and
overrun at others.
TAMY I was the FAA's mam repair installation based around Archerfield,
Brisbane's civilian airport, from late March 1945. It conducted major and minor aircraft
inspections, aircraft erections, engine overhauls and the dismantling of aircraft for spares in
a process called 'reduce to produce' which involved over 100 men and dealt with fifteen
planes per month. Rear-Admiral Portal praised this vital effort: 'Because of the shortage of
spares which persisted throughout, this work was of the utmost importance.v" The erecting
capacity of TAMY I was relatively minor compared with MONAB II, at between twenty-
five and thirty per month.t'' None of the 150 engine overhauls begun at TAMY I were
completed by August 1945, due to the lack of spares although the potential output was 100
25 Rear Admiral Portal was titled Flag Officer Naval Air Pacific (FONAP) from June 1945.
26 Vice Admiral Daniel, VA (Q), commanded the entire logistic effort from his headquarters in Melbourne on
behalf ofAdmiral Fraser.
27 Unpublished notes on StaffHistory ofBritish Naval Aviation, 1919-1945, Volume 3,598, NHB.




engines per month. The extent of aircraft wastage was such that aircraft were often ditched
rather than repaired and the few engine overhauls required were tackled by the repair
ships.'!
MONAB VII, the second RDU, was established on the site of TAMY I in July
1945, and the requirement for this combined base was 125 erected aircraft per month, but
the total in the month before the end of hostilities was only forty-six. The improvised
nature of the base was the major obstacle: 'It is considered most improbable that MONAB
7, equipped with portable hangars, and supported only by an M.M. [Mobile Maintenance]
component would ever have produced a satisfactory output of erected aircraft, from a
forward airfield. ,32 An all weather airfield with permanent hangars and full equipment was
deemed necessary.
Between 1 March - 15 August 1945, an estimated 730 aircraft were brought into
service, a figure never contemplated before the start of operations. The average effort in
man-hours to make an aircraft serviceable was 2000 hours for a packed Firefly, 1800 for an
erected Avenger, or 1000 for a partly erected Hellcat.33 Erected aircraft were often found to
be a poorer condition than their packed compatriots but the most pressing shortages, as in
all aspects of air logistics, were in spares and tools.
Maintenance support to squadrons while ashore in Australia was provided by
MONAB's I, III, V and VI. MONAB's I and III were standard units comprising one
Mobile Maintenance Component (MM) and two Mobile Servicing Components (MS). The
MM was the larger and better equipped, capable of repairing or replacing aircraft
components in its workshops and hangars. The MS was a small mobile unit capable of
offering assistance in light maintenance to a squadron after it flew ashore, equivalent to the
Squadron Servicing Units established in Britain, and each was equipped for one aircraft
type. Those in MONAB I for Avengers and Corsairs and in MONAB II for Fireflies and
Seafires. Both were in place just in time to accept aircraft from the Fleet Carriers in
February 1945. When plans to establish an air base in the Philippines were abandoned in
June 1945, MONAB's V and VI were also based in Australia.
Forward air bases were located on the small coral islands of Ponam and Pityliu off
Manus in the Admiralty Islands, formerly used by the Americans. MONAB IV on Ponam
comprised the usual MM and MS components plus a Mobile, Servicing and Repair unit-
30 Part IX (MONAB's - Reports ofProceedings), Section 8 (R.N. TAMY I - Report ofProceedings). ADM
199/119.
31 Part III (Air Engineering), Section 2 (Repair Policy), ADM 199/119.




MSR 4 - to maintain an aircraft reserve forward of Australia. MSR's were equipped, in
theory at least, for all aircraft types. Personnel and equipment for MONAB IV arrived with
the remainder of the Fleet Train in early March. Further units - MSR's 1 and 6 - arrived in
June to build up a Forward Aircraft Pool (FAP) comprising' .. .40% of the embarked F.A.E.
[First Line Aircraft Establishment].' 34 The quantities of aircraft passing though MONAB






MONAB IV reported a high rate of unserviceability among arriving aircraft and HMS
Unicorn, the aircraft repair and maintenance ship, called in on her way to Sydney at the end
of May to examine the situation and land a number of Seafires requiring test flights.36 Since
Manus had been an American base and a party ofAmericans remained to maintain the coral
air strips, it was unlike any other MONAB in the Pacific: 'Because ofthe semi-permanence
ofthe facilities here, [HMS] Nabaron [MONAB IV] has become less and less a Mobile Air
Base and more and more a Naval Air Station.v" Without the considerable assistance of the
US Navy it is difficult to see how MONAB IV could have operated effectively.
Additional forward support was provided by the Air Train, as support afloat was
known from June. Initially Commodore Mereweather aboard Unicorn co-ordinated air
logistics in the forward area for Rear-Admiral Portal, with Commodore Murray-Smith of
HMS Pioneer taking over in June. First to arrive were Unicorn, and ASIS Fort Colville,
with the rest of the Fleet Train at Sydney in February. They sailed onto Manus in early
March. HMS Deer Sound, an Aircraft Component Repair Ship, reached Manus on 9 April
when 'Iceberg One' was underway. Further reinforcements in the shape of HMS Pioneer,
an Aircraft Maintenance Ship, and a second ASIS Fort Langley took part in the
July/August operations which improved the situation considerably: 'The general spares
position was helped by the arrival of ASIS Fort Langley in the forward area...stored for all
34 Ibid.
35 Part IX (MONAB's - Reports ofProceedings), Section 4 (MONAB No 4 - Report ofProceedings) , ADM
199/119
36 Report from CO, HMS Unicorn, to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, Appendix 1(Diary - H.M.S. Striker),




five first line types.' 38 Pioneer, a converted Light Fleet Carrier, also proved a valuable
addition.
The Director of Plans, Quartermaster Branch, submitted a report in August 1945
reviewing the progress of the three Fleet Air Maintenance Groups planned in January
1944.
39
Allocated to each group was an Aircraft Maintenance Ship, an Aircraft Component
Repair Ship and an Aircraft Engine Repair Ship. Only the first group was anywhere near
operational with Pioneer and Deer Sound on station and Aircraft Engine Repair Ship
Beauly Firth to join shortly. Vessels in the second group were not due until October 1945
and work on the remainder was suspended. This illustrates the lengthy processes of
construction and conversion: after eighteen months planning, only one-third of the ships
were available.
It is worth discussing here the contrasting fortunes of two Air Train ships. Among
the delays and shortages afflicting the air stores organisation, a notable success was the
arrival of ASIS Fort Langley at Manus in June 1945, loaded with stores for all the types of
aircraft. Since the autumn of 1944 the supply of air stores from the USA for British use had
been directed primarily towards the Pacific, rather than Britain or Ceylon. Fort Langley
was stored at Victoria, British Columbia, most of the stores having been shipped 3,000
miles from the British Naval Store Depot in Philadelphia. Stores also arrived from the UK
and missing items were scrounged from Air Store Depots along the west coast. The ship
sailed with ninety-eight per cent of stores embarked, a figure that compares very favourably
with ships sailing from the UK. The main difficulty was the late arrival of British stores
from the UK causing some stores to remain unpacked and unstowed when she sailed.40
An entirely opposite experience accompanied the passage of Aircraft Component
Repair Ship Deer Sound which arrived in Sydney on 23 February. She was stored with only
seventy-seven per cent of items before leaving the UK, being 4,500 items short of the full
complement of 18,250.41 Captain Johnson complained that in the initial six weeks of
storing in the UK, in addition to general air stores, the only specific spares received were
for Seafire's airframes plus Seafire and Firefly propellers. Many deficiencies were met
when the ship arrived at Greenock on 4 January 1945, but when she sailed for the Far East
four days later she was still 2000 items short and carrying a number of repairable
components, but without repair equipment. More repairable spares. tools and equipment
38 Ibid.
39 Report by Director ofPlans, Quartermaster Branch, 23 August 1945, ADM 1/19015.. T
40 History ofNaval Store Department in North America, Section 3 (Air Stores and Equipment), Chapter XLV
(Air Stores and Equipment - Outfitting of Ships in U.S.A), ADM 116/581.3. _
41 Report from Admiralty to Vice Admiral (Administration). BPF, 31 Apn11945. ADM. 199/17)9.
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were loaded at Colombo. However, in Sydney, Deer Sound received signals ordering that
she should be stowed with sufficient stores to maintain 250 aircraft for six months.
Accordingly she placed an order for another 15,000 items! Unsurprisingly few of these
could be obtained as the air stores situation was stretched to breaking point by demands
from the 1st ACS. On leaving Sydney, her captain estimated that the ship had a full
complement of equipment and tools but only twenty per cent of essential stores now
deemed necessary to carry out her task. 42 The assessment by Captain Merewether of
Unicorn on Deer Sound's situation was devastating:
'It might repay an investigation to find out why this ship was sent from England
to the forward area via Sydney only to arrive in such a condition... She is lacking
in repair material; hydraulic seals, rivets, but, on arrival at Sydney, she carried
arrester hooks, aerofoi1s, cockpit covers, complete wireless sets and other
material, which were of no use to her but were possibly needed e1sewhere ... in
effect she proved a drain on the fleet. In these circumstances Deer Sound is being
returned to the main base, and it is proposed that she remains there until fully
stored- however long that may be.,43
Most logistic units arriving in Australia, whether MONAB's, support afloat or CYE's
made initial requests for spares, but none on the scale ofDeer Sound.
Air logistics during Operation 'Iceberg', 26 March - 25 May 1945
While the four carriers ofthe 1st ACS swayed at their anchors at Manus between 8 -
22 March in preparation for 'Iceberg', the replenishment CVE's supplied thirty-two aircraft
including eight repaired and modified by Unicom/" Unicorn was the lynchpin of the
supply chain for Operation 'Iceberg' anchored in San Pedro Bay, Leyte in the Philippines,
several hundred miles forward of Manus. The ship had arrived at Sydney from Colombo on
12 February loaded with eighty-two aircraft and 120 engines. After an exchange of aircraft
with MONAB II at Bankstown, she headed for Manus and then Leyte for the beginning of
'Iceberg One' on 25 March. Replenishment CYE's shuttled from Unicorn the 700 miles to
and from the Fleet. Her role was severely criticised by Rear-Admiral Vian on 14 May:
'HMS Unicorn in her present capacity is of very little use, if fleet carriers were to
accumulate wrecks on board for transfer to a repair carrier once a month, the CV's
42 Report from CO, HMS Deer Sound to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, 22 Mar 1945, ADM 1991 759.
43 Report from CO, HMS Unicom to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, 4 May 1945, ADM 199/1759.
44 Report from CO, HMS Unicorn, to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, 2 May 1945. ADM 199/1745.
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operational value would become more and more negligible as the month ran out its
,45 Th . I I .
course. ere was simp y no a tematIve to the use of Unicorn in this forward role
because there was no airfield available at Leyte. Without her presence at Leyte the CVE's
would have to travel from Manus, twice the distance, and there were not enough available
in March 1945 to carry out that task. Unicorn's time at Leyte would have been more
successful if an airfield had been available as this would have enabled more test flying of
aircraft to be carried out. However, between 19 March - 27 May, Unicorn repaired or
modified seventy-two aircraft of which seventy were supplied to the fleet.46 The supply of
aircraft to Unicorn during 'Iceberg' was maintained by ferry CVE's from Manus. Fencer
arrived at Leyte on 11 April, Ruler on 27 April and Chaser on 11 May.
The replenishment CVE's of the so" Aircraft Carrier Squadron (AC30),
commanded by Commodore Came, provided the fmallink in the logistic chain transporting
aircraft from Leyte to the 1st ACS in replenishment area off the Sakishima Gunto. The
Operational Schedule of February 1945 clarified the initial availability of CVE's: 'At the
start of the operation there will be 4 CVE's available for Ferry and Replenishment duty:-
Striker, Fencer (Ferry only), Speaker, Slinger... ,47
Even at the beginning of March, as Came commented, ' ... the problems which were
to arise were quite unforeseen and with the future employment of the British Pacific Fleet
still undecided, no air replenishment planning had or could be undertaken. ,48 Striker left
Manus on 19 March to rendezvous with the carriers, transferring four aircraft to rep lace
those lost since the fleet departed Manus. The second replenishment carrier Slinger headed
for Leyte with Unicorn and Fort Colville. A third CVE, Speaker, accompanying Striker,
supplied Combat Air Patrols (CAP) and anti-submarine (AlS) cover for the Fleet Train in
the forward area and the whole BPF during replenishment periods. The logistic plan in the
forward area was detailed in the 'History of the Fleet Train': ' ...three or four Task Units
were formed to ply between Leyte and the fuelling area, the distance being about 700 miles
each way. A typical Task Unit would consist of three tankers, one escort carrier, and two or
three escort vessels. ,49 According to the orders for Air Operations of Rear-Admiral Vian,
commanding the 1st ACS, the ideal loading for a CVE was six Avengers, nine Corsairs,
45 Report from Flag Officer Commanding, 1st ACS, BPF, to C-in-C, BP~, 14 May 19~5, ADM 199/590. _
46 Figures compiled from Report from CO, HMS Unicorn, to Rear Admiral Fleet Tram, BPF, 2 May 19..b and
Report from CO, HMS Unicorn, to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, 31 May 19~5, ADM 199/1745.
47 British Operational Schedule in Operation 'Iceberg from Evans Lambe to C-m-C, 13 Feb 1945, ADM
199/1745, I
48 Report from Commodore Commanding, AC30, to Cvin-C, BPF, 4 Nov 1945, ADM 199119.







four Seafires, four Hellcats and one Firefly but admitted 'It should not, however, be
assumed that this loading will be achieved at any time. ,50
The CVE's suffered two inherent handicaps, one related to their design and another
which impacted on all aspects of the logistic chain. As American built vessels, they were
equipped with American type catapults from which British aircraft could not be launched.
With a maximum speed of only eleven knots, the full length of the flight deck was required
to launch British aircraft in light wind conditions. All CVE's carried a mix of British and
American types. This reduced aircraft capacity, stored in the hangar only, to a maximum of
twenty-five. By comparison, USS Attu delivered seventy-six aircraft to the USN's carriers
off Okinawa in one replenishment: the ability to catapult all aircraft being crucial, although
the Attu class were also twin-screw ships capable of twenty knots.I' The second problem
was providing replacements for five different types of aircraft for only four carriers!
Coupled with the small complements of the CVE's this meant that only a few of each type
were carried, as illustrated by Vian's 'ideal loading' orders above. Admiral Fraser was fully
aware situation and the advantages ofstandardisation:
, ... the multiplicity of types is a grave hinderance in this type of warfare. It leads
to tactical and logistic inflexibility and also is most uneconomicaL.. the
American aircraft (Avenger, Corsair and Hellcat) which are satisfactory are so
altered to British requirements that any idea of pooling of resources with the
Americans - even in this American product - would be impossible.,52
The results of the replenishment periods during 'Iceberg One' were as followsr''
Aircraft carried/supplied to the Fleet
14/13
25/22
14/11* (12 launched - one crashed*)
Total 57/46
There were no immediate reinforcements for the meagre forces at Leyte and Manus and
with only two CVE' s: ' ...the supply of aircraft to the fleet from Leyte was very much on a
50 Memorandum 'Section II (Air Orders)' from Flag Officer Commanding, 1st ACS, BPF, to The Flag and
Commanding Officers, HM Ships, BPF, 22 March, 1945, ADM 199/1745.
51 Unpublished notes on Staff History ofBritish Naval Aviation,. 1919-1945, Volume 3,579, NHB.
52 Despatches, Nov 1944 - 1ul1945, from C-in-C, BPF, to Admiralty, 23 Nov, 1945, ADM 199/118.
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hand-to-mouth basis.t " When, in response to American requests, 'Iceberg One' was
extended beyond 11 April, its original completion date, it was not possible to supply CVE's
for the replenishment periods of 14-15 and 18-19 April. By the end of 'Iceberg One' the 1st
ACS had lost sixty-eight aircraft but had received only forty-four replacements.
Many elements of the CVE's operations were of an extemporized nature, the remarks
on aircraft supply by Slinger's Commanding Officer on 7 April is just one example: 'Who
controls this? Presumably FONAS (A) sends up what he can. Does ACI [Rear-Admiral
Vian] state any special requirements to anyone? I was given no message to bring.
Presumably I take what Unicorn offers and get on with it. ,55 Vian' s air orders, issued on 22
March, stated he would report as early as possible: ' ...the replacement requirements ofeach
Fleet Carrier individually... ,56. Clearly it had not reached one of its most important
recipients.
The most senous deficiency during 'Iceberg One' was apparent in air stores
exemplified by the situation on 8 April when, as Captain Mereweather of Unicorn
remarked, Unicorn and Formidable were required to supplement the exhausted stocks in
Fort Colville to meet requests from the Fleet.57 Before the start of 'Iceberg Two' the most
urgently required stores had to be up flown from Sydney. Commander L.S. Davis, the Fleet
Train Naval Store Officer, commented on the unprecedented expenditure of certain air
stores during 'Iceberg One' and that the situation: ' ...was only overcome by the timely
arrival of supplies from Sydney by air; assistance from the U.S. Navy; and the withdrawal
of stocks from H.M. Ships Unicorn and Illustrious - that latter having been partly de-stored
prior to leaving for refit.,58 Fort Colville returned to Sydney on 3 May to re-store,
transferring some stores to Unicorn before her departure. Unicorn supplied 204 separate
patterns of air stores to the carriers throughout 'Iceberg' .59
During the break at San Pedro Bay, Leyte, from 23 April - 1 May, a further 39
aircraft were transferred by the replenishment CVE's. For 'Iceberg Two', Speaker, Striker
and the newly arrived Chaser were each present for two replenishment periods. Slinger had
53 Report ofProceedings from Commodore Commanding, AC30, to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, 29 April
1945, Appendix I (Diary.ofEvents)iliA~M 199/17~5. . . . . ,
54 Report 'Experience gamed by 30 Aircraft Carner Squadron In the British Pacific Fleet from Commodore
Commanding, 30th Aircraft Carrier Squadron to C-in-C BPF, 4 Nov 1945, ADM 119/199
55 'Some remarks on replenishment' from CO, HMS Slinger, 7 April 1945, ADM 199,'1759.
56 Memorandum' Section II (Air Orders)' from Flag Officer Commanding, 1st ACS. BPF, to The Flag and
Commanding Officers, H.M. Ships, British Pacific Fleet, 22 Mar, 1945, ADM 199/1745. _
57 Report from CO, HMS Unicorn, to Rear Admiral Fleet Tra~n, BPF, 2 M~y 1945, AD~l 199/17·b.
58 Report ofProceedings up to 31 May 1945, from Rear Admiral Fleet Tram, BPF to C-m-C. BPF, 7 Jun
1945, Appendix E (Report by Fleet Train Naval Store Officer), ADM 199/1766. , _
59 Report from CO, HMS Unicorn, to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, 31 May 1945, ADM 199;174).
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suffered an engine failure on a trip to Manus. Ruler replaced Speaker in the CAP and AlS
role.
The aircraft situation in the central Pacific on 1 May 1945 was thus; Fleet Carriers
230, Striker twenty-four, Speaker twenty-five, twenty-six in reserve aboard Unicorn plus
twenty-two for CAP duties on Ruler. A further twenty-four aircraft awaited repair on
Unicorn, seven were at Ponam, thirty-three were being ferried to the forward area by
Chaser and eleven awaited transfer to Ponam from Illustrious which was returning to the
UK for refit.
60
The replenishment schedule for 'Iceberg Two' which commenced on 4 May
was."
Date Carrier Aircraft carried/supplied to the Fleet
6 May Striker 23/15
10-11 May Speaker 25/17
14-15 May Striker 24/20
18-19 May Chaser 22/8
22-23 May Chaser /13* (4 to Ruler, the CAP carrier *)
22-23 May Speaker 24/14
Total 118/87 62
Aircraft losses in May were 135, but there was no supply failure. A serious hangar fire
aboard Formidable on 18 May damaged thirty aircraft, after which the carrier was
despatched to Sydney for a refit. The aircraft lost during the final strike period of 24-25
May also did not require replacing.
Striker's diary for May, 1945, illustrates a CVE's typical replenishment
programme.I" She sailed from Leyte on the morning of 3 May in the company of Ruler,
two tankers and four destroyers, arriving in the servicing area on the afternoon of 5 May.
The support ships rendezvoused with the fleet the following day and Striker flew off
fifteen aircraft and received thirty-four casualties from Formidable before immediately
60 For figures see Ibid.
61 Figures compiled from: Report from CO, HMS Unicorn, to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, 31 May 1945;
Report ofProceedings from Commodore Commanding, AC30 to Rear Admiral, BPF, 29 Apr 1945, Appendix
I (Diary ofHMS Striker); Report ofProceedings from CO, HMS Striker, to Commodore Commanding,
AC30, 7 Jun 1945; Report ofProceedings from CO, HMS Chaser, to Commodore Commanding, AC30, 17
Jun 1945, ADM 199/1745.
62 A figure of78 is quoted in Report by C-in-C, BPF, 6 Nov 1945; enclosure, report No. FORO 9 by Fleet
Operational Research Officer, 15 Oct 1945, ADM 199/118.
The figure of 87 has been used since the Report ofCommanding Officer, H.M.S. Unicorn, 31 May, 1945.
provides a breakdown of the total and these agree with all available reports ofCommanding Officer of the
replenishment CVE's.
63 Report from CO, HMS Unicorn, to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, 31 May 1945, ADM 199/1745.
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sailing for Leyte escorted by the destroyer Kempenfelt. From 1900hrs on 8 May until the
morning of 12 May, Striker was based at Leyte's San Pedro Bay. When she left on 12 May
accompanied by two tankers and two destroyers, twenty-four replacement aircraft were on
board. Striker's second replenishment period began on 14 May which saw fourteen aircraft
despatched and one flyable dud received. The next day a further six replacements were sent
over and another flyable dud arrived. This marked the end of Striker's participation in
'Iceberg'. The ship returning to Leyte on 17 May and from 18-28 May was escorted back
to Sydney by the destroyer Ulster.
Chaser was one of the other two CYE's providing replacement aircraft for 'Iceberg
Two'. Her narrative for the final replenishment period of 22-23 May illustrates a CVE's
'd 64vane programme:
22 May
0850 - Embarked pilots from Undaunted
0950 - Flew off five Corsair IV's to Victorious
0955 - Landed on one Corsair IV and three Avenger II's 'Flyable duds' from
Victorious
1600 - Transferred pilots to and from Undaunted
1655 - Flew off three Hellcat I's to Ruler and one Hellcat II to Indomitable
1720 - Flew off one Hellcat II to Ruler
1754 - Embarked mail and correspondence from Napier
23 May
0652 - Flew off three Corsair II's to Victorious
0701 - Flew off one Corsair II to Victorious
1038 - Embarked hospital cases from Quadrant
1120 - Transferred mail and correspondence from Quality
1145 - Transferred mail from Wessex
1255 - Embarked 1 Officer and 92 Ratings (ex Quilliam) from Black Prince
1745 - Transferred correspondence from Napier
1755 - Embarked personnel and mail from Quadrant
1815 - Formed T.V. 122.1.10 with Napier and Speaker and sailed for Manus
Like most Cv'E's, Chaser found keeping aircraft serviceable most problematical. Spares
for American aircraft were lacking and they had to be sourced from flyable duds or even
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the Fleet Carriers. The maintenance complement, largely comprised of MSR 5A, only
joined the ship at Manus and was unused to being afloat, in addition to being unfamiliar
with some of the types of aircraft and engines embarked.F Commodore Carne complained
that the CYE~swere severely under prepared for their task:
, ... they had nothing like an adequate complement of air maintenance ratings and
numbers had to be made up by drafting of air sections of MSR~s most of whose
ratings had never been at sea. All ships had a most limited range of air stores and
yet had to maintain operational aircraft for far longer periods than had been
expected.~ 66
The capabilities of Slinger and Speaker were certainly affected as their operational
squadrons were despatched to Fleet Carriers to provide additional aircraft and aircrew. At
the conclusion of 'Iceberg One.', Speaker was ordered to transfer all 1840 Squadron pilots
to Indomitable in addition to seventy maintenance ratings leaving only 100 of the latter on
board. The change from an operational carrier with a Hellcat Squadron to replenishment
carrier for all types of aircraft, left Speaker with only spares for and maintenance ratings
familiar with this single type of aircraft. Ratings embarked from MSR 5 brought experience
of other aircraft, but additional spares never arrived. In the light of these experiences the
comments of Captain Denny of Victorious are hardly surprising: 'Considerable work has to
be done on replacement aircraft before using them on operations, and the aircrews in
consequence inclined to mistrust these aircraft. ,67 Carne was left in no doubt that both front
line carriers and replenishment CYE's should be regarded on a similar level- that of a fully
operational carrier:
' ...to carry out her main function the replenishment eVE must be an efficient
aircraft carrier. The replenishment eVE has to achieve efficient maintenance of
all types of operational aircraft and to carry out flying operations to meet the ever
rapidly changing circumstances in the fuelling area... she must have a properly
worked up ship's company.. .left as undisturbedby drafting as a fleet carrier.t'"
64 Report ofProceedings from CO, HMS Chaser, to Commodore Commanding. AC30, 17 Jun 1945, ADM
199/1745.
65 Report ofProceedings from CO, HMS Chaser. to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, 17 Jun 1945, ADM
199/1745.
66 Report from CO, AC30 to Rear Admiral Fleet Train, BPF, 23 Jun 1945, ADM 199/1745.




Unfortunately sufficient resources were not available in the Pacific for this situation to be
realised. Throughout 'Iceberg' the aircraft replenishment programme was precarious, if the
allocated carrier had broken down, no substitutes were available.
Air logistics during the July/August operations, 17 July -10 August 1945
The arrangements for the July/August operations involved substantial changes to
the 'Iceberg' plan. Leyte was abandoned as a forward base since no airfield had been
obtained ashore. All ships of the Air Train, Unicorn, Pioneer, Deer Sound, Fort Colville
and Fort Langley, were based at Manus where they could operate in conjunction with the
units ashore there. Arbiter, Chaser, Speaker and Striker were available for replenishment
duties, with Ruler continuing in the CAP role. The 'History of the Fleet Train' recorded the
new despatch arrangements:
'Unlike 'Iceberg' they [CVE's] did not work to a regular timetable, one meeting
the Fleet on each occasion of re-fuelling. " two were sent forward at the
beginning and the others at weekly intervals. They were retained as long as any
aircraft remained for issue and sentback empty for reloading and retum.t'"
Arbiter made two trips and Chaser, Speaker and Striker one each. Since they sailed
from Manus, rather than Leyte, their 700 mile trip during 'Iceberg' was increased to nearer
2500, the equivalent of Clyde to Montreal or Portsmouth to Tobruk. It took nine days,
rather than two, to travel from the forward base to replenishment area. At the last
replenishment period of the Pacific war on 10 August with a reduced fleet and only one
fleet carrier, Indefatigable, Ruler was the only CVE present. The pattern for aircraft supply
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While ninety-nine replacement aircraft were requested by the Fleet and 102 were
despatched by the CVE's, supplies were not always available at the right time as the
Operational Research Report acknowledged: ' ... had there been a strike period between
August 2nd and August 6th, a serious deficiency in the availability of aircraft might have
arisen ...two more ferry carriers, at least, would have been necessary, to ensure that all
requirements were comfortably met on time ...' 71
During 31 July - 2 August, thirty-seven replacements were requested but Chaser
and Speaker could supply only twenty-seven.F Of the fifteen Corsairs, eleven Seafires and
four Fireflies required, only ten, six and three respectively were available. Chaser, the
newly arrived ship, had nineteen aircraft aboard of which eight were Seafires, four Corsairs
and three Seafires, however she was expected to be available for next replenishment period
as well. By contrast she had four Hellcats which were not requested although one was
supplied anyway.I'' As the Fleet did not mount any operations before the next scheduled
replenishment on 6 August, owing to a typhoon, the shortcomings were rectified by Arbiter
which flew over a further twenty-two aircraft on 6-7 August. The CAP carrier, Ruler,
supplied several Corsairs when the stocks were inadequate; thirty-five Corsairs were
requested by the Fleet in the first three replenishment periods and thirty were duly
received, but records indicate the four replenishment CVE's carried only twenty-three.i"
Rear-Admiral Denny of Victorious remained less than complimentary about his
ship's new aircraft: 'The great majority of such aircraft flown on board are NOT
operationally fit and cannot be flown in the next day's strikes. ,75 Vice-Admiral Vian,
however, claimed that air logistics were improving: 'This situation is, however, being
steadily rectified, though much remains to be done ... Aircraft coming forward are in a





75 Report from CO, HMS Victorious, to Flag Officer Commanding, 151 ACS, BPF, 14 Aug 1945, ADM
199/1478. .
76 Report from Flag Officer Commanding, 151 ACS, BPF, Enclosure No.2 (Remarks on Air Operations), to




The achievement of the BPF's air logistics organisation was very much against the
odds enabling the 15t ACS to complete the most ambitious air operations which the Royal
Navy had ever attempted. The delayed decision to deploy a Pacific fleet meant the first
MONAB's did not arrive in Australia until January and no CYE's were nominated until
February. Initially units lacked the spares and equipment to do their job. During 'Iceberg',
there were few reinforcements available, spares were in short supply and many aircraft
supplied had been assembled hurriedly with insufficient inspection and test flying. The
reasonably settled base at Manus for July/August operations produced a much smoother
running organisation although the CYE's had to travel 800 miles further than their US
counterparts from Ulithi. Ultimately most of the aircraft and stores were coming from the
UK or USA, the former three months from Australia, so only time would solve the
problems. Admiral Fraser noted the serious difficulties caused by the failure of air stores
supply: ' ... the lack of air stores came nearer to causing a complete breakdown in operations
than any other single factor. .. Air store troubles have been endemic on all foreign stations
throughout the war ... ,77
Nevertheless, the 235 aircraft supplied represented sixty per cent of the 344 lost by
the 15t ACS. Unpredictable losses such as those inflicted by Kamikazes or hangar fire
accounted for thirty per cent of the losses, so the logistic plan was sufficient to provide for
purely predictable, operational losses, but there was no margin for unforeseen events. The
US carriers would also have run short of aircraft during 'Iceberg', but several suffered
Kamikaze hits and withdrew, transferring their aircraft to other vessels.78 The logistic units
of the FAA had demonstrated their ability to maintain in the demanding naval environment
which hitherto had been the sole preserve ofthe United States Navy.
Thesis summary
This thesis provides an original interpretation of naval aviation, not only by approaching
the topic from a logistic rather than an operational viewpoint, but also by affording the
development of the Royal Naval Air Service the prominence it deserves within this
context. In many ways the study of the RNAS is the more fascinating because of the
novelty of aviation. The use of the Imperial War Museum's Sound Archive has provided a
fascinating insight into the backgrounds and training of maintenance personnel during the
77 Report from C-in-C, BPF, to Secretary of Admiralty, Part II (Analysis), Section IL (Logistic Lessons), d
(Air Stores), 15 Mar 1945, ADM 199/118. . . . .
78 Unpublished notes on Staff History ofBritish Naval Aviation, 1919-1945, Volume 3,580-581, NHB.
Chapter 7
249
First World War which is not available from the official records. The fact that the navy
saw itself as most certainly the Senior Service in this period and acted accordingly in
relation to procurement and operations undoubtedly soured relations with the RFC and did
little to endear it to the Cabinet. The priority afforded to maritime operations in 1916
seems to have been rather less than that given to a bombing offensive in conjunction with
the French.
This study places the role of naval air stations and other shore facilities in a much
more prominent light than hitherto. Their importance is perhaps most vividly illustrated by
developments overseas culminating in the Pacific operations, but neither should their
indispensable role in training and accommodation of squadrons in Britain be overlooked.
For most of the Second World War squadrons spent a considerably greater time ashore
than afloat. In addition since the construction of new air stations was a lengthy process, the
lack of such facilities posed a significant barrier to FAA expansion. The cost of RNAS
facilities highlights the relative complexity of those for flying boats and airships, which is
also reflected in the cost of the machines themselves, in relation to aeroplanes which could
be operated from rudimentary facilities.
The folly of the dual control arrangement during the inter-war years has been
demonstrated, not just in terms of aircraft procurement which other authors have also
emphasised, but the impact which this had on the provision of shore facilities to meet the
requirements of the expansion programmes and the lack of a maintenance organisation
which forced a substantial reliance on RAF resources in both cases. At various times the
Admiralty considered the possibility of taking on the training of all FAA maintenance
personnel at naval establishments, but the pressures ofwartime made this impossible.
The thriving relationship between the Admiralty and British manufacturers during
the First World War can be contrasted with the increasingly difficult liaison which existed
twenty years later. That is not to say that aircraft production for the RNAS was hugely
successful in meeting production targets which was hampered by the availability of
engines and the building of complex machines such as flying boats, but the navy was
equipped with some of the finest aircraft types of the period. The sorry state of aircraft
production in the 1930s could not be easily rectified in wartime, both on account of the
Admiralty'S limited air engineering expertise, the limited production facilities afforded to it
by the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the incompetence of some its major
manufacturers. The importance of foreign aircraft production to the success of naval
operations is most obvious from the enormous American contribution in World War II.
however the French also provided crucial supplies in 1914-1916.
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Above all the one major lesson is the difficulty of co-ordinating all the various
logistic elements to bring air expansion programmes to fiuition. Not only do the carriers
have to be built, air stations commissioned and aircraft procured, but adequate numbers of
maintenance personnel also need to be trained. Delays in carrier construction can lead to
their squadrons being underemployed with a subsequent effect on morale. A lack of air
stations can result in the formation of squadrons being deferred. If it becomes necessary to
break up existing units to provide experienced personnel for new squadrons then front line
forces would be hit. Without suitable aircraft the ability to carry out certain operations will
be restricted. Even if all the other aspects are in place the lack of comparatively mundane
air stores could and did have a serious impact on operational effectiveness. Yet the
problems of planning in wartime meant that changes to policy were frequently necessary
be it the reduction of the forecast number of flying boats in 1917-1918 to take account of
more realistic production schedules, or the need to deploy Escort Carriers to a new range of
duties in World War Two. Given the perceived Admiralty opposition to operating shore-
based squadrons in the Second World War it was interesting to read the debate which
attended their proposed withdrawal in 1943. Even when considerable resources were
available in 1945 a drastic change in the nature of operations, far more sustained and
intensive than hitherto, resulted in the logistic chain being stretched to breaking point.
However, while logistic difficulties hampered the ability of naval aviation to
undertake certain operations, logistics also proved to be a great enabler in the operational
sphere. The rapid construction of non-rigid airships early in the First World War saw a
major advance in anti-submarine capabilities. A combination of flying boats, airships and
seaplanes operating from a large number of bases facilitated a highly impressive anti-
submarine effort from 1917. The swift redeployment of aircraft from Luxeuil to the
Western Front in 1917, albeit against the Admiralty's better judgement, provided
reinforcements for the RFC in a key period of the air war. The build up of a worldwide
network of air stations and repair facilities in the Second World War may have been
lengthy and problematic, but operationally it gave the FAA global reach on a scale that it
could not have dreamt of in 1939. The fact that Katukurunda in Ceylon was the FAA's
largest air station in 1944 is a clear demonstration of this. As has been stated a number of
times in this thesis, the substantial quantities of American equipment supplied to the FAA
and the training facilities made available in the United States enabled it to expand to an
operational size which simply would not have been possible if these had not been
forthcoming. This is plainly evident from the statistics on aircraft production in Chapter -L
Superb American carrier aircraft like the Avenger, Corsair and Hellcat enabled operations
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to be undertaken over longer distances than was possible with British machines such as the
Barracuda and Seafire. There is also little doubt that the aircrew were far happier flying
these American aircraft in operations than many British built counterparts. Throughout the
Second World War carriers proved to be very flexible tools contributing to the
maintenance of an RAF presence on Malta and ferrying aircraft from the United States and
around the world in addition to various operational roles. The reorganisation of carrier-
based squadrons into larger Wings and Carrier Air Groups was an important development
in improving operational coordination between squadrons for the larger operations which
the FAA would undertake in 1944-1945. At a tactical level, naval squadrons operating
ashore in the Western Desert and throughout the Mediterranean between 1940-1942
depended on a great deal of improvisation and help from the RAF to maintain their aircraft,
but performed key operational roles with great effectiveness. The development of
centralised, rather than squadron, maintenance led to much improved efficiency and helped
to sustain more intensive flying training and operations.
The example of the British Pacific Fleet was used to conclude this study because it
graphically illustrates the vital and complex nature of logistics in air warfare by the end of
this period. Because the force was based in the Pacific and therefore required its own
logistic arrangements it is easier to appreciate the sheer size of the logistic chain that was
required. Indeed in many ways the logistic arrangements were more complex than the
operations themselves. The Pacific operations also provided the author with an initial
exposure to the importance of air logistics several years ago which led to this much more
wide ranging analysis of air logistics during the two World Wars.
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Planning for UK naval air stations, August 19421
Establishment Function Date commissioned
RNAS Arbroath No.2 Observers' School 9 June 1940
(HMS Condor) Service Trials Unit
TBR Deck Landing School
Air Signal School
RNAS Campbeltown Satellite to Machrihanish 1 April 1941
(Books ofLandrail) 1);2 squadrons (living at (under Merlin)
Machrihanish) 15 June 1941
(transferred to Landrail)
Reserve Aircraft Pool, Reserve aircraft storage
Cowdray Park
RNAS Crail TBR School 1 October 1940
(HMS Jackdaw) Fleet Requirements Unit
1 Disembarked squadron
RNAS & Aircraft Repair Yard Aircraft Repair Yard 24 May 1939
Donibristle (HMS Merlin) Communication squadron
2 Disembarked squadrons
RNAS Dundee Seaplane base 15 July 1941
(Books ofCondor)
RNAS East Haven Satellite to Arbroath Under construction and
(Books of Condor) 1 Disembarked squadron development
RNAS Eastleigh Observers Training Part I 1 July 1939
(HMS Raven) 2 Squadrons forming
RNAS Elswick 4 Disembarked squadrons Under construction
Torpedo facilities
RN Air Section, RAF Evanton Reserve Aircraft Storage
(Books ofMerlin)
RNAS Fearn 4 Disembarked squadrons 1 August 1942
(HMS Owl) Torpedo facilities
- -----
I Enclosure to Admiralty letter A.01214/42,24 August 1942, ADM 1/13603.
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RN Aircraft Repair Yard Aircraft Repair Yard May 1940
Fleetlands (Civil Establishment)
RN Air Section, RAF Ford RN Air Photographic School
(Books ofCondor)
RN Training Centre, Fulham Preliminary training of arr
(Books ofDaedalus) fitters
RNAS Haldon Landing ground for use with 18 August 1941
(Books ofHeron) range at Teignmouth
RNAS Hatston 5 Disembarked squadrons 2 October 1939
(HMS Sparrowhawk) Torpedo facilities
RNAS Henstridge Satellite to Yeovilton Under construction and
(Books ofHeron) 1 Disembarked squadron development
RNAS Lawrenny Ferry Advanced Seaplane School 1 February 1942
(Books ofDaedalus)
RNAS Lee-on-Solent Communication squadron 24 May 1939
(Books ofDaedalus) 4 Disembarked squadrons
RN Barracks, Lee-on-Solent Headquarters 0 f RANAS 24 May 1939
(HMS Daedalus) Depot for RN Air Ratings
RNAS Machrihanish Fleet Requirements Unit 15 June 1941




RN Aircraft Training Technical training of air fitters, May 1940
Establishment, apprentices and mechanics
Newcastle-under-Lyme
(HMS Daedalus II)
RNAS Ollerton Advanced Instrument Flying 13 August 1942
(Books ofBlackcap) School
RNAS Portland Seaplanes only Reduced to care and
(Books ofDaedalus) maintenance basis
RNAS St Merryn Armament Training School 10 August 1940
(HMS Vulture) 1 Disembarked squadron
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Reduced to care and
maintenance basis
1 June 1942
Reduced to care and
maintenance basis
1 July 1942
1 April 1941 (in use)
1 January 1942
(commissioned)
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Dates of formations of new squadrons, 1939-19451
Pre-war squadrons
Fighters - 800, 801, 802, 803
Strike - 810,811,812,813,814,818 (08/39) 820, 821,822,823,824,825
New fighter squadrons
1939 -804(30111)
1940 - 806 (1/02), 805 (4/05 & 01/01/41),808 (1/07), 807 (15/09)
1941 - 809 (15/01),880 (15/01),885 (1/03), 881 (1106),882 (15/07), 883 (10110),
884 (1111), 888 (1/11)
1942 - 886 (15/03), 887 (1106),889 (16/03),890 (20/05),893 (15/06), 891 (1/07),
892 (15/07), 894 (15/07), 897 (1108), 896 (15/08), 898 (17/09), 879 (111 0),
895 (15/11)
1943 - 878 (1/03), 1830 (1/06), 1831 (1107), 1833 (15/07), 1834 (15/07), 1832
(15/08), 1835 (15/08), 1836 (15/08), 1837 (1/09), 1770 (10/09), 1838 (111 0),
1839 (15/11), 1843 (15/12)
1944 - 1771 (1/02), 1847 (1/02), 1840 (1103), 1841 (1/03), 1842 (1/04), 1843
(1/05), 1772 (1105), 1845 (1/06), 1846 (1107), 1848 (01107), 1849 (01108),
1850 (1/08),1851 (01109)
1945 - 1790 (1/01), 1852 (01102), 1791 (15/03), 1853 (01104),1792 (15/05)
New strike squadrons
1939 - 816 (3/10),815 (9/10)
1940 - 819 (15/01), 826 (15/03), 829 (15/06), 827 (15/09), 828 (15/09), 830 (1/07)
1941 - 817 (15/03), 831 (1/04), 832 (01104), 833 (8/12), 834 (10/12)
1942 - 835 (15/02), 836 (1/03), 837 (1105),838 (15/04),840 (01/06),841 (01/07)
1943 - 845 (01/02), 842 (01/03), 846 (01104), 847 (01/06), 848 (01/06), 849
(01/08),850 (01/09), 851 (01/10),852 (01/11),853 (01112)
1944 - 854 (01/01),855 (01/02), 856 (01103),857 (01/04)




Appendix 3 - Availability of Escort Carriers, 1943-19441
Date Completing Alterations In service UK No in Special Allocation
(U.K. or Vancouver) service
August Argus DLT (Non-
1943 Activity operational)
Archer DLT or Trade only
Biter Trade only
Battler " "










October Nairana, Vindex, Searcher Fighter
Pursuer, Ameer (V) Chaser 14 Ferry
November Emperor (UK), Begum Striker Trade
(V), 15
Atheling (V), Empress (V)
December Trumpeter (UK), Pursuer
Slinger (UK), Khedive Emperor
(UK), Campania (UK), Nairana
Speaker (V), Nabob (V), Vindex
Shah (V) 19
January Premier (V), Patroller (V)
1944
February Ranee (V) Ameer Proposed Fighter
Trumpeter
Slinger








March Thane (V), Rajah (V), Nabob
Queen (V) 28
April Trouncer (V), Ruler (V) Speaker Proposed Fighter
Shah
Premier
Patroller 32 Proposed Fighter
May Arbiter (V) Ranee 33
June Puncher (V) Rajah




August Smiter (V) Arbiter 39






Efficiency of maintenance at naval air stations, 19451
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Leading Air Fitter (E) Reg Veale, 'A Wish Come True'
Mr Barnard, 'The Navy 1944-1945'
Lieutenant R.F. Le Bailly, 'Reminiscences of service in WWI'
Chief Air Artificer E.W. Clayton, 'Eighteen Months with a
Swordfish Squadron: An Air Fitter's Diary'
828 Squadron, 1 July 1945 - 31 May 1946
1833 Squadron, 15 July 1943 -31 December 1952
1841 Squadron, 1 March 1944 - 23 July 1945
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DS/MISC/86 C.N.H. Bilney 96/33/1-4 R. Phillimore
80/35/1 F. Buxton P430 H.R. Puncher
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